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My dissertation demonstrates how Mansfield Park, which contains philosophically compelling claims 
about judgment generally and aesthetic judgment specifically, makes these claims through a reading 
experience that is itself an exercise in aesthetic judgment. Although this experience could be had by 
any actual reader of the novel, the experience of every actual reader depends upon her willingness to 
measure the exercise of her own faculty of judgment against that of the self-reflective, aesthetically 
disinterested, yet emotionally engaged reader whom the novel itself hypothesizes. With this 
hypothesized reader, I argue, the novel encourages readers to realize this ideal of aesthetic judgment 
while also explaining the various ways they might fall short. This hypothesized reader, I argue 
further, strives to follow a demand similar to Mikhail Bakhtin’s demand in “Art and Answerability” 
for each individual to make art and life answerable to one another.  
Mansfield Park challenges readers to make art and life answerable primarily through a double 
plot structure; narrative techniques that complicate the distance between characters and readers; and 
the portrayal of the characters’ various failures of judgment. I employ methods of rhetorical 
narratology in my analysis of the novel to highlight the specifically literary ways it contributes to 
questions of philosophical aesthetics. This approach also accounts for the extent and types of 
disagreements about the novel in the critical literature about it. Within the general structure of a 
marriage comedy, Mansfield Park tells another story that challenges the expectations raised by that 
structure: the story of Fanny’s complicated perspective on Mansfield Park as both she and it change. 
I call this story the novel’s position plot. By complicating readers’ expectations for and judgments of 
the characters, the novel challenges readers to consider the extent to which their judgments of the 
characters and of the novel should be grounded in their expectations for a marriage comedy and the 
extent to which they should be informed by the novel’s portrayal of how one’s position affects one’s 
judgment. The novel manipulates readers’ expectations as well as their distance from the characters 
in clarifying the limits and possibilities of both disinterested and aesthetic judgment. 
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Introduction: Philosophical Questions, Literary Answers 
I. Statement of Argument 
My dissertation demonstrates how Mansfield Park, which contains philosophically 
compelling claims about judgment generally and aesthetic judgment specifically, makes 
these claims through a reading experience that is itself an exercise in aesthetic judgment. 
Although this experience could be had by any actual reader of the novel, the experience of 
every actual reader depends upon her willingness to measure the exercise of her own faculty 
of judgment against that of the self-reflective, aesthetically disinterested, yet emotionally 
engaged reader whom the novel itself hypothesizes. With this hypothesized reader, I argue, 
the novel encourages readers to realize this ideal of aesthetic judgment while also explaining 
the various ways they might fall short. This hypothesized reader, I argue further, strives to 
follow a demand similar to the one which Mikhail Bakhtin makes in “Art and 
Answerability,” namely, that each individual must make art and life answerable to one 
another. It is important to emphasize both directions of Bakhtin’s demand. A widespread 
tendency to consider art frivolous often overshadows the importance of art to life. While art 
not made answerable to life loses its relevance, life not made answerable to art loses the 
ability to imagine things differently. Uniting art and life in this way is, essentially, a problem 
of judgment, indeed, several interrelated problems. It involves the proper judgment (i) of the 
work of art; (ii) of its relation to one’s life; and (iii) of the relationship of judgments in and 
about art to similar judgments in and about life.   
These problems, as well as the answers to them, are in nuce what I draw out of 
Mansfield Park in the chapters that follow. Since my efforts to do so should be seen in the 
light of two larger discourses in which the nature and value of literature have been debated, I 
accordingly begin here by reviewing the major positions in each discourse. This review aims 
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primarily to clarify how my work not only fits into but also contributes to these two wider 
discourses. The first discourse, widespread in virtue ethics, claims that literature is 
philosophically valuable. The second discourse, on which both reader-response and 
rhetorical criticism rest, sees literature as essentially communicative. Because I am arguing 
that Mansfield Park has something philosophically valuable to communicate to its readers, it 
makes sense for me to explain in reference to each of these discourses, first, my 
understanding of the relationship between philosophy and literature, and, second, my 
method of reading, i.e., rhetorical narratology, as a means of bridging an all-too-frequent and 
all-too-unfortunate disciplinary divide between philosophy and literature. 
 
II. Ontological and Moral Interests in Literature 
 Philosophy most often asks two types of questions about literature: ontological and 
ethical.1 Of these, the ethical questions, as questions of valuation and judgment, are far 
closer to my own. But the ontological questions do resemble my Bakhtinian concern with 
the relationship between fictional worlds and real life, so I begin with a few words about 
those questions.  
 Ontological questions have to do with the nature of fiction and fictional entities. 
Philosophers debate whether fictional entities exist, and, if so, in what way, as well as 
whether or not they can be created.2 Neither the premises nor the results of these debates 
figure significantly in this dissertation, as I take it for granted in a perhaps philosophically 
                                               
1 Cognitive approaches to philosophy and literature are fast developing within both sets of 
questions. I focus here, however, on non-cognitive approaches exclusively since it is to these 
approaches that my work primarily relates. As will become clear in the following pages, I am 
interested in the phenomenology rather than the neurology of reading.    
2 Meinong’s object theory accounts for a variety of non-existent objects, including fictional; 
D.K. Lewis’s modal realism locates fictional entities in possible worlds. For an article that 
both summarizes and argues against what it takes to be current philosophical orthodoxy, the 
belief that authors create fictional characters, see Brock. 
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naive way – as I think most readers of fiction do – that there are such things as fictional 
entities. More pertinent here, as I have indicated, are the philosophical investigations into the 
relationship between fictional and real worlds. But these proceed at an abstract level quite 
distant from the reading experience that they claim to implicate and that I, by contrast, seek 
to describe in detail. Nevertheless, metaphysical, logical, and semantic investigations into the 
relationship between fiction and reality do complement my literary investigation into how 
novels themselves define the terms of their relationships with readers and how readers might 
try to redefine those terms. I want to clarify further this complementary relationship between 
the questions asked in philosophy of literature and those asked in this dissertation by means 
of a brief explanation of an enduring topic in the philosophy of literature, the so-called 
paradox of emotional response to fiction.  
 The paradox of emotional response to fiction relies on two premises: first, people 
respond emotionally to fiction; and, second, emotional response requires belief in the 
existence of whatever one responds to emotionally. So-called pretend theorists, notably 
Kendall Walton, solve the paradox by denying the first premise, explaining that the emotions 
people feel in response to fictions are not real, but rather quasi- or fictional emotions. This 
explanation is part of Walton’s conception of fiction, and art in general, as a kind of game of 
make-believe.3 Although the notion that reading or watching movies is akin to playing a 
game of make-believe explains some features of our engagement with fictions, critics of the 
pretend theory argue that the analogy between art and make-believe does not hold. 
                                               
3 See Mimesis as Make-Believe for Walton’s general theory and “How Remote are Fictional 
Worlds from the Real World“ for his treatment of a question central to this dissertation, 
albeit in a quite different way. The article addresses the distance between fictional and real 
worlds with reference to how truth can be used in relation to fiction, another question 
central to philosophical investigations of literature. Walton develops his theory, especially in 
relation to photographs and music, and clarifies the relationship between fiction and 
imagination in his recent collection In Other Shoes: Music, Metaphor, Empathy, Existence.  
  
 
4  
Philosophers in this camp, such as Noel Carroll, Peter Lamarque, and David Novitz, target 
the second premise, that existence-beliefs are necessary for emotional responses. According 
to these theorists, real emotions can be, and often are excited by thoughts, or mental 
representations. Thought-theorists differ amongst themselves with regard to the details of 
emotional responses to fiction, but they all offer compelling insights into the function of 
fiction as something able to excite emotional responses. Carroll’s The Philosophy of Horror, or, 
Paradoxes of the Heart deals with a special case of the paradox of emotional response to 
fiction. His discussion of the appeal of horror both delineates the genre and confirms the 
aesthetic potential of monsters and revelatory plot structures. Lamarque’s argument, in 
“How Can We Fear and Pity Fictions?,” that we respond emotionally to fictions as 
descriptions, i.e., as (following Frege) sense without reference, grounds his interest in 
fiction’s ability to “create complex structures of thought in our minds” (302).4 For Novitz, 
imagination is central to fiction’s ability to impart knowledge of all kinds.5 These thinkers 
continue to be cited in ongoing debates about the relevance of the paradox and the nature of 
emotional responses to art.6 
 These metaphysical and epistemological debates focus on distinctions that underlie, 
but are not consciously observed in, everyday reading experiences. Though they understand 
this experience differently from one another, all the approaches mentioned above argue 
more or less explicitly for the value of fiction generally and of literature specifically. Moral 
philosophers of literature share this commitment to the value of literature. Their interest in 
                                               
4 See also Lamarque and Olsen for a developed theory of the value of literature. 
5 See Knowledge, Fiction, and Imagination and “Fiction, Imagination, and Emotion.” 
6 See Stecker for an argument that a combination of Walton and Lamarque’s views can lead 
to a greater understanding of emotional responses to fiction and their special functionality; 
Irwin and Johnson for a solution relying on mirror neurons, which, they claim, do not 
distinguish between fiction and reality; and Tullman and Buckwalter for an argument that 
current understandings of emotion do not enlist the notions of existence employed in the 
paradox.   
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literature’s moral value, however, seems to require a different sort of justification, one which 
readers are far more likely to recognize as part of their experience of fictional worlds. How 
do works of fiction engage us morally? What kinds of moral examples do they provide, and 
how are they conveyed? How do works of fiction affect one’s behavior in real life? These 
questions are clearly related to, but also quite different from, the ontological questions 
discussed above. They are furthermore related to, but still distinct from, the questions asked 
in this dissertation. How so is what I want next to clarify.  
 In contrast to the philosophers already mentioned who work in generalities, moral 
philosophers must ask their questions of specific texts. Dealing with the moral value of 
specific literary texts requires making interconnected moral and literary – in other words, 
aesthetic – judgments. Moral philosophy of literature is thus susceptible to disagreements 
about not only the moral but also literary merit of any given example. Because moral 
philosophy develops its arguments by reference to specific texts, it is much closer to literary 
criticism than the philosophical approaches discussed above that deal in generalities about 
literature’s ontological status.7 Though both literary critics and moral philosophers deal with 
specific texts, they do so in ways that are importantly different. Moral philosophers have 
already answered a question that literary critics debate, namely, whether a text tells us about 
ethics. In other words, moral philosophers turn to literature to answer questions of moral 
philosophy. This truism is important to bear in mind because the approach of literary critics, 
                                               
7 It would be odd if some fictional works had an entirely different ontological status than 
other fictional works. However, see arguments for (by Skov Nielsen, Phelan, and Walsh in 
“Ten Theses abut Fictionality”) and against (by Dawson in “Ten Theses against Fictionality) 
expanding the study of fictionality to include any kind of non-referential uses of language, 
e.g., thought-experiments, political speeches, conversational instances. Those for expanding 
the use of fictionality argue for degrees of fictionality, while Dawson reminds us that 
something must either be or not be fictional.   
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who read texts for a variety of reasons, can look quite similar despite its very different 
motive and orientation.  
 I will return to the overlap between literary criticism and moral philosophy after 
looking briefly at several leading figures in moral philosophy’s turn to literature. Both 
Alisdair MacIntyre and Martha Nussbaum looked to literature to enrich, or even correct, 
limits and shortcomings of traditional philosophy, particularly problems of moral language. 
In After Virtue, MacIntyre argues that the incoherence of moral language can only be 
corrected by a return to virtue ethics, an ethics both bound up in narrative and exemplified 
in literature. For MacIntyre, virtue requires a narrative to unify one’s efforts to approach its 
ideal, and outstanding examples of such narratives are provided by great or serious literature. 
MacIntyre finds in Jane Austen, and more specifically, Fanny Price, an example of a virtue 
ethic centred on constancy and justice.8 This reading of Mansfield Park helps MacIntyre 
clarify his definition of the virtues as well as the relationship he posits between narrative 
unity and virtue. Though he links Austen’s aesthetic and ethical achievements, MacIntyre 
reads literature primarily to elucidate a particular idea of ethics rather than to explicate the 
particular literary qualities of a text. 
 While MacIntyre turns to literature to clarify a moral outlook that Enlightenment 
philosophy obscured and that neither phenomenology nor analytical philosophy can restore, 
Nussbaum calls attention to a richness of moral experience in literature that cannot be 
                                               
8 See Tarpley’s book-length study of Mansfield Park and Fanny Price in terms of constancy. 
Interestingly, Tarpley also links Austen and Bakhtin. Emsley reads Austen in light of the 
philosophical tradition of the virtues, arguing that each heroine faces ethical questions of 
how to live. Ryle describes Austen as a moralist, “interested from the south side in some 
quite general or theoretical problems about human nature and conduct in which 
philosophers proper were and are interested from the north side” (286). See also Dunn, who 
contrasts MacIntyre’s and Said’s readings of Mansfield Park to highlight the complexity 
portrayed by the novel and not captured by either of these readers. Holquist uses Bahktin to 
enrich MacIntyre’s view of narrative and cognition by providing a way to evaluate different 
narratives. The Bahktinian standard he identifies is a recognition of diversity.   
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expressed in the language of traditional philosophy. Nussbaum spends more time than 
MacIntyre does defending the formal particularity that literature contributes to moral 
philosophy, and, correspondingly, more time with her literary examples. She too, however, 
brings a specific conception of ethics to her readings of literature, in this case an Aristotelian 
ethics favouring the particular and private over the general and universal. In Love’s Knowledge, 
she argues that novels, especially those of Henry James, offer vital answers to the 
Aristotelian question of how to live. The way to live, according to Nussbaum, is to cultivate 
a sensibility able to negotiate conflicting values and make moral judgments with reference to 
the unique contexts that demand them. Reading novels can, furthermore, contribute to the 
cultivation of this sensibility. For Nussbaum, James’s novels are an essential part of moral 
philosophy, supplying something uniquely literary and valuable to the questions that 
preoccupy moral philosophers. 
 Nussbaum’s claim for the philosophical value of literature, which relies on particular 
readings and supports an Aristotelian philosophy of the particular, has recently been 
challenged by Alan Goldman, a philosopher who, if not within the same camp as Nussbaum, 
is in a closely aligned one. In Philosophy and the Novel, Goldman makes a claim for literature’s 
philosophical value that, while also Aristotelian, emphasizes the general ethical truths that 
can be learned from particular readings. Engaging both the ontologists mentioned above, 
especially on questions of literature’s truth-value, and the moral philosophers just discussed, 
he not only argues for, but also provides examples of, the philosophical value of the novel. 
For Goldman, the novel’s aesthetic and philosophical value resides in its ability to engage 
readers cognitively, imaginatively, emotionally, and psychologically. Goldman presents the 
exercise of these faculties as an end in itself, while also linking their engagement to the 
potential for teaching general moral truths. 
  
 
8  
 One of Goldman’s examples is Austen’s Pride and Prejudice, which he reads as 
portraying the stages of moral development. Interestingly, he begins his analysis of the novel 
with an overview of current psychological and philosophical understandings of moral 
development, understandings with which he then credits Austen as grasping in all their 
complexities long before they were articulated in other disciplines. On the one hand, this 
approach seems to strengthen his claim that novels are philosophically valuable, while, on 
the other, it privileges not only the moral generally, but also a particular conception of moral 
agency and development. In other words, Goldman –  like MacIntyre and Nussbaum –  
brings to the interpretation of novels a preconceived notion of morality.  
 Of course these moral philosophers must have well-developed notions of morality. 
Reading particular novels in terms of these philosophical notions, claim moral philosophers, 
can enrich both our understanding of the novels and of the notions of morality. However, as 
I mentioned above, this means that moral philosophers must defend both their notions of 
morality and their literary interpretations. Nussbaum in particular has been charged not only 
with failing to address poststructuralist challenges to traditional notions of morality, but also 
with the often related charge of importing her own, suspect, values into her literary 
interpretations.9 This charge bothers moral philosophers less than it does literary critics 
because the former are interested primarily in developing and defending particular moral 
questions rather than developing and defending particular reading practices and 
interpretations. Moral philosophers and literary critics may be susceptible to some of the 
                                               
9 Ramal singles out Nussbaum as an egregious example of a general tendency in moral 
philosophy to read one’s own values into literature. Gibson groups Nussbaum with other 
“pre-Barthesian” narrative humanists such as Lionel Trilling (cited in Hale, “New Ethics” 
(896-7)). Harpham charges Nussbaum not only with importing her own values into her 
readings, but also with denying autonomy to the aesthetic.    
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same sorts of charges, but their disciplinary differences make different defences available to 
each group.     
 As MacIntyre and Nussbaum turned to literature to broaden their investigations into 
moral questions, suspicions about humanism, and ethics itself, pushed literary critics away 
from ethical questions.10 Recently, literary critics such as Dorothy Hale and other “new 
ethicists” have redefined the ethical concerns of reading in terms of the encounter with 
alterity offered by novels.11 Hale, furthermore, finds common ground with Nussbaum in 
spite of the latter’s alliance with the traditional morality rejected by the new ethicists. Both 
Nussbaum and the new ethicists, argues Hale, understand the modern novel as offering an 
experience of individual freedom by confronting us with our inescapable sociality. Hale links 
this experience to a defence of literary value, an ethical defence that may open more 
channels of communication between moral philosophers and literary critics. 
 Part of what complicates the relationship between literature and philosophy is a 
reductive tendency of each: philosophy reduces literature to useful exemplifications,12 while 
literary criticism reduces philosophy to mere explanation.13 Stanley Cavell, however, avoids 
both pitfalls and makes the tension between literature and philosophy productive. In 
Disowning Knowledge in Six Plays of Shakespeare, Cavell clarifies how and why his investigation of 
                                               
10 Of course, ethical questions were never entirely abandoned by literary critics. I will return 
below to the prominence of ethics in rhetorical narratology, the method closest to my own. 
11 See “Aesthetics and the New Ethics: Theorizing the Novel in the Twenty-First Century,” 
“Fiction as Restriction: Self-Binding in New Ethical Theories of the Novel,” and “On Beauty 
as Beautiful? The Problem of Novelistic Aesthetics by way of Zadie Smith,” which argues 
that Smith’s novel compares novelistic and philosophical treatments of beauty. As her title 
indicates, Hale uses Smith’s novel to help her articulate a novelistic aesthetic of alterity.   
12 The recent collection, Jane Austen and Philosophy (edited by Marinucci), includes readings of 
Austen that seek to clarify philosophical concepts such as epistemic injustice and Aristotelian 
friendship. 
13 One notable exception to this tendency is Pinch, who links Austen’s narrative techniques 
with philosophical questions of self-knowledge. She reads Emma, for example, as asking a 
question central to feminist philosophy: how women can know (xix).    
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skepticism in Shakespeare’s plays does not begin with predetermined philosophical content 
to be illustrated by literary works, asking, “Is the issue of communication between 
philosophy and literature itself a philosophical or literary issue?” (3). His insistence on 
keeping that question open guides his epistemological interpretations, which, therefore, 
preserve the literariness of his answers. In this way, he allows literature to say something 
philosophically significant in a uniquely literary way.14  
 Like Cavell, my approach to the philosophical significance of literature leaves open 
the relationship between literature and philosophy, looking to the works themselves to 
define that relationship. The ability of individual novels to define in particular ways their 
relationships to philosophy is part of what motivates my investigation into aesthetic 
questions in and about the novel in general. I take for granted, in other words, that novels 
make interesting contributions to philosophical questions of aesthetics. But which questions 
and how the contribution is communicated depends, I insist, on the particular novel. 
 My insistence on allowing individual works to dictate the terms on which they are 
read attempts to avoid  the kind of literary interpretation that has been usefully described as 
instrumental. Derek Attridge gives a theoretical, and Michael Clune a historical, account15 of 
the rise of instrumental interpretation, a general term for criticism that reads literature with a 
predetermined agenda to clarify something beyond the text itself. My attempt to avoid 
instrumental interpretation also shares a commitment of both Charles Altieri and Joshua 
Landy. Altieri and Landy make different but equally compelling cases for the value of 
                                               
14 See Franke for a reading of Disowning Knowledge which not only characterizes Cavell’s 
approach as one of acknowledging otherness, but also speaks to engagement with fictional 
characters, especially those of tragic theatre, as a way to understand our human predicament 
and ground our relations to others. I will discuss Mansfield Park’s portrayal of private 
theatricals as a way to misunderstand ourselves and others in Chapters Four and Five.  
15 See Attridge’s The Singularity of Literature and Clune’s American Literature and the Free Market: 
1945-2000.  
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literature by proposing experiential alternatives to instrumental interpretation. Altieri’s 
interest in approaching texts as purposive and self-evident works frames the wide sense in 
which I understand literature as communicative. Landy’s conception of formative fictions 
capable of training people in life skills helps clarify my reading of Mansfield Park as an 
exercise in judgment.  
 In Recknoning with the Imagination; Wittgenstein and the Aesthetics of Literary Experience,  
Altieri counts as instrumental interpretation also any approach that claims to yield 
knowledge, turning instead to imaginative engagement as the source of literature’s potential 
value. Imaginative engagement, for Altieri, involves approaching the text as a work, as self-
evident and purposive, as the result of intention. Altieri defends aesthetic intention against 
New Critical claims for literature’s independence from context and authorial intent, 
deconstruction’s critique of identity, and ethical objections to the hierarchical structure of 
authorial intention. “Without intention,” explains Altieri, “there is too much possibility and 
too little focus. The text remains just a thing rather than a ‘work’ inviting a specific mode of 
imaginative activity” (34).  According to this understanding, intention merely anchors the 
possibility of a response, allowing exploration into how a work achieves what it does.  
 Altieri infers intention from the imaginative activity of reading. He “take[s] 
‘purposiveness’ to refer simply to our need to attribute self-consciousness to authorial 
actions in order to establish their significance for the force of the art object even though we 
cannot have a definite concept of the agent’s reasons” (9). In order to respond to literature, 
in other words, we must read as if a work is written by someone for some purpose. I 
understand narrative as communicative in a similar way: as meaningfully intended. I do not 
invoke particular agents, a specific communicative act, or a particular type of content that 
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can be communicated.16 Thus, though the terms communication and rhetoric smack of the 
kind of knowledge claims Altieri works to avoid, I use them here to describe the 
purposiveness Altieri finds it necessary to attribute to works of art. For Altieri, this 
purposiveness rewards close reading and imaginative engagement, and “will also enable us to 
make claims for the social significance of literary experience because of the self-reflexive 
modes the active imagination can afford social life” (42). My rhetorical approach also 
attempts to engage a work’s purposiveness through close reading, but I am interested in 
making a claim for the philosophical significance of literary experience.  
 Landy’s idea of formative fictions, elaborated in How to Do Things with Fictions, helps 
clarify my attempt to uncover philosophical significance without falling completely into 
instrumental interpretation. Like Altieri, Landy seeks to “reclaim fiction from the meaning-
mongers” (9), to stop looking to literature for an instructional take-away. According to 
Landy, formative fictions do not “provid[e] knowledge per se – whether propositional 
knowledge, sensory knowledge, knowledge by acquaintance, or knowledge by revelation – 
what they give us is know-how; rather than teaching, what they do is train. They are not 
informative, that is, but formative” (11). This idea of readings texts in order to train 
particular, valuable skills intersects with my claim that Mansfield Park asks to be read as an 
exercise in judgment. Like Landy, I treat fiction as inviting a kind of formative engagement, a 
challenge and opportunity to see and think differently.17 Landy’s claim about formative 
fictions is, however, normative and pragmatic in a broadly ethical sense. He singles out four 
types of training available from different kinds of texts, and makes the case that we ought to 
let these texts instruct us in how to read them in order to “help us become who we are” (10).  
                                               
16 See Banfield (Unspeakable Sentences) for a linguistic critique of literature as communicative.  
17 Attridge also emphasizes the challenging aspect of literature, particularly as related to 
creativity and individuality.  
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 My claim about Mansfield Park as an exercise in judgment is neither normative nor 
pragmatic, (though I do hope to show why such a reading is interesting and worthwhile). 
Instead, I want to bring to light the novel’s contributions to philosophical aesthetics. These 
contributions relate to the connections between art and life that Altieri and Landy call upon 
in their claims about the value of literature. Altieri draws literature into relevance by treating 
“the skills we need to engage art objects [as] basically the same skills we need to negotiate the 
many interpretive situations we encounter in our daily lives” (6). Landy’s claim about 
formative fictions as teaching “strategies for flourishing” also rests on the idea that how one 
reads can be, and, for Landy, ought to be, connected to how one lives. These ideas about the 
potential for connecting art and life are made in the context of literary studies’ struggle for 
relevance, and the consequences of attempting to prove that relevance in extra-literary terms, 
hence the characterization of much criticism as instrumental. Mansfield Park’s contribution to 
philosophical aesthetics also has to do with negotiating the relationship between art and life. 
But, in the world of Mansfield Park, art and life are not alienated, but rather problematically 
intertwined. For the characters of the novel, the differences between art and life need to be 
clarified and re-established before a productive connection can be made, work that the novel 
invites readers to do as well. 
 I hope my intention to explore Mansfield Park’s contribution to philosophical 
aesthetics without either reducing the novel to an example or limiting its contribution to 
knowledge claims is becoming clear. Next, I elaborate the method of reading that best suits 
my intention, a method that allows a work of literature to speak for itself on two counts: 
both what and how it wants to communicate. Rhetorical narratology provides a framework 
for an inside-out method of reading that permits individual literary works to speak for 
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themselves, when – in accord with their basic purposiveness as works – they speak to 
readers.18 
  
III. Methodology: Rhetorical Narratology 
Rhetorical narratology has roots in Russian Formalism and poetics. Its commitment 
to the formal elements of texts goes hand in hand, however, with its understanding of 
narrative as a rhetorical act, an act of communication. Rhetorical narratology thus allows for 
an exchange between reader and text, rather than remaining at either the text-centred 
extreme of some formalism or the reader-centred extreme of some reader-response and 
reception theories of literature. As I noted at the outset, this dissertation reads Mansfield Park 
as an exercise in judgment, an exercise which the text initiates and in which readers engage. 
The method of rhetorical narratology provides the tools and terms for studying how the 
text’s formal elements structure a range of diverse responses and possible engagements.  
The formal elements important to this study fall into the three main areas delineated 
by theorists such as Tzvetan Todorov and Gerard Genette and studied in contemporary 
narratology: temporal relations, narrative levels, and viewpoint. In Narrative Discourse; An 
Essay in Method, Genette works out his theory of literature in relation to a single work, 
Proust’s A la recherche du temps perdu.19 Fully aware of the tension between theory and 
criticism, he strives (like Cavell in relation to philosophy and literature and Bakhtin in 
relation to art and life) to make this tension productive. Genette does so by keeping the 
terms in motion; as he says in his preface, “perhaps the real relationship between ‘theoretical’ 
                                               
18 There is a related concern here regarding genres and individual exemplifications which I 
will deal with when I discuss generic expectations in Chapter One.  
19 See Landy (Philosophy as Fiction) for a reading of Recherche’s related philosophical and 
novelistic contributions. 
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dryness and critical meticulousness is one of refreshing rotation and mutual entertainment” 
(23).20   
This dissertation likewise focuses on a single work. My goals here, however, are 
much more modest than articulating a general theory of literature. My choice to analyse a 
single novel is aimed at two interrelated goals. The first is to bring to light Mansfield Park’s 
specific contribution to questions of philosophical aesthetics, more specifically, to aesthetic 
judgment; the second is to provide an example of how poetics and rhetorical narratology can 
be used to reveal what specific works of literature might have to say about the aesthetic 
questions central to their enterprise, but not often approached directly by rhetorical 
narratologists. These include not only questions of aesthetic judgment, but also aesthetic 
experience and the nature of the literary work of art.   
Todorov, whose structuralist and semiotic poetics seeks to clarify the general laws 
and conditions under which literary meaning operates, sees (in 1973) questions of aesthetic 
value as something in the future of poetics, when the division cutting a work off from its 
reader can be bridged. “[I]f we find means to study what is commonly called the ‘taste’ or 
the ‘sensibility’ of a period,” he ventures, “whether by investigation of the traditions forming 
them or of the aptitudes innate in each individual, then a passage will be established between 
poetics and aesthetics, and the old question as to the beauty of the work can be raised once 
again” (69). Todorov sees the reader as providing the potential link between poetics and 
aesthetics because his formalism does not privilege the text over the reader as the locus of 
meaning. He insists on both the unique aesthetic of each individual work of literature and 
the special, subjective nature of aesthetic judgment.  
                                               
20 In later work, Genette turns to aesthetic questions both in literature and in general.  
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Todorov suggests that a potential study of taste or sensibility might bring poetics and 
aesthetics into conversation by considering either how a specific period’s sensibility is 
formed or how taste functions in any given individual. The first consideration points to a 
reception theory which asks how a work is beautiful to these people at this time. The second 
points to reader-oriented theories dealing with how a work is beautiful to people in general.21 
Reception and reader-oriented theories abound, but few ask questions of aesthetic value, 
preferring instead to focus on the ideology of signification or the possibilities of literature 
affecting life.22 
Those works do not achieve the kind of passage between aesthetics and poetics that 
Todorov imagined, nor does my own. Whereas considerations of a period’s sensibility tend 
towards political and ideological readings, those of individual taste tend to be psychological 
and cognitive. My own work seeks to reveal a different kind of passage between literary and 
aesthetic questions, one that does, however, share Todorov’s respect for the uniqueness of 
both texts and readers. This study of Mansfield Park offers an example of how a literary text 
itself contributes to understandings of both uniquely literary and general questions of 
aesthetics.23 
                                               
21 Todorov equates beauty with the value of literature, a value he locates in the “dynamic 
unit” of work and reader (69).  
22 Fish’s work on interpretive communities shifted focus from text to reader and relocated 
textual significance in the shared interpretive practices of specific groups of people at 
specific times. Mailloux’s reception histories show the various cultural, political, and 
ideological forces at work in specific acts of interpretation. Holland’s psychoanalytic reader-
response theory sees interpretation as a function of individual identity. Psychological and 
cognitive findings about empathy form the basis of Keen’s study of how empathy with 
fictional characters functions, and how this empathy may or may not affect how readers 
behave in real life. 
23 The focus here is theoretical and general, rather than historical. I am not, however, 
unaware of the richness of aesthetic debate in Austen’s time, and will have more to say in 
Chapters One and Six about terms (such as disinterestedness and common sense) central to 
that debate.  
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Wayne C. Booth, in his seminal work of rhetorical narratology, The Rhetoric of Fiction, 
analyses different types of fictional narrative according to how they are employed by authors 
to affect readers. He is not concerned with either flesh-and-blood authors or readers, but 
rather those implied by the narrative. Since The Rhetoric of Fiction, the concepts of implied 
author and implied reader have been actively argued and modified.24 I make use of these 
concepts here in a way that I hope complements work on flesh-and-blood authors and 
readers. Throughout the dissertation I employ phrases such as “the reader who sympathizes 
with Fanny will respond…”. These phrases are never intended to refer to actual readers, 
whose individual responses to any part of the narrative I consider both obscure in 
themselves and outside the scope of this project. Instead, such phrases refer to aspects of 
how the text structures a diversity of possible responses.25 The text presents readers with 
various choices. I attempt not to describe the unique complexity of actual individual readings 
of the novel, but rather how these textual choices are presented. Mansfield Park invites a 
range of different responses. Insofar as it can be read as an exercise in judgment, it invites 
reflection on how one’s own response measures up against other possibilities. 
                                               
24 The notion of the implied author is most often criticized for cutting a work off from its 
historical context or attempting to authorize interpretations that amount to a critic’s own 
opinion. See Style 45.1 (2011) for a series of articles reviewing, criticizing, and, 
predominantly, defending, the implied author. I favour a pragmatic defence of the 
interpretive value of the implied author and implied reader. In general, I hold to the principle 
that its explanatory power may justify an interpretation. See also Nehamas for the idea of a 
postulated author as the formal, not efficient, cause of a text.     
25 See Stewart for an interrogation of how the texts of classic realism write, “conscript” their 
readers. Though I share Stewart’s conception of the reader as “a drastic abstraction of the 
self, spirited away from self-identity by text, a subjective construction spun out from 
moment to moment by the subvocal rematerialization of the graphic signifiers on the read, 
not just opened, page” (10), I emphasize possible choices and challenges presented by the 
text in contrast to Stewart’s interest in the reader constructed specifically through uses of 
direct address and structural parallel. Stewart’s theoretical and historical exploration of this 
reader avoids the pitfalls of both contextual and formal criticism, the extremes of which turn 
the reader into a “pawn of cultural indoctrination or…placeholder for textual signification 
itself” (12). 
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James Phelan continues and expands Booth’s work in five (and counting) books, his 
“ongoing effort to write a comprehensive account of the rhetorical theory of narrative” 
(Experiencing Fiction, xiii). In the fifth book, Experiencing Fiction; Judgments, Progressions, and the 
Rhetorical Theory of Narrative, Phelan “attempt[s] to lay out [his] principles and methods for 
connecting readerly experience to interpretation and theory, and to model the interpretive 
practice that follows from these principles and methods” (x). Judgments of three types, 
interpretive, ethical, and aesthetic, connect readers and text in a “feedback loop” which 
develops as the narrative progresses. Phelan’s focus here on judgment, especially aesthetic 
judgment, as well as his articulation and exemplification of an inside-out method of reading, 
make this work of special importance to my own approach. 
Above, I noted moral philosophers’ tendency to read literary works according to pre-
conceived notions of morality. While moral philosophers are explicit about their moral 
interests in literature, literary critics often are not, sometimes bringing preconceived notions 
of morality to a text without defining or defending these moral ideas. Phelan argues for 
reading inside out in order to avoid evaluating texts according to preconceived moral or 
aesthetic ideas, and instead, to evaluate each text according to the moral and aesthetic 
standards it sets for itself.26    
I adopt Phelan’s method of reading from the inside out, with one significant 
modification, a modification having to do with the relatively narrow conception of aesthetic 
judgment appropriate for his project in contrast to the relatively broad conception of 
                                               
26 G. Stewart also advocates reading from the inside out, “not to evade context but to seek 
for a way of registering it, from the inside out, as firstly a textual concern” (9). He bases this 
methodology on the structure of narrative fiction itself, which “works up and out from the 
individual (language, plot, personal agents) to the cultural totality” (7). Landy sees a 
formative fiction as “contain[ing] within itself a manual for reading, a set of implicit 
instructions on how it may best be used” (13). Altieri’s imaginative engagement directs itself 
to “how the texts calls attention to its manner as defining the significance of its matter” (59). 
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aesthetic judgment and the realm of aesthetics in general appropriate for mine. For Phelan, 
aesthetic judgments have to do with the artistic qualities of the narrative and its parts. 
Following Phelan’s method of reading from the inside out, these aesthetic judgments are not 
based upon preconceived notions of aesthetic value, but are rather part of a “process of 
reconstruction and evaluation,” of “identifying the nature of the work’s narrative project and 
analyzing the skill with which it executes that project” (13). The “inside” of Phelan’s reading 
thus resides at the level of “narrative project,” the text as artistic construct. My question 
about what specific works of literature might contribute to philosophical aesthetics begins at 
a level below, the level within the fictional world. Do the characters of a novel have aesthetic 
experiences? What do these experiences mean to them? Do the characters interact with art 
objects and, if so, how?  
These questions about the role that aesthetic issues, in the broadest sense, play 
within a fictional world comprise the starting point of my investigation into what a given 
novel might contribute to philosophical questions of aesthetics. The aesthetic experiences of 
fictional characters cannot, of course, be separated from a work’s narrative project. The 
relationship between the aesthetic experiences of a novel’s characters and the novel’s overall 
project, however, cannot be predetermined. Reading from the inside out provides a way to 
understand how each text defines this relationship. My approach to Mansfield Park, then, 
focuses on aesthetic questions, while my use of Phelan’s method assures that I am not 
merely applying a predetermined rule and standard to the text.  
Call this approach my Kantian modification of Phelan’s theory. Judgment is often 
the application of a general rule to a specific situation. In his discussion of beauty, however, 
Kant distinguishes between determinative and reflective judgments. Whereas determinative 
judgments involve the application of an established rule to a particular case clearly governed 
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by the rule, reflective judgments proceed from the particular case to the search for a rule that 
might subsume cases of this sort. In order to follow Bakhtin and make art and life 
answerable to one another, interpretation cannot be the application of pre-given rules, but 
must rely instead on reflective judgments.27 Mansfield Park, I argue, has much to say about the 
challenges besetting such judgments without pre-given rules, the role that standards and 
ideals play in such judgments, and the relationship between judgments of art and judgments 
of life. 
 
IV. Chapter Summaries 
Having reviewed my understanding of the relationship between philosophy and 
literature, as well as my method of reading, I can now restate my interpretation of Mansfield 
Park as a practice of judgment. Inside the fictional world, the characters exemplify a range of 
different types of judgments. They approach the practice of judgment with various degrees 
of sincerity; they embrace and avoid judging out of self-interest; and they confuse and 
manipulate the difference between judgments of art and judgments of life. The characters’ 
various judgments and different kinds of judging are presented, in turn, with various degrees 
of irony by the narrator, who invites readers to judge the characters in complicated and 
sometimes contradictory ways. The novel’s plot structure, furthermore, challenges readers’ 
expectations, encouraging them to examine the grounds of their judgments of the characters. 
 The challenge Mansfield Park offers readers has provoked a wide range of judgments of the 
novel itself. The critical literature on Mansfield Park is divided over the merits of the novel 
                                               
27 Altieri’s distinction between instrumental interpretation and imaginative engagement relies 
on Kantian conceptions of judgment and aesthetics. He demonstrates the currency of 
idealist aesthetics in part through Wittgenstein’s concept of exemplification, which he 
“believe[s]…addresses the fundamental way that art proves useful in a purely practical 
sense” (28).  
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and its characters. In the first chapter of this dissertation I review this literature in order to 
elaborate my claim, which, I argue, resolves this debate. The novel’s combination of a 
marriage plot with a plot about Fanny’s perception of the world, I contend, explains the 
different standards of judgment at play in the novel and in judgments of it and its characters. 
Chapter Two focuses on how the contrast between Fanny Price, the “heroine,” and 
Mary Crawford, the “rival,” challenges readers’ judgments. Both the “heroine” and her 
“rival,” (terms that are uneasily applied to Fanny and Mary) exemplify different kinds of 
flawed judgment and their different consequences. Whereas Mary’s ambitious partiality leads 
to unhappiness, Fanny’s failures to achieve the disinterestedness for which she strives do not 
prevent her from achieving a happiness for which she dares not hope.  
Chapter Three contributes to critical discussions of the relationship between the real 
and the represented in the episode of Mansfield Park’s private theatricals. My reading clarifies 
not only the relationship between social and theatrical roles, but also the different modes of 
judgment appropriate to reality and representation. I analyze Austen’s literary devices to 
draw out the consequences of the various ways in which Mansfield Park’s characters confuse 
reality and representation. The episode also invites readers, I argue, to consider the 
relationship between their judgments of the fictional characters and those of real people with 
whom they share a world.  
Chapter Four develops the conclusions of Chapter Three by focusing on Fanny’s 
behavior during the private theatricals. Fanny’s struggles and mistakes are presented by the 
narrator with both sympathy and irony. This presentation poses important questions about 
Fanny’s status as a literary representation and the mode of judgment appropriate to her. 
Readers are invited to ask: To what extent is Fanny an idealized heroine? To what extent is 
Fanny a realistic heroine? How should a reader respond to and judge the narrator’s irony? 
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What is the relationship between these judgments about irony and judgments of the aesthetic 
accomplishments or failures of the novel? 
The novel’s complicated combination of realism and idealism provides the terms in 
which Chapter Five discusses Fanny’s increased importance within the fictional world. As 
the plot-geometry of Mansfield Park’s two love triangles develops, these literary modes  –  as 
well as the different sets of standards by which the novel’s two plots invite readers to judge 
Fanny –  come into more direct conflict. This conflict, I claim, exemplifies how fiction can 
and must recommend its own standards of judgment. 
Chapter Six’s analysis of the different kinds of partiality represented in Mansfield Park, 
especially surrounding Fanny’s refusal of Henry and her visit to Portsmouth, contributes not 
only to debates about the success of this episode, but also to discussions of partiality and the 
possibility of disinterested judgment. Mansfield Park challenges readers to consider their own 
partialities in relation to the novel and its characters, as well as to relate these biases with 
those that might affect their judgments of real people. 
The final chapter takes up the idealism of Mansfield Park’s conclusion, which is 
condemned by many critics. I argue here that the novel’s conclusion is a strength rather than 
a weakness. The conclusion, I show, wraps up the novel’s instabilities as well as its tensions 
by emphasizing the difference between fiction and life and, in doing so, invites readers to 
consider how their judgments of the novel and its characters might inform their judgments 
in life. 
 
V. The Contribution of a Philosophical rather than Contextual Approach to Aesthetic 
Judgment in Mansfield Park 
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In order to further clarify my method and contribution, I will, in this section, contrast 
the formal, ahistorical emphasis of my inside-out method with the contextual emphasis so 
common in Austen scholarship, and perhaps so tempting given the development of moral 
and aesthetic philosophy in the century preceding her.28 I insist on reading Austen outside 
her historical context not because of any objection to contextualization, but rather because it 
is the predominant approach to Austen’s novels, an approach usefully complemented by 
non-contextual readings, which, I might add, is how readers in contrast to literary and 
cultural historians read. 
Mansfield Park contains many specific references to writers such as Shakespeare, William 
Cowper, and Samuel Johnson, as well as discussions of specific aesthetic activities such as 
playing music and estate improvement. In this dissertation, I do not devote attention to any 
of these explicit references to aesthetic objects or activities. My treatment of Lovers’ Vows, for 
example, focuses not on the theatrical, literary or socio-historical interactions between the 
play and novel, but instead on the manipulations of social and theatrical roles explored in the 
episode of the private theatricals and the questions of judgment that this exploration raises.  
My interest in Mansfield Park’s contribution to questions of philosophical aesthetics, in 
short, is ahistorical. By “questions of philosophical aesthetics” I mean a group of questions 
and ideas explored by different kinds of thinkers in different times. A contextualist might 
respond that all these explorations and ideas are also embedded in their particular histories, 
that any investigation into such concepts as “judgment,” “beauty,” “sense,” “taste,” etc. 
must account for the historical and contextual forces at work in any given articulation of 
them. While I do not deny the importance of any of these contextual studies, I do deny any 
claim to their exclusive validity. That is, I assume the validity of exploring ideas and artworks 
                                               
28 There are, of course, many different kinds of contextual readings. I am interested here in 
those that situate Austen in a philosophical or intellectual context.  
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outside particular contexts, if only as a thought-experiment that can hopefully inform or 
complement various contextual resituatings.29 The validity of such work is testified to also by 
philosophy’s distinction between philosophy and the history of philosophy.30 
Let me therefore reiterate: exploring Austen’s use of and relationship to Shakespeare, 
Cowper, Johnson, or the other specific aesthetic practices and discourses mentioned in 
Mansfield Park can be fruitful, but is not the work of this dissertation. Instead of placing 
Austen in a specific context or in relation to specific aesthetic works or thinkers, I ask how 
her work contributes to a broad group of concepts and questions not limited in time or 
space. The narrator of Mansfield Park, in exploring Fanny’s thoughts about Henry’s 
persistence, comments that “it would not be fair to inquire into a young lady’s exact estimate 
of her own perfection” (224). Similarly, while it may not be fair to inquire into Austen’s exact 
estimate of the influence and persistence of her work, I do think it reasonable to assume that 
she would not have limited her audience to her immediate contemporaries. Her work, in 
other words, has relevance to and has been found engaging by readers even with limited 
knowledge of her historical context and the aesthetic practices referred to in her novel. 
Though reading Lovers’ Vows and knowing of the landscape improver Henry Repton might 
enrich a reader’s literary as well as historical experience of Mansfield Park, the novel itself 
provides ways for readers ignorant of this context to explore the issues implied by these 
references.  
Moreover, focus on Austen’s and Mansfield Park’s context can obscure, just as much as it 
can illuminate, the achievements of the novel. To clarify this point further, let me turn to a 
                                               
29 I consider contextual work as occupying a similar status as thought-experiments. 
Contextualists often see their work as both objectively valid and exclusive; I present mine as 
persuasive and complementary. 
30 See Philosophy in History for a series of essays considering the relationship between 
intellectual history and philosophy.  
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contextual reading of Austen and Mansfield Park that overlaps significantly with my non-
contextual approach. In Austen’s Oughts, Karen Valihora situates Austen in the “century of 
thought about judgment that precedes her work” (30). Her discussion of judgment in this 
century of thought and in Austen shares many additional emphases with my own, such as 
aesthetic distance, disinterestedness, partiality and impartiality, and standards of judgment. 
Exploring the different ways these concepts are explicated in Valihora’s work in contrast to 
mine will help clarify my method and contribution, as well as the shortcomings to which 
contextual criticism so easily succumbs.  
The obvious connections between Austen’s interest in judgment and the theoretical 
explorations of the subject dominating moral and aesthetic philosophy in the eighteenth 
century make reading Austen in terms of this thought both interesting and common.31 That 
Austen explores issues also central to thinkers such as Adam Smith and Shaftesbury may be 
a given, but how she does so, how scholars might connect them, and how doing so pays off 
needs articulation in each case. Is it enough to say that these thinkers are working out similar 
issues in distinct media? Does near contemporaneity necessitate relevance? What kind of 
reading “situates” an author in a “century of thought”? What justifies such situating?  
Valihora’s approach, like much contextual reading, assumes rather than defends the 
validity of such situating. I suggest, however, that contextual readings are subject to a 
criterion of judgment applicable also to theoretical approaches: that attention to the work, 
                                               
31 See, for example, Despotopoulou, who uses Adam Smith’s idea of an impartial spectator 
to develop ideas of the male and female gaze in Mansfield Park. Fletcher and Monterosso 
invoke Smith’s ideas of empathy and restraint in their discussion of Austen’s use of free 
indirect speech. Knox-Shaw reconstructs the intellectual tradition of Austen’s home as that 
of the Anglo-Scottish skeptical Enlightenment. Wainwright considers Austen’s conception 
of character Lockean. Garson’s study of “moral taste” reads Austen as participating in the 
moral-aesthetic discourses of her time. Her reading of Mansfield Park emphasizes the 
discourses of natural taste, sensibility, resources, and (anti-)accomplishment. L. Clark reads 
Mansfield Park as a Shaftesburean soliloquy in novelistic form.   
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on the one hand, and application of the theory or consideration of context, on the other 
hand, must mutually illuminate one another. In other words, Valihora’s proposal to read 
Mansfield Park in terms of eighteenth-century moral and aesthetic philosophy should, if done 
well, tell us something both about the novel and the discourse of the picturesque, which is 
the particular context in whose terms she situates Mansfield Park (though the term 
“picturesque” appears nowhere in the novel).32 Valihora asserts the importance of Austen’s 
formal achievements and makes narrative perspective central to her argument, but her 
contextual reading of Mansfield Park and Fanny Price in terms of picturesque tourism and 
impartial spectatorship imposes these terms on the text and consequently distorts Austen’s 
achievement. 
Valihora’s chapter on Mansfield Park is the final in her exploration of the relationship 
between moral philosophy and aesthetics in the eighteenth century. Austen, whose work, 
according to Valihora, “represents only the culmination of a century of inquiry into the art of 
the impartial perspective” (59), is accordingly read by Valihora in the terms of this inquiry. 
Mansfield Park in particular turns to “the critique of distance offered in the discourse of the 
picturesque” (58) to “suggest…that attaining a perspective that is morally and aesthetically 
complex enough to prevail…means actually being able to impose a certain way of seeing” 
(59). This reading relies on a contrast between impartial spectatorship and picturesque 
absorption. Valihora argues that Austen “situates her heroine, Fanny Price, as both impartial 
                                               
32 Valihora stresses the number of times the name Repton appears in the novel (I find only 
five, in a single conversation (three of them uttered by the eager-to-impress and inarticulate 
Mr. Rushworth) rather than the eight she claims). Repton was an improver Valihora 
discusses as “associated with the pretentious side of picturesque renovation” (290). She uses 
this association to claim that “Austen mocks the idea that one can actually, literally, 
‘improve’ on the natural” (291), connecting the improvement of landscape with that of 
human nature, a topic she associates with Fanny and Edmund in relation to the Crawfords. 
But how does the idea of the picturesque help clarify her contrast between Rushworth and 
Henry, on the one hand, and Edmund and Fanny, on the other?   
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spectator…and picturesque tourist absorbed in the people and events around her” (58-9). 
What does this reading teach us about Mansfield Park, impartiality, and the picturesque?  
 I will look first at Valihora’s characterization of Fanny as impartial spectator and 
picturesque tourist. In her Introduction, Valihora claims that it is Austen who “situates her 
heroine” as both impartial spectator and picturesque tourist (59), whereas in the chapter 
devoted to Mansfield Park – “The Impartial Spectator of Mansfield Park” – Fanny “occupies 
two roles: while she struggles to become a properly impartial spectator, she seems more 
often to play the part of picturesque tourist” (279). Back in the Introduction, Valihora 
locates Fanny’s struggle not only in relation to impartiality, but rather as both impartial 
spectator and picturesque tourist: “in both roles, Fanny struggles to find the right 
perspective to bring to bear on Mansfield Park” (59). These small differences point to larger 
problems in how Valihora uses the terms of eighteenth-century moral and aesthetic 
philosophy to read Mansfield Park. How might Austen situate Fanny in either of these roles 
and how would readers identify Fanny in them? What is the difference between Fanny’s 
struggle to occupy a role and her playing a part? How are this role and part defined by the 
text? Does Fanny identify herself as either an impartial spectator or a picturesque tourist? 
How do Fanny’s struggles to find the right perspective refer to impartiality or picturesque 
views? Valihora does not address these questions.  
This dissertation devotes much attention to Fanny’s struggles to judge and behave 
according to various standards and ideals. I draw these multiple standards and ideals from 
the text itself, and connect them to the, also multiple, standards and ideals by which the 
novel suggests its characters might be judged. My method relies on close-reading, attention 
to plot, and detailed analyses of narrative perspectives. Valihora’s contextual approach, in 
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contrast, reads Mansfield Park in terms of the threat to disinterested judgment that she argues 
is posed by the picturesque (279, 287 and passim).  
Why ought readers expect Fanny to be an impartial spectator? In her Introduction, 
Valihora suggests that Austen situates Fanny as an impartial spectator because she is 
“sidelined at the play rehearsals, benched in the gardens at Sotherton” (58), but the terms 
“sidelined” and “benched” suggest an imposed and emotional distance rather than the 
disinterestedness of an impartial spectator. Why would readers expect someone who is 
“sidelined” or “benched” to watch impartially something from which she has been excluded?  
In her chapter’s first reading of a specific passage, an episode Valihora introduces as “a 
subtle parody of the whole idea of the picturesque prospect – and along with it the idea of 
aesthetic distance” (279), Fanny “finds a picturesque prospect at her service” (279). This 
picturesque prospect features Edmund, Mary, and the horse that Fanny has been expecting 
to ride. Valihora’s use of the picturesque emphasizes the combination of Fanny’s distance 
from and absorption in “the scene” (279). In fact, it is the very distance of Fanny “as a 
tourist” in this “picturesque prospect” who “would occupy the foreground, which opens 
onto a long-distance” (279) that Valihora uses to form her contrast between impartiality and 
absorption. “While one might think that at this distance,” according to Valihora, “Fanny 
must be an impartial spectator, she enjoys a peculiarly detailed view of everything that 
passes” (279). But why would “this distance” position Fanny as an impartial spectator of 
what Valihora has already described as an emotionally charged situation? (She introduces it 
thus: “Fanny walks out one morning looking anxiously for Edmund” (279).) Valihora 
suggests that mere distance provides impartiality only to elaborate how the picturesque 
challenges any such connection. In other words, Valihora’s reading of the scene in terms of a 
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picturesque aesthetic “predicated, not on distance, but on absorption” (281) is what 
generates the expectation that Fanny “must be an impartial spectator.” 
Valihora’s analysis of Fanny’s complicated position during the private theatricals repeats 
the same pattern. “Once she has refused a part in the rehearsals of Lovers’ Vows at 
Mansfield,” Valihora remarks, “one might expect Fanny to take on the morally privileged 
role of an observer of the main action” (283). On what would such an expectation be based? 
How does this “morally privileged role of observer” actually relate to Adam Smith’s “idea of 
a properly impartial spectator,” the idea, Valihora claims, which Austen tests in this episode? 
Valihora again emphasizes Fanny’s interest and absorption in the private theatricals, 
concluding that “Fanny is an impartial spectator in name only; in reality, she is a jealous and 
agitated conscript to the sidelines” (284). But who has named Fanny an impartial spectator 
other than Valihora herself? As Valihora insists (though unfortunately conflating the distinct 
instances of Fanny’s jealousy with her relatively peaceful, though not unproblematic, 
involvement), the narrative emphasizes Fanny’s complicated and not entirely disinterested 
position as both observer of rehearsals and participant in the scheme of the private 
theatricals. “The impartial spectator we might be expecting to guide us through the action,” 
Valihora proclaims, “has been recast as a picturesque tourist: absorbed within the frame and 
taking her readers with her” (284). Valihora’s projection of the picturesque onto Mansfield 
Park, I counter, recasts Fanny as an impartial spectator only to elaborate the picturesque’s 
challenge to such a position. Valihora gives no account of why one might expect Fanny to be 
an impartial spectator. In fact, her descriptions of Fanny’s exclusion from these scenes 
undermines the idea of Fanny’s being positioned as impartial.     
There are, however, reasons other than providing a target for picturesque aesthetics to 
consider Fanny as a spectator as well as in the terms invoked by Valihora such as 
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impartiality, interestedness, and imagination. My own analyses of these scenes in particular 
(in Chapter Two, section III and Chapter 4)) and of Fanny generally emphasize the same 
terms, but draw them from textual analysis of the narrative’s management of perspective and 
distance together with attention to the novel’s plot structure and the different kinds of 
expectations which it might raise for readers. Thus I need not rely, as does Valihora, on an 
unspecified and general “one might expect” to introduce the possibility or expectation of 
Fanny’s impartiality. My rhetorical-narratological approach allows me to explain why readers 
and Fanny herself might expect her to be an impartial spectator, how and why she is not, 
and the consequences of her various kinds of partialities (in comparison with those of the 
other characters) and the way they are presented by the narrative. 
Expectations of impartial judgment are raised, I show, at various levels of the narrative. 
First, according to my inside-out method of reading, standards of impartial judgment are 
important within the fictional world. For example, my analyses of the different ways values 
are espoused and ignored at Mansfield Park and in London (Chapter One, section IV); of 
the various ways characters relate to social (and theatrical) role-playing (Chapters Three and 
Four); and of the characters judgments of one another throughout explore the complicated 
and various ways that impartiality (as well as completeness) is invoked as a standard of 
judgment within the fictional world. Moreover, my analysis of Mansfield Park’s double plot 
structure connects the role of impartial judgment within the fictional world to the challenge 
posed to readers’ judgments of characters by the different expectations raised by this plot 
structure. Furthermore, the model of self-reflective judgment yielded by this approach 
acknowledges the infinite range of interests and partialities readers might bring to their 
judgments of Mansfield Park, and explains how the novel encourages readers – if not literary 
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and cultural historians – to reflect on both their own and other possible judgments of it and 
its characters. 
My exploration of judgment in and of Mansfield Park clearly shares many of the terms of 
picturesque discourse specifically, as well as the broader discourse of eighteenth-century 
moral and aesthetic philosophy. Reading these explorations of judgment together, 
considering the particularity of their different forms, articulating their convergences and 
divergences, and identifying moments of mutual illumination, would certainly be interesting 
work. It is not, however, the work of this dissertation. Nor, for that matter, is it an 
accomplishment of Valihora’s book. While I am interested in a close-reading that draws out 
Mansfield Park’s unique contribution to philosophical aesthetics generally, Valihora forces the 
specific terms of eighteenth-century moral and aesthetic philosophy onto Austen and 
Mansfield Park, reading both novelist and novel as illustrations of her own interpretations – 
perhaps impositions – of the interaction between moral and aesthetic judgment in this 
period.         
The problems with Valihora’s contrast between Fanny as an impartial spectator and a 
picturesque tourist repeat on a small scale the larger problems with her reading of Austen’s 
novels as “draw[ing] together these two strands of thinking about art…neoclassical 
formalism and the art of perspective and arrangement elaborated in picturesque aesthetics” 
(228). Valihora takes for granted Austen’s “well-known…deployment of picturesque 
categories” and associates the values of neoclassical formalism with “strict, measured, 
judicious impartiality, the standard of the narrator” (228). The association of Austen’s 
narrator or narrative voice with some kind of objective, often moral, standard is not unusual 
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in readings of Austen; but it is, as is the case here, more often asserted than explained.33 If 
Austen’s narrators embody a neoclassical standard of judgment, are they all the same? Are 
the narrators’ judgments consistent and univocal? How does this standard appear in the 
different narrative modes of third-person narration, quotation, and free indirect discourse?    
Valihora links neoclassical aesthetic values with Austen’s “formal, measured, almost 
abstract style” and “the standard of the narrator” (228). But, as we have seen, Valihora 
appeals to this standard in order to articulate the challenge posed to it by picturesque 
aesthetics. What will supply the category of picturesque aesthetics at this level of the 
argument? “Austen’s irony,” it turns out, “at once distances us from this ideal standard at the 
same time as it makes it the principle of all judgments, of character, conduct, propriety, and 
proportion” (228). Austen’s irony, like her narrative voice, is often burdened with excessive 
and unexplained interpretive weight.34 Here, irony distances readers from the ideal standard 
identified with Austen’s formalism and narrator, and it makes the same ideal standard a 
principle of judgment (within the fictional world or in relation to it?). In other words, irony, 
according to Valihora, imposes a standard already embodied by the narrator and form of the 
novels while also distancing readers from that standard. Irony is often associated with 
                                               
33 Hough’s discussion of Austen’s mixed style, for example, associates her objective narrative 
with a moral standard governing absolutely both her novels and her world. Though I find 
unconvincing Hough’s insistence on the absoluteness of this standard and the 
correspondence between Austen’s fiction and her world, his detailed analyses of narrative 
style can be interesting. Tandon’s premise, in contrast to Hough’s, is that Austen’s society 
can no longer rely on indicators of virtue, particularly polite conversation, that are 
nonetheless still required. 
34 I have already mentioned Trilling’s oft-cited reading of Mansfield Park, which understands 
Austen’s irony as “a method of comprehension” (181). For many critics, for example, 
Brenner and Burdan, reading Mansfield Park as ultimately ironic preserves an aesthetic 
accomplishment potentially undermined by what they consider the novel’s didacticism or 
failures in Fanny’s conception. Duffy and Mudrick, on the other hand, condemn the novel 
for its lack of irony. Kirkham reads Mansfield Park as promoting a feminist agenda of rational 
agency by treating Fanny ironically and turning irony against the reader. Tauchert locates the 
irony of Austen’s novels in their combination of romance and realism.    
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distance, but I am unsure how it functions to impose a standard that Valihora associates also 
with Austen’s narrator, defined as an impartial judge representing the neoclassical aesthetic 
values of unity, completeness, and order. Valihora’s formulation, I suggest, expresses the 
confused relationship that she posits between neoclassical and picturesque aesthetics, on the 
one hand, and moral and aesthetic judgments, on the other. 
The tension in Austen that Valihora locates in the combination of neoclassical and 
picturesque aesthetic values is read differently by a number of other thinkers, including 
myself. In the “Review of the Literature of Mansfield Park” in the next chapter, I discuss 
several examples of how critics of Mansfield Park specifically locate the tension, which can be 
described most generally as one between form and content. Valihora elaborates her contrast 
between neoclassical and picturesque aesthetic values with a contrast between Austen’s 
novels as “aesthetic wholes…governed absolutely by such criteria as unity, integrity, 
proportion, and completeness (27), and a pervasive irony that undermines “any standard 
Austen introduces to order judgment” (27). This description of complete and harmonious, 
yet always ironic, aesthetic wholes confuses rather than clarifies Austen’s aesthetic 
achievement, an achievement this dissertation shows goes beyond the aesthetic categories of 
the eighteenth century. 
To reinforce this conclusion, let me return to the picture that Valihora paints of the 
relationship between neoclassical and picturesque aesthetics, on the one hand, and moral and 
aesthetic judgment, on the other. Valihora insists that the “aesthetic means” of Austen’s 
novels “bear the weight of [their moral] project” (228). This moral-aesthetic unity is itself 
governed by the neoclassical values of “unity, order, harmony, and sufficiency” (229); but, 
because “any fulfillment” of the promise of “this crucial aesthetic and moral standard…is 
explicitly ironic, fictional, the province of art” (229), readers are provided with a distance 
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that allows for reflection. “Austen suggests,” Valihora claims, that “ideal standards inform 
life and ought to direct self-reflection but are never congruent with it” (229). This assertion 
sounds similar to my own argument about standards of judgment and the relationship 
between art and life, but instead of locating these ideal standards in Austen’s inheritance of 
neoclassical aesthetics and an absolute, yet also absolutely ironic, “standard of the narrator” 
(228), my analysis describes in detail the specific ideals and standards at work within the 
fictional world, at the level of the narrative, and in how readers judge the characters as well 
as the novel. My focus on aesthetic concepts and narrative art, in other words, allows me to 
draw out a complex picture of judgment that is not only specific to Austen’s novel, but also 
relevant to thought about judgment including and beyond the discourse of the picturesque. 
I must finally turn to Valihora’s reading of the end of Mansfield Park. Her focus on the 
contrast between impartial spectator and picturesque tourist, on ways of seeing and judging 
in the terms of eighteenth-century moral and aesthetic thought, leads to the following 
conclusion:  
The ordering principle that finally prevails in Mansfield Park is the one that can at once 
appeal to and invoke a moral vision comprehensive enough to be held in common; it is a 
vision of the way things ought to be that acquires such status only because it can appeal 
to, rather than impose on, others. (297) 
Fanny, according to Valihora, can finally “impose an integral order” (298) because she 
appeals to “what ought to be” even as she is immersed in a series of partial and problematic 
scenes. The slippage between “imposing,” “invoking,” “sharing,” and “appealing to” in 
Valihora’s descriptions of the final vision of Mansfield Park betrays the problems with her 
own imposition of the terms of eighteenth-century moral and aesthetic thought onto the 
novel. Though Valihora emphasizes the reflection encouraged by Austen’s narrative art, she 
  
 
35  
is oddly unreflective about her own judgments and interpretations of the novel and its 
characters. How, for instance, does the narrative show the final picture of life at Mansfield 
Park as one that Fanny has made possible through an appeal to something shareable? How 
might an appeal to an “ought” be shared? Valihora’s emphasis on the imposition of 
perspectives makes this sudden turn to the idea of a shared perspective surprising. Valihora 
herself describes the accomplishment of “the elusive moral landscape” as “finally realized in 
Fanny’s harmonizing imagination, and then, in short order, in real life. Fanny returns to a 
Mansfield that will be totally transformed” (297). But what role does the narrative give 
Fanny in this transformation and how is it different from the imposition of partial 
perspectives which, for Valihora, comprise the subject of the novel? How and where does 
Valihora locate “the emphasis on a Fanny who decisively acts at the end of the novel” (297)? 
Fanny’s ultimate “role at [Mansfield’s] moral center” (297) does not necessarily make her 
instrumental in achieving it, yet Valihora gives no indication of how Fanny accomplishes this 
shared moral picture.    
 The idea of a shareable moral order with which Valihora concludes her reading 
brings together the contrasts between ideal and artificial, moral and aesthetic, neoclassical 
and picturesque, that interest Valihora. “In not only imposing a frame and a point of view, 
but allowing us to see them at work,” Valihora concludes, “Austen teaches us how to see 
and gives us the distance necessary to reflect” (299). I share Valihora’s admiration of 
Austen’s artistry in representing and enacting different kinds of framing, partialities, and 
appeals to standards. My exploration of this achievement, however, does not strive for a 
single, shareable or imposable, way Mansfield Park “ought to be” read. Instead, I find that 
attention to the aesthetic concepts central within and significant for the fictional world of 
Mansfield Park suggests a mode of judgment that is self-reflective. Although Valihora 
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elaborates a concept of reflective distance, she does not reflect on her own interpretive 
practices or conclusions. This shortcoming results in an imposition rather than a convincing, 
shareable, interpretation. 
 Certainly such an interpretation of Mansfield Park and eighteenth-century moral and 
aesthetic philosophy is possible. Reading the novel in this philosophical context might 
clarify, expand, and complement eighteenth-century philosophical investigations into 
impartiality, disinterestedness, distance, imagination, and judgment. Exploring these 
philosophical ideas in the novel might illuminate aspects of the novel that have not yet been 
appreciated. Such accomplishments, however, are not the goal of this dissertation.     
Instead, this dissertation identifies judgment and aesthetic distance as the subjects on 
which Mansfield Park contributes most to philosophical aesthetics. More particularly, I 
explain how judgment might rely on standards and ideals; the limitations and possibilities of 
different kinds of disinterestedness; and the possible relationships among judgments in and 
of art to judgments in and of life. The last question especially picks up on the idea, which is 
central to my project, that Mansfield Park issues a Bakhtinian challenge to make art and life 
answerable to each other. This challenge implies, I claim, that this, or any, novel’s 
contribution, precisely as a work of literature, to philosophical aesthetics resides in the 
reading experience. So, to get at Mansfield Park’s specifically literary contribution, its 
philosophical import cannot be separated from what we do and what we might do when 
reading the novel.  
Within the fictional world of the novel we encounter characters who confuse and 
manipulate aesthetic distance; who hold various relationships to ideals of impartiality and 
disinterestedness; and who make various kinds of mistakes of judgment. These characters 
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and their interactions, in turn, are presented to readers through a double plot structure by a 
narrative voice that takes various distances from the characters and readers. 
The plot structure of Mansfield Park, I argue, combines an idealized, Cinderella-type 
marriage plot with a focus on a realistically portrayed idealistic heroine whose main concern 
is to occupy her humble position. This plot structure challenges reader’s expectations for and 
evaluations of its characters by suggesting different outcomes for and standards of judging 
them. The narrative voice of the novel, furthermore, moves in and out of the characters’ 
perspectives and thoughts in ways that show readers more than the characters themselves 
know, sometimes encouraging proximity and sometimes distance. 
Mansfield Park’s depiction of its characters’ values and their evaluations, its double 
plot structure, and its narrative voice work together to suggest, I argue, a mode of judgment 
appropriate to fiction and relevant to life. This mode of judgment involves comparisons, or, 
judgments of judgments, at various levels. The centrality of competing values and 
evaluations within the fictional world of Mansfield Park makes these processes themselves 
objects of readers’ judgments, judgments further complicated by the novel’s plot and 
narrative voice. These complications encourage reflection on how a reader assesses the 
characters (and their values and evaluations). But this is not all. The novel, I show, 
encourages readers to compare their own acts of judgment not only with those of the 
characters, but also with other possible readers. Through this act of comparison, any 
individual reader might approximate the reader hypothesized by the text, an emotionally-
engaged, aesthetically-disinterested, and self-reflective reader who strives to make art and life 
answerable to each other.   
The mode of judgment suggested by Mansfield Park thus encourages both the 
imaginative and emotional freedom associated with aesthetic engagement (in both positive 
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and negative understandings of the aesthetic) and the reflection and disinterestedness 
associated with aesthetic distance. Readers might bring both their own particularity to their 
reading of the novel and their reading experience into real life relevance. To do so, they must 
balance partiality, bias, and incompleteness, which are nonetheless necessarily disinterested 
due to the aesthetic distance separating readers and characters, with reflection on the causes 
and consequences of the interests that can compromise their judgments.  
This kind of reading is encouraged by what I’ve called Mansfield Park’s Bakhtinian 
challenge to make art and life answerable. In my analysis of the novel, I emphasize the effort 
and responsibility involved in making art and life answerable, uniting them for and in one’s 
own person. Bakhtin, however, does not forget to emphasize the vulnerability of 
answerability, the liability to blame that, according to him, answerability entails. This aspect 
of answerability is important for Mansfield Park’s contribution to philosophical aesthetics 
specifically and for the potential value of literature more generally. 
In the dissertation, I approach both Mansfield Park’s contribution to philosophical 
aesthetics and questions of literary value via the details of the novel. I hope that my readings 
of specific passages are compelling; but, more than that, I hope that when readers find 
themselves in disagreement, the terms of the disagreement can be usefully negotiated 
through the framework of aesthetic judgment and distance that I elaborate here. This 
possibility informs my combination of a broadly defined focus on aesthetics with a method 
of reading that attempts to let the novel speak for itself.  
Attempts at value-less reading are – often rightly – disparaged as obscuring the 
values that any reader necessarily brings to a text, or worse, as assuming that the values 
brought are necessarily universal and unquestionable. My focus on aesthetics guides my 
reading in a way that I hope both opens up and holds together the plurality of engagements 
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encouraged by the novel and realized through the particular interests and commitments of 
actual readers. I hope, in other words, to have illuminated a particular, aesthetic, aspect of 
the text so that it can be better seen and discussed, discussed in ways that include 
questioning the scope and limitations of my particular spotlight.    
Similarly, although the dissertation does not claim to stake out new ground on a 
variety of topics much-debated within Austen scholarship, for instance, free indirect 
discourse, irony, or realism, my reading of Mansfield Park brings these topics together in a 
novel and useful way within a comprehensive framework of judgment. My use of this 
framework is, I think, justified by the importance of “judgment” as a concept in Austen’s 
work generally and Mansfield Park specifically. My combination of a broad focus and detailed 
reading also addresses the relative neglect of aesthetics in philosophical approaches to 
literature and the sometimes-strained dialogue between literary criticism and philosophy that 
I discussed above. Mansfield Park itself provides the terms for a philosophical engagement, 
terms that clarify how the question, central to rhetorical narratology, of how works of 
literature communicate, might be framed philosophically. In this way, the dissertation joins a 
growing dialogue between philosophers and literary critics about literary aesthetics, and I 
invite my readers to judge it as such.  
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Chapter One: The Plots of Mansfield Park 
I. Mansfield Park as a Marriage Comedy and More 
The marriage plot of Mansfield Park can be summarized as the story of a poor relative 
who ends up marrying the upstanding cousin whom she has hopelessly loved. Fanny Price is 
brought as a young girl to the estate of her well-married aunt. She falls in love with her 
cousin, Edmund Bertram, the only person at Mansfield Park who befriends her. This cousin, 
already ineligible to Fanny because of her social standing as well as their familial relationship, 
is soon attracted to another woman, Mary Crawford, who returns his affection in spite of 
being unwilling to marry a lowly clergyman, which is what Edmund, as a second son, is 
destined to be. Mary has a brother who, after having flirted with and disappointed both the 
Miss Bertrams, turns his attention to Fanny as the only young woman left to conquer, and a 
particular challenge due to her shyness. Fanny, having seen his behavior towards her cousins 
and being already in love with Edmund, refuses Henry’s eventual marriage proposal. In 
response to her refusal, Fanny’s uncle returns her to her parents’ home so that she might 
learn the value of Henry Crawford’s offer. Meanwhile, Edmund heads to London planning 
to propose to Mary. When Henry runs off with Fanny’s married cousin, who had never 
really gotten over him, Mary’s reaction reveals her true character to Edmund and both 
Edmund and Fanny return to Mansfield Park. Edmund learns to love Fanny and they marry. 
This summary of Mansfield Park’s marriage plot, however, does not adequately describe the 
action of the novel, and so there is good reason to read it as something more than, or 
perhaps other than, a marriage comedy.   
Mansfield Park, like Austen’s other novels, focuses on a young woman and ends with 
her marriage. Fanny is not, however, a typical heroine, and the subject of the novel is not 
primarily how she manages to marry the hero. Within the general structure of a marriage 
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comedy, the novel tells another story that challenges the expectations raised by that 
structure, the story of Fanny’s complicated perspective on Mansfield Park as both she and it 
change. The ways in which the novel does not fit the model of a marriage comedy, I argue, 
are directly related to the novel’s concern with both its characters’ and its readers’ judgments. 
My basic claim is that the novel’s presentation of its characters’ failures to judge 
disinterestedly challenges readers to consider the grounds of their own judgments of the 
characters and of the novel.  
This chapter accordingly identifies what I call a position plot in addition to Mansfield 
Park’s marriage plot. My goal is to explain how these two plots challenge readers’ judgments 
of the characters and the novel. But first, I situate this claim in relation to the critical 
literature on the novel.  
 
II. Review of the Literature on Mansfield Park 
 Mansfield Park is often singled out as Austen’s problem novel, a work that does not 
fit in with her others or that merely attempts something at which another work succeeds. 
Critics and Janeites alike engage in “Fanny wars,”1 attacking and defending the novel’s timid 
heroine and, more generally, conflicting in their judgments about the novel’s merits – 
aesthetic and moral. At the same time, another group approaches the novel dispassionately, 
accepting it and its characters as unproblematic. Why is Mansfield Park’s reception so 
divided?2 
                                               
1 For an overview of the “Fanny wars” see Troost and Greenfield. Though their focus is 
Fanny’s popular reception, they also give a useful summary of scholarly reception. For a 
picture of Austen criticism in general, see the introduction of Johnson and Tuite’s useful 
volume. 
2 Though it is difficult to overstate the extent of this division, it should be noted that 
disagreement characterizes discussion of Austen’s work in general. I will have more to say 
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 My claim in answer to this question follows a long line of such claims. Some critics 
discuss the novel itself as flawed. Others locate the problem in the reception, arguing that 
the novel has been misunderstood. This position generally either limits the novel’s proper 
audience, usually to historical contemporaries, or returns to some obscurity in the novel that 
leads to misunderstanding; this obscurity itself can be considered a merit or demerit. This 
dissertation falls into the final group: those arguing that the novel presents a kind of 
challenge, one that is taken up in different ways by different readers (though, as the 
“Introduction” indicated, my interest is in different hypothetical readers rather than in actual 
or historical readers). I do not claim to have uncovered a final and correct reading of the 
novel, but rather a structure that helps explain the disagreement it is meant to provoke. 
 It is generally agreed that Mansfield Park is, like Austen’s other novels, a marriage 
comedy. What is at stake and how to determine the desired outcome, however, is not 
entirely clear. Mansfield Park thus also lends itself to interpretations seeking to fit the novel 
into various kinds of contexts. And such interpretations, of both Mansfield Park and Austen 
herself, abound. Was Austen, as Marilyn Butler asserts in Jane Austen and the War of Ideas, an 
anti-Jacobin writer of didactic fiction? Or, as Peter Knox-Shaw counters in Jane Austen and 
the Enlightenment, a centrist exploring questions significant to skeptical Enlightenment 
thinking? Does Mansfield Park’s pessimistic realism make it the first great novel of the 
Victorian era, as Julia Prewitt Brown asserts in Jane Austen’s Novels: Social Change and Literary 
Form?3 Or does it abandon realism in favour of romanticism and a monstrous, solitary 
heroine, as Nina Auerbach would have it? Can Marvin Mudrick’s position that Mansfield Park 
fails completely in its complete lack of irony be defended more or less than Lionel Trilling’s 
                                                                                                                                            
below about how scholars discuss Mansfield Park’s place in the context of Austen’s other 
work.  
3 Collins also characterizes Mansfield Park as a Victorian novel and Yeazell suggests that this 
characterization is, paradoxically, due to Mansfield Park’s archaic elements.  
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contention that the novel brilliantly directs irony at irony itself? Does Mansfield Park depict a 
world of stability or change, shared language or no possibility of communication? This list of 
questions could go on at much greater length. I will take up other central issues in the critical 
literature in the chapters that follow. In this chapter, I will limit myself to the various 
interpretations of the novel’s plot and subject matter.  
 First, however, I will attempt to clarify the standards by which critics judge the novel 
and its heroine. Critics argue that Fanny or Mansfield Park, on the one hand, lives up to a 
particular standard or ideal, or, on the other, criticizes or challenges a particular standard or 
ideal. I have already mentioned in the “Introduction” that Fanny is considered a moral ideal 
by many virtue ethicists interested in literature. Literary critics, too, approach Fanny as a 
moral ideal. But, while philosophers tend to see Fanny in terms of philosophical ethics, 
literary critics generally situate Fanny in relation to literary types, religious and political 
discourses, or feminine and feminist ideals. All these approaches claim to locate Mansfield 
Park in its proper context, but they disagree about what the context should be. Though these 
contexts often seem complementary, the particular readings of Fanny and Mansfield Park that 
these diverse contextual focuses yield usually are not. 
 In the introduction to the 1988 edition of her 1975 The War of Ideas, Butler situates 
her not-explicitly-feminist work in relation to feminist thought since the book’s initial 
publication, aligning her interest in Austen’s historical context with feminist criticism’s 
tendency to contextualize rather than idealize Austen. Like Butler, Margaret Kirkham 
situates Austen in her historical context. However, while Butler’s historical reading shows 
Austen to be participating as a conservative in established novelistic discourses, Kirkham’s 
makes her an advocate of what she calls Enlightenment feminism, as articulated by Mary 
Wollstonecraft in particular. Kirkham reads Mansfield Park as an ironic, feminist treatment of 
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ideal conduct-book heroines. Though Fanny Price shares the physical weakness of 
sentimental heroines of the type favoured by Rousseau, she is not such an ideal heroine, 
according to Kirkham. Instead, the irony with which she is treated shows her as a rational 
moral agent.4  
 Both Mary Poovey and Nancy Armstrong also discuss Austen’s relationship to ideals 
of femininity. Poovey focuses on three women authors’ figuring of the ideal of feminine 
propriety, whereas Armstrong, in Desire and Domestic Fiction, discusses how the novel itself 
reshaped middle class ideals. These differing analyses of how Austen and her novels both 
participated in and influenced nineteenth-century ideals of femininity have in common 
ambiguous and problematic notions of agency and causality.5  
 The problematic links that Poovey and Armstrong make between fiction and 
bourgeois ideology dovetail with critical conceptions of realism as the purveyor of the 
illusion of objective reality and transparent language. Such monolithic views of the 
nineteenth-century novel have largely given way to more nuanced considerations of both 
particular authors and their relationships to various historical settings.6 William Galperin’s 
The Historical Austen resituates Austen at the origins of realism not retrospectively, as, he 
argues, had become customary, but contextually, in a way that recaptures Austen’s style as it 
                                               
4 See Jenkins for a discussion of why Fanny cannot be a moral ideal, but can be a feminine 
ideal.   
5 See A. Anderson for a useful criticism of these literary critics’ metaleptic move to make 
gender a site of power. See Downie for a criticism of Armstrong’s expansive definition of 
the middle class and an argument placing both the Bertrams and Austen herself in the 
gentry. May finds logical inconsistencies in many of Armstrong’s claims. Greenfield aligns 
herself with Armstrong’s association of conduct books and middle-class ideology, likening 
Fanny to a conduct-book heroine.  
6 Claims for regulatory realism include Armstrong’s specific claim about the novel as well as 
Eagleton’s more general claim about aesthetics as inescapably ideological. For more nuanced 
views, see Shaw (Narrating Reality), who argues against conceptions of regulatory realism, 
uncovering instead a realism that engages readers. He develops the view of “fiction train[ing] 
us in processing reality” (207) in “Austen’s Realist Play.” Levine sees realists themselves 
struggling with the ambiguity of their project.   
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emerges. This shift in perspective shows Austen’s use of free indirect speech and her 
relationship to the marriage comedy as original and oppositional rather than ideological and 
regulatory.  
  When Galperin devotes his attention to Mansfield Park specifically, however, he 
characterizes the novel as a “missed opportunity” at a number of levels. Most importantly, 
for Galperin the novel “chronically misfires” due to a disjunction between the realistically 
represented world and the idealistic moral standards of the novel’s heroine, narrator, and 
plot (127). This assessment relies on a contrast between realism and idealism, here in the 
form of didacticism, which appears again and again in the criticism of Mansfield Park. I will 
return below to the importance of this contrast for my own argument, as well to those of 
other critics who characterize the novel as a challenge.  
 Austen’s realism is generally associated with her limited subject matter and 
unobtrusive narrative voice. These characteristics are also often linked to Austen’s famous 
irony. Realism and irony are opposed to idealism and didacticism, elements associated with 
the happy endings demanded by marriage comedies. The basic structure of a marriage 
comedy demands a heroine and hero who are, or become, worthy of each other and of 
happiness. The hero and heroine must overcome obstacles related to these two demands in 
order to achieve their inevitable marriage. The marriage comedy often shares these basic plot 
elements with the romance, but differs in the quality of the world and characters treated. 
Heroes and royalty populate the world of romance; the world of the marriage comedy, by 
contrast, is inhabited by more down-to-earth characters. In addition, these realistic 
characters must overcome their obstacles in more realistic ways.7 The marriage comedy, in 
                                               
7 François considers “the question of Austen’s ‘Romanticism’” as “the question of 
accommodating romance to realism” (220, note 2). She interestingly connects Fanny’s 
reticence and passivity with Austen’s realism: “the novel’s wit lies in presenting a heroine 
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short, combines a romantic and idealized structure with realistic characters.8 Judgments 
about Mansfield Park depend, in part, on the extent to which the novel is taken as a marriage 
comedy or a romance.9 
 Critics disagree, as I have mentioned, about the kind of marriage comedies Austen 
writes, about the kind of marriage comedy Mansfield Park is (or is not), and about what 
Mansfield Park is about. Disagreements about the subject matter of the novel overlap with 
disagreements about Mansfield Park’s plot. A much-discussed line in a letter of Austen’s 
complicates disagreements about subject matter: some interpret the line as identifying 
Mansfield Park’s subject as ordination, while others do not think she refers to the novel at 
all.10 My method of reading makes Austen’s letter of little importance here, but critics’ 
                                                                                                                                            
who never acts on principle alone but whose rational and disinterested judgments repeatedly 
dovetail with her secret desires and personal debilities. Austen’s ‘realism’ – humanist in its 
readiness to accommodate human limitations – consists of so qualifying the heroism of a 
self-effacing virtue with conditions that make it easy to practice that Fanny’s example is 
finally less admirable than merely excusable, humanly forgivable” (244). François uniquely 
characterizes the challenge posed by Mansfield Park (as well as by Fanny) in her reading of the 
novel as participating in an aesthetic of reticence rather than expression, an aesthetic she 
elaborates through the concept of the open secret, “where the term open secret refers to 
nonemphatic revelation – revelation without insistence and without rhetorical underscoring” 
(xvi).     
8 See Frye’s Anatomy for general approaches to and relationships among realism, irony, satire, 
and romance, and Secular Scripture for a focus on the structure of romance. This focus leads 
Frye to note the tension between characters and plot in Austen generally (39-40), and to an 
interesting reading of Fanny as an archetypal romance heroine existing on two levels, and 
having two social identities (76). 
9 See Tauchert for an argument that Austen’s use of romance allows her to write marriage 
comedies that preserve feminine autonomy in their mediation between real and ideal. To the 
debated categories “romance” and “marriage comedy,” one can add “comedy of manners” 
and “didactic novel.” Lynch’s discussion of how the image of Austen and her novels was 
wielded in the interwar period (“At Home with Jane Austen”) usefully connects battles over 
genre and canon with social and political concerns and tensions, reminding us that 
oppositions between Austen’s realism and preceding romances have as much to do with the 
context in which they are made as with the texts that they characterize.     
10 Chapman associates the sentence with Mansfield Park (appendix 6), and it is invoked by 
critics as different as Lascelles and Galperin. See Edge for an overview of the interpretations 
of Austen’s letter, and an argument that she did not refer to ordination as the subject of 
Mansfield Park. Mandal concurs, citing the context, and arguing that Austen was well along in 
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enduring discussion of the subject of Mansfield Park is of interest. Ordination is indeed an 
important question in the novel: the hero’s imminent ordination conflicts with the rival, 
Mary’s, ambitions. But there is little reason to consider ordination the central issue of the 
novel other than uncertainty about what that central issue is. In addition to ordination, critics 
argue that Mansfield Park is primarily about improvement, education, lack of authority, and 
instability, to name a few possibilities.11  
 A number of critics argue that Mansfield Park is about family. Paula Marantz Cohen 
characterizes Mansfield Park as a “family romance,” (670) analyzing it in terms of family 
systems theory. In this analysis, the ideal ending of the marriage comedy becomes a utopian 
picture of family equilibrium. According to Cohen, this ideal picture of family life achieves a 
balance between the two options chosen by most other nineteenth-century fiction: the tragic 
or the conventional happy ending. Tara Goshal Wallace also reads Mansfield Park as primarily 
about family, but rather than a utopian picture of family life, she sees a dystopian and 
competitive family. This reading of Mansfield Park as portraying a “dark and pessimistic” 
world in which authority fails to create moral consensus is part of Wallace’s larger claim that 
Austen’s work in general articulates discomfort with authority. David Kaufmann argues that 
                                                                                                                                            
Mansfield Park when she wrote the letter. Donohue also gives a useful overview of debates 
about ordination as the subject of Mansfield Park. Instead of resolving the interpretation of 
Austen’s letter, however, Donohue re-interprets the “ordination” that interests Austen in 
Mansfield Park as restoring order to a disorderly society. Bonaparte also argues that Austen is 
interested in the “ordination” of society, but her reading of Austen as philosophical, 
metafictional, and romantic makes this ordination something possible only in fiction. 
Soloway sees the subject of the novel not as ordination, but rather the right wife for an 
ordained minister.  
11 Duckworth famously compares estate improvement with personal improvement in his 
reading of Mansfield Park. Brenner also reads Mansfield Park as primarily about improvement, 
but its impossibility rather than its accomplishment. Duffy sees Mansfield Park’s real subject 
as the disintegration of society, but finds the novel’s didacticism incompatible with his 
standards of realism. Wiesenfarth reads Mansfield Park as a dramatization of Fanny’s 
education and Fleishman, in a rare monograph devoted entirely to Mansfield Park, 
characterizes the novel as a Bildungsroman.   
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Mansfield Park has both a marriage and a familial plot. Critics and readers see the end of 
Mansfield Park as problematic, Kaufmann argues, because they misunderstand or disagree 
with Austen’s assertion that family relations take precedence over marital connections. 
Eileen Cleere takes this emphasis on family a step further, arguing that Mansfield Park 
advocates endogamy. Tess O’Toole, like Kaufmann, identifies two plot strands in Mansfield 
Park, this time an adoption as well as a marriage plot. Whereas O’Toole explains Fanny’s 
frailty as part of a larger strategy to minimize the importance of bloodlines in maintaining 
the estate culture into which Fanny is adopted, Cleere identifies Fanny as a familial insider 
rather than outsider, one whose value should be reinvested in the family rather than wasted 
outside of it. These different interpretations of Mansfield Park paint conflicting pictures of 
both the novel and what it says about family. 
  Additional critics identify Mansfield Park as challenging traditional plot structures. 
Charles Hinnant claims that all of Austen’s novels subvert the sentimental courtship plot by 
delaying closure and recasting the ideal elements of these traditional plots ironically and 
realistically. Austen, he claims, “is calling into question easy assumptions about the 
characters and the narratives in which they appear” (299). Taken together, Hinnant argues, 
the storylines of Austen’s novels reveal the idealized elements of courtship novels as 
dangerous illusions preventing real love.  
 William Magee, like Hinnant, looks at all six of Austen’s novels to make a general 
argument about her relationship to the courtship plot. In contrast with Hinnant’s synchronic 
perspective that characterizes the novels as anti-courtship, Magee’s diachronic view charts 
Austen’s developing relationship to this plot structure, from the first, simplest adoptions of 
it, through struggles with its restrictions, to, finally, a complex use of the courtship plot to 
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enlarge women’s possibilities and value.12 Mansfield Park occupies the middle stage of this 
progression, Magee argues, when Austen resists the rigidity of the conventional ending – the 
marriage between Edmund and Fanny – by using two love triangles to provide the sense of a 
real choice. Magee explains disappointment with the conventional end of Mansfield Park as a 
consequence of Austen’s “flexibility” with the conventional plot, associating this flexibility 
with Austen’s move towards “less fixed and more realistic” plots (202).  
 In Jane Austen and the Morality of Conversation, Bharat Tandon singles out Mansfield Park 
as uniquely frustrating readers’ expectations. This goal fits into Tandon’s larger argument 
that polite conversation in Austen’s world and her novels is still required, but no longer 
reliable as an indicator of virtue (18). Austen’s novels, therefore, invite readers to be active 
and exercise their “‘tempers of mind’” (35-6). Mansfield Park accomplishes this aesthetic goal 
in part by using nineteenth-century plot conventions “while declining to locate its own 
important transitions at those points” (217). The content of the novel, for Tandon, thus sits 
uneasily with its form.  
 In “Fanny Price: ‘Is she solemn? – Is she queer? –Is she prudish?,’” George Haggerty 
asks, in the spirit of Ralph Rader, why Fanny challenges readers’ sympathies (177). 
Haggerty’s formalist analysis focuses on Fanny’s purpose as a heroine and emphasizes the 
centrality of her perspective, especially her unacknowledged feelings for Edmund. Mansfield 
Park concludes, argues Haggerty, with Austen’s creation of a new world in which Fanny and 
Edmund’s union may not be exciting, but is realistic and natural. “What is ‘quite natural’ 
                                               
12 Among other characterizations of Austen’s oeuvre are M. Butler’s division of the novels 
into those about a heroine who is wrong and those about a heroine who is right (166), and 
Brown’s into those of satiric realism and ironic comedies (37-49). C.S. Lewis distinguishes 
Mansfield Park and Persuasion from the four other major novels on the basis of their solitary, 
unchanging heroines (28-30).  
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about this ending,” Haggerty concludes, “is really how un-natural the novel has made it 
seem” (187). 
 All these critics, it should be clear, grapple with the challenging plot structure of 
Mansfield Park.13 Haggerty’s description of the end of the novel as unnaturally natural points 
to the same difficulty Tandon and Galperin discuss as a disjunction between form and 
content, Maggee and Hinnant identify as a resistance to plot convention, and critics like 
Mudrick and Halperin (in “The Trouble with Mansfield Park) call a failure of irony.14 My 
reading of Mansfield Park explains these disputes about the plot structure as a result of the 
different standards of judgment at work in the novel.  
 As I noted at the outset of this review of the literature, my dissertation falls into the 
group of criticism including Hinnant, Magee, Tandon, and Haggerty that considers Mansfield 
Park productively challenging. 15 Both Hinnant and Magee link Mansfield Park’s difficult plot 
structure to the challenge, mounted by all Austen’s novels, to the conventions of the 
courtship plot. Their studies of all Austen’s novels in relation to the traditional courtship 
plot share my emphasis on a contrast between realism and idealism as well as attention to 
irony. But, whereas Hinnant and Magee use these terms to elucidate the relationship among 
Austen’s own novels in contrast to traditional courtship novels, my study of aesthetic issues 
                                               
13 See Wright for an interesting reading that contrasts a dominant sickness-cure metaphor of 
narrative progression with one of prevention. Mansfield Park, argues Wright, not only 
privileges prevention over cure, but also teaches readers to read cautiously and imagine 
alternatives to an idealized past or frightening future. Mandal argues persuasively that Austen 
productively and subtly uses conventional didactic elements, but nonetheless finds fault with 
“a somewhat awkward strapping together of a subjective, Fanny-centered novel in which she 
learns about the world around her, and an objective, didactic tale meant to exemplify an 
Evangelical ideology” (128). 
14 Miller’s study of closure considers a related tension, what he calls “the equivocation of 
Jane Austen’s form – its tendency to disown at an ideological level what it embraces at a 
constructional one” (54). I will return to Miller’s argument in Chapter Seven.   
15 This group also includes Lodge, who argues that the novel persuades readers to “endorse a 
system of values with which we have no real sympathy at all” (94).  
 51 
in Mansfield Park alone finds that the novel itself has much to say about realism, idealism, 
irony, and their relationships to aesthetic judgment. 
 Tandon attributes to Austen herself the idea of her novels as a kind of exercise for 
readers. His approach to these exercises emphasizes, like mine, relationships between reality 
and representation as well as between real and ideal. But, Tandon asks about the relationship 
between Austen’s real, socio-political world and the worlds of her novels. I ask, instead, 
about what Mansfield Park itself says about how readers might relate the world of the novel 
to their own real worlds. Haggerty’s formalist analysis of Mansfield Park shares with my own 
the methodological assumption that Fanny is meant to be how she is; a critic’s role, 
therefore, is to ask why she is how she is. Though, in answering this question, Haggerty 
emphasizes, as do I, the centrality of Fanny’s perspective, he does not draw out the 
implications of Mansfield Park’s plot structure for how it has been and could be judged. 
These implications, I argue, offer insights not only into the novel itself, but also into the 
nature of aesthetic judgment, how novels might provide an opportunity for readers to 
develop such judgment, and to exercise it in considering the relationship between their 
judgments about art and their judgments about life. 
 
III. The Position Plot of Mansfield Park 
The plot summary of Mansfield Park as a marriage comedy with which this chapter 
began emphasizes the overlapping love triangles of Fanny-Edmund-Mary and Henry-Fanny-
Edmund. The novel itself, however, emphasizes not primarily how Fanny avoids Henry and 
wins Edmund, but rather how she perceives and judges herself and the people around her. 
This emphasis on Fanny’s perception and judgment contrasts her low opinion of her own 
worth and her lack of ambition with her central importance to the narrative and its promise 
of a marriage comedy’s happy ending. The hopes for Fanny’s happy ending encouraged by 
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the novel’s focus on her and the love triangles that it sets up are complicated by the 
narrator’s sympathetic but not uncritical portrayal of Fanny’s struggles to be happy where 
she is.16  
In order to clarify how Mansfield Park complicates its structure as a marriage comedy 
by focusing on how Fanny’s position in the fictional world affects her judgment, I will look 
at Phelan’s identification, in Experiencing Fiction, of the common characteristics of Austen’s 
use of narrative comedy. He articulates these characteristics in order to distinguish Persuasion 
from the rest of Austen’s novels as her “most radical experiment with the form of narrative 
comedy” (27). Phelan supports this claim with an elegant and compelling interpretation of 
the novel’s unusual progression, a progression in which both the introduction of the hero 
and the assurance to readers that a marriage between the heroine and the hero will indeed 
take place are delayed. I largely agree with Phelan’s interpretation of Persuasion, but I do not 
believe that its success rests on distinguishing Austen’s last novel so sharply from her others. 
Mansfield Park, like Persuasion, experiments with the form of narrative comedy, for unique 
reasons and to unique effects. 
According to Phelan, Austen’s marriage comedies share three main characteristics 
(except for Persuasion, which only conforms to the first). First, “Austen asks her audience to 
make an interpretive judgment that the engagement of the female protagonist to the male 
hero is the best outcome available within the world of the novel;” second,  
the instabilities faced by the protagonists that drive the progression of the action are 
both internal and external; that is, the successful resolution depends on the protagonist 
                                               
16 M. Clark’s discussion of how narratives elaborate different conceptions of the self (in 
Narrative Structures) has influenced my thinking about the plot geometries of Mansfield Park. 
Especially pertinent are Chapter Five’s analyses of romantic triangles as Freudian thirds.  
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recognizing and overcoming deficiencies in her own character even as she negotiates 
or endures various external obstacles;  
and third,  
throughout the progression of instabilities…Austen guides her audience’s interpretive 
judgment so that we expect the engagement will occur, and she guides our ethical 
judgment so that we desire it to occur. Consequently, our interest is focused less on 
whether the engagement will occur and more on how it will come about. (28-9)  
Mansfield Park’s instantiation of any of these characteristics is, at best, debatable. The 
novel both encourages and challenges the expectations outlined by Phelan. The internal and 
external obstacles to Fanny’s marriage with Edmund challenge how readers arrive at the 
interpretive judgment that their marriage is the best possible outcome within the fictional 
world. Because the desirability of their union is an issue, an uncertainty about whether the 
union will take place competes with the question of how it might come about. Although 
readers are ultimately asked to evaluate Fanny’s marriage to Edmund as the best possible 
outcome within the fictional world, the novel complicates how they arrive at such a 
judgment in order, I claim, to challenge them to consider the grounds of their judgments of 
the characters as well as of the novel.  
The novel complicates readers’ interpretive judgment that Fanny’s marriage to 
Edmund is the best outcome possible within the fictional world in several ways. First, the 
expectation that Fanny will marry Edmund challenges readers to hope something for Fanny 
that she is not capable of hoping for herself. Her denial of her feelings for Edmund 
corresponds to her attempts to conform to her lowly position in the Bertram household and 
to live up to ideal moral standards that only she and Edmund take seriously, and that they 
both fail to embody perfectly. The novel’s characterization of Fanny thus contrasts with the 
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expectations encouraged by a marriage comedy in a way that undercuts readers’ abilities to 
sympathize with her and hope for her happy ending.  
Second, Edmund’s feelings for Mary Crawford are a complex obstacle to his 
marriage with Fanny. Mary has all the strength and vivacity that Fanny lacks, though she 
herself lacks the values that Fanny and Edmund share. The novel contrasts Fanny and Mary 
in ways that show both characters’ strengths and weaknesses, a contrast to which I will 
return in the next chapter. An internal obstacle to Fanny’s marriage to Edmund that inhibits 
some readers’ sympathy with Fanny – her own belief in the union’s impossibility – is thus 
complemented by an external obstacle that similarly complicates readers’ sympathy – his 
feelings for Mary, a woman some readers prefer to Fanny. 
Third, Henry’s pursuit of Fanny is also a complex external obstacle to Fanny’s 
eventual marriage with Henry. I argue that, though the novel characterizes Henry as a less 
desirable option for Fanny, it does pose the question of whether Henry is to be considered a 
viable option rather than merely an obstacle to her eventual marriage to Edmund. Henry’s 
pursuit of Fanny develops the issues of education and improvement first raised by 
Edmund’s role as mentor to Fanny and the improvement in Mary he hopes her feelings for 
him will effect. With Henry’s courtship of Fanny, the novel presents a possible alternative 
ending in which both Mary and Henry would be improved by their respective marriages to 
Edmund and Fanny. I will return to the novel’s presentation of this alternative ending in 
Chapters Five and Six, and to some readers’ preference for it below.  
In addition to the external obstacles of other potential matches for both Edmund 
and Fanny, two additional external obstacles complement the internal obstacle of Fanny’s 
refusal to acknowledge her feelings for Edmund. Within the fictional world, a marriage 
between Fanny and Edmund is considered impossible on two counts: the fact of their 
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kinship and the fact of their different social statuses. The second of these obstacles is more 
likely to encourage than dispel expectations that Fanny and Edmund will marry as it 
conforms to the pattern of a Cinderella plot wherein a young woman wrongly placed in a 
low position is eventually recognized as intrinsically worthy and raised to her rightful 
position through marriage.17 The first obstacle can be read in a similar light.18 
In Before Reading: Narrative Conventions and the Politics of Interpretation, Peter Rabinowitz 
reads the first mention of this obstacle in such a light. When Sir Thomas Bertram hesitates 
to agree to Mrs. Norris’s plan to bring their niece to Mansfield Park, Mrs. Norris dispels his 
reluctance in part by saying:  
“You are thinking of your sons—but do not you know that, of all things upon earth, 
that is the least likely to happen, brought up as they would be, always together like 
brothers and sisters? It is morally impossible. I never knew an instance of it. It is, in 
fact, the only sure way of providing against the connexion.” (7) 
According to Rabinowitz, Mrs. Norris’s claim illustrates a specific type of rule of 
configuration, the rule of chutzpah, one of the rules governing the kinds of expectations 
raised by particular elements in given literary contexts (111). Rabinowitz’s aptly named rule 
says: “When a character states with assurance that which he or she has no good reason to 
                                               
17 Many critics mention the fairytale elements of Mansfield Park. Harding’s reading of 
Austen’s novels as an outlet for her criticism of those she loved discusses her use of what he 
calls the Cinderella theme. He finds Fanny and Mansfield Park priggish due to the “curiously 
abortive attempt at humility that the novel represents” (175). See Huang for a feminist and 
historical study of how women writers, including Austen, in Mansfield Park, use the 
Cinderella plot subversively. Huang identifies this plot’s central paradox as that between the 
heroine’s praised humility and the deviousness suggested by her rise in status (5). Simpson 
sees Austen’s use of multiple fairytale elements in Mansfield Park as complementing her 
realism. Toymentsev’s ideological reading moves from casting Fanny as the upwardly mobile 
Cinderella to “a scapegoat supposed to atone for the crisis of the aristocratic family” (27). 
Garson argues that Austen’s characterization of Fanny reveals the limits she places on social 
mobility and rationalizes the elevation of a select few.      
18 Cleere and Cohen both discuss incest in their explorations of family relationships in 
Mansfield Park. For a socio-historical analysis of incest in Austen, see Hudson.  
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believe to be the case, we can expect that he or she will turn out to be wrong, especially if 
the claim is important to the outcome of the plot” (121). Rabinowitz accordingly reads Mrs. 
Norris’s typically bombastic claim that bringing Fanny to Mansfield Park will actually 
prevent, rather than precipitate, a romance between cousins as giving readers a reason to 
expect that Fanny will in fact marry Tom or Edmund Bertram (122). 
This reading is based on Rabinowitz’s focus on how “Western readers’ prior 
knowledge of conventions of reading shapes their experiences and evaluations of the 
narratives they confront” (3). Readers use their knowledge of conventions to identify 
Mansfield Park as a marriage comedy and, accordingly, are on the lookout for a heroine and a 
hero who, after overcoming obstacles, will happily marry. Mansfield Park, in presenting 
readers with a heroine in a low position who lives in a world in which marriage is the 
primary concern, conforms to the conventions of a marriage comedy and raises the 
concomitant expectations in readers. The rule of chutzpah can be applied to Mrs. Norris’s 
statement because readers are on the lookout for potential heroes.  
The different aspects of reading on which Rabinowitz and Phelan respectively focus 
in the two works mentioned result in emphases on different aspects of readers’ formation of 
expectations, aspects that I claim Mansfield Park intentionally sets against one another.19 On 
the one hand, Rabinowitz’s concern with how readers’ previous reading experiences affect 
their expectations of any new narratives which they encounter emphasizes how examples of 
specific genres conform to conventions and meet the expectations they raise. On the other 
hand, Phelan’s concern with how the reading process involves forming and revising 
                                               
19 See Lowe’s discussion of the power of plot as derived from the tension created in the 
reading experience between becoming involved in the fictional world and the immediate 
situations of the characters and considering these details in relation to the story as a whole 
and its resolution (24-5 and passim).  
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expectations emphasizes how single narratives, for example Persuasion, progress in ways that 
thwart readers’ expectations.  
Accordingly, Phelan reads the first three chapters of Persuasion as deviating from the 
conventions of narrative comedy by failing to indicate clearly the fate of the heroine, Anne. 
“If you confidently conclude,” he claims, “upon reading the end of Chapter III, that ‘he’ will 
be Anne’s future husband, you are relying less on the progression of the first three chapters 
and more on your sense of what Austen’s other novels have done, and thus, what her novels 
are supposed to do” (37). Phelan’s analysis emphasizes the specific details of Persuasion over 
the conventional expectations that Rabinowitz shows readers systematically bring to 
Austen’s novels. Both Rabinowitz’s and Phelan’s focuses are important, I claim, to the 
aesthetic project of Mansfield Park.  
Mansfield Park conforms to the conventions of a marriage comedy to raise 
expectations that its deviations from a marriage comedy can then complicate. By 
complicating readers’ expectations for and judgments of the characters, the novel challenges 
readers to consider the extent to which their judgments of the characters and of the novel 
should be grounded in their expectations for a marriage comedy and the extent to which 
they should be informed by the novel’s portrayal of how one’s position affects one’s 
judgment. The novel manipulates readers’ expectations as well as their distance from the 
characters in order to clarify the limits and possibilities of both disinterested and aesthetic 
judgment.  
How and why the novel asks readers to sympathize with and judge Fanny (and the 
other characters) can be clarified by looking at how the novel dramatizes the effects of her 
social, geographical, and psychological position on her perception and judgment. To show 
how the novel does so, let me revise the plot summary with which I began. The story of 
 58 
Fanny’s changing positions and perceptions is that of a poor relative’s earnest efforts to 
understand and conform to the peripheral position expected in her munificent new family. 
Only two members of this family concern themselves with clarifying Fanny’s position, one, 
her aunt Norris, insisting on its lowliness, and the other, her cousin Edmund, asserting 
Fanny’s merit. Fanny’s own forbidden and unwanted feelings for her cousin first shape how 
she conforms to her position. Then, the surprising and unwanted attentions of one of his 
friends makes clear that Fanny’s social inferiority is not as certain as everyone, including 
Fanny herself, has insisted. Becoming increasingly central at Mansfield Park would make 
Fanny uncomfortable under any circumstances because of her shyness. Being pursued by 
Henry, however, is also uncomfortable because Fanny cannot communicate her assessment 
of his character without revealing her cousins’, particularly the then-engaged and now-
married Maria’s, earlier susceptibility to Henry’s charms. Refusing Henry on the basis of 
what she has seen of him from her peripheral position, Fanny appears stubborn and 
ungrateful to Sir Thomas, who sends her back to her poor parents’ home to learn a lesson. 
But Fanny understands what Sir Thomas intends as a punishment to be in fact the 
fulfillment of her long-standing wish to visit to her parents. The move from Mansfield to 
Portsmouth, however, makes Fanny realize that she is more at home in the former than the 
latter. Henry’s continued attentions impress Fanny in Portsmouth, and she waits anxiously 
for news of Edmund’s engagement to Mary. Instead of this eventuality, she learns of Henry 
and Maria’s adultery. After Henry and Mary show themselves to have the faults Fanny has 
long seen in them, Fanny is returned to Mansfield Park where she now knows that she 
belongs. The Bertrams, having lost one daughter and almost a son to the Crawfords, 
welcome Fanny both as the kind of daughter that Sir Thomas thought he had been raising 
his own daughters to be and as a suitable wife for Edmund.  
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Fanny’s return to Mansfield Park to become the daughter and wife she had not dared 
aspire to be concludes the marriage comedy and the story of Fanny’s perspective. She ends 
up with the man she loves, and she as well as those around her have learned her true value. 
The narrator’s impatience in the final chapter, however, “to restore everybody, not greatly in 
fault themselves, to tolerable comfort, and to have done with all the rest,” (312) highlights 
the fictional qualities of the union between Fanny and Edmund and the static happiness 
achieved at Mansfield Park. The different narrative voice used in the final chapter imposes 
new distances among itself, characters, and readers. Instead of continuing to let readers into 
the minds of the characters, the narrator leaves the final stage of the marriage comedy 
(Edmund’s transfer of affection to Fanny and the happiness of each upon learning of the 
other’s love) for readers to imagine for themselves. The narrator’s insistence on the fictional 
qualities of the novel’s conclusion resolves the tension created by the novel’s use of the 
structure of a marriage comedy. The new narrative stance of the final chapter completes the 
exchange with readers offered by the implied author’s presentation of Fanny’s perspective 
within the structure of a marriage comedy by inviting readers to compare the kind of 
judgments appropriate in and about fiction with the kind appropriate in and about life.  
In making explicit its ability to reward the good with happy marriages and punish the 
bad with loneliness, the novel highlights the difference between fiction and reality. People 
cannot be placed in static positions that reflect their worth in the same way that Mansfield 
Park finally situates its characters. But the novel’s depiction of the limits and possibilities of 
the kinds of judgments ultimately reached by the characters, and of disinterested judgment in 
general, undermines the finality of the situation achieved at Mansfield Park. The novel, in 
other words, has created a fictional world that refuses to conform to the kind of fictional 
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closure imposed on it.20 This judgment about the insufficiency of the closure achieved within 
the fictional world goes hand in hand, however, with a judgment about the sufficiency of the 
completeness of the reading experience.21 Questioning the acceptability or finality of Fanny’s 
happiness does not necessitate a negative judgment of the novel or its conclusion. The 
artificiality of the novel’s conclusion can be evaluated instead as a successful ending to the 
experience that it has offered readers. The final chapter of Mansfield Park concludes the 
novel’s two stories by pointing out the limitations of fiction, on the one hand, and its 
potential to affect how real people live, on the other, by showing them, for example, a set of 
different but related influences on judgments in and of fiction as well as on judgments in and 
of life.   
Mansfield Park thus tells a story about Fanny’s perspective within the structure of a 
marriage comedy in a manner that asks readers to consider and compare the grounds of 
judgments in and about fiction and life. Within the fictional world, Fanny’s observations and 
judgments are conditioned by her ideas of social distance. The narrative, in turn, places 
different kinds of distances between readers and characters. The story of Fanny’s perspective 
lets readers into her mind. This proximity, however, is complicated by the difference 
between how Fanny perceives the world and what the marriage comedy promises for her. 
The narrative positions readers in relation to Fanny so that their judgments of her are 
complicated in ways not dissimilar to how her judgments are complicated within the fictional 
world. Both sets of judgments are dependent on the position of the judge and the kind of 
distance thought to obtain between judge and judged.  
                                               
20 This claim relates to Miller’s work (Narrative and its Discontents) on problems of closure in 
general, the “unnarratable” elements of Mansfield Park, and its final imposition of closure. I 
will return to this issue when I deal with the conclusion of the novel in Chapter Seven. 
21 See Phelan for the distinction between closure, the narrative’s end, and completion, the 
conclusion of the reader’s judgments about the narrative (Experiencing Fiction 20-21, 95 and 
passim). 
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IV. The Opening of the Novel: Fanny’s Setting 
 I have characterized Mansfield Park as a marriage comedy that complicates the 
expectations it raises by focusing primarily not on how Fanny will happily marry, but instead 
on how her position affects her judgment. For the sake of simplicity, I will henceforward 
refer to the novel as having two plots, a marriage plot and a position plot. The opening of 
the novel introduces both plots together.  
The opening sentences of the novel describe the very different marriages of the three 
Ward sisters: Lady Bertram’s “elevation,” Mrs. Norris’s finding herself finally “obliged to be 
attached to the Rev. Mr. Norris, a friend of her brother-in-law, with scarcely any private 
fortune,” and Mrs. Price’s “untoward choice” of “a lieutenant of marines, without education, 
fortune, or connexions” (5). This description not only introduces marriage as a socio-
economic matter of the utmost importance, but also sets the stage for Fanny’s move from 
her poor home to Mansfield Park. As I mentioned above, this introduction characterizes 
Fanny as a Cinderella-type heroine.22 The usual obstacle faced by such a heroine is her 
devaluation by the other characters. Once her true value is recognized by the rest of the cast 
in the fictional world, her marriage can take place. Mansfield Park’s happy ending does 
depend on a change in the way other characters, especially Sir Thomas and Edmund, see 
Fanny. Fanny’s eventual marriage also depends, however, on a change in the way she thinks 
of herself. Her low self-esteem is as much of an obstacle to her eventual marriage as is the 
low opinion of her worth that the others have. 
                                               
22 Simpson identifies the Cinderella elements in the opening paragraph’s description of Lady 
Bertram, elements which, she claims, Austen introduces “only to temper them with realism 
and point to the fallacies of the expectations they set up” (26).  
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 The early part of the novel, however, does not primarily develop either a tension 
about how the Bertrams might come to think differently about Fanny or a tension about 
how Fanny might come to think differently about herself. What, then, does the early part of 
the novel do?  The opening chapters of the novel establish the ambiguity and fluidity of 
different sets of values within the fictional world. They also depict how the different 
characters talk about and apply these values, that is, how they make different kinds of 
judgments. The novel’s characters represent a range of social and ethical positions, and a 
range of attitudes towards what type of interests may be properly pursued. The novel’s early 
chapters display how superficially many of its characters hold values, as well as the kinds of 
superficial agreements this attitude towards values allows. A change in the way the characters 
relate to and share values is thus as central to the novel as the change in how the other 
characters value Fanny suggested by the novel’s marriage plot, and the change in how Fanny 
values herself suggested by the novel’s position plot.23  
 The ambiguity and fluidity of values at Mansfield Park contribute to Fanny’s overly 
severe understanding of the lowliness of her position there. Though Sir Thomas and Mrs. 
Norris agree that bringing Fanny to Mansfield Park is tantamount to committing themselves 
to securing for her “‘the provision of a gentlewoman’” (8), they also agree on the difficulty 
of establishing “‘the distinction proper to be made between the girls as they grow up.’” Sir 
Thomas worries about “‘how to preserve in the minds of [his] daughters the consciousness of 
                                               
23 M. Clark distinguishes five common “hypotheses” (events that upset a novel’s early 
equilibrium and thus constitute its beginning): Arrival, Departure, Meeting, Need, and Birth 
(49). Fanny’s Arrival at Mansfield Park temporarily upsets two equilibriums: the normal 
routine of Mansfield Park is affected in a minor way by her addition, while Fanny’s 
psychological equilibrium is deeply affected by her move. Fanny’s presence at Mansfield 
Park is, however, accepted by both her and the others by the end of the third chapter. Only 
the discrepancy between how the various characters relate to the values espoused at 
Mansfield Park remains a problem, a problem addressed differently, and largely indirectly, by 
each of the novel’s plots until it becomes central to the resolution of both at the end of the 
novel.  
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what they are, without making them think too lowly of their cousin; and how, without 
depressing her spirits too far, to make her remember that she is not a Miss Bertram;’” he 
insists that “‘they cannot be equals. Their rank, fortune, rights, and expectations will always 
be different’” (10); and he leaves the actual establishment and maintenance of this distinction 
entirely up to Mrs. Norris.24  
 While Sir Thomas’s formulation of the proper distinction to be made between Fanny 
and the Miss Bertrams problematically describes a difference that is at once meaningful and 
insignificant, Mrs. Norris’s enforcement of the distinction is less ambiguous, but no less 
problematic. She lacks Sir Thomas’s theoretical subtlety and concerns herself only with the 
first and last parts of his distinction: that his daughters think highly of themselves and that 
Fanny remembers that she does not have the same value as her cousins. Fanny thus learns to 
think of her position as less valued than Sir Thomas intends it to be. Her timid character, 
furthermore, inclines her to belittle herself and to fear being presumptuous above all.   
 Readers, by contrast, understand that Sir Thomas’s intentions in bringing Fanny to 
Mansfield Park were not to make her into the near-servant that she becomes under Mrs. 
Norris’s stern watch. Though Mrs. Norris and the Miss Bertrams would surely resent any 
claims Fanny made for herself, she would be justified even within the fictional world for 
asserting more importance than they give her. The marriage plot’s promise of Fanny’s 
elevation, moreover, encourages readers to think of her position as more fluid than she does. 
The combination of Fanny’s low and readers’ high expectations for her make it easy for 
readers to forget that, though Fanny might reasonably think more highly of herself than she 
does, she has no reason to think that a marriage to one of her cousins is possible.  
 
                                               
24 See Cleere for a socio-economic reading of the establishment and maintenance of this 
distinction.  
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V. Fanny’s Distance from her Cousins 
Mansfield Park’s two plots each encourage readers to take different kinds of interest in 
the characters, to regard them from different distances. On the one hand, the marriage plot 
suggests idealized characters who clearly differ from real people and who should thus be 
judged by different standards. The difference between idealized characters and real people 
emphasizes the distance between fictional and real worlds. The position plot, on the other 
hand, invites readers into the characters’ minds, presents the characters as more realistic than 
two-dimensional idealizations, and obscures the difference between fictional and real worlds. 
While idealized characters can be judged against ideals, the standards for judging realistic 
characters are less straightforward; they can be judged according to their own standards, the 
standards of the world in which they are found, or readers’ personal standards. Novels such 
as Mansfield Park require readers to keep all three sets of standards in mind as they form 
judgments. 
The expectations encouraged by the marriage plot and the focus of the position plot 
thus challenge the grounds of readers’ judgments of the characters, particularly Fanny. How 
should the aesthetic distance separating readers from Fanny inform and affect their 
judgments of her? The narrative’s portrayal of Fanny’s judgment, moreover, emphasizes her 
difficulties in understanding the kind of distance that obtains between her and her cousins. 
Fanny regards her cousins from a problematic distance. In her struggles to occupy her lowly 
position in the household, Fanny observes her cousins almost as if she and they do not share 
a world and affect one another. From this distance, Fanny seems to take pleasure in 
observing them, a pleasure that is more like the aesthetic pleasure of reading a book than the 
interested, personal pleasure of people sharing a world. The narrative’s depiction of how 
Fanny misplaces aesthetic distance calls attention to the challenge it offers readers to clarify 
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both the aesthetic distance between themselves and Fanny and the relationship between 
judging real and represented worlds.  
In addition to indicating the problematic nature of how the Bertrams and Mrs. 
Norris conceive of Fanny’s position at Mansfield Park, the narrative portrays the problems 
with Fanny’s attempts to occupy this position and how they affect her perception and 
judgment of the world of Mansfield Park. By the novel’s second chapter, Fanny is “fixed at 
Mansfield Park” and readers learn that she grows up there “not unhappily” (17). When 
Fanny’s cousins enter society and start attending balls, Lady Bertram, who is too lazy to 
accompany them, relies on Fanny in their absences. Fanny attends happily to Lady Bertram, 
and welcomes the unusual tranquility of being alone with her aunt rather than feeling any 
wish to go out herself. Not desiring to enter the world of her cousins, however, does not 
mean that Fanny does not enjoy hearing about it. After describing Fanny’s pleasure in her 
quiet evenings with Lady Bertram, the narrator details how she 
loved to hear an account of [her cousins’ gaieties], especially of the balls, and whom 
Edmund had danced with; but thought too lowly of her own situation to imagine she 
should ever be admitted to the same, and listened, therefore, without an idea of any 
nearer concern in them. (27) 
The narrator’s description subtly contrasts Fanny’s particular interest in Edmund with her 
detachment from the social world he inhabits. The strangeness hinted at here of Fanny’s 
apparently innocent pleasure in hearing about her cousins’ experiences at balls becomes 
clearer when compared to the need Fanny feels, later in the novel, to share stories of her 
own experience at a ball. But before introducing the later occasion, I will examine how the 
narrator suggests the attitudes and assumptions behind Fanny’s pleasure, a pleasure without 
concern, in hearing her cousins’ accounts. 
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 The narrator first indicates the part of her cousins’ stories most enjoyable to Fanny, 
and then her understanding of her relationship to the world they depict. The narrator’s use 
of “but” to connect these ideas suggests that Fanny’s enjoyment will be negatively affected 
by her understanding of her situation; the consequence, however, of her belief that she will 
never attend a ball, the narrator next specifies, is a lack of “nearer concern” in her cousins’ 
accounts that seems to coexist with her enjoyment of hearing them. How can Fanny’s 
enjoyment of her cousins’ accounts, her belief that they are about an inaccessible world, and 
her lack of nearer concern or strategic interest in them, be compatible? The narrator’s 
description suggests, I submit, that Fanny’s enjoyment of her cousins’ accounts rests 
problematically both on her personal interest in them, and on an aesthetisized distance from 
them, since distance and disinterestedness seemingly provide the conditions that permit 
Fanny’s particular enjoyment of their stories.  
 The detail about Fanny’s particular interest in Edmund’s dancing partners indicates, 
however, that her enjoyment of her cousins’ accounts is based on her personal relationship 
to her cousins, rather than on the satisfaction of a desire to hear about balls generally or on 
any quality of the accounts themselves. Fanny takes pleasure in hearing about the gaieties of 
people she knows and cares about, and more pleasure in hearing about those of the person 
about whom she cares the most. If Fanny were not listening to her cousins as someone who 
cares about what happens to them, she would not take more interest in one or another of 
them. Readers may or may not already suspect that Fanny has developed the romantic 
feelings for Edmund that will become explicit only when Mary Crawford arrives at the end 
of the same chapter in which Fanny listens to her cousins’ accounts. Whether Fanny’s 
feelings for Edmund at this moment are purely cousinly, however, affects only the kind of 
personal concern Fanny might have in hearing about his dance partners, not the personal 
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quality of her concern. Fanny’s special pleasure in hearing about Edmund has to do with her 
affection for him, regardless of its type or extent. This pleasure is based on the assumption 
that Fanny and Edmund share a world and affect one another. 
 The reminder of Fanny’s social distance from Edmund that immediately follows the 
detail about her interest in his dancing partners shifts from characterizing her cousins’ 
accounts as enjoyable stories of people Fanny cares about to characterizing them as accounts 
of inaccessible gaieties. Pleasure is not the only way someone in Fanny’s position might 
respond to hearing about a happy world from which she is excluded. The understanding that 
her position prevents her from joining her cousins would, for a different type of character, 
also prevent her from enjoying accounts of their gaieties. Not only does Fanny have no 
jealousy of her cousins or wish to be included, her understanding of her exclusion, the 
narrator specifies, prevents her from listening with “an idea of any nearer concern” in her 
cousins’ accounts. 25 
 What type of “nearer concern” is the narrator describing and how does it compare 
with Fanny’s affectionate enjoyment of the specifics about Edmund’s dance-partners? If she 
thought she might one day attend a ball, Fanny might listen to her cousins in order to gather 
information and prepare herself for the anticipated experiences. She might listen, in other 
words, with personal and practical interest. She might even imagine how she would behave 
in the situations described by her cousins. This kind of imaginative act would be pleasant for 
someone anticipating actual participation in the events described, for example, if the 
audience were a younger Bertram sister, not yet old enough to attend balls. It would not be 
                                               
25 In general, the Cinderella theme plays with the relationship between the heroine’s humility 
and her desires for inclusion and betterment. Huang discusses the connection between virtue 
and social mobility in various Cinderella stories. Garson analyses the discourse of natural 
taste in similar terms, characterizing Fanny as a natural aristocrat (16), and likening her not 
only to Cinderella, but also a swan in the midst of ugly ducklings (126), and a delicate 
princess like that bothered by the pea (128).  
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so pleasant for someone who wanted to, but could not, attend balls, for example, a different 
kind of person in Fanny’s position. Fanny’s unassuming nature and understanding of her 
situation seemingly prevents her from wanting to belong to the world of her cousins. This 
lack of nearer concern, this type of un-appetitive and unselfish disinterested attitude does 
not, however, sit comfortably with the personal interest that Fanny has in her cousins as real 
people with whom she shares a world. 
 Fanny’s detachment rests on different assumptions than the pleasure with which she 
listened to details about Edmund. The detachment involves a belief in an insurmountable 
distance between the world depicted and Fanny’s world, a distance that automatically relieves 
her, the listener, from practical interest in the account. The pleasure, in contrast, rests on a 
belief that the listener inhabits the same world that is depicted, and therefore has practical 
interest in this world that can figure more or less in how she listens. Fanny responds to her 
cousins’ accounts, in other words, both as if she shares their world and as if she does not. 
On the one hand, she relates to her cousins with an unselfish, but personal and emotional, 
interest that appears entirely appropriate among cousins. On the other, she listens to their 
accounts as if to stories of characters in a fictional world. Placing this distance between 
herself and her cousins provides the illusion that she simply cannot have the kind of 
practical or selfish interests in them that she wants to avoid.   
 Although one can certainly take various attitudes towards accounts of real, fictional, 
and historical worlds, historical and fictional worlds do not threaten to interfere in one’s day-
to-day life in the same way that parts of one’s real world can. Regardless of how impossible 
it is for Fanny to imagine going to a ball with her cousins, that she might do so is possible in 
a way that her entering one of Cowper’s poems or Lord Macartney’s journals is not. Perhaps 
more importantly, the events befalling her cousins at balls can affect Fanny in ways that what 
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happens to her favorite fictional and historical personages cannot, regardless of how strongly 
she feels for the latter.26 Some of my central questions surround the construction and 
consequences of this difference, and one of my central contentions is that this difference is a 
subject about which Mansfield Park has much to say. 
Fanny listens to accounts of her cousins’ gaieties almost as if listening to accounts of 
a fictional or historical world unquestionably distinct from her own. This attitude stems from 
her desire to conform to expectations and protect herself from wanting anything beyond 
what her situation merits. Placing this kind of distance between herself and her cousins 
makes wanting to enter their world seem as ridiculous as trying to intervene in the action of 
a play. Fanny’s particular interest in Edmund, however, indicates the impossibility of freeing 
herself from the kind of nearer concern in her cousins that living in the same world as them 
makes possible and necessary. While putting the world of her cousins at an aesthetic remove 
helps Fanny accept the limitations of her situation, it also makes her susceptible to mistakes 
of judgment and complicates how she interacts with others. Aesthetisizing the distance 
between herself and her cousins removes Fanny from the action of the novel differently than 
does her inferior position in the household. The narrative raises the question of whether 
Fanny’s inaction is due to her dependent position and meek nature or another kind of 
imposed distance between herself and the world in which she actually lives. The novel also, I 
claim, invites readers to explore how and why they may or may not be sympathetic to 
Fanny’s attempts to conform to her position and employ good judgment from that position. 
                                               
26 Stolnitz (“On the Origins”) locates the origin of aesthetic disinterestedness in eighteenth-
century British thought and traces its development from an ethical idea to a way of 
perceiving. Especially pertinent here is Stolnitz’s attention to the different kinds of interest 
to which disinterestedness is opposed. See also Ortega y Gasset’s image of four people at a 
deathbed (wife, doctor, reporter, painter) and the different kinds of interest each takes in the 
scene (14-19). I will have more to say about disinterestedness and distance in what follows, 
especially in Chapters Two and Six.   
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In the passage above, Fanny easily takes pleasure in hearing about Edmund enjoying 
himself at balls. The narrator introduces her particular interest in him subtly, by embedding 
it in a description of her comfortable position in the Bertram household as attendant to Lady 
Bertram and observer of, rather than participant in, the family activities. When the 
Crawford’s acquaintance brings society to the Park, Fanny does not find it so easy to witness 
Edmund’s growing affection for Mary. The narrator, accordingly, makes her discomfort 
slightly more explicit. After emphasizing Edmund’s influence on Fanny, the narrator 
ironically understates the challenge Edmund’s feelings for Mary pose to Fanny: 
Having formed her mind and gained her affections, he had a good chance of her 
thinking like him; though at this period, and on this subject, there began now to be 
some danger of dissimilarity, for he was in a line of admiration of Miss Crawford, 
which might lead him where Fanny could not follow. (47) 
 Even if Fanny’s judgment of Mary agreed as usual with Edmund’s, her admiration of a 
potential match for him would be of a different nature than his own. Fanny’s inability to 
follow Edmund in his admiration of Mary, however, has as much to do, the narrator 
suggests, with Fanny’s feelings for Edmund as with their different evaluations of Mary. Even 
in his admiration, Edmund does not find Mary flawless, and he values discussing his qualms 
with Fanny. As the novel progresses, Fanny becomes a more and more important (and less 
and less comfortable) observer of Edmund and Mary’s relationship. In this role as observer 
and confidant Fanny is confronted with her feelings for Edmund, if only insofar as she must 
suppress her jealousy of Mary. Her ability to feel the right kind of interest in Edmund’s 
romance is further tested as she and Edmund are shown very different views of Mary as the 
novel continues. 
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 Fanny’s understanding of her situation is also challenged when, after a number of 
important events to which I will return, Henry Crawford turns his attentions to Fanny. Sir 
Thomas decides to hold a ball at Mansfield Park to encourage Henry and gratify the wishes 
of Fanny’s brother, who is visiting. Though Fanny cannot but feel nervous in her central 
position at the ball, she is able to enjoy some of the excitement such an event usually 
produces.  
Fanny’s experience of the kind of social pleasure she formerly considered 
inaccessible to her changes the way she evaluates such pleasures. When, seeing her before 
the ball, Edmund engages Fanny for two dances, “she had hardly ever been in a state so 
nearly approaching high spirits in her life. Her cousins’ former gaiety on the day of a ball was 
no longer surprizing to her; she felt it to be indeed very charming” (187). This description of 
Fanny’s revised perspective reveals that while Fanny could, as discussed above, enjoy 
accounts of her cousins’ experiences at balls after the fact, she did not understand their 
joyful anticipation of such events. Fanny could enjoy her cousins’ accounts without 
connecting them to their anticipation of balls only by listening to these accounts as if they 
were entertaining pieces of fiction. If she considered their accounts descriptions of a real 
world, she should either understand their excitement before a ball or have decided based on 
their accounts that balls do not merit anticipation, in which case, hearing about them should 
not be enjoyable either.27 The fact that she enjoys hearing about her cousins’ experiences at 
balls, but does not understand her cousins’ anticipation of them until she experiences such 
anticipation herself, exposes Fanny’s inconsistent emotional detachment from both their 
stories and their world.   
                                               
27 Consider also the different ways Sir Thomas and Henry listen to William’s well-told stories 
of his travels and experiences in the navy. 
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The contrast between Fanny’s complicated pleasure in hearing accounts of her 
cousins’ attendance at balls and her own desire to discuss the ball she opens at Mansfield 
Park28 reinforces one’s impression of the strangeness of her response to those stories. 
Fanny’s feeling that “she must talk to somebody of the ball” (193) cannot be satisfied the 
next day because Lady Bertram does not remember enough of the event’s details. Two days 
after the ball, however, Fanny has  
the opportunity of talking over [the] night with Mrs. Grant and Miss Crawford, in a 
very handsome style, with all the heightenings of imagination and all the laughs of 
playfulness which are so essential to the shade of a departed ball. (194) 
Readers are given more information about the qualities and effects of this interactive 
discussion than they were about the Bertrams’ accounts of balls that Fanny used to enjoy 
hearing. The narrator details that, after talking about the ball with Mrs. Grant and Mary, 
Fanny “could…bring her mind without much effort into its everyday state, and easily 
conform to the tranquillity of the present quiet week” (194). In the past, Fanny took pleasure 
in hearing about an aesthetisized social world she believed inaccessible to her. She listened to 
accounts of this world after evenings alone with Lady Bertram, the “tranquillity” of which 
was characterized as “unspeakably welcome” (27) to the easily upset Fanny. Now, after 
undeniably entering that social world by opening a ball, the imaginative and playful rehashing 
of the experience helps Fanny make the transition from the unusual excitement of the ball to 
the calm of her everyday life. But what distance does the discussion of the ball allow Fanny 
to place between her normal life and the unprecedented experience? Does Fanny’s 
participation in the ball convince her that she is an actor in the world she is used to 
contemplating from a distance? Or, does Fanny’s discussion of the ball place it at an 
                                               
28 There is an impromptu ball in Volume One that Fanny attends, but the ball she opens is 
the first at which she is important.  
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aesthetisized distance similar to that she believes exists between her cousins’ lives and her 
own, thus serving instead to fortify her problematic understanding of her situation and her 
potential? 
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Chapter Two: Mansfield Park’s Heroine: Creating and Upsetting Expectations 
I. The Novel’s Challenging Heroine and her Problematic Rivalry 
In Chapter One, I argued that the plot of Mansfield Park follows, yet complicates, the 
genre of marriage comedy in order to challenge readers to consider the grounds of their 
judgments of the characters and the novel. Central to this challenge is the novel’s portrayal 
of Fanny. Fanny falls short of the standards both of a Cinderella-type heroine and of the 
ideal self she strives to be. Chapter One detailed how Fanny’s struggles to conform to her 
position in the Bertram household not only conflict with readers’ expectations for her happy 
marriage, but also lead her to impose an untenable, aesthetisized distance between herself 
and her cousins. Although Fanny is the primary focalizer of the novel, her position as 
peripheral observer situates readers at a critical distance from both the Bertrams and Fanny 
herself. While the narrator shows the Bertrams in a harsher light than that in which Fanny is 
willing to see them, the narrator’s depiction of how Fanny observes the Bertrams shows her 
flaws in a light that prevents some readers from liking her enough to hope for her happy 
marriage.  
 In this chapter, I will develop my discussion of the challenge created by the novel’s 
sympathetic yet critical treatment of Fanny by examining the establishment of the love 
triangle among Fanny, Edmund, and Mary. I argue that, although the narrative clearly prefers 
Fanny to Mary, Fanny’s perception and judgment are not impeccable. The novel thus 
challenges readers to consider the relative strengths and weaknesses of Fanny and Mary as 
well as to distinguish between their different kinds of mistakes of judgment and perception. 
In order to hope for Fanny’s happy marriage to Edmund, readers must be more sympathetic 
to her (and his) mistakes of perception and judgment than they are to those of Mary (and of 
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the other characters). But, as I will show below in an analysis of three examples, the narrative 
does not permit any uncritical preferences and sympathies. 
 Before turning to these examples, however, I want to review briefly how and why 
readers and critics respond so differently and vehemently to Fanny. In Chapter One, I 
discussed this issue in terms of Mansfield Park’s plot structure. Here, I will focus on Fanny as 
a heroine, doing so specifically in terms of the issues of aesthetic distance developed by 
Hans Robert Jauss. In “Levels of Identification of Hero and Audience,” he lays out an 
aesthetics of reception meant to complement the aesthetics of presentation proposed by 
Frye in Anatomy of Criticism. Jauss’s aesthetics of reception addresses readers’ identification 
with literary characters in terms of aesthetic distance and disinterestedness. For Jauss, 
distance and identification are inextricably, but not uniformly, related to each other in 
aesthetic reception. Because the aesthetic object is imaginary, Jauss argues, one’s experience 
of it is fundamentally ambiguous. Aesthetic experience can be positive or negative. That is, it 
can involve either the enlightenment celebrated by Aristotelians or the unthinking enjoyment 
of questionable sensual pleasures feared by Platonists. Jauss’s descriptions of this ambiguity 
at different levels of reception help clarify my larger, Bakhtin-inspired claim about Mansfield 
Park as an exercise in judgment, as an invitation to readers to make art and life answerable to 
each other.  
 According to Jauss, distance or disinterestedness is the ontological condition of 
relating to the aesthetic object, which is necessarily imaginary, and thus at the root of the 
ambiguity of aesthetic experience. The ambiguity of this experience expresses itself 
specifically via the divergent potentialities for which one might be freed, that is, via what one 
does in and with the freedom from practical concerns that aesthetic disinterestedness 
affords. As Jauss says: “aesthetic enjoyment is always a liberation from something as well as a 
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liberation for something” (286). Liberation from one’s personal interests and quotidian 
concerns, i.e., disinterestedness, can be for the sake either of a critical perspective on the 
world or an absorption in a pleasurable distraction. In other words, the positive potential of 
aesthetic experience happens when a reader makes the transition from aesthetic to moral 
judgment, that is, when a pre-reflective or unreflective reader becomes a self-reflective 
reader who relates in a critical way her identification with a fictional hero to her own life; the 
negative potential results when this transition does not occur.1   
  This description of the positive and negative potential of aesthetic experience aligns 
with what I have been calling Mansfield Park’s challenge to readers, and accordingly I want to 
utilize Jauss’s analysis of modes of readers’ identifications with different types of fictional 
heroes to develop my argument. More specifically, with the help of his analysis, I want to 
advance my discussion from Chapter One about the various ways in which Fanny may or 
may not represent an ideal by connecting it to questions of aesthetic distance and 
disinterestedness, for, as the examples I analyze below will show, these terms are also 
important within the fictional world. Jauss, in short, provides me with a convenient way to 
link directly the question about the type of heroine which Fanny is with the question of how 
readers might identify with her. Is she admirable or sympathetic? Likable or unlikable? Right 
or wrong?     
As I address these questions, and therewith explicate further the aesthetic challenge 
at the heart of Mansfield Park, three of Jauss’s five modalities of identification are particularly 
relevant: admiring, sympathetic, and ironic. Admiring and ironic modes of identification 
emphasize aesthetic distance, whereas the sympathetic mode usually associated with realism 
                                               
1 Jauss clarifies these positive and negative possibilities for five distinct modalities of 
identification. Here, I emphasize the aspects most important to the modalities most 
pertinent to readers of Mansfield Park.   
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stresses overcoming aesthetic distance to put oneself in the hero’s position. Generally 
speaking, Fanny is taken by some critics as a moral ideal; by others as a realistically fallible 
heroine worthy of sympathy; and by a third group as ironic in one way or another. These 
modes obviously can overlap in multiple ways, and their possible permutations, too, are a 
subject of critical disagreement. What kinds of aesthetic distance and disinterestedness do 
these various critical stances invoke?  
With this question in mind, let me briefly review the literature. Many critics of 
Mansfield Park use the terms “admiration,” “sympathy,” “irony,” “pity,” and “identification” 
to discuss how readers do and should relate to Fanny. While some define these terms clearly, 
others use them loosely. My goal here is not to detail how different critics use these slippery 
terms in the contexts of their own arguments, but rather to show how different critics use 
these terms to describe issues of aesthetic distance.     
 For Marilyn Butler, Fanny is the aesthetic problem with Mansfield Park. “Fanny’s real 
task,” she claims, “is to excite emulation rather than sympathy – and for this reason the 
modern reader is justified in rejecting her as the fallible individual she looks like at first 
sight” (250). Butler here employs ideas of emulation and sympathy to argue that Austen’s 
didactic goals and conservative message got the better of her aesthetic goals of representing 
society and consciousness in Mansfield Park. On this reading, Fanny fails as an ideal to be 
emulated specifically because she is presented realistically as a fallible individual without 
becoming, especially for the modern reader, sympathetic as a fallible individual. Interestingly, 
Butler finds Fanny successful in the early parts of the novel, where, as an observer, she 
functions to “cast the reader as a moral arbiter” (228). According to Butler, this success in 
the first part of the novel, where readers are asked to identify with her role rather than with 
her per se, is forfeited in the second part, when she becomes more central to the narrative 
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action. (I will return below to aesthetic distance and Fanny’s role as an observer.) Butler’s 
analysis thus suggests that Fanny is most successful aesthetically when readers identify with 
her role while distanced ironically (and, possibly, with a sense of superiority) from her 
personally and least successful aesthetically when readers are distanced from her as an 
admirable example while simultaneously being asked to sympathize with her.  
 In Jane Austen and the Art of Clarity, Roger Gard links the proper judgment of Fanny 
to sympathy rather than identification. Austen’s masterful use of free indirect speech, 
according to Gard, lets readers into Fanny’s thoughts while at the same time maintaining a 
distance from them to allow for reflection (129). So, despite their terminological differences, 
Gard and Butler agree that readers are meant to put themselves in Fanny’s position, not in 
order to feel how she feels, but rather in order to sympathize with her struggles. But, 
whereas Butler insists that Fanny fails because Austen’s ideological goals trump her artistic 
ones, Gard contends that Fanny’s success as a character requires sacrifices that make 
Mansfield Park’s shortcomings “not so much bad art as art limited by its ambitions” (141). 
 Both Howard Babb and Joseph Duffy regard Fanny as an infallible moral ideal. But 
unlike Babb, who finds her unsuccessful,2 Duffy, who evaluates Mansfield Park as a novel 
negatively,3 judges her successful as a heroine to be admired rather than liked.4 Fleishman, by 
contrast, finds Fanny’s unlikeability problematic and the novel itself successful, claiming that 
readers are meant to sympathize with the weak and flawed Fanny as they would with a child 
                                               
2 Tony Tanner and Kingsley Amis both also see Fanny as unsuccessfully presented as 
infallible (though the former judges Mansfield Park to be great and the latter finds the novel 
defective by aesthetic standards (141)). Burdan disagrees, arguing that the novel is Austen’s 
most ironic, especially towards Fanny who is shown to be self-deceived.   
3 Duffy’s reason for this negative evaluation is the novel’s didacticism. In my opinion, he 
relies on an overly-narrow conception of realism that I believe cannot do justice to Mansfield 
Park. 
4 This characterization fits with Jauss’s description of admiring identification, and serves as a 
valuable reminder that likability is not necessarily an important quality for a heroine. 
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(44). Thomas Edwards, proposing yet another judgment of the heroine, deems Fanny both 
admirable and imperfect, a combination that he considers successful in part because of the 
distancing irony with which Fanny is treated.    
 Critics, one sees, vary widely regarding what the proper distance between readers and 
Fanny is as well as whether that distance is achieved. The reason for that variance, I suggest, 
lies in the novel’s deliberate complications of this distance. In the analyses of the three 
instances that follow, therefore, I focus on how Mansfield Park positions readers in relation to 
its characters and how ideas of distance and interest are important to this positioning. By 
positioning readers at different, and even conflicting, distances from Fanny, the novel 
encourages what Jauss defines as ironic identification. For Jauss, just as the possible 
remoteness of admiring identification leads naturally to sympathetic identification, the 
unreflective pleasure that can result from sympathetic identification leads naturally to the 
need for irony to disrupt this possibility and encourage reflection on the aesthetic 
experience. In the chapters that follow I will have more to say about Austen’s irony. For 
now, Jauss’s broad characterization of the reflective dimension in ironic identification allows 
me to clarify my argument about how Mansfield Park’s positioning of Fanny challenges 
readers to reflect on their aesthetic experiences and on aesthetic experience as such.     
 
II. Fanny vs. Mary 
 The Crawfords do not arrive at Mansfield Park until the novel’s fourth chapter. 
Fanny’s affection for Edmund has been established, but the nature of these feelings has not 
been made explicit to readers or to Fanny herself. Readers expecting her to marry one of her 
cousins easily infer that her feelings are romantic, but the narrative describes them as 
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familial. Fanny, won over by Edmund’s kindness and his role in her education,5 “loved him 
better than any body in the world except [her brother] William; her heart was divided 
between the two” (18). 6 Fanny certainly has no aspirations to marry up, and it is not clear at 
this point whether her feelings for Edmund are romantic at all.  
 The jealousy Fanny feels when confronted by Edmund’s obvious attraction to Mary 
Crawford, however, suggests that her feelings for Edmund are more than familial, feelings 
that she struggles not to acknowledge. The merely superficial agreement of Edmund’s and 
Fanny’s initial judgments of Mary betrays the influences of their respective emotional 
involvements. Edmund’s affection for Mary encourages him to minimize her faults, while 
Fanny’s affection for Edmund makes her especially quick to perceive Mary’s unworthiness 
and reticent in expressing this judgment. The novel will eventually prove Edmund’s 
judgment to have been both interested and inaccurate, and Fanny’s to have been accurate 
despite being interested.   
 Although Edmund admits Mary’s indecorousness and Fanny acknowledges her 
attractiveness, they do not reach the agreement about Mary that Edmund insists they do 
when he concludes an early conversation about Mary by saying: “‘She is perfectly feminine, 
except in the instances we have been speaking of. There she cannot be justified. I am glad you 
                                               
5 “Kept back as she was by every body else, his single support could not bring her forward, 
but his attentions were otherwise of the highest importance in assisting the improvement of 
her mind, and extending its pleasures. He knew her to be clever, to have a quick 
apprehension as well as good sense, and a fondness for reading, which, properly directed, 
must be an education in itself. Miss Lee taught her French, and heard her read the daily 
portion of History; but he recommended the books which charmed her leisure hours, he 
encouraged her taste, and corrected her judgment; he made reading useful by talking to her 
of what she read, and heightened its attraction by judicious praise” (18). Gardiner argues that 
Fanny uses the education she receives from Edmund to achieve autonomy and critical 
authority. Gardiner’s focus on Austen’s rejection and subversion of the eighteenth century’s 
gendered standards of critical authority, however, causes her to simplify the complexity of 
Mansfield Park’s depiction of judgment and education.    
6 See Brissenden and M. Anderson for readings of Fanny’s love for William as incestuous. 
The latter argues that Fanny’s love for William is sublimated as love for Edmund (171).   
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saw it all as I did’” (47). But the conversation, particularly Fanny’s quickly softened charge of 
ungratefulness, betrays the difference between how she and Edmund regard Mary. Fanny 
perceives her faults to be of a greater seriousness than does Edmund, and while he is quick 
to excuse them, her caution in asserting them does not mean that she excuses them as easily.  
 The narrator explains this caution in a way that raises suspicions about the nature of 
Fanny’s feelings for Edmund.  Though she “could not wonder” at Edmund’s desire to pass 
as much time with Mary as he does, she is  
a little surprised that he could spend so many hours with Miss Crawford, and not see 
more of the sort of fault which he had already observed, and of which she was almost 
always reminded by a something of the same nature whenever she was in her 
company; but so it was. Edmund was fond of speaking to her of Miss Crawford, but 
he seemed to think it enough that the Admiral had since been spared; and she scrupled 
to point out her own remarks to him, lest it should appear like ill-nature. (48) 
Fanny’s hesitation to communicate her judgment of Mary to Edmund betrays her precarious 
position in relation to the two of them. Her devotion to Edmund legitimately interests her in 
his romantic prospects. As a cousin and a friend she wants the best for him. Why, then, 
should expressing her doubts about Mary appear ill-natured? The fear that it would suggests 
that a less legitimate, more selfish, kind of interest threatens her judgments of Mary: 
romantic feelings for Edmund. Fanny does not, however, acknowledge either her jealousy of 
Mary or the feelings that cause it. Fanny’s denial of having such feelings thus strengthens 
readers’ suspicions that she does have them.  
 Fanny’s unwillingness to see herself as Mary’s rival for Edmund’s affection follows 
from her peripheral position within the fictional world. Though Fanny is the heroine of the 
novel, the other characters consider her, just as she does herself, a minor player in their 
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world. Mary, by contrast, is considered by everyone, including herself, to be central to any 
social circle in which she finds herself.7 Furthermore, while Mary has the strength, wit and 
liveliness of a heroine such as Emma Woodhouse, Fanny’s weakness together with her timid 
and unassuming nature make her a heroine who must be liked for other, less exciting 
qualities, such as the virtue and idealism that she strives for, but does not always reach.  
 The possibility of matches between the Crawfords and the Bertrams is at the 
forefront of the characters’ as well as of readers’ minds. Mary’s twenty thousand pounds and 
ambition to marry well matches up with Tom Bertram’s situation, and Maria Bertram’s 
engagement to Mr. Rushworth makes Henry Crawford “in equity the property of Julia, of 
which Julia was fully aware, and before he had been at Mansfield a week, she was quite ready 
to be fallen in love with” (33). Henry, however, has no intention of falling in love or 
marrying. His attitude that “‘all is safe with a lady engaged; no harm can be done’” (34), and 
Maria’s complementary belief that “‘there could be no harm in her liking an agreeable man’” 
(33) suggests that much harm will likely come to pass. Henry’s presence at Mansfield Park, 
therefore, immediately promises to create problems between the Bertram sisters as well as 
between Maria and her fiancé.  
 Mary’s “early presentiment that she should like the eldest [Bertram son] best” (35) 
lines up with Mrs. Grant’s even earlier plans for the match.8 When Tom Bertram leaves for 
the races, however, Mary is surprised “that, without [Edmund’s] being a man of the world or 
an elder brother, without any of the arts of flattery or the gaieties of small talk, he began to 
                                               
7 Garson characterizes Mary as the heroine of her own drama, and interestingly contrasts her 
with Fanny in terms of their relative abilities to display their conversely relative inner 
resources (131 and passim).  
8 Miller focuses on this passage (and its continuation: “She knew it was her way”) in his 
analysis of Mary’s language. Mary, he argues convincingly, “disqualifies the indirect discourse 
practiced on her in what may be the only possible way: by practicing it on herself” (29). The 
ironic distance with which Mary treats her shortcomings is a “way of staying unknown, 
impermeable to the categories of right knowledge” (31).   
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be agreeable to her” (47). Henry and Maria think her ineligibility will prevent their flirtation 
from becoming a meaningful attachment, while Mary unthinkingly allows herself to become 
attached to someone whom she does not find eligible. Edmund’s obvious interest in Mary 
confronts Fanny not only with their differing judgments of her, but also with her own 
jealousy. A timid and weak, yet morally demanding, heroine who refuses to acknowledge her 
feelings stands opposed to a selfish and ambitious, but lively and charming rival. 
In addition to placing Fanny and Mary at opposing points of a love triangle, the 
narrative explicitly contrasts Fanny and Mary in a way that tests readers’ judgments of them. 
Instead of simply encouraging readers to hope for Fanny and dislike Mary as a threat, the 
narrative changes the perspective readers have on the two, inviting them to make different 
(and conflicting) kinds of judgments at different times.9 Three examples will give a sense of 
the different ways the narrative positions readers in relation to Fanny and Mary. In the first 
example, the narrator’s representation of Fanny’s thoughts as she watches Edmund teach 
Mary to ride shows Fanny’s jealousy and her inability to face her feelings for Edmund. Do 
these shortcomings preclude sympathy with Fanny? How do Fanny’s shortcomings, seen 
from the inside, compare with those of Mary, seen from Fanny’s perspective? The second 
example, a passage contrasting Fanny and Mary as they share a carriage on the way to 
                                               
9 See Davidson’s explanation: “Mansfield Park redistributes the psychological traits of the 
female characters in Austen’s earlier novels in surprising new combinations, a practice that 
has consistently challenged readers’ expectations. If Mary Crawford gets the charm and 
liveliness of Elizabeth Bennet (and is punished for possessing these qualities), Fanny Price, at 
least in respect of her social class, has as much in common with Lucy Steele as with the 
reticent heroine of Sense and Sensibility” (252). E. Auerbach gives another account of the 
contrast between Fanny and Mary, arguing that “although Austen presents Fanny Price as 
the indisupatable heroine of this novel, she goes to great lengths to make Mary Crawford 
seem a more appealing character in many ways – and one whose voice, at times, sounds 
remarkably like Austen’s” (179). “[T]he narrative voice,” she continues “offers readers an 
alternative combining the best of both women” (183). It is important to note not only the 
contrast between Mary and Fanny, but also the differences in the way each is presented at 
different times.  
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Sotherton, unequivocally prefers Fanny’s ability to interest herself in the world around her 
over Mary’s limited ability to attend to that which does not directly concern her. The final 
example, which takes place at Sotherton, contrasts Fanny’s pity for Mary with the 
disinterested amusement of a hypothetical observer in a way that raises the question of the 
proper relationship between readers and characters. 
 
III. Jealousy and Standards of Judgment  
Readers are asked to judge Fanny by two conflicting sets of standards. On the one 
hand, they are invited to judge Fanny as the heroine of a marriage comedy. Judging such a 
heroine involves, in the most general terms, assessing her worthiness of the happy ending 
promised for her. But, in the more specific terms of Mansfield Park, it involves deeming her 
preferable to or more worthy than her rival. On the other hand, readers are invited to judge 
Fanny’s attempts, first, to conform to her lowly position, and, then, to adjust to the elevation 
in her status. Judging Fanny’s perception and judgment, in contrast to judging her 
worthiness to marry, demands understanding her perspective within the fictional world. By 
focusing on how they can hope for Fanny’s happy marriage, readers can overlook the 
parameters within which Fanny perceives and judges. In order to sympathize with Fanny, 
readers must judge her denial of her feelings for Edmund according to her reasonable 
conviction that cousins in their situations are forbidden from marrying. Readers who judge 
her denial of her feelings as hypocritical or prudish on the basis of their (also, of course, 
reasonable) conviction that she will end up with Edmund are prevented from sympathizing 
with her and hoping for that marriage. The novel challenges readers to judge Fanny’s failure 
to place the right kind of distance between herself and others, and her inability to recognize 
the kind of interest involved in her perception of Edmund and Mary, according to what 
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Fanny knows about her situation rather than according to what readers know about what 
will happen to her.   
The narrative shows readers Fanny’s thoughts in different ways at different times. 
Exposing Fanny’s mind to readers has the potential either to collapse or to emphasize the 
distance between her and readers. Readers might be encouraged to think, feel, and judge 
along with Fanny; or they might be encouraged to focus instead on how differently from 
Fanny they think, feel, and judge. In the scene in which Fanny watches Edmund teach Mary 
to ride, the narrator lets readers into Fanny’s mind in a way that exposes both the jealousy 
that influences her perception and the objective difficulties of her social station. Fanny’s 
judgment of Mary is not disinterested. At the same time, the ambiguities of her situation are 
emphasized when Edmund invites Mary to use the horse that he has designated for Fanny. 
Fanny is expected to ride for exercise, but her station precludes her from making any claims 
on her own behalf. In this situation, she cannot fulfill her role without either failing to meet 
expectations or acting presumptuously.    
As I have mentioned, because Fanny is unable to acknowledge her feelings for 
Edmund, she is equally unable to acknowledge her conflict with Mary over Edmund. Mary’s 
desire to learn to ride, however, puts her interests into a different, and more direct, conflict 
with Fanny’s. Mary’s use of the horse that Edmund procured for Fanny comprises “the first 
actual pain which Miss Crawford occasioned her” (48). The narrator describes Mary’s 
offence in terms that highlight her best and worst attributes. She is “active and fearless,” 
capable of enjoying “the pure genuine pleasure of the exercise” (48). The purity of this 
enjoyment is, however, mixed with the less pure enjoyment of Edmund’s attentions and the 
still less pure enjoyment of her “conviction of very much surpassing her sex in general by 
her early progress” (48). While Mary’s vitality allows her an innocent enjoyment of exercise 
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that Fanny’s poor constitution prevents, Fanny’s principles prevent her from the type of 
selfishness that allows Mary to indulge in the less innocent pleasures of reckless flirtation and 
self-congratulation at the expense of other people.10 
The narrator exposes how Fanny’s inability or unwillingness to acknowledge feelings 
and interests that she considers impossible makes these interests more, rather than less, likely 
to influence her perception and judgment. Not acknowledging her feelings for Edmund or 
her jealousy of Mary does not necessarily make Fanny’s judgments wrong, but it does mean 
that her judgments are not disinterested. When Fanny goes outside to look for Edmund and 
the horse for which she has been waiting she walks until she can “look down the park, and 
command a view of the parsonage and all its demesnes, gently rising beyond the village 
road” (49). From this distance she sees Edmund and Mary “both on horseback, riding side 
by side” (49), attended by the Grants, Henry, and a few grooms. 11 From her distance, Fanny 
cannot make out the details of the scene, but “a happy party it appeared to her, all interested 
in one object” (49). Fanny’s exclusion from the group, and particularly from Edmund’s 
attention, contributes to her perception that Mary’s centrality goes hand in hand with a 
happiness that she cannot share. Though Fanny is not close enough to the party in the 
meadow to see the expressions on their faces, “the sound of merriment ascended even to 
her” (49), proving their cheerfulness and precipitating her own pain. “It was a sound,” the 
narrator specifies, “which did not make her cheerful; she wondered that Edmund should 
forget her, and felt a pang. She could not turn her eyes from the meadow, she could not help 
watching all that passed” (49). Fanny cannot ignore the scene that causes her pain; instead, 
                                               
10 K. Anderson develops this contrast in terms of feminine ideals of strength and weakness.  
11 Valihora reads Fanny as a picturesque tourist, arguing that in this scene, Fanny is situated 
in the foreground of the picturesque view she observes and is interested and absorbed in it 
rather than separated from it by the kind of distance that would afford disinterestedness 
(279-80). 
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she interprets what she sees in ways that both emphasize her pain and obscure its effect on 
her perception.   
As Fanny watches Edmund and Mary, she imagines, the narrator says, an intimacy 
that her physical distance from the scene prevents her from actually seeing and that she fears 
in a way she is unable to acknowledge. She watches Edmund “evidently directing [Mary’s] 
management of the bridle, he had hold of her hand; she saw it, or the imagination supplied 
what the eye could not reach” (49). Fanny’s imagination crosses the distance that her eye 
cannot span. This imaginative seeing also makes use of information that Fanny will not 
consciously consider: her jealousy.  
In Chapter One, I discussed the imaginative retelling that is central to Fanny’s ability 
to make the transition from the unusual excitement of opening a ball to the tranquility of her 
everyday life. This imaginative act seems to place a distance between Fanny and her own 
experiences that resembles the distance she had earlier placed between herself and the world 
of her cousins as she listened to their stories about attending balls. In talking about the ball, 
however, Fanny uses her imagination to recast her own real experience as distant and 
foreign, while in listening to her cousins’ stories, the aesthetisized distance she places 
between herself and them prevents her from being able to imagine what it would be like to 
be in their position. In one case an imaginative retelling enables an aesthetisized distance 
from a real experience, while in the other listening from an enforced aesthetisized distance 
prevents the imaginative act that would allow the listener to put herself into the position 
about which she hears. The imaginative seeing precipitated by Fanny’s jealousy of Mary, by 
contrast, nullifies the physical distance that prevents her from actually seeing the intimacy 
between Edmund and Mary that she fears. 
  88  
Jealousy is not generally an appealing trait. Fanny’s jealousy is additionally offensive 
because it affects her judgment; it interferes with the ideal she sets for herself; and, it displays 
her inability to be honest with herself about her feelings. The narrator’s exposure of these 
shortcomings is tempered, however, by indications of the real difficulties of Fanny’s 
situation. 12 Edmund himself points out the difference between Mary’s and Fanny’s claims on 
the mare, and, in the same breath, proves himself guilty of the very lack of consideration for 
Fanny of which he insists Mary is free. The latter longs to take the mare for a whole morning 
and Edmund arranges this with Fanny, maintaining that “‘any morning will do for this. She 
would be extremely sorry to interfere with you. It would be very wrong if she did. –She rides 
only for pleasure, you for health’” (50-1). Fanny assures Edmund that neither her health nor 
her inclination runs contrary to Mary’s desires, saying “‘I have been out very often lately, and 
would rather stay at home. You know I am strong enough now to walk very well’” (51). 
Fanny does not assert her health as more important than Mary’s pleasure, but when Edmund 
also fails to consider the claims of her health and indulges Mary’s wishes to ride four days in 
a row, the effect on Fanny’s emotions is greater than that on her health. “[T]he pain of her 
mind had been much beyond that in her head” (54) after having caught “‘the heachach’” (52) 
walking in the heat to compensate for her lack of riding. Whether readers think Fanny can 
and should assert her claim to the horse or to Edmund’s affection determines their 
evaluation of her failure to do both.  
The narrator’s exposure of Fanny’s shortcomings is also complemented by exposing 
those of Mary. While the scene showing Fanny watch as Edmund teaches Mary to ride 
emphasizes Mary’s assertiveness and vivacity in contrast to Fanny’s jealousy, passivity and 
                                               
12 Wainwright emphasizes Fanny’s jealousy of Mary, as well as her “unwarranted hostility 
towards Henry Crawford” in her analysis of the significance of these attitudes in Lockean 
terms, according to which Fanny fails to reason properly, and instead “succumbs to, a 
defense mechanism” (60).  
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the weakness of her constitution, the continuation gestures towards the strength of Fanny’s 
good intentions in contrast to Mary’s flippant selfishness. When Fanny sees “the party in the 
meadow disperse,” she begins “to be afraid of appearing rude and impatient; and walk[s] to 
meet them with a great anxiety to avoid the suspicion” (49). Mary greets her by wittily 
managing to make no excuses for herself at the same time as requiring complete absolution. 
She declares:  
“I am come to make my own apologies for keeping you waiting–but I have nothing in 
the world to say for myself–I knew it was very late, and that I was behaving extremely 
ill; and, therefore, if you please, you must forgive me. Selfishness must always be 
forgiven you know, because there is no hope of a cure.” (49)13 
The leeway Mary gives herself in indulging her own interests is in direct proportion to the 
restraint Fanny attempts to place on feeling self-interest at all: both err gravely on the side of 
excess. The novel, however, challenges readers to distinguish these errors and their 
consequences before reaching its own final judgments. 
 How readers distinguish Mary’s and Fanny’s errors depends on the standards by 
which they judge the characters. The marriage plot encourages evaluating their worthiness to 
marry Edmund, while the position plot invites imaginative participation in Fanny’s 
perspective. This imaginative act is the basis for more sympathetic judgments of Fanny’s 
failures to live up to her own ideal self as well as to the standards of a heroine of a marriage 
comedy. By putting themselves in Fanny’s shoes, readers reduce the distance between 
themselves and Fanny. And by judging along with Fanny, readers form judgments of her 
that take her perspective into account and see the good intentions at the base of her 
                                               
13 K. Anderson condemns Mary for attracting Edmund “by displaying her physical vitality 
and fearlessness while pretending to rely on his guidance, and by parading as witty modesty 
her admission of selfishness” (347). 
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shortcomings. The narrative both encourages and complicates this imaginative act by its 
readers.  
 The narrative’s complex ways of showing readers Fanny’s thoughts does not 
necessarily aid them in imagining the perspective in which these thoughts are couched. 
Fanny’s conception of her position and her belief in the inappropriateness of her feelings for 
Edmund as well as the jealousy they cause are obscured rather than emphasized by the 
narrator’s depiction of her thoughts upon seeing Edmund teach Mary to ride. In order to put 
themselves in Fanny’s position, readers must engage in an imaginative act that is complicated 
by both the novel’s structure and the insight into Fanny’s mind that the scene provides. 
Below, I will argue that the novel encourages such an imaginative act by depicting it in an 
unexpected way. The acts of imagination depicted before the later example, however, 
emphasize the complex relationships among imagination, interest, and distance instead of 
the kind of relatively disinterested imagination necessary to put oneself in another’s shoes. In 
her imaginative rehashing of the ball she opens, Fanny distances herself from experiences 
that raise questions about her conception of her position in the world, while in her 
imaginative seeing of an intimacy between Edmund and Mary her jealousy ignores physical 
distance and brings her face to face with the fears she still refuses to acknowledge directly. 
The scene in which Fanny watches Edmund teach Mary to ride shows readers Fanny’s 
thoughts in a way that encourages evaluative judgments while only hinting at a perspective 
from which her thoughts might be judged differently: her own.  
 
IV. Character as Inner Resources vs. External Stimuli 
 In describing Fanny watching Edmund and Mary, the narrative pits an internal view 
of Fanny’s shortcomings against an external view of Mary’s. These views of Fanny’s 
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thoughts and Mary’s words align some readers more with the former and others with the 
latter. The narrative’s explicit contrast between Fanny and Mary as they share a carriage on 
the way to Sotherton shows them both from the same external perspective. The narrator’s 
knowledge of the characters’ interiority, however, reveals the very different qualities behind 
their superficial similarity in exclaiming upon seeing Edmund on horseback behind them.   
The comparison privileges Fanny’s ability to observe over Mary’s inability to pay 
attention to anything other than what directly affects her. I cite the paragraph describing 
how Mary and Fanny differ in everything except their attention to Edmund in its entirety for 
reasons that will become clear. 
Their road was through a pleasant country; and Fanny, whose rides had never been 
extensive, was soon beyond her knowledge, and was very happy in observing all that 
was new, and admiring all that was pretty. She was not often invited to join in the 
conversation of the others, nor did she desire it. Her own thoughts and reflections 
were habitually her best companions; and, in observing the appearance of the country, 
the bearings of the roads, the difference of soil, the state of the harvest, the cottages, 
the cattle, the children, she found entertainment that could only have been heightened 
by having Edmund to speak to of what she felt. That was the only point of 
resemblance between her and the lady who sat by her; in every thing but a value for 
Edmund, Miss Crawford was very unlike her. She had none of Fanny’s delicacy of 
taste, of mind, of feeling; she saw nature, inanimate nature, with little observation; her 
attention was all for men and women, her talents for the light and lively. In looking 
back after Edmund, however, when there was any stretch of road behind them, or 
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when he gained on them in ascending a considerable hill, they were united, and a 
‘there he is’ broke at the same moment from them both, more than once. (58)14 
The narrator begins the paragraph by contextualizing Fanny’s enjoyment in a way that 
implicitly contrasts Fanny’s inexperience with Mary’s worldliness and relative independence, 
and reminds readers of Mary’s recent usurpation of the only horse available for Fanny’s 
limited rides. Fanny is in a position to enjoy the view from the barouche because she has 
been taught to appreciate scenery but has not had the opportunity to see much. Both what 
Fanny sees and its newness are pleasant; she enjoys both “observing” and “admiring” (58). 
Before detailing the things that Fanny sees, the narrator gives another reason she is able to 
enjoy the scenery: she is not distracted from it by being invited to talk with the others. 
Fanny’s habitual place on the periphery of the group has encouraged habits of reflection. 
Her reflections on the scenery are not fraught with the same interests as was her observation 
of Edmund and Mary.  
Fanny’s ability to appreciate the scenery is twice characterized as predicated on her 
relative privations: limited opportunities to go out to enjoy nature and limited company. 
Fanny’s thoughts and reflections are her “best companions” (58) at Mansfield, and except 
for Edmund, they are indeed her only real companions. This characterization of Fanny’s 
response to her lowly situation emphasizes her inner resources15 rather than the 
shortcomings emphasized by the depiction of her observation of Edmund and Mary riding. 
While Fanny appears in a better light in this triangulation of perspectives (Fanny and Mary 
watching Edmund), Mary is seen at a disadvantage.   
                                               
14 DeRose reads this scene in terms of Johnsonian morality and the importance of memory 
to moral character (266).  
15 See Garson for a detailed analysis the inconsistencies of the discourse of inner resources, 
not the least of which is how to convey such resources without undermining them. Garson 
points to the carriage ride to Sotherton as the single time Fanny’s inner resources are 
portrayed as effective (128). 
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Though Mary, like Fanny, places a high value on Edmund, she lacks Fanny’s 
“delicacy of taste, of mind, of feeling” (58). This succinct description of what Fanny has and 
what Mary lacks marks the paragraph’s shift in focus from Fanny to Mary. Whereas Fanny 
observes and admires, Mary sees with little observation. The narrator’s distinctions between 
seeing and observing and “inanimate nature” and “men and women” (58) clarify the 
differences between Mary and Fanny.16 Neither lacks sight, the sense on which observation 
depends. But, while for Fanny seeing provides an opportunity to exercise her powers of 
observation, Mary attends only to what is alive to her, to what engages her. Mary has few 
qualms about attending only to what is interesting to her and doing only what she likes. In 
the context of showing herself a natural horsewoman, Mary exclaims: “‘nothing ever fatigues 
me, but what I do not like’” (50) betraying her attitude towards physical as well as mental 
exercise: she is as strong as can be as long as she enjoys herself.  
Mary’s exclamation of selfishness follows directly upon the narrative’s depiction of 
Fanny’s suppressed jealousy when watching Edmund and Mary. Readers un-inclined to 
sympathize with Fanny’s shortcomings might go so far as to find Mary honest and 
refreshing. In the carriage on the way to Sotherton, on the other hand, the only positive 
thing the narrator includes about Mary, her “talents for the light and lively” (58), appears at 
the end of a list of desirable qualities that she lacks. The only other trait with which the 
sentence credits her, that her “attention was all for men and women” (58) is a negative 
characteristic in the paragraph’s contrast with Fanny’s explicit ability to observe “inanimate 
nature” (58). This contrast might remind readers that even Fanny’s recent shortcomings in 
observing men and women displayed a general attitude towards others quite different from 
                                               
16 Duffy cites this comparison as an example of excessive and inept criticism of Mary (89, 
note 11) because it interrupts the illusion of reality created by the novel. I argue that the 
narrator’s explicit judgments on the characters work together with the realistic portrayal of 
them and their world to challenge readers to examine the grounds of their own judgments.   
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Mary’s self-centered attitude. Here, Mary’s need to be entertained makes her desire to see 
Edmund less appealing than Fanny’s desire to share with him an experience that she is able 
to enjoy by herself.  
On the ride to Sotherton, Mary, like Fanny, is interested in Edmund. The paragraph 
contrasting them, however, is constructed to develop the falseness of the appearance of 
similarity between Fanny and Mary with which it ends. Though Mary and Fanny are “united” 
(58) in their simultaneous exclamations upon catching sight of Edmund, Fanny’s perception 
of him is qualified by her ability to observe her surroundings, while Mary’s ability to perceive 
her surroundings is qualified. 
This contrast between Fanny and Mary recontextualizes the shortcomings of Fanny’s 
perspective that the narrator exposed in depicting Fanny watching Edmund and Mary. 
There, the narrator emphasized Fanny’s suppression of her jealousy in contrast to Mary’s 
forthright self-regard. On the way to Sotherton, Mary’s talents are said to be limited in 
contrast to the abilities Fanny has developed in the absence of social opportunities beyond 
Edmund’s company. Readers will weigh these scenes differently depending on whether they 
judge Fanny’s faults and strengths according to her beliefs about the world she inhabits or 
according to their beliefs about what the novel promises for her. Readers are shown that 
Fanny does not perceive her world disinterestedly. While she should be held accountable for 
these failures, she cannot be reasonably expected to behave according to the rules of 
marriage comedies that readers are encouraged to invoke. The different sets of standards 
according to which readers are invited to judge Fanny challenge them not only to distinguish 
her mistakes from Mary’s, but also to sort out her biases from their own.   
 
V. The Significance of Disinterested Observation within the Fictional World  
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We have seen that the narrator of Mansfield Park does not shy away from making 
explicit contrasts between Fanny and Mary, contrasts emphasized by their one similarity: 
love for Edmund. The narrator’s comparisons between the two women encourage readers to 
infer the different ways Fanny and Mary might behave if their social and romantic situations 
were reversed. Such a difference between Fanny and Mary is implied during a moment on 
the tour of Sotherton in which the latter embarrasses herself. The narrator’s explicit contrast 
between Fanny’s reaction to seeing Mary’s distress and that of a hypothetical “disinterested 
observer” (64) raises, furthermore, the question of the proper relationship between readers 
and the world of Mansfield Park.  
When the group of young people reaches Sotherton’s chapel and learns that the 
current inhabitants have not maintained the habit of daily prayers, Mary quips to Edmund 
that “‘every generation has its improvements’” (62). In fact, when Fanny expresses the 
opposite view, Mary, not knowing that Edmund is bound for the clergy, continues to mock 
the custom of household prayer. Mary acquires the vital information about Edmund’s 
vocation that she has lacked in her attempts to be agreeable to him from Julia, who jokes 
that Maria and Mr. Rushworth could be married on the spot if only Edmund had already 
taken his orders. The narrator comments: “Miss Crawford’s countenance, as Julia spoke, 
might have amused a disinterested observer. She looked almost aghast under the new idea 
she was receiving. Fanny pitied her” (63-4).17 The narrator explicitly contrasts two responses 
to Mary’s distress: amusement and pity. By aligning amusement with disinterestedness, the 
narrator implies that Fanny’s pity is an interested response. Pity for Mary, however, is not 
the only, or even necessarily the most obvious, interested response for someone in Fanny’s 
                                               
17 Interestingly, this line seems to be overlooked in the critical literature on the novel.  
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position to have. The reader has enough information to infer that Mary, in a comparable 
situation, might take self-interested pleasure in a rival’s blunder. 
But how are these different kinds of interest and disinterestedness related and who 
could the hypothetical disinterested observer be? Does the observer occupy a position inside 
the world of Mansfield Park or one outside of this fictional world? Is the distance separating 
the hypothetical observer from Mary, and allowing for amusement, a distance separating two 
people who share a world, or the distance separating the real from the represented? Before 
exploring the possibilities of the latter perspective, and asking how this hypothetical 
disinterested observer could be related to a hypothetical reader (which I will postpone until 
section six), I will consider the possibilities of a disinterested inhabitant of the world of 
Mansfield Park.  
We might imagine a guest at Sotherton who knows neither the Bertrams nor the 
Crawfords joining the tour of the house. Such an individual with no personal connection to 
or interest in Mary or Edmund might be in a position to find funny Mary’s “almost aghast” 
expression as she realizes her mistake with Edmund. According to this reading, not knowing 
Mary personally provides enough distance from her for someone to be entertained by her 
expression of embarrassment and regret. If Mary were in the position of this hypothetical 
disinterested observer would she be amused in this way? How does this disinterested 
response compare to the interested response someone like Mary might have to a rival’s 
distress? Does Mary’s hypothetical capacity to take personal and selfish pleasure in a rival’s 
embarrassment correspond to the capacity to laugh at, rather than pity, a stranger’s 
embarrassment?   
Readers are left to answer these questions for themselves, but Fanny’s response is 
given explicitly. The narrator shows Fanny, not actively picturing how Mary must feel, but 
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rather passively receiving an impression: “‘How distressed [Mary] will be at what she said just 
now,’ passed across [Fanny’s] mind” (64). The empathy Fanny so effortlessly feels contrasts 
sharply with the shortage of human feeling exhibited by my hypothetical stranger’s 
disinterested amusement.18  
Fanny’s pity for Mary is emotionally interested; 19 it is not practically, or selfishly 
interested. Is it personally interested? To what extent is Fanny’s almost automatic response 
to Mary’s expression due to a personal connection with Mary, and to what extent is it an 
emotional response that Fanny would feel for anyone? Readers know that Fanny does not 
think highly of Mary, and that she is jealous of Mary in a way that affects how she perceives 
her. This personal connection with Mary could cause a selfish pleasure in the 
correspondence between Mary’s blunder and Fanny’s interests as her rival. Fanny’s response 
to Mary’s distress displays neither this selfishness nor these interests. Instead, her pity for 
Mary seems to come from an empathy that overrides both Fanny’s suppressed jealousy and 
her negative evaluation of Mary’s character. Fanny’s pity displays an emotional interest in 
Mary as a person that takes precedence over any selfish interests that her personal 
relationship with Mary might inspire.   
Readers who judge harshly Fanny’s jealous and imaginative perception of Edmund’s 
attending to Mary may have trouble believing that she can sincerely feel pity for her rival’s 
blunder with the hero. Those giving more weight to Fanny’s attempts to feel how she 
believes she ought to are less likely to find her pity for Mary insincere, hypocritical, or out of 
character.  
                                               
18 Hart comments on Fanny’s often involuntary sympathy for others in the context of an 
argument about the dependence of privacy on social place in Austen’s novels (327-8).  
19 See Stokes on Austen’s use of “interesting” and “disinterested:” “A person or subject 
found interesting is one that ‘comes home to the feelings,’ that precludes disinterestedness” 
(168-9).  
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The interaction between Mansfield Park’s two plots also complicates readers’ 
judgments of Fanny and Mary in this situation. In terms of the marriage comedy, Mary’s 
blunder should correspond to an opportunity for Fanny. This opportunity does not 
materialize. Mary acknowledges her mistake and changes the subject. Edmund excuses her 
unflattering portrait of chapel prayers as the product of a “‘lively mind’” (62). Fanny, in turn, 
does not acknowledge Mary’s blunder as an opportunity even to bring Edmund’s judgment 
of Mary closer to her own, let alone put herself forward as an alternative to Mary. Mary’s 
mockery of Edmund’s vocation angers Fanny, but Mary’s subsequent embarrassment due to 
this mockery arouses Fanny’s pity as easily as her irreverence aroused her anger. We saw 
above that Fanny was not able to keep her feelings for Edmund from affecting her 
perception of him and Mary riding together. Here, she appears to be free from the self-
interest a rival for Edmund’s attention might have in relation to Mary. The narrative presents 
an opportunity for Fanny’s romantic interests to be furthered at Mary’s expense, but uses it 
instead to explore Fanny’s perception.  
I have already claimed that Fanny’s perceptions and judgments should not be 
evaluated according to what the marriage comedy promises for her, but rather in terms of 
what the fictional world affords her. Fanny should not be held accountable for the romantic 
interests that the marriage comedy promises to fulfill, though she should be held accountable 
for her response to her prohibited romantic feelings. Her failure to speak with Edmund 
about her negative judgment of Mary confuses how readers both construe and evaluate 
Fanny’s motives. A decision to speak with Edmund about Mary’s attitude towards his 
vocation could be motivated by laudable personal interest in his well-being just as reasonably 
as by selfish romantic interests in him. Fanny generally ignores the possibility of the latter 
and concentrates explicitly on the former. Because these different motives result in the same 
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action, for the most part only people not worried about being suspected of having selfish 
romantic interests20 comfortably point out the negative characteristics of the object of 
another’s affection. The narrator has already noted Fanny’s fear of appearing ill-natured as 
her reason for not mentioning to Edmund the faults she notices in Mary. Her timidity and 
reluctance to disagree with him about anything might also be blamed. Readers know, 
however, that Fanny is not free of the romantic feelings that would cast suspicion on her 
motives were she to express her doubts about Mary to Edmund. This knowledge might 
cause them to suspect that a fear of appearing jealous, rather than ill-natured, motivates 
Fanny’s silence. Fanny’s failure to speak to Edmund about Mary’s attitude towards his 
vocation, then, might be deemed suspicious based on two types of information readers have 
about Fanny: her romantic feelings for Edmund and the marriage comedy’s promise that she 
will end up with him. Fanny is responsible for how she handles her feelings for Edmund, but 
not for how she fails to take advantage of the marriage comedy’s opportunities.  
 
VI. Universalizing vs. Individualizing Perspectives 
Fanny’s empathetic response to Mary’s distress arises from a universalizing 
perspective that sees human beings in terms of universal capacities, e.g., the ability to feel 
pleasure and pain, rather than in terms of their individual particularities and situations. Fanny 
directs her attention towards Mary as another feeling human being like herself, imagining, 
moreover, that every human being is, ideally, capable of this empathetic attentiveness. The 
self-interest a character like Mary might take in her rival’s embarrassment, on the other hand, 
focuses on others as individuals that might harm or benefit oneself. Self-interest coincides 
with an individuating perspective in contrast to the universalizing perspective that 
                                               
20 Mothers come to mind, though of course they might be suspected of a whole different set 
of selfish interests.  
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accompanies an empathetic interest in others.21 Mary, in contrast to Fanny, is often 
motivated by self-interest. She is like Fanny, however, in assuming that most people think of 
others as she herself does. In other words, each universalizes her perspective, but Fanny 
universalizes the compassion she feels, whereas Mary universalizes her self-centered and 
individuating outlook.22 
One example of Mary’s assumptions about what generally motivates people appears 
later in the novel when she takes leave of Fanny for friends in London, and describes the 
effect that Henry’s devotion to Fanny will have there. Mary thinks Fanny will be happy to 
learn of  “‘…the envyings and heartburnings of dozens and dozens! the wonder, the 
incredulity that will be felt’” (244) in the Crawfords’ circle in town. Fanny, however, still 
does not take Henry’s proposal seriously. In accounting for her response to Henry’s 
“‘gallantries’” (246), Fanny explains that she assumed his attentions to her, like those he had 
paid to Julia and Maria, meant nothing. Mary acknowledges that Henry has been a “‘sad 
flirt,’” but quickly moves from this, his “‘only fault’” (246), to the advantage which it affords 
Fanny: “‘the glory of fixing one who has been shot at by so many; of having it in one’s 
power to pay off the debts of one’s sex! Oh, I am sure it is not in woman’s nature to refuse 
such a triumph’” (246). Mary’s idea of woman’s nature is not Fanny’s (nor, as both Mary and 
                                               
21 Arendt’s conception of political thought as representative relies on a Kantian act of 
imagining other perspectives. Arendt interestingly distinguishes imagining oneself in another 
situation from imagining how someone else might feel in that situation, as well as from 
empathizing. Representative thought, “being and thinking in my own identity where actually 
I am not” (“Some Questions” 241), takes into account other perspectives in order to work 
towards an impartial opinion, and its only condition is disinterestedness (“Some Questions” 
242). I will have more to say about the various kinds of interested imaginative acts depicted 
in and encouraged by Mansfield Park in Chapter Six.  
22 See Babb for an interesting discussion of Mary’s language and the way in which two types 
of generalizations she makes throughout the novel display her inability to achieve objective 
judgments: “one type is the axiom that codifies self-interest” and “her second type of 
generalization expresses her personal feelings more openly, and, typically, it projects them as 
a standard, something valid for everyone” (156 and passim). Sturrock also notes Mary’s 
tendency to universalize her own standards, particularly about money (181). 
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he will discover, is it Edmund’s). Mary’s woman is motivated by self-interest not only in her 
single-minded effort to secure the husband with the highest status and largest fortune 
possible, but, more significantly, in her ability to triumph and glory over those who have 
failed where she has succeeded. Fanny, on the other hand, while not insensible to the socio-
economic aspects of marriage, considers compatibility between partners a higher concern. 
She hopes, if not naively assumes, that other good people think like her, as evidenced by her 
mistaken optimism in telling Sir Thomas that she intends to refuse Henry. Fanny “had 
hoped that to a man like her uncle, so discerning, so honourable, so good, the simple 
acknowledgment of settled dislike on her side, would have been sufficient. To her infinite 
grief she found it was not” (215).   
 Readers who are hostile to Fanny interpret this mistake about how Sir Thomas 
understands Henry’s proposal as a sort of self-interested blindness, not unrelated to her 
suppression of her feelings for Edmund, and her refusal to acknowledge the possibility of 
her own importance. Readers willing to sympathize with Fanny’s mistakes of perception, on 
the other hand, do not judge her so harshly for assuming that Sir Thomas will act according 
to his ideals, or for not observing the other ways in which he does not uphold them.23  
Fanny and Mary have different ideas of human nature, ideas centered, I submit, 
around the different kinds of interest and disinterestedness they are capable of having in 
relation to other people as well as to nature and art. I discussed above how Mary and Fanny 
each universalizes her own characteristics. Mary’s assumption that everyone else is as self-
centered and socially ambitious as she is describes better the type of observer within the 
                                               
23 His allowing of Maria’s marriage to Rushworth is one example to which readers are made 
privy. Though it seems unreasonable to think Fanny would be aware of how he bent his 
ideals to accommodate his personal, practical, and selfish interests, it also seems 
unreasonable to think that Fanny would not have seen other examples of his shortcomings, 
especially in the raising of his daughters.  
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fictional world – one who might be disinterestedly amused at the kind of embarrassment she 
suffers – than does Fanny’s assumption that others are, like she tries to be, selflessly 
empathetic.  
 
VII. The Hypothetical Disinterested Observer as Hypothetical Reader 
What happens when the disinterested observer is placed at a reader’s distance from 
the characters? Does this distance help explain amusement at Mary’s distress as a 
disinterested response? The interested amusement with which a character like Mary might 
react to her rival’s blunder is not possible from the distance of a reader who cannot benefit 
from Mary’s distress. A reader might, however, be in a position similar to the stranger within 
the fictional world, who does not know Fanny, Mary, or Edmund, and who observes Mary’s 
attempts to be agreeable to Edmund and then her realization of her blunder. How does 
moving the hypothetical observer from inside to outside the fictional world affect 
amusement as a response to Mary’s blunder? The narrator’s mention of a disinterestedly 
amused response to Mary’s blunder encourages readers to feel amused as well, but only in 
order to then contrast this amusement with Fanny’s pity and highlight the lack of empathy 
necessary to the former.  
 Though readers are like the hypothetical disinterested stranger within the fictional 
world insofar as they have no practical interest in its characters, they are not strangers to the 
characters. The impossibility of practical interest in the characters does not mean that 
readers are otherwise disinterested in them. Mansfield Park not only interests readers in its 
characters (as all novels must), but also challenges readers to examine their interests, and to 
consider the possibilities and limitations of ideals of disinterested judgment in relation to 
both real and represented worlds. The introduction of a disinterested observer to the group 
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at Sotherton reminds readers of the variety of ways in which they might be interested in 
Mary’s embarrassment.  
The order in which the narrator presents Mary’s expression and the possible 
responses to it is important and worth repeating: “Miss Crawford’s countenance, as Julia 
spoke, might have amused a disinterested observer. She looked almost aghast under the new 
idea she was receiving. Fanny pitied her. ‘How distressed she will be at what she said just 
now,’ passed across her mind” (63-4). Readers sympathetic to Fanny are likely to involve 
themselves in the fictional world by being interested on her behalf. Such a reader is likely to 
share the amusement that the narrator says a disinterested observer might feel watching 
Mary. This reader’s amusement would not, however, be disinterested, but instead akin to the 
self-interested response that, as we have already seen, a character such as Mary might have 
inside the fictional world. The narrator, in other words, invites the reader who aligns herself 
with Fanny to feel an interest in Mary’s embarrassment that is much closer to what Mary 
might feel than what Fanny does. The narrator’s description of Mary’s “almost aghast” (64) 
expression could alert an amused reader to the discrepancy between amusement and what 
Fanny might feel upon seeing this expression. If not, the empathy and pity Fanny is next 
shown to experience make the contrast explicit. The narrator’s mention of an amused 
response to Mary’s distress momentarily encourages readers sympathetic to Fanny to be 
interested on her behalf in a manner that Fanny herself would not condone. A reader’s 
interested amusement in Mary’s embarrassment thus compares even more poorly with 
Fanny’s interested pity than does the disinterested amusement of a hypothetical stranger 
inside the fictional world that was explored above. Fanny’s pity, therefore, confronts readers 
sympathetic to her with the possible consequences of this partiality: a lack of empathy for 
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Mary. These readers might appreciate the insight Fanny’s response offers, or find it 
obnoxious, and Fanny annoyingly virtuous. 
Readers already annoyed by Fanny’s naively virtuous assumptions and emotional 
volatility, as I have already mentioned, are unlikely to respond well to her selfless pity for 
Mary’s distress. These readers might, on the one hand, pity Mary. This episode thus 
challengingly aligns readers who are sympathetic to Fanny with Mary, and readers who are 
sympathetic to Mary with Fanny. The latter reader’s pity would, like the amusement of the 
reader in the previous example, express an emotional and personal interest, but on Mary’s, 
rather than Fanny’s, behalf. This pity would not, however, be at Fanny’s expense, as the 
amusement on Fanny’s behalf is at Mary’s. On the other hand, readers unsympathetic to 
Fanny might not sympathize with Mary either, and instead take the narrator’s hint to be 
amused at her expense as conforming to expectations about a marriage comedy’s treatment 
of the heroine’s rival. This reading might highlight Fanny’s inabilities to desire or forward the 
marriage promised for the heroine of such a marriage comedy. 
The narrator’s contrast between the possibility of disinterested amusement at Mary’s 
expense and the interested pity Fanny feels on her behalf confronts readers with their 
interests in Fanny and Mary, regardless of what those interests are. The contrast also points 
to the question of the difference between interested- and disinterested-ness in relation to real 
and represented worlds. The disinterest of an amused observer within the fictional world is 
of a different sort than the disinterest afforded by a reader’s removal from this world. The 
practical disinterestedness of a reader in relation to fictional characters allows for a unique 
sort of emotional and personal involvement with them. This practical disinterestedness 
means that readers cannot selfishly put their own interests above those of the characters; it 
does not, however, preclude readers from indulging their own interests in their judgments of 
  105  
characters or from adopting the selfish interests of the characters with whom they 
sympathize. 
Mansfield Park’s two plots and its various ways of contrasting Fanny and Mary 
encourage readers to develop conflicting kinds of interests in relation to its characters. The 
encouragement of these conflicting interests alerts readers to different standards of 
disinterestedness operating in relation to real and represented worlds, and to the idea that the 
standards of the latter might afford experiences that are relevant to the former. More 
specifically, Mansfield Park’s examples of being interested and disinterested portray the 
strengths and weaknesses of different approaches. The novel’s manner of interesting readers 
in its characters, furthermore, offers them the opportunity to consider their own approaches 
as they evaluate those of the different characters.  
This chapter’s focus on the relationship between, on the one hand, Mansfield Park’s 
contrasts of Fanny and Mary and, on the other, its management of the distance between 
readers and characters, sheds light on a particular meaning of interestedness: partiality. I 
discussed above the different ways Mary and Fanny both universalize partial perspectives. 
Mary is partial to her own interests, and she assumes that everyone is similarly partial. Fanny 
is empathetic, attempts to be impartial, and assumes that others strive similarly. Fanny’s 
universalization of empathetic impartiality leads her into as many mistakes about other 
people’s motives as does Mary’s universalization of selfish partiality. Both of their 
universalizations paint an inaccurate and partial picture of the world they inhabit because 
they both fail to take into account the different attitudes possible within that world.24 
                                               
24 They both also have strengths as readers of their world. Mary’s charm depends on her 
ability to understand other people. She sees how Fanny is treated at Mansfield Park as well as 
Edmund’s regard for her, and is able to use both to her advantage in making herself pleasing 
to Edmund. Fanny sees clearly the interactions among Henry, Maria, and Julia and those 
between Susan and Betsey in Portsmouth.  
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Fanny and Mary are both able to put themselves in other positions and imagine what 
they might do if they found themselves there. Imagining oneself in different positions does 
not, however, necessarily reveal much about the specific experiences of others in these 
positions. Instead, it forms a partial picture, a picture of what a certain type of person might 
feel or do in various situations. Impartiality requires a more complete picture of what various 
types of people might feel or do in various situations. 
The novel’s depiction of the different partial perspectives of its characters gives 
readers a relatively complete view. Even the relative completeness of a reader’s perspective, 
however, does not afford impartiality. Although the narrative shows readers a more 
complete picture of the characters and their motives than any of the characters have, it also 
encourages, as I have explored in this chapter, various types of biases in relation to the 
characters. The narrative thus clarifies two different ways of defining, and attempting to 
achieve, impartiality: as completeness and as lack of bias.  
These two definitions of impartiality are at work both in the novel’s management of 
the distance between readers and characters and among the characters within the fictional 
world. Readers are shown the different ways in which the characters try to and fail to achieve 
impartiality. Both Fanny and Mary are shown to have incomplete and biased perspectives. 
Mansfield Park asks readers to distinguish between Mary’s and Fanny’s different types of 
partialities. The novel’s two plots complicatedly oppose Mary’s bias in favor of her own 
interests to the bias caused by Fanny’s feelings for Edmund, and the incompleteness of 
Mary’s worldview caused by her self-centered attitude to the incompleteness of Fanny’s 
worldview caused by her selfless attitude. 
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Fanny and Mary both need to read their situations accurately in order to achieve 
their goals. They have, however, very different goals. Fanny tries to be virtuous; Mary is 
ambitious. Fanny’s attempts to be disinterested and impartial blind her to the interests and 
partialities of others as well as to the influence of her feelings for Edmund on her own 
perception. Her perspective is thus both incomplete and biased. Mary’s attempts to forward 
her socio-economic interests blind her to the more idealistic motives of others. Her 
perspective is thus both biased and incomplete. 
Because Fanny’s attempts to be virtuous mean ignoring the possibility that the 
marriage comedy promises for her and that readers know accords with her feelings, some 
readers cannot sympathize with these attempts. These readers are more likely to sympathize 
with Mary’s attempts to ignore her ambition in allowing herself to become attached to 
Edmund. The marriage comedy’s fulfillment of Fanny’s unacknowledged wishes and 
punishment of Mary’s ambitious demands declares its preference for Fanny’s type of 
partiality over Mary’s and for Fanny’s failed attempts at impartiality over Mary’s biased ability 
to imagine other people’s perspectives. Whether readers accept this ending and agree with 
this preference depends on how they respond to the novel’s challenging way of interesting 
them in and distancing them from the characters.  
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Chapter Three: Reality and Representation in (and of) Mansfield Park 
I. Confusing Reality and Representation: The Private Theatricals 
In this chapter, I clarify the similarities and differences between social and theatrical 
roles, especially by comparing the characters’ behavior during the episode of the private 
theatricals. In the last chapter, I argued that Mansfield Park challenges readers to distinguish 
the kinds of mistakes of perception and judgment made by Fanny from those made by Mary. 
The episode of the private theatricals, I argue below, contrasts the characters’ different kinds 
of mistakes on the basis of their different senses of propriety and capacities for judgment. 
None of the characters behaves blamelessly, but neither are they all guilty of the same 
mistakes. The consequences of these various mistakes within the fictional world differ from 
their possible consequences for readers’ judgments of the characters. The novel, I claim, uses 
the private theatricals to dramatize the moral and aesthetic consequences for both characters 
and readers of confusing real and represented worlds. 
 The episode of the private theatricals at Mansfield Park is the source of much critical 
discussion and disagreement for a number of reasons. Most importantly for this study, the 
activity of putting on a play explicitly raises a number of aesthetic and moral issues of 
representation and reality, art and life, and the nature of role-playing. In addition, the choice 
of play, Lovers’ Vows, Elizabeth Inchbald’s free translation of Kotzebue’s Das Kind der Liebe, 
invites criticism about the morals, politics, and reception of this play in Austen’s time.1 And, 
                                               
1 Jordan argues that in Mansfield Park, Austen “tacitly but actively” debates with Inchbald 
about the moral effects of theatre (140), as well as the pulpit and the novel, characterizing 
Austen as taking the mentor-mentee theme “further in a feminist direction than either Mrs. 
Inchbald or Mary Wollstonecraft” (142). Greenfield also gives a feminist reading of the play 
and novel, arguing that they are ideologically similar in promoting the internal merits of 
women. Nachumi, like Jordan, argues that Austen participates in contemporary debates 
about the theatre. But Nachumi claims that Austen suggests a rational distance from the 
emotions possible in aesthetic experience. Nachumi’s suggestive analysis cites historical 
debates about the dangers of theatre and links formal features of Austen’s style, e.g., free 
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because it focuses all the characters on a single project, the theatricals provide a unique 
opportunity for comparing their behavior and attitudes.2 
 Criticism is divided along the familiar lines of criticism of Austen generally and 
Mansfield Park more specifically: is Austen a conservative who condemns both Lovers’ Vows 
and the practice of private theatricals on moral and/or political grounds or a radical feminist 
and/or liberal who criticizes the immorality of society by comparing it to the superior, 
sentimental morality prevailing in Lovers’ Vows? How do the values expressed in Lovers’ Vows 
and Mansfield Park compare? Is “Mansfield Park…nothing more nor less than Lovers’ Vows 
translated into terms of real life with the moral standard subverted by Kotzebue neatly re-
inverted” (326), as E.M. Butler would have it?3 Or, following Paula Byrne in Jane Austen and 
the Theatre, are the plots of novel and play parallel, suggesting not the dangers of theatre but 
instead the necessity of playing roles?  
 Mansfield Park’s attitude towards theatricality and role-playing has been taken up by 
many critics in various ways, from Trilling’s focus on a fear of impersonation to Daniel 
O’Quinn’s discussion of Mansfield Park as inviting readers to participate in theatre as 
autoethnography. These discussions emphasize various aspects of role-playing to make 
different kinds of claims. Penny Gay’s historical study, Jane Austen and the Theatre (not to be 
                                                                                                                                            
indirect speech, with her approach to aesthetic distance. However, I think she overlooks the 
importance of emotion and imagination in Austen’s approach to aesthetic distance, and I 
find myself in disagreement with her reading that the end of the novel shows Fanny 
accepting values the novel condemns (see Chapter Seven for my own reading of how the 
novel’s conclusion successfully points to the difference, as well as connection, between 
judgments of real and represented). Lott also discusses Mansfield Park’s depiction of the 
private theatricals in terms of contemporary debates about theatre as socially disruptive or 
stabilizing.     
2 The play also suggests comparison between its characters and those of the novel. 
Greenfield, E.M. Butler, Jordan, Bevan, and Conger all link characters in the novel with 
characters in the play.  
3 In E.M. Butler’s reading, Austen reworks the preposterous characters and licentiousness of 
Lovers’ Vows into the realistic characters getting their just moral deserts of Mansfield Park.  
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confused with Byrne’s, also historical, book by the same title, published in the same year) 
emphasizes the moral ambiguity of theatricality. Joseph Litvak uses the metaphor of 
infection to describe the inescapability of theatricality in the world of Mansfield Park, as well 
as in contemporary debates about the moral effects of theatre on audiences (for example, by 
Evangelicals like Thomas Gisborne and Hannah More). David Marshall links the necessity 
of role-playing with the inescapability of signification in his discussion of the possibility of 
real feeling and sincerity in Mansfield Park. I agree that social role-playing is inescapable. My 
focus on judgment contributes to critical discussions by clarifying how the episode of the 
private theatricals clarifies different modes of judgment appropriate to different levels of 
reality and representation and sets up the consequences of different ways of confusing them.   
The social role-playing demanded in the world of the novel affords opportunities in 
which appearances, the feelings behind them, and the meanings they are meant to have for 
various observers can be confused with one another both intentionally and unintentionally. 
Taking up theatrical roles as social entertainment introduces new kinds of representation and 
levels of reality available for manipulation in the world of Mansfield Park, and therefore new 
possibilities for misunderstandings among the characters. The novel’s portrayal of the 
characters’ self-representations and misrepresentations during the episode of the private 
theatricals highlights the problems of negotiating the relationship between one’s inner reality 
and one’s social self.4 In giving the characters the opportunity to manipulate the difference 
between their theatrical roles, their social roles, and their inner selves, the private theatricals 
                                               
4 Altieri describes realism as the representation of a shareable reality, as, at its best, offering 
“self-reflexive explorations of what is involved in leading a recognizable life in society, 
sharing its pleasures and its pains, and especially, its principles of evaluation, even if this 
sharing also means criticizing…” (79). Frye links the Cinderella archetype and domestic 
comedy with the integration of a reader-like hero into society (Anatomy 44). Canuel reads 
Mansfield Park as delineating the relationship between individual and society through a focus 
on pain and punishment, linking this interest to eighteenth- and nineteenth-century reforms 
of the British system of punishment.  
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expose the weaknesses of their various strategies and the consequences of their 
compromised judgments. The private theatricals put all of the characters in difficult social 
and moral situations, in which their social behavior and moral judgments are influenced by 
emotion and self-interest.  
The different characters have very different attitudes towards private theatricals and 
towards the roles they take in Lovers’ Vows. Their attitudes towards their theatrical roles are 
related to their attitudes towards social roles in complicated ways. In general, however, a 
willingness to manipulate social appearances self-interestedly corresponds to a willingness to 
use one’s theatrical role to further one’s personal interests, while placing a value on frankness 
in social interaction makes characters susceptible to inconsistencies of judgment and 
behavior during the private theatricals.5  
Readers, like the characters, respond very differently to the private theatricals, as well 
as to how the characters behave during this episode. Those who do not accept the 
objections to private theatricals expressed by Edmund, Fanny, and Sir Thomas are more 
likely to judge these characters harshly and forgive the behavior of Henry and Maria. But 
readers who do not judge harshly the behavior of Henry and Maria begin to find themselves 
at odds with judgments expressed within the fictional world leading up to the plot’s eventual 
condemnation of them both. Readers willing to accept the dangers posed by the private 
                                               
5 Bevan argues that in Mansfield Park, “acting is used both as an illustration of, and as a 
metaphor for, invalid attempts to express and define the self” (595). Accordingly, while 
Fanny, who is grounded in her emotions and strives for harmony between herself and her 
world, cannot act, the Crawfords, who are unfixed and seek to create their own realities, 
constantly create and perform fictions. See Edwards for a reading of the theatricals’ blurring 
of art and life in terms of the characters’ desires to impose their wills upon one another. He 
argues that Mary and Henry do not distinguish between art and life, that their interactions 
with Edmund and Fanny ask everything of them without committing anything themselves 
(61). 
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theatricals, on the other hand, tend to judge Fanny’s behavior more sympathetically and 
convict Henry and Maria of the grave errors for which the novel ultimately punishes them.6  
These judgments about the characters’ behavior are also judgments about different 
ways of confusing and manipulating the relationship between the real and the represented. 
Readers frustrated by disapproval of the private theatricals resist the novel’s claim about the 
dangers of blurring the boundary between real and represented, while those dismayed by 
how Henry and Maria use their theatrical roles to further their flirtation accept the novel’s 
depiction of the possible dangers of confusing the real and the represented. The different 
relationships between the real and the represented depicted during the episode of the private 
theatricals raises the question of the consequences of the sort of distance from which a 
reader might regard the fictional world.  
 
II. Social vs. Theatrical Role-playing 
 The central claims of this chapter have to do with the private theatricals’ importance 
to the characters of the novel, the progression of the plot, and the judgments readers make 
about both the characters and the novel. In order to make these specific claims about the 
importance of the private theatricals, I must clarify a number of more general issues about 
social and theatrical roles. In this section, I first explain the differences and similarities 
between theatrical and social roles, as well as the relationship between the real and the 
                                               
6 These judgments are related to judgments about how the novel presents the private 
theatricals. See Zelicovici for a distinction between disapproving of the private theatricals or 
play and disapproving of the players. She is often credited with being the first to make a case 
for Austen condemning the players, not the play. I. Armstrong identifies the private 
theatricals as objectionable within the text because they subvert Sir Thomas’s authority and 
threaten his property (58 and passim). She also discusses the political questions raised by the 
novel’s use of Lovers’ Vows (67 and passim); and the relationship between the novel’s 
characters and the inappropriate roles they choose to play in Lovers’ Vows (70 and passim).  
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represented involved in each. I then discuss the general attitudes at Mansfield Park and in 
London towards social role-playing.  
Theatrical roles, when confined to the theatre, generally form a straightforward 
contrast with social roles, where the former are representations and the latter reality. 
Theatrical roles exist in a fictional realm, one separated from the world of their actors and 
audience by the same kind of aesthetic distance separating the characters in a novel from its 
readers. Social roles, in contrast, belong to the real world of their actors. The reality of social 
roles, however, does not mitigate their nature as roles. As such, they imply a distinction 
between the appearance maintained in playing the role and the feelings, beliefs, and 
intentions connected to this appearance. While the appearance maintained in the 
performance of a social role is easily characterized as a kind of representation, whatever 
might contradict or lie behind this performance is less easily characterized as reality.  
Though I am investigating what Mansfield Park has to say about the relationship 
between representation and reality, I am more interested in clarifying how different kinds of 
representation function than in defining the “realness” of any reality that might be related to 
these representations. My discussion of how the characters of Mansfield Park approach the 
relationship between the real and the represented involved in social role-playing relies on 
Erving Goffman’s analysis of social performances in The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. I 
follow Goffman in considering crucial not “which is the more real, the fostered impression 
or the one the performer attempts to prevent the audience from receiving” (65-6), but rather 
“merely that impressions fostered in everyday performances are subject to disruption” (66). 
The crucial literary and aesthetic considerations for this dissertation are not whether 
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Mansfield Park depicts the existence of a real self behind one’s social performances,7 but 
rather how and why characters and readers interpret and judge differently the various kinds 
of social role-playing in the novel. 
Although social roles appear to have the same structure of depicter and depicted 
characteristic of theatrical roles, there is no coherent “real person” that can be defined in 
contrast to the social roles one plays. The depicter and the depicted might be 
indistinguishable or contradictory. Social roles, furthermore, confine their actors to a typical 
code of behavior, but not to a set script. In order to distinguish different kinds of social role-
playing, therefore, we need to consider not the contrast between an actor and a role, but 
instead how social roles can be manipulated and misinterpreted. How one appears in a social 
role can be different from what one believes, what one feels, and what one intends. One can 
knowingly or unknowingly misrepresent one’s beliefs, feelings, and intentions for various 
more or less selfish reasons. As I have already indicated, the characters of Mansfield Park can 
be compared according to the extent to which they allow themselves to act out of self-
interest as well as according to the extent to which they know themselves to be doing so. 
 One of the many differences between Goffman’s investigation of social role-playing 
in twentieth-century Anglo-American society and my investigation of the depiction of social 
and theatrical role-playing in Mansfield Park is important at this point. The reality of whatever 
lies behind the social performances studied by Goffman is unimportant to his investigation 
because it is expressed, and therefore can be studied by his methods, only insofar as it 
empirically contradicts a social performance, or affects the performance in another way that 
can be determined by its audience. In contrast to actual social performances, literary 
                                               
7 See Urda for a claim that in Mansfield Park, Austen chooses not to represent any actual 
performances in order to protect the idea of coherent moral subjectivity against theatrical 
ideas of inescapable performance.  
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depictions of social performances often include information about what lies behind the 
performance, information about which, furthermore, the performing characters may be 
more or less aware.8 Accordingly, I compare the characters in Mansfield Park with regard to 
how knowingly they play social roles, how willingly they misrepresent themselves in these 
roles, and how effectively they justify their misrepresentations.9 
Mansfield Park provides a complex and challenging picture of how the different 
characters perform socially, their different abilities to predict the consequences of their 
performances, and how aware they are of what motivates their performances. The plot of 
the novel evaluates the behavior of the characters in one way in its ultimately uniting Fanny 
and Edmund at Mansfield Park and banishing Maria and the Crawfords from it. The insight 
that the novel gives readers into the social performances of the characters as it depicts these 
performances, in contrast, encourages different types of interest in and judgments of the 
characters at different moments. These varied evaluations are important also because they 
challenge readers to examine the reasons behind their own interests in, involvements with, 
and judgments of the different characters. Mansfield Park’s use of the private theatricals is 
one of the ways in which the novel emphasizes the relationship between the distance 
between readers and characters, on the one hand, and readers’ judgments of characters, on 
the other. 
I first examine the characters’ general attitudes towards their social and theatrical 
roles. Then, as I discuss the specific behavior and judgment of the characters, I address how 
this behavior is presented. Before I turn to how the various characters perform socially, 
                                               
8 Goffman makes use of this advantage of literature by using the occasional literary example 
to illustrate his claims.  
9 Conger uses Jauss’s scheme of reception to characterize the Crawfords’ and Miss Bertrams’ 
interaction with the theatre as cultic participation in contrast to Edmund and Fanny, for 
whom the episode is a spur to ethical action, a much higher form of aesthetic experience 
(93-4). Lodge also characterizes the episode of the private theatricals as a test.  
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however, it is important to note the inescapability of playing social roles. Judgment is not to 
be passed on the fact that the characters play social roles, but rather on how they play them. 
This reminder is important because of the ease with which both readers and characters 
understate the dramatic nature of social interaction and associate role-playing with 
dishonesty. Goffman attributes this tendency to the “two common-sense models according 
to which we formulate our conceptions of behavior: the real, sincere, or honest 
performance; and the false one that thorough fabricators assemble for us” (70).10  The 
“honest” performance is thought to be transparent and “real,” not much of a performance at 
all. Contrived behavior, conversely, is assumed to be dishonest as well. These associations 
are not accurate, argues Goffman, as “there is a statistical relation between appearances and 
reality, not an intrinsic or necessary one” (71). These common, yet mistaken associations 
between honesty, goodness, and spontaneity, on the one hand, and dishonesty, selfishness, 
and contrivance, on the other, not only inform how readers judge characters and characters 
interpret one another’s behavior, but also form the basis of an inaccurate conception of 
social life.11  
While Mansfield Park contrasts the society of Mansfield Park and that of the 
Crawfords’ London,12 it also suggests that the two societies share this misconception about 
                                               
10 The “we” of Goffman’s sentence is “Anglo-American culture” defined broadly. That 
something similar to these models is at work in the world of Mansfield Park is evidenced not 
only by the characters’ interactions, but also its use of the word “artless” to describe a 
manner that appears honest and uncontrived.  
11 Bevan and Marshall both discuss these assumptions tangentially.  
12 Many critics look at the novel in terms of this contrast, for example Mudrick and 
Fleishman. Banfield, in her discussion of how the novel equates aesthetic and moral 
standards, argues that while the contrast between country and city is important, the novel 
actually characterizes Mansfield Park as the “just mean” (“Moral Landscape” 5) between the 
extremes of Sotherton, on the one hand, and Portsmouth, on the other. According to 
Banfield, Mansfield Park exhibits the harmony prized by neoclassical aesthetics, while 
Sotherton is characterized by an overly rigid and empty formality and Portsmouth by chaos 
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social behavior. All of the characters in the novel play social roles; they all associate 
transparency in these roles with honesty and good intentions. They do not, however, place 
the same value on honesty or share a definition of acceptable intentions. The London society 
exemplified by the Crawfords pays lip service to values similar to those espoused at 
Mansfield Park, but assumes that everyone actually pursues her own interests.13 The 
inhabitants of Mansfield Park, in contrast, tend to believe that people actually hold the 
values they espouse.  
Goffman’s distinction between sincere and cynical social performances helps clarify 
the different attitudes towards social role-playing prevalent at Mansfield Park and in London. 
“When an individual has no belief in his own act…” explains Goffman, “we may call him 
cynical, reserving the term ‘sincere’ for individuals who believe in the impression fostered by 
their own performance” (18). Goffman uses this contrast between sincerity and cynicism to 
talk only about the extent to which a performer is “taken in” (17) by his performance, not as 
an indication of the quality of a performer’s intentions. A sincere performance, in other 
words, does not have any necessary relationship with admirable intentions. Conversely, a 
cynical performance does not necessarily correspond to ignoble intentions.14  
Mansfield Park values sincere performances, while London society assumes that 
people normally perform cynically. The assumption that people do not believe in their social 
                                                                                                                                            
and impropriety. Ryle sees London as a “convenient sink” for vice that Austen prefers not to 
explore in detail (295-6).  
13 See Gordon for discussions of Mandevillian assumptions of universal self-interest in 
seventeenth-century England and of Richardson’s explorations of this problem in Pamela and 
Clarissa. 
14 See Davidson for an argument that Mansfield Park defends a particular type of hypocrisy as 
necessary, forgivable, and a successful social strategy, especially for dependents such as 
Fanny. Davidson discusses eighteenth-century manners and patronage, and associates 
Fanny’s hypocrisy with her lack of transparency to the other characters. Fanny’s “good” 
hypocrisy and lack of transparency is contrasted with the more predictable pursuit of self-
interest that characterizes London’s society as well as Maria, Julia, and Tom.   
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performances goes hand in hand with the assumption that people are generally motivated by 
self-interest, which in London is defined as the pursuit of social standing, wealth, and 
fleeting pleasures. These pursuits may sometimes be acknowledged, but the “veneer of 
consensus” (Goffman 10) operating in London also often demands that they be obscured by 
performances of selflessness. Because London society continues to pay lip service to values 
such as honesty and selflessness in spite of assuming that few actually act on them, the 
pursuit of social status, wealth, or fleeting pleasure is often furthered by an appearance of 
honesty and selflessness. In London society, therefore, there is often reason to hide one’s 
pursuit of self-interest from others, but there is no reason to hide it from oneself.  
 At Mansfield Park, by contrast, it is in one’s interest to hide one’s less than virtuous 
inclinations from oneself. Only by ignoring these inclinations can one conform both to the 
expectation of sincerity in performances and to the demand to be virtuous. Ironically, then, 
the value Mansfield Park places on sincere performances discourages the kind of self-
reflection and self-awareness associated with sincerity in its everyday sense. The faulty 
association of sincere social performances with goodness conspires with Mansfield Park’s 
insistence on these kinds of performances to encourage a degree of self-deception. The two 
societies pay lip service to similar notions of virtue and many of their members actually 
behave according to similar types of self-interest. London’s assumption that people behave 
cynically, however, encourages an awareness of this discrepancy between appearance and 
behavior, while Mansfield Park’s belief in sincere performances discourages any such self-
awareness. 
 
III. Social-Role Playing and Knowledge of Oneself and Others 
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 The preceding generalizations about the attitudes towards social roles prevalent at 
Mansfield Park and in London will help me frame the specific attitudes of the different 
characters. These comparisons, however, will also involve generalizations and 
simplifications, as the behavior of each character is both complex and various. I cannot 
bring out the importance of the characters’ behavior during the private theatricals, however, 
without first providing a general schema of the characters’ different attitudes towards social 
roles. 
 When discussing, in Chapter One, the importance to the novel’s plot of a change in 
the way the characters hold values, I indicated that the novel’s initial situation encouraged 
both misunderstandings among the characters and characters’ misunderstandings of 
themselves. I can now be more specific about how these misunderstandings work, their 
functions in the plot, and their implications for judgments of the real and the represented. I 
will focus in this section on the attitudes towards social role-playing of the Miss Bertrams, 
the Crawfords, and Edmund. Chapter Four is dedicated to Fanny. I will have more to say 
about Sir Thomas in Chapter Five, and I will address the other characters along the way.  
 The Miss Bertrams enter society with sincere social performances, while the 
Crawfords arrive at Mansfield Park ready to perform cynically in order to achieve their 
respective romantic objectives. This contrast, however, has more to do with the different 
societies in which the Crawfords and Miss Bertrams have been raised than with their values. 
The Miss Bertrams’ sincerity in their social performances does not mean that they act out of 
self-interest any less than do the Crawfords; it means only that they do so with less self-
awareness.  
 The narrator of Mansfield Park efficiently depicts the sincerity with which the Miss 
Bertrams appear to have values that they do not understand. Their vanity, readers are told as 
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the young women enter society, “was in such good order, that they seemed to be quite free 
from it, and gave themselves no airs; while the praises attending such behaviour, secured, 
and brought round by their aunt, served to strengthen them in believing they had no faults” 
(26). The Miss Bertrams believe that they are as praiseworthy as the appearances they put on 
for society. But the sincerity of this belief does not affect its falseness, as the novel will go on 
to emphasize. The Miss Bertrams have learned that they should not appear vain or self-
interested. Their upbringing’s focus on appearances has prevented them from gaining a 
deeper understanding of the possible value associated with such appearances. Though “they 
joined to beauty and brilliant acquirements, a manner naturally easy, and carefully formed to 
general civility and obligingness” (26),15 the Miss Bertrams are “entirely deficient in the less 
common acquirements of self-knowledge, generosity, and humility” (16).16 These young 
women do not live up to the roles they play because they are ignorant of the values to which 
they pretend. They know only the appearances their society rewards. The sincerity of the 
Miss Bertrams’ performances relies upon this ignorance of its deficiencies. By not examining 
the motives for their behavior, the Miss Bertrams remain taken in by their performances as 
admirable young women. I will discuss below challenges to the Miss Bertrams’ sincerity as 
well as their more cynical performances, e.g., as dutiful daughters and in their vying for 
Henry.   
The Crawfords’ respective attitudes towards marriage display their cynical attitudes 
towards social performances. Henry, characterized by Mary as “‘the most horrible flirt that 
can be imagined’” (32) proclaims himself “‘unwilling to risk [his] happiness in a hurry’” (32). 
                                               
15 This description agrees with Goffman’s analysis of the “veneer of consensus” (10) 
marking social interaction.  
16 See Garson’s discussion of how Mansfield Park participates in an anti-accomplishment 
discourse, contrasting the Miss Bertrams’ empty accomplishments with Fanny’s natural taste 
(125 and passim). Mandal examines the distinction between empty accomplishments and 
principle as Evangelical (106).  
 121 
This reluctance to commit does not prevent Henry from engaging the affection of young 
women explicitly looking to be married.17 While his sister numbers among this type of young 
woman, she considers her cynical view of marriage a kind of protection against the 
heartbreak that her friends have suffered from Henry. Her general attitude that “‘every body 
is taken in at some period or other’” (34) applies particularly to marriage, which she 
considers “‘of all transactions, the one in which people expect most from others, and are 
least honest themselves’” (34). In Mary’s description of marriage, people behave cynically 
while expecting others to be sincere. 
Mary’s attitude towards marriage does not prevent her from expecting too much 
from Edmund. But Edmund also expects too much from Mary though he has a more 
positive and less ambitious attitude towards marriage. He quickly falls in love “without 
studying the business… or knowing what he was about” (47), while she “might be equal to 
feel, though not equal to discuss with herself” (48) the charm of qualities, e.g., “his sincerity, 
his steadiness, his integrity” (47), that she is not used to valuing at all – let alone valuing 
above – the social status, “the arts of flattery,” and “the gaieties of small talk” (47) in which 
Edmund is deficient. The high expectations and lack of self-interrogation fueled by their 
mutual attraction enable them to misinterpret the significance of their differences. 
 Edmund and Mary do not, however, shy away from clearly stating their very 
different values. As their attraction grows, so too does the need to address Edmund’s 
commitment to a profession that Mary disdains. In their first disagreement, at Sotherton, she 
                                               
17 The narrator comments on Henry’s attitude towards the Miss Bertrams: “the Miss 
Bertrams were worth pleasing, and were ready to be pleased; and he began with no object 
but of making them like him. He did not want them to die of love; but with sense and 
temper which ought to have made him judge and feel better, he allowed himself great 
latitude on such points” (33). Note the parallels between sense and judgment, as well as 
temper and feeling. I will have more to say about Henry’s potential and his failings in 
Chapter Five. Miller cites the same passage in characterizing Henry as incurably 
unnarratable, unwilling to fix meaning or be fixed by marriage (20-27).  
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asserts that “‘a clergyman is nothing’” (66) and flirtatiously, if pointlessly, attempts to 
convince him to choose another profession. He, in turn, solemnly tries to convince her of 
the value of the clergy. Mary’s judgment of the clergy is based on the impossibility of gaining 
“‘distinction…in the church’” (66). In his defense of the clergy, Edmund differentiates 
between a clergyman and his office as well as between manners and conduct.18 Both these 
differences clarify his commitment to sincere social performances. Edmund understands the 
office of clergyman as a type of social role that demands sincere performance. The man 
must live up to this role or he will “‘appear what he ought not to appear’” (66). The force of 
this “ought” is lost on Mary, who both assumes that people generally perform cynically and 
does so herself. She continues to consider the clergy in terms of particular examples19 
because she does not acknowledge the possibility of sincere social performances or the 
importance of the office as Edmund defines it. The social performance of the clergyman 
could not have the importance that Edmund attributes to it, she argues, as two sermons are 
hardly sufficient to “‘govern the conduct and fashion the manners of a large congregation 
for the rest of the week’” (66). Edmund has already defined the office of the clergy as 
consisting in more than two sermons a week, and he attempts to clarify his understanding of 
                                               
18 Zimmerman notes this distinction in his reading of Mansfield Park as the novel that initiates 
Austen’s later period of pervasive irony, a discrepancy between individual and society. 
Fanny, he argues, represents an ideal in which there should be no ironic discrepancy between 
conduct and manners (351), but, in the ironic vision of the novel, she eventually prefers a 
flawed society in which such a distinction exists (353). Mandal sees the distinction as an 
Evangelical one that emphasizes the importance of the clergyman’s role in the community 
(104).   
19 In a later conversation she defends her view with the example of her brother-in-law: “‘… I 
am not entirely without the means of seeing what clergymen are, being at this present time 
the guest of my own brother, Dr. Grant. And though Dr. Grant is most kind and obliging to 
me, and though he is really a gentleman, and I dare say, a good scholar and clever, and often 
preaches good sermons, and is very respectable, I see him to be an indolent selfish bon 
vivant, who must have his palate consulted in every thing, who will not stir a finger for the 
convenience of any one, and who, moreover, if the cook makes a blunder, is out of humour 
with his excellent wife’” (79). 
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it by distinguishing the influence Mary doubts – manners demanded in good society – from 
that which he defends – conduct demanded by good religious and moral principles.20 
 Edmund is at pains to make this distinction because of the ease with which manners 
and conduct are confused. Though he describes two different types of behavior, namely, 
public manners and conduct resulting from good principles, the two often look similar. The 
politeness and courtesy demanded by society can overlap or conflict with the conduct 
demanded by good principles. When politeness, courtesy, and refinement stem from good 
principles, they overlap with what Edmund calls conduct. When politeness, courtesy, and 
refinement stem merely from a desire to conform to social expectations or to win social 
favor, they differ from what Edmund calls conduct. London’s assumption that people 
behave cynically suggests that politeness, courtesy, and refinement often disguise the kind of 
self-interest considered impolite to pursue openly. Mansfield Park’s insistence on sincere 
performances privileges conduct over mere manners, but it does not always differentiate 
clearly between them. 21      
 The confusion of manners with conduct contributes to the trouble that the 
characters of Mansfield Park have clarifying their own motives as well as those of others. 
Society does not always demand behavior that conforms to good principles, but there is 
enough overlap between the demands of society and those of good principles to cause 
                                               
20 He says: “‘And with regard to their influencing public manners, Miss Crawford must not 
misunderstand me, or suppose I mean to call them the arbiters of good breeding, the 
regulators of refinement and courtesy, the masters of the ceremonies of life. The manners I 
speak of, might rather be called conduct, perhaps, the result of good principles; the effect, in 
short, of those doctrines which it is their duty to teach and recommend; and it will, I believe, 
be every where found, that as the clergy are, or are not what they ought to be, so are the rest 
of the nation’” (67).  
21 See the narrator’s description of Julia at Sotherton, stuck with Mrs. Rushworth and Mrs. 
Norris: “The politeness which she had been brought up to practise as a duty, made it 
impossible for her to escape; while the want of that higher species of self-command, that just 
consideration of others, that knowledge of her own heart, that principle of right which had 
not formed any essential part of her education, made her miserable under it” (65). 
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confusion. The Miss Bertrams, for example, do not distinguish between public manners and 
principled conduct. As I explained above, they think that they have good principles because 
they have been taught that these are important without having learned what they are. The 
good manners that they have learned trick their parents and themselves (but not Mary and 
Henry) into thinking that they have qualities such as selflessness and humility, which they in 
actuality lack. 
 Mary has been taught to value public manners as a means to and expression of 
wealth and status. Unlike the Miss Bertrams, she does not feel compelled to disguise the 
value she places on wealth and status. Her disagreements with Edmund about the value of 
the clergy raise the question of whether she understands the kind of religious and moral 
principles and concomitant conduct described by Edmund. Either she does not understand 
it, or she does not value it. Mary flirtatiously dashes Edmund’s hope to convince her of the 
importance of the clergy, saying, “with an arch smile,” “‘I do not think you ever will…I am 
just as much surprised now as I was at first that you should intend to take orders. You really 
are fit for something better. Come, do change your mind. It is not too late. Go into the law’” 
(67). She values Edmund, but she does not share his values. While she does not believe his 
assertions that he is nothing other than his values, he, in turn, does not believe that she 
actually holds the contradictory values she asserts.  
 
IV. Confusing the Real and the Represented: The Injudiciousness of the Private Theatricals  
 I have discussed some of the ways that social role-playing involves the manipulation 
of both other peoples’ and one’s own opinions of oneself. The constant shifting of the 
feelings and beliefs behind social performances contributes to the ease with which sincere 
performers are, and cynical performers can be, taken in by their own acts. Now, I turn to the 
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feelings and beliefs of the person who performs a theatrical role. The clear difference 
between oneself and a theatrical role that one takes up should prevent confusion between 
them. The principal characters of Mansfield Park, however, take up theatrical roles in order to 
escape the confines of their social roles. Their theatrical roles are thus confused with both 
their social roles and their real intentions. While their different attitudes towards social role-
playing make it easy for them to misinterpret one another, the different ways they use their 
theatrical roles raise the stakes of these misinterpretations, the consequences of which were 
kept in check by the constraints of social life.  
 The private theatricals could not have been undertaken if Sir Thomas had been at 
home to enforce his sense of propriety and oversee the social role-playing of his children. 
The proposal to hold private theatricals makes explicit the importance of Sir Thomas’s 
absence during his daughters’ “most interesting time of life” (25). His leaving, in Chapter 
Three, to oversee his estate in Antigua22 relieved the Miss Bertrams “from all restraint; and 
                                               
22 Critics have long noted the Bertrams’ connection to colonialism and slave holding. Said’s 
attention to Austen in Culture and Imperialism initiated a wave of postcolonial criticism of 
Mansfield Park seeking to show the text’s failure to fully repress the slavery and colonialism 
on which the lives of its characters and author depended. Ferguson and Fraimen are among 
those who read Mansfield Park as governed by the same principles as Sir Thomas’s Antiguan 
estate, comparing the plight of women to that of slaves. Southam and Lew also link Sir 
Thomas’s slave-holding to his management of his family, but the former argues that Austen 
does not share Sir Thomas’s attitudes, as Said would have it, but rather Fanny’s position as 
“‘a friend to abolition’” (498). See also The Postcolonial Jane Austen, edited by Sunderrajan and 
Park. Voskuil reads Austen’s challenge to imperialism not in relation to Sir Thomas’s 
Antiguan estate, but rather in her ideologically charged treatment of landscape, particularly in 
the Sotherton episode. While Voskuil proposes this reading to counter postcolonialist 
tendencies to look at what the text does not say, Boulukos discusses the problematic 
association between silence and complicity at work in many postcolonial approaches to 
Mansfield Park. This assumption not only leads to a misreading of the silence in the drawing 
room after Fanny asks Sir Thomas about the slave trade, but also, argues Boulukos, to an 
overlooking of the multiple contemporary fictional and non-fictional debates about slavery. 
Boulukos claims that these debates show amelioration as the most likely position held by 
Austen and her characters. Wiltshire goes further, arguing that postcolonial misreadings of 
Mansfield Park “colonise” the novel itself. These critiques point to the pitfalls of reading 
outside-in rather than inside-out.   
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without aiming at one gratification that would probably have been forbidden by Sir Thomas, 
they felt themselves immediately at their own disposal, and to have every indulgence within 
their reach” (25). Sir Thomas’s strict sense of propriety restricts his daughters’ ability to 
pursue their own interests. As they establish themselves in society free from his scrutiny, 
they need only consider their own desires for material comfort and passing pleasures.  
A private theatrical promises much pleasant entertainment, and it is on this basis that 
Tom and his sisters argue for staging a play. All the Bertram children know, however, that 
Sir Thomas would disapprove of such an endeavor. Although Tom and his sisters argue to 
the contrary, their reaction to their father’s unexpected return proves that they are aware of 
their transgression. They have engaged in an activity that, as Edmund argued before they 
began, is 
“very wrong. In a general light, private theatricals are open to some objections, but as we 
are circumstanced, I must think it would be highly injudicious, and more than 
injudicious, to attempt any thing of the kind. It would show great want of feeling on 
my father’s account, absent as he is, and in some degree of constant danger; and it 
would be imprudent, I think, with regard to Maria, whose situation is a very delicate 
one, considering every thing, extremely delicate.” (89) 
I will return shortly to what Edmund and Sir Thomas consider the impropriety of private 
theatricals in general. I want first to look more closely at the specific situation that makes 
them so inappropriate for the party at Mansfield Park. According to Edmund, Sir Thomas’s 
dangerous situation abroad intensifies the inappropriateness of disregarding his certain 
disapproval. Edmund characterizes this disregard for their father as lacking both judgment 
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and feeling.23 To ignore Maria’s delicate situation, furthermore, lacks prudence. Though Sir 
Thomas has approved of her engagement with Mr. Rushworth, “he only conditioned that 
the marriage should not take place before his return” (30). This conditional engagement 
makes Maria’s situation delicate because she is neither available for courting nor safely 
married.  
 Why does this situation make private theatricals imprudent? Maria’s delicate situation 
adds force to the objections to which private theatricals are generally open.24 These 
objections involve the propriety of ladies and gentleman acting out scenes that may not 
conform to their own society’s rules of conduct. To Edmund’s arguments, Tom retorts that 
he “‘can conceive no greater harm or danger to any of us in conversing in the elegant written 
language of some respectable author than in chattering in words of our own’” (89). His 
comparison reveals the ease with which he equates, as entertainment, regular social 
interaction with conversing in the language of a playwright. But the misunderstanding 
resulting from Henry and Maria’s use of their roles in the play to indulge in a real, though 
forbidden, flirtation, contradicts this contention. It makes no difference, Tom contends, 
whether the young people at Mansfield Park use their own words or someone else’s to 
interact. Private theatricals are objectionable precisely because they blur the boundaries 
between the real and the represented. 
 The ease with which Tom equates staging a play with regular social interaction stems 
from the primary goal of private theatricals: the entertainment of the actors themselves. 
                                               
23 Graham sees the private theatricals as posing a moral problem that the Bertrams fail, first, 
by disrespecting Sir Thomas in his absence. He characterizes this failing as “loosely biblical” 
(877) before turning to the second failing, that of confusing two senses of acting: knowingly 
pretending and “translating one’s true feelings and character into words or deeds” (878).    
24 See E.M. Butler, Litvak, Conger, and Jordan for discussions of contemporary attitudes 
towards private theatricals and femininity (especially Thomas Gisborne and Hannah More) 
and the dangers they pose for undue intimacy between the sexes.   
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Acting in a play is one among a limited number of activities available for the entertainment 
of young people living in the country. They take up acting, in other words, not primarily for 
the sake of any artistic aspirations, but rather for the same reason they hunt, ride, attend 
balls, and play cards: to pass their time pleasantly. Acting in a play, however, is different 
from these other activities in an essential way. Whereas the social performances involved in 
everyday activities are connected by both the performers and the audience to the real 
feelings and desires of the performers, theatrical performances ostensibly have nothing to do 
with the reality of their performers. Tom’s argument in favor of holding private theatricals 
not only ignores this difference between social and theatrical performances, but also suggests 
that a playwright’s represented world can be no worse than his own social reality. The 
extramarital sex and illegitimate child central to Lovers’ Vows contradict this suggestion.  
 The less than proper situations a play might represent do not, however, pose the 
greatest danger of private theatricals. When the world of a play and the world of its actors 
are clearly distinguished, as would normally be the case at a theatre, anything dangerous 
represented in the play can be confronted by both actors and audience. Private theatricals, 
however, allow the concerns of the casual actors to intermingle with the roles they play. 
Edmund emphasizes the difference between public and private theatricals when Julia tries to 
sway him by reminding him of his love of the theatre. He distinguishes between “‘real acting, 
good hardened real acting’” and “‘the raw efforts of those who have not been bred to the 
trade, - a set of gentlemen and ladies, who have all the disadvantages of education and 
decorum to struggle through’” (88).25 According to Edmund, the social roles demanded of 
                                               
25 Canuel mentions this distinction in discussing the problem with the private theatricals as 
how the players use the characters to express personal desires (137-8). Ford also interprets 
this line as expressing concern about the relationships between casual actors and roles, 
contextualizing the issue with a discussion of how eighteenth-century theatre-goers were 
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gentleman and ladies interfere with their ability to play theatrical roles. They are, or ought to 
be, confined by the rules of their social roles, rules from which real acting departs. The ladies 
and gentlemen of Mansfield Park, however, do not intend to leave their social concerns 
behind as they take up their theatrical roles. These concerns range from relatively innocent 
desires for pleasant entertainment to less innocent pursuits of self-interest that take 
advantage of the distance between real and represented in order to mask their impropriety 
and its possible consequences. 
The most innocent participants in the scheme are Mr. Yates and Mr. Rushworth. 
Neither man, however, meets the standards of Mansfield Park. Their innocence is due in 
part to their ignorance of these standards, or more specifically of Sir Thomas’s sense of 
decorum and his certain disapproval of the private theatricals. But neither do Mr. Yates or 
Mr. Rushworth have ulterior motives in participating in the play. Mr. Yates, having just 
suffered the sudden interruption of a theatrical party at Ecclesford, wants to display his 
talents as an actor and entertain himself with the business of staging a play. Mr. Rushworth 
thinks less of his acting skills, but appears quite happy with his two-and forty speeches and 
several changes of costume. They participate, in other words, to gratify their vanity and need 
to be entertained, but without the consciousness of doing something inappropriate.  
Tom, master of the house in his father’s absence, knows that his father would not 
allow the private theatricals. His pursuit of the scheme, therefore, is guilty where the 
participation of Mr. Yates and Mr. Rushworth is innocent. Though Tom knowingly 
contravenes his father’s decorum, he, like Mr. Yates and Mr. Rushworth, does so to gratify 
                                                                                                                                            
interested in the lives of professional actors, and the convergence and divergence of actors 
and characters.   
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the relatively innocent personal desire to be pleasantly entertained.26 The Miss Bertrams, like 
Tom, disregard their father’s rules in favor of their own interests. But unlike Tom, Mr. Yates, 
and Mr. Rushworth, the Miss Betrams pursue more than mere entertainment.  
Both Julia and Maria pursue romantic relationships with Henry, and they know that 
the private theatricals offer opportunities to interact with him that are more intimate than 
those allowed in everyday life. The scene in which the novel’s characters choose parts in 
Lovers’ Vows highlights the social roles that the Miss Bertrams and Henry Crawford play with 
one another; the way they try to disguise their personal interests as selflessness; and how they 
intend to use their roles in the play to further their romantic interests. Mr. Yates first offers 
to play the Baron, the role he had most wanted at Ecclesford, but “remembering that there 
was some very good ranting ground in Frederick, he professed an equal willingness for that” 
(94). Henry also professes himself willing to take either part, which motivates “Miss Bertram 
feeling all the interest of an Agatha in the question…to decide it” (94).27 She encourages Mr. 
Yates to play the Baron by appealing to his vanity and proclaiming him fit for the part 
because of his height. Julia also disguises her self-interest as consideration for others, when 
she “meaning like her sister to be Agatha, began to be scrupulous on Miss Crawford’s 
account” (94). Here, the Miss Bertrams know that their appearances of concern for others 
hide their pursuit of their own interests. Their competition for Henry’s attention outweighs 
the demand that they perform sincerely, but not the demand that they appear selfless.  
I mentioned in Chapter Two that Henry admits to preferring engaged women 
because their attachment supposedly gives them the freedom to flirt without consequences. 
                                               
26 Graham’s emphasis on the moral problem of disrespecting Sir Thomas causes him to 
pardon the Crawfords, and, somewhat strangely, fault Tom and Mr. Yates with giving “the 
project a less-than-worthy feel from the start” (877).   
27 The narrator’s formulation makes it clear that the “interest” Miss Bertram feels is her own 
as she imagines playing the role of Agatha.  
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An even more radical divide between behavior and consequences is promised to Henry in 
the kind of play-acting involved in private theatricals. Play-acting offers not only to mask his 
flirtation, but also to render it somehow unreal. This attitude causes his failure to grasp the 
real expectations his behavior raises in Maria. Maria’s engagement encourages him to initiate 
the flirtation; the private theatricals, he thinks, provide an opportunity to develop the 
flirtation without it being taken seriously.  
Henry, after looking over the play with “seeming carelessness” (94) decides which 
sister will play Agatha by pleasantly entreating Julia not to play the tragic part on the grounds 
that seeing her “‘countenance dressed up in woe and paleness’” would “‘be the ruin of all 
[his] solemnity’” (94). The pleasantness of his entreaty hides his real motives only from those 
uninterested in the issue. Julia sees “a glance at Maria, which confirmed the injury to herself; 
it was a scheme - a trick; she was slighted, Maria was preferred; the smile of triumph which 
Maria was trying to suppress shewed how well it was understood” (95). Both sisters clearly 
see the romantic intentions behind Henry’s superficially innocent entreaty. But while this 
slight teaches Julia that he has been toying with her, it strengthens Maria’s misunderstanding 
of his motives.  
Maria thinks that Henry, like her, acts out of real feeling. While Henry uses his 
theatrical role to play the social role of a philanderer, Maria puts her real feelings into her 
theatrical performances. 28 Like Henry, she plays a social role meant to hide this use of her 
theatrical role. Fortunately for her, her fiancé, though matching her in vanity, lacks her 
awareness of how she appears to others. Maria “very kindly took his part in hand,” and Mr. 
Rushworth 
                                               
28 Though Maria and Henry play mother and son rather than lovers, the first scene, which 
their desire to rehearse is, in Mary’s words, “‘indefatigable’” (118), gives them ample 
opportunity to express their romantic love as familial.  
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liked the idea of his finery very well, though affecting to despise it, and was too much 
engaged with what his own appearance would be, to think of the others, or draw any 
of those conclusions, or feel any of that displeasure, which Maria had been half 
prepared for. (97) 
With typical economy, the narrator here indicates the different kinds of mistakes Maria and 
Mr. Rushworth make in their interpreting and playing of social roles. The other characters 
share the narrator’s insight into Mr. Rushworth’s affectation. His attempts to hide his vanity 
are less effective than those of the well-trained Miss Bertrams. Their sincere performances 
hide their vanity from themselves as well as others, while their cynical performances are 
more effective than Mr. Rushworth’s at hiding their real feelings from others. In this case, 
however, Maria’s awareness of her real motives in the casting of parts causes her to worry 
that Mr. Rushworth might be more adept at interpreting her behavior than he has shown 
himself capable of being. 
 Mary, like the Miss Bertrams, sees the private theatricals as an opportunity to pursue 
her romantic interests in ways beyond those that are part of normal social interaction.  
Though she is entitled to flirt with Edmund and can therefore do so more openly than Maria 
can with Henry, the private theatricals promise the increased intimacy of rehearsals as well as 
the performance of love scenes in which her own feelings might coincide with those of her 
character. After being selected to play Amelia, a forward young woman who professes her 
love and proposes to the clergyman, Anhalt, who is her tutor, Mary puts on a social 
performance calculated to gather information and engage Edmund. First, she feels out the 
situation by subtly determining whether Edmund has agreed to participate. Instead of raising 
the question explicitly, she compliments Lady Bertram and the other “‘by-standers’” on a 
play having finally been chosen, “glancing half fearfully, half slily, beyond Fanny to 
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Edmund” (101).29 The narrator further emphasizes Mary’s intentions by making explicit the 
answer to her implicit query: “Edmund said nothing. His being only a by-stander was not 
disclaimed” (101).  
 After so determining that Edmund does not intend to participate in the play or join 
in any discussion of it, Mary uses a similar tactic to raise an issue that she hopes will interest 
him more. The narrator emphasizes the discrepancy between her intentions and her social 
performance:  
 After continuing in chat with the party round the fire a few minutes, Miss Crawford 
returned to the party round the table; and standing by them, seemed to interest herself 
in their arrangements till, as if struck by a sudden recollection, she exclaimed, “My 
good friends, you are most composedly at work upon these cottages and ale-houses, 
inside and out - but pray let me know my fate in the meanwhile. Who is to be Anhalt? 
What gentleman among you am I to have the pleasure of making love to?” (101) 
Mary’s seeming interest in the conversation about the theatrical arrangements, the narrator 
implies, hides her real interest in determining the best way to engage Edmund and ascertain 
who will play opposite her without making explicit her desire that it be he. The question of 
who is to play Anhalt interests her, and her joking conflation of herself with her character 
makes explicit what is at stake in the answer. Her part requires her to express her love to 
Anhalt, an experience she hopes will be tempting to Edmund.  
 She replies to the answers that no one has undertaken the part “with a brightened 
look” (101) and continues the discussion by distancing herself from the character with 
whom she so easily identified above. “‘Amelia,’” she says, “‘deserves no better. Such a 
forward young lady may well frighten the men’” (101). Mary’s queries about who will play 
                                               
29 See Edwards for a discussion of Mary’s corruption in terms of conscience and 
consciousness, which he proposes as an alternative title for the novel (60).  
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Anhalt express both the opportunity she sees in the role of Amelia and the difference 
between herself and her character. Whereas she herself would never declare her love to 
someone who had not already offered himself to her, she is willing to use the role to pursue 
her flirtation with Edmund.30 
 Next, Mary tries a more direct approach with Edmund, appealing to him as “‘a 
disinterested advisor’” (102) on the grounds that he does not act. Though Edmund does not 
have the interest of one of the actors in determining who should play what part, he does, she 
hopes, have the interest of a lover in determining who should play opposite her. Edmund’s 
judgment against their holding private theatricals in general, and against their choice of 
Lovers’ Vows in particular, however, trumps any interest he might feel in the question of who 
should play Anhalt, and he answers that his advice “‘is that you change the play’” (102).  
 Edmund’s unwillingness to enter into a discussion about the play does not deter 
Mary. Instead, her attempts to interest him in Lovers’ Vows become even more direct. She has 
characterized him as a by-stander in the hopes that he would contradict her, tried to tempt 
him by asking with seeming innocence to whom she, as Amelia, will make love, and appealed 
to his interest in her by asking his disinterested advice about casting Anhalt. Finally, she 
directly raises the possibility that Edmund play Anhalt. She does so, however, without any 
explicit reference to herself or the relationship between Amelia and Anhalt. Instead, she 
expresses implicitly her hopes that playing opposite her would tempt Edmund to take the 
part by suggesting explicitly that Anhalt’s profession should make the part appealing to 
Edmund: “‘If any part could tempt you to act, I suppose it would be Anhalt,’ observed the 
lady, archly, after a short pause— ‘for he is a clergyman you know’” (102).  
                                               
30 Jordan regards Amelia’s active courtship as “the vindication of woman as heroine” (146).  
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 Mary’s archness suggests her desire that she might tempt Edmund to take the part as 
well as her attitude towards his profession. On the one hand, she seems to be acknowledging 
that Edmund really intends to be a clergyman, an intention she hopes to change his mind 
about; on the other hand, however, her teasing observation reveals the lack of seriousness 
with which she regards his choice. Edmund’s response indicates his different attitude 
towards both social and theatrical roles. “‘That circumstance would by no means tempt me,’” 
Edmund answers, “‘for I should be sorry to make the character ridiculous by bad acting. It 
must be very difficult to keep Anhalt from appearing a formal, solemn lecturer; and the man 
who chooses the profession itself, is, perhaps, one of the last who would wish to represent it 
on the stage’” (102). Unlike Tom and Mary, who easily conflate social and theatrical roles, 
Edmund insists not only on their difference, but also on the futility of ladies and gentleman 
attempting the latter. Edmund can take up the social role of a clergyman with dedication and 
seriousness because of his training, and this same training prevents him from taking up 
theatrical roles in an equally effective manner. Edmund’s answer, however, implies more 
than distaste for misrepresenting Anhalt. The solemn decision to be a clergyman, in his 
opinion, makes it unlikely that one would want to play a clergyman. Edmund’s attitude that a 
man should perform the social role of a clergyman sincerely makes the idea of representing 
this role theatrically distasteful. Because he distinguishes between social and theatrical roles, 
the similarity between the two in this case makes the theatrical role less, rather than more, 
appropriate.31  
 Although Mary’s attempts to interest Edmund in playing Anhalt fall short, the threat 
that someone outside the group at Mansfield Park play the part proves effective. Edmund 
                                               
31 Jordan links the importance of a clergyman’s sincere role in society with Mansfield Park’s 
implicit argument that Austen’s realist novel, rather than Inchbald’s theatre, “can supplement 
the pulpit” (143).  
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finally capitulates. Does he do so, as he asserts, in order to limit the evil of the private 
theatricals, which he cannot prevent, or, as everyone else believes, to keep a stranger from 
playing opposite Mary? And if the latter, do his feelings for Mary influence him merely to 
protect her from making love to a stranger? Or is he finally tempted to act opposite her 
himself? The narrator does not give readers obvious answers to these questions. Instead of 
indicating discrepancies between Edmund’s behavior and his feelings, the narrator gives 
Edmund’s own misgivings in his own words, as well as the, quite different, misgivings of his 
confidant, Fanny.  
 The narrator thus challenges readers to judge Edmund’s behavior for themselves.32  
Edmund’s feelings for Mary compromise his decision to join in the private theatricals. 
Readers who find Edmund (and Fanny) priggish in his disapproval of the private theatricals 
can have little patience for his worries over whether to participate, and even less for how he 
lets his emotions influence the good judgment about which he claims to be so serious. 
Readers who accept his objections to the private theatricals are likely to be more sympathetic 
to the decisions faced by Edmund (and Fanny). These readers might also forgive whatever 
lapses in judgment they find Edmund to have committed as different in nature from those 
of the other characters. While Edmund fails to live up to the high standards he sets for 
himself, the other characters do not hold themselves to such standards. The novel finally 
condemns the latter failure, while readers put off by the former failure, or by the novel’s 
portrayal of Edmund (and Fanny’s) standards, condemn Edmund (and Fanny) as well as the 
novel.  
 After hearing Tom’s plan to canvas the neighborhood for a suitable Anhalt, Edmund 
seeks Fanny’s opinion on the decision he has already made to take the part himself. Instead 
                                               
32 This challenge is intensified regarding Fanny, as I will discuss in the next chapter.  
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of asking Fanny directly about this decision, however, he first seeks her acquiescence to the 
point that, in his mind, justifies the decision. The idea of including another person in the 
scheme, says Edmund, “‘is the end of all the privacy and propriety which was talked about at 
first’” (107-8). The “‘more than intimacy—the familiarity’” (108) that would result from such 
a solution appears to Edmund as “‘an evil of such magnitude as must, if possible, be 
prevented’” (108). Edmund’s emphasis on the objectionable intimacy and the necessity of 
finding any possible way of preventing it prefigure the explicit appeals on Mary’s behalf to 
which he will soon turn. In asking Fanny, “‘Do not you see it in the same light?’” (108), 
Edmund makes it more difficult for her to disagree, although he has not yet said anything to 
which she might object.  
 Fanny does agree completely with Edmund, but, convinced as she is of his refusal to 
participate, his solution to the problem has not occurred to her. She cannot answer when he 
offers it, and, though she does eventually succeed in formulating some objections, she 
cannot voice her real disappointment in his decision or in the influence of Mary she sees in 
it. Interestingly, both she and Edmund emphasize the appearance of his capitulation and the 
effect it will have on his siblings. “‘No man,’” says Edmund,  
“can like being driven into the appearance of such inconsistency. After being known to 
oppose the scheme from the beginning, there is absurdity in the face of my joining 
them now, when they are exceeding their first plan in every respect; but I can think of 
no other alternative. Can you, Fanny?” (108) 
Edmund implicitly distinguishes the appearance of his capitulation from the reality of his 
position, a position he implies is consistent. His opposition to the private theatricals, he 
suggests, has not changed. Instead, his siblings’ plan to enlarge the players and the audience 
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forces his opposition to express itself differently.33 While he first refused to join in an 
endeavor he judged to be wrong, he now sees his own participation as the only way to 
prevent the scheme from getting worse. He cannot prevent the others from rehearsing 
Lovers’ Vows, but he can, by joining them, prevent the “‘mischief,’” “‘unpleasantness,’” lack 
of “‘restraint,’” and “‘license which every rehearsal must tend to create’” (108) if a “‘young 
man very slightly known to any of us’” (107) is included in the scheme. Edmund first 
objected to the private theatricals because of his conviction that Sir Thomas would not like 
his “‘grown up daughters to be acting plays’” (90), and then to the choice of Lovers’ Vows, 
which he considers “unfit for private representation’” (98) because of the situations of its 
female characters. These reasons are consistent with his objection to a stranger’s inclusion, 
but his concern is now more for Mary than for his sisters, or for his father.  
 When Edmund sees that Fanny does not approve of his decision, he urges her to 
“‘put [her]self in Miss Crawford’s place’” (108), an imaginative act that affects Fanny 
differently than it does Edmund. She and Edmund do not imagine Mary in the same way, 
and their different relationships to her also affect their consideration of what she might feel. 
Edmund’s romantic feelings influence his imaginative act, while Fanny’s jealous feelings 
influence hers. Edmund imagines that Fanny’s empathy with Mary’s situation will move her 
to approve his judgment. The effort to put herself in Mary’s position is more likely, however, 
to inspire in Fanny thoughts of the joy Mary might feel at learning of her triumph over 
Edmund’s principles, and of the greater influence Mary has on him than do his principles, 
his father’s disapproval, or Fanny herself.34 
                                               
33 Litvak likens Edmund’s awkwardness in joining the theatricals to the instabilities he finds 
in contemporary Evangelical objections, such as those of Thomas Gisborne and Hannah 
More, to theatre’s overstepping of boundaries (337-8).  
34 When Edmund asks Fanny to put herself in Mary’s place, she cannot, as she 
spontaneously could at Sotherton in the episode I discussed in Chapter Two, imagine how 
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 Fanny now must not only put herself in Mary’s position, but also try to recall 
Edmund to his. Fanny’s answer thus explicitly compares her empathy for Mary with her 
reaction to Edmund’s decision: “‘I am sorry for Miss Crawford; but I am more sorry to see 
you drawn in to do what you had resolved against, and what you are known to think will be 
disagreeable to my uncle. It will be such a triumph to the others!’” (108). The unpleasantness 
Miss Crawford would suffer acting opposite a stranger does not, to Fanny, justify either 
Edmund’s inconsistency or his decision to disregard his father’s disapproval, especially since 
it will validate the scheme in the eyes of the others. Like Edmund, Fanny worries about the 
effect his capitulation will have on his siblings. But while his conviction that his intentions to 
limit the scheme justify his decision help him “‘brave’” (108) their triumph, Fanny’s belief 
that “it was all Miss Crawford’s doing” (110) coincides with Tom and the Miss Bertrams’ 
interpretation of Edmund’s behavior, and makes her suffer for the same reasons they 
triumph. His siblings, like Fanny, attribute Edmund’s decision to his “jealous weakness” 
(110). Though Edmund’s grave looks still express his disapproval, “their point was gained; 
he was to act, and he was driven to it by the force of selfish inclinations only. Edmund had 
descended from that moral elevation which he had maintained before, and they were both as 
much the better as the happier for the descent” (110). Fanny, on the other hand, is as much 
the worse as the unhappier. She has relied on Edmund’s moral elevation to support her own. 
His descent is painful to her as a descent, because it is caused by his feelings for Mary, and 
because it weakens her own resolve.  
                                                                                                                                            
she herself or anyone like her would feel in such a position. Instead of considering Mary 
generally, as a person with feelings, Fanny here considers her individually, as a particular 
person with whom Fanny has a specific relationship. Edmund’s obvious feelings for Mary 
and the effect they have on his judgment influence Fanny’s ability to empathize with Mary. 
She now imagines what it would be like to be Mary rather than what it would be like to be in 
Mary’s position.  
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 How should readers judge the influence of Edmund’s feelings for Mary on his 
decision to act? Why shouldn’t his regard for her outweigh his opposition to the scheme? 
Edmund hopes not only to prevent the inclusion of a stranger, but also to limit the audience 
of the play. Does this attempt to mitigate the wrongdoing justify his participation? His duty 
to his father and his own sense of propriety make claims against his participation for any 
reason. When his father returns, both Edmund and Tom see their mistakes. Tom tries to 
mitigate the offence by comparing it to the reading that Sir Thomas encouraged in them as 
children (127), a comparison that he has already tried, unsuccessfully, with Edmund. Though 
he now understands that his behavior showed a lack of consideration for his father, he still 
does not fully understand the objectionable nature of private theatricals, the difference 
between reciting as children and staging a play as young people. Edmund, by contrast, goes 
to his father to  
give him a fair statement of the whole acting scheme, defending his own share in it as 
far only as he could then, in a soberer moment, feel his motives to deserve, and 
acknowledging with perfect ingenuousness that his concession had been attended with 
such partial good as to make his judgment in it very doubtful. (129) 
This description makes certain Edmund’s own, as well as Sir Thomas’s, judgment that his 
decision to participate was ultimately wrong. It also makes clear that, to Sir Thomas and 
Edmund, Edmund’s understanding of his mistake, as well as his intentions in making it, 
mitigate somewhat his lapse in judgment.  
 The description does not, however, entirely clarify Edmund’s motives. Does his 
“soberer” (129) reflection on his decision admit of the “jealous weakness” and “selfishness” 
(110) of which his siblings condemned him? Or does Edmund still rely on the same 
justifications he initially voiced to Fanny, only regretting his decision to let these 
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justifications overrule his duty to his father? The narrator’s comment on the “perfect 
ingenuousness” (129) of Edmund’s acknowledgment of his lapse in judgment might be read 
as sincere, as ironically belying Edmund’s ingenuousness, or as undermining his 
acknowledgment of his lapse in judgment. While the narrator often makes explicit the 
deception involved in the characters’ social performances, readers are left to determine for 
themselves the extent of Edmund’s self-deception regarding his decision to act. The 
difficulty of establishing and evaluating Edmund’s motives highlights the narrative’s claim 
about the relationship between social and theatrical performances.  
 Both social and theatrical performances involve a distinction between the real and 
the represented. But the reality connected to a social performance is much less easy to pin 
down than the actor behind a theatrical role. The reality behind social performances is 
susceptible to various and variable interpretations. The ease with which social performances 
obscure real motives from both performers and audiences, the novel suggests, demands that 
social performances be clearly differentiated from theatrical performances. Both the 
performance and whatever lies behind it must be considered real, must be acknowledged as a 
reality that affects oneself and others.35  
 The novel’s portrayal of the different kinds of mistakes made by the characters 
during the private theatricals emphasizes the consequences of confusing representation with 
reality. This portrayal also distinguishes between misplacing the aesthetic distance separating 
the realm of an actor from that of the theatrical roles he plays in a social setting, on the one 
hand, and failing to understand the real motives behind one’s social performance, on the 
other.  
                                               
35 See Litvak’s discussion of how contemporary Evangelicals feared the real effects of theatre 
on private lives, a fear he argues is based on the inescapable theatricality of everyday life 
(335-340).  
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 The episode of the private theatricals emphasizes the consequences of the characters’ 
failures to understand the real effects of their social and theatrical role-playing. Taking up 
theatrical roles exaggerates their tendencies to ignore the real consequences of both their 
unexpressed feelings and their deceptive social performances. I have already discussed the 
importance of Henry and Maria’s misunderstandings of the real consequences of their social 
and theatrical performances. The various ways Edmund’s decision to act might be 
interpreted show the different sort of danger of social performances.36  
 Edmund obscures his motives from himself in a way transparent to Fanny, his 
siblings, and readers. All see the influence of his feelings for Mary on a decision that he 
insists is based on the same principles that fuel his disapproval of the private theatricals. 
Edmund’s capitulation cannot, however, be attributed to a temptation to blur or manipulate 
the boundaries between the socially real and the theatrically represented, but instead to a 
blurring and manipulation of social expectations and real emotions. Henry and Maria can 
both insist, though with different beliefs in this insistence, that their flirtatious behavior is 
part of their theatrical performance. This insistence relies on a common-sense distinction 
between theatrical and social roles, the former understood as mere representation having 
nothing to do with the reality of the latter. Edmund’s insistence that his decision to act is 
consistent with his principles, by contrast, relies on a reinterpretation of what these 
principles demand and a failure to acknowledge the influence of emotion on his 
understanding of these demands. 
                                               
36 The narrator’s treatment of Edmund’s mistake can also be compared to the depiction of 
the Miss Bertrams’ sincere social performances that I discussed earlier. While they are so 
focused on appearances that it never occurs to them to examine themselves and their 
motives, Edmund engages differently with the standards of his father’s household and 
attempts, if not succeeding, to match his inner self with the ideal these standards suggest.  
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 The narrator makes explicit the different ways Maria and Henry understand their 
manipulations of the relationship between social and theatrical roles, but does not give a 
precise picture of exactly how Edmund’s emotions influence his decision or of how aware he 
eventually becomes of this influence. This lack of detail corresponds to the difficulty of 
establishing the emotional reality behind social performances. On the one hand, only 
Edmund has the vantage point to decipher his own motives; on the other, his social 
performances show his audience influences he does not acknowledge.37 The reality behind 
social performances can be obscured from the performer by his conception of and 
expectations for himself, while it can be obscured from audience members by the 
performance as well as by their own assumptions about how people behave. 
 Readers must decide for themselves the extent to which Edmund lets his feelings for 
Mary influence his decision, as well as how aware he becomes of this influence. How they fill 
in the gaps left by the narrator affects readers’ judgments of Edmund’s mistake, of how his 
mistakes compare to those of the others, and of the novel itself. The plot of the novel 
condemns the mistakes of Henry and Maria, which lead directly to their eventual adultery 
and punishments. Edmund’s decision to join the private theatricals leads to the, rather 
momentary, disapproval of his father. His capitulation also upsets Fanny, but her 
disappointment does not change her judgment of or feelings for him.38 The narrative thus 
treats Edmund’s mistake in a way that suggests that his failure to judge rightly his motives is 
                                               
37 See Goffman on impression management and unmeant gestures (51 and passim). 
38 See her complicated reaction to Sir Thomas’s reproachful look upon discovering their 
theatre: “Such a look of reproach at Edmund from his father she could never have expected 
to witness; and to feel that it was in any degree deserved, was an aggravation indeed. Sir 
Thomas’s look implied, ‘On your judgment, Edmund, I depended; what have you been 
about?’ – She knelt in spirit to her uncle, and her bosom swelled to utter, ‘Oh, not to him. 
Look so to all the others, but not to him!’” (128). She both acknowledges that he is 
blameworthy and jumps to his defense.  
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less egregious than the failures of judgment involved in Maria and Henry’s manipulation of 
aesthetic distance to indulge their romantic self-interests.  
 The private theatricals offer the characters an opportunity to manipulate the 
relationship between the real and the represented in a more radical way than those afforded 
by everyday life. The novel’s condemnation of this kind of manipulation suggests that it is 
more problematic than Edmund’s mistaking his real motives and compromising the ideal 
that his social performances strive to embody. Maria and Henry think only of themselves 
and their own pleasures. Their focus on the relationship between the theatrically represented 
and the socially represented obscures the question of the relationship between the real and 
the represented of their social performances. Though Edmund deceives himself, he does so 
as part of his engagement with the right issue: the slippery relationship between the real and 
the represented in social life. 
 In this section, I have compared the behavior of the various characters during the 
private theatricals in order to bring out some of the challenges the novel poses to readers’ 
judgment with this episode. These challenges, I claim, revolve around the novel’s suggestion 
that, though none of the characters behave blamelessly, their mistakes are of different sorts. 
The novel invites readers to compare the behavior of the various characters in order to fill in 
gaps left by the narrative and form judgments of the characters. The different kinds of 
mistakes made by the characters have to do with how they relate to the difference between 
the real and the represented in social interaction, on one hand, and in theatrical roles, on the 
other. In the next chapter, I will both clarify and complicate this picture with the novel’s 
portrayal of Fanny’s behavior during the private theatricals.  
 
V.  Reading the Private Theatricals: Distance and Aesthetic Pleasure 
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Mansfield Park’s complex depiction of the various ways the characters behave during 
the private theatricals raises questions about the various kinds of distances readers might 
place between themselves and the characters of the novel, as well as about the influence of 
these distances on the judgments readers make about the characters and the novel. How 
involved in its characters does Mansfield Park ask its readers to be? What effect does the 
aesthetic distance that separates readers from characters have on the emotional and personal 
interests that readers take in the characters and the judgments readers make about them? 
The novel’s portrayal of the characters’ different attitudes towards the private theatricals 
encourages readers to consider their own attitudes not only towards social and theatrical 
performances, but also towards engaging with the fictional world of the novel.  
A concluding perspective on distance and aesthetic pleasure is offered by the final 
“scene” enacted on the stage of Mansfield Park after Sir Thomas’s unexpected return. 
Instead of merely showing readers Sir Thomas’s discovery of the stage, the narrator shows 
readers Tom’s experience as an audience of that discovery. During the episode of the private 
theatricals, I have argued in this chapter, the characters treat as social entertainment an 
object, the play, which is properly aesthetic. Here, Tom enjoys aesthetically a properly social 
object. This aesthetisization, quite different from Fanny’s of her cousins’ social world, arises 
not out of a problematic effort to prevent inappropriate interests in what is observed, but 
instead because Tom enters a space which has been made into a theatre and becomes the 
audience of what transpires on the stage. The action on the stage, however, is not a play, but 
a social performance made comic, if only momentarily and only for Tom, by its appearance 
on a stage as well as by the very different social roles forced upon each of its surprised 
participants.  
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Since I will discuss the aesthetic merit of the scene as well as the events it depicts, I 
quote it in full. It begins by following Sir Thomas’s experience upon his entry into the study, 
which has been transformed into a greenroom during his long absence:  
Sir Thomas had been a good deal surprized to find candles burning in his room; and 
on casting his eye round it, to see other symptoms of recent habitation, and a general 
air of confusion in the furniture. The removal of the book-case from before the 
billiard room door struck him especially, but he had scarcely more than time to feel 
astonished at all this, before there were sounds from the billiard room to astonish him 
still further. Some one was talking there in a very loud accent – he did not know the 
voice – more than talking – almost hallooing. He stept to the door, rejoicing at that 
moment in having the means of immediate communication, and, opening it, found 
himself on the stage of a theatre, and opposed to a ranting young man, who appeared 
likely to knock him down backwards. At the very moment of Yates perceiving Sir 
Thomas, and giving perhaps the very best start he had ever given in the whole course 
of his rehearsals, Tom Bertram entered at the other end of the room; and never had he 
found greater difficulty in keeping his countenance. His father’s looks of solemnity 
and amazement on this his first appearance on any stage, and the gradual 
metamorphosis of the impassioned Baron Wildenheim into the well-bred and easy Mr. 
Yates, making his bow and apology to Sir Thomas Bertram, was such an exhibition, 
such a piece of true acting as he would not have lost upon any account. It would be 
the last – in all probability the last scene on that stage; but he was sure there could not 
be a finer. The house would close with the greatest eclat. (126)39 
                                               
39 P. Byrne (“We Must Descend” 98) suggests that this scene blurs distinctions between 
theatricality and reality while Galperin (“Missed Opportunities” 130-1) links Tom’s 
perspective of bemused reflection in this scene to the novel’s perspective on the everyday. 
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The scene starts by giving readers the perspective on Sir Thomas that his children are, at the 
same time, imagining in their dread of his discovery of the extent of their scheme and of Mr. 
Yates on the stage. Readers are not surprised by Sir Thomas’s astonishment; they can also 
anticipate its increase upon finding Yates. The difference between what readers know and 
what Sir Thomas knows distances them from him in a way that makes it easy to laugh at his 
experience. By giving readers Sir Thomas’s thoughts as he hears the ranting of Mr. Yates, the 
narrator increases the comedy by contrasting readers’ superior knowledge with Sir Thomas’s 
confused attempts to decipher sounds he has never before heard in his house.  
 Sir Thomas’s attempts to clarify the situation coincide with his entrance upon stage, a 
coincidence that makes Tom, as well as readers, into his audience. Sir Thomas’s entrance 
also affects Yates, who, in dropping his theatrical role for a social one, gives a performance 
that Tom appreciates as a “piece of true acting” (126).40 Before giving Tom’s assessment of 
Yates’s performance, the narrator indicates the weaknesses of Yates’s theatrical acting. 
Although a successful ranter, he cannot feign surprise; the start given him by Sir Thomas 
outshines any he has attempted in rehearsal. The spontaneity and reality of this start is part 
of what threatens Tom’s countenance. His difficulties in keeping a straight face increase the 
comical quality of the scene presented to readers. 
 Both readers and Tom are positioned to enjoy the very different kinds of surprise of 
Sir Thomas and Mr. Yates. They see that Sir Thomas does not know that he is making an 
entrance on a stage while Mr. Yates does not know that he is entering Sir Thomas’s society. 
They also see that Sir Thomas tries unsuccessfully to hide his real surprise and confusion 
                                                                                                                                            
Tave finds the scene comic, but also having value because it shows Tom beginning to be 
aware of his offence (45). 
40 Marshall uses this phrase to describe the tricky kind of behavior he takes Mansfield Park to 
be about: “something between playing at feeling and real feeling, something between a 
theatrical part and a real part, something that might be called true acting” (76).  
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while Mr. Yates drops the emotional state of his theatrical role for the easiness of his social 
role. But, while readers can maintain their distance from this meeting, Tom must give up his 
position as audience member. The narrator immediately notes how “little time” Tom has 
“for the indulgence of any images of merriment. It was necessary for him to step forward 
too and assist the introduction, and with many awkward sensations he did his best” (126). 
The merriment with which Tom regards the finest scene he could have wanted for his stage 
must give way to the awkwardness of the discrepancy between the social role that his father 
requires and the one that he plays with his friend.  
 How does Tom’s inclusion in the scene affect readers’ appreciation of it? How does 
Tom’s momentary appreciation of this scene compare with the appreciation of readers who 
do not have to give up their merriment in order to join the actors? I have already suggested 
that exposure to Tom’s enjoyment of the scene increases the enjoyment readers have in it. 
Readers know not only more than Sir Thomas and Mr. Yates, but also something Tom 
momentarily forgets, namely, that he is part of the scene. Tom’s spontaneous response and 
his positive evaluation of the scene also encourage similar, though not similarly restrained, 
reactions of laughter and appreciation in readers.  
 Tom’s evaluation of what he sees as “a piece of true acting” (126) also raises 
questions about the relationship between social, theatrical, and fictional roles. Tom’s 
response reflects his attitude that social performances are just as entertaining as theatrical 
ones, in addition to the ease with which he ignores the consequences of the former. The 
social performance he observes, however, is entertaining because it is spontaneous, because 
it is staged differently than the more calculated performances of everyday interaction, and 
because he brackets his involvement in it. Readers do not have to bracket their involvement 
with the scene Tom enjoys, or with the scene of which he is a part, in order to enjoy it. The 
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aesthetic distance from which they regard the characters allows them to engage emotionally 
with the characters in ways that do not have the same kind of consequences as those 
incurred by the characters’ emotional involvement with one another. The novel’s depiction 
of the characters’ behavior, however, encourages readers to compare the responses for 
which aesthetic distance allows with those demanded by the kind of real world relationships 
portrayed in the novel.  
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Chapter Four: The Ideals of Mansfield Park 
I. High Standards and Sincere Social Role Playing 
 This chapter examines Fanny’s behavior during the private theatricals and how it 
might be judged, especially in comparison with the behavior of the other characters. The 
novel’s focus on her struggles to behave as she ought to during the episode highlights her 
failures to live up to the standards typical of a heroine in a marriage comedy as well as those 
that she sets for herself. The episode of the private theatricals thus amplifies the tension 
between Mansfield Park’s two plots. As the heroine of a marriage comedy, Fanny is expected 
to become more central within the fictional world. The novel’s characterization of Fanny as 
excessively humble and morally demanding suggests that this centrality could be achieved in 
two related ways. In order to be valued by others, she must learn to value herself, either by 
the others’ standards or by her own.1 The private theatricals and Fanny’s refusal to 
participate in them bring these two sets of standards into direct conflict for the first time. 
While her refusal to participate indicates that her centrality will not be achieved by adopting 
the lower standards of the others, it also demonstrates her failures to live up to her own.  
 My analyses of how the narrative positions readers in relation to Fanny during the 
episode of the private theatricals allow me to clarify my contribution to discussions of 
Austen’s use of irony and free indirect discourse.2 Mansfield Park’s double plot structure, as I 
have explained, encourages readers to hope for and identify with Fanny in complicated, 
                                               
1 Greenfield argues that by the end of the novel everyone but Fanny recognizes her internal 
values (307).  
2 For classic discussions of free indirect style, see Banfield (Unspeakable), who analyzes the 
unique linguistic features of free indirect discourse. Also see Cohn’s still influential typology 
of ways of representing consciousness, Transparent Minds. This typology has been modified 
and challenged, especially by cognitive narratology. See Herman’s collection for historical 
and cognitive approaches to representing consciousness which emphasize the similarities 
between approaches to fictional and real-world minds. 
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sometimes conflicting, ways. The narrative, furthermore, uses irony and free indirect 
discourse to position readers at various distances from its characters. Irony is often 
associated with distance and free indirect discourse with proximity. Austen uses both 
techniques in a variety of ways, often combining them to give readers insight into a 
character’s mind while also indicating the character’s shortcomings.3 
  My argument that Mansfield Park positions readers to be active is not, as I have 
shown, unique. The uniqueness of my claim resides instead, first, in the kinds of judgment I 
show at work within the world of the novel and, second, in my explanation of how the 
novel’s plot structure and narrative techniques challenge readers to exercise their own 
judgment in relation not only to the novel, but also to its possible relevance to their own 
lives. Irony and free indirect discourse are central to this challenge. Because of how they 
manipulate the distance between readers and characters, these techniques potentially change 
the operative standards of judgments. Mansfield Park, I argue, not only asks readers to judge 
Fanny’s judgments, but also complicates the grounds on which they might do so by offering 
different kinds of perspectives on Fanny’s judgments.4  
                                               
3 Booth’s discussion of Emma in The Rhetoric of Fiction characterizes Austen’s technique as a 
brilliant solution to the artistic problem that Austen set herself in this novel, namely, a faulty 
but sympathetic heroine (243). See also Fletcher and Monterosso for a cognitive approach to 
free indirect discourse that challenges recent associations between free indirect discourse and 
empathy and seeks to avoid scientific reduction of literary richness, instead showing how 
scientific reduction can describe literary variety. They identify a type of free indirect 
discourse used by Austen that shares Adam Smith’s concepts of empathy, indirect writing, 
and self-restraint. Austen, they argue, often uses free indirect discourse not to promote 
empathy with her characters but instead to satirize them in a way that discourages readers 
from making the same mistakes. Spencer situations Austen in relation to preceding and 
contemporary women writers, characterizing free indirect discourse as women’s writing.  
4 François’s analyses of free indirect style and third person narration in Mansfield Park focus 
on free indirect style’s elusiveness, on “reflective judgments that barely pause to distinguish 
themselves from the ‘unconcerned’ progress of narrative report” (225). François’s focus on 
experiences that elude articulation emphasizes how the narrator exposes the limitations of 
both Fanny’s self-knowledge and her virtue (see especially 224-227). Her subtle reading, 
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 Fanny’s feelings for Edmund compromise the impartiality of her judgment most 
explicitly during the private theatricals, and, after his capitulation, she abandons her attempts 
to judge rightly. Readers sympathetic to Fanny might not judge her more harshly at this 
point than they have previously; but they might, nevertheless, be influenced by several issues 
almost certain to affect the judgment of readers already unsympathetic to Fanny. I have 
already mentioned that readers who do not accept the objections raised to the private 
theatricals within the fictional world are likely to react negatively to Fanny’s refusal to act. 
Fanny’s motives in refusing to act are, furthermore, somewhat compromised. Her eventual 
participation on the periphery of rehearsals invites the question of how true to Sir Thomas’s 
wishes her behavior actually is. While the narrator singles her out as the only person in a 
position to appreciate aesthetically the acting, her capacity to do so is complicated by the 
social nature of the private theatricals as well as by her emotional involvement with the 
actors. Finally, she gets credit within the fictional world for a refusal to act that she does not 
entirely maintain. Fanny’s failures to live up to her ideals during the episode of the private 
theatricals thus challenge sympathetic and unsympathetic readers’ judgments of her. How do 
Fanny’s failures compare to those of Edmund? How do they compare to those of Mary, 
Henry, and Maria? Having high standards does not prevent Fanny from falling short of 
them, but it does, the novel suggests, mitigate rather than aggravate the severity of her 
mistakes. Though her insistence on high standards emphasizes her failures to meet them, the 
very attempt to live up to high standards, I argue, is favorable to eschewing them completely. 
                                               
however, is attentive to Austen’s “relaxed tone” which “implies that, whatever the falseness 
of Fanny’s excessively conscientious feelings, Austen is not going to disown her heroine for 
a hypocrisy she does not even recognize; she, unlike many critics to follow, takes Fanny’s 
inconsistencies in stride” (227). 
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At the same time, standards might be so high that no one could ever live up to them, and 
such a morality could strike readers as insufferable precisely because impossible.   
 Before discussing in more detail how Fanny behaves during the episode of the 
private theatricals, I need to clarify her attitude towards social role-playing. Fanny shares 
Edmund’s idea of conduct and takes seriously Mansfield Park’s insistence on sincere social 
performances. Her eagerness to please together with her good sense and Edmund’s guidance 
make Fanny’s attitude toward sincere performances very different from that of the Miss 
Bertrams. The failures of their parents and Mrs. Norris to teach the latter the good principles 
that promise good conduct lead instead to their mistaking manners for conduct. In fact, their 
aunt’s constant praise encourages their ignorance of their shortcomings. Fanny, by contrast, 
is often criticized by her aunt Norris, the Miss Bertrams, and herself.  
 Mrs. Norris first thought of bringing Fanny to Mansfield Park in order to appear 
generous, yet treats her as if she has no real right to be there. The Miss Bertrams, under the 
influence of their aunt, look down on Fanny for lacking their accomplishments and 
opportunities. Fanny accepts the low status her aunt and cousins impose, but this acceptance 
does not prevent her from holding herself to the high standards of Mansfield Park.5 Unlike 
the Miss Bertrams, she constantly examines the feelings and motivations behind her 
behavior. The low opinion that the Miss Bertrams, Mrs. Norris, and Fanny herself have of 
her worth contributes to her willingness to find that she falls short of her own standards. 
Whereas the combination of Mansfield Park’s high standards and high self-esteem 
discourages the Miss Bertrams’ self-reflection, the combination of high standards and low 
self-esteem encourage Fanny to acknowledge, and attempt to correct, discrepancies between 
herself and those standards.  
                                               
5 See Goffman’s discussion of idealization (34-51 and passim).  
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 In her social performances at Mansfield Park, Fanny tries to live up to the high 
standards that she knows she does not always embody.6 Readers are shown not only Fanny’s 
attempts to live up to these standards, but also ways in which she is sometimes unaware of 
her failures. The combination of her attempted sincerity and these failures to uncover her 
own motives turns some readers against her. Few prefer the Miss Bertrams’ obliging 
ignorance to Fanny’s imperfect sincerity, but many sympathize more easily with Mary’s 
acknowledged cynicism than with what they judge to be Fanny’s hypocrisy.7  
 
II. Real vs. Aesthetic Distances in Social Positioning  
 The tendencies, discussed in the previous chapter, to read Mansfield Park in terms of 
theatricality stem in part from the parallels between Fanny’s refusal to act in the play and her 
refusal, or inability, to act, or take responsibility for her inevitable actions, in the life of 
Mansfield Park. Fanny’s refusal to act stems from various motives.8 Though she begins to 
examine these motives, she abandons her self-examination in response to Edmund’s 
decision to act in the play. When Fanny is urged to take the part in Lovers’ Vows for which 
she is needed, Edmund, in his only active support, defends her right to “‘choose for herself’” 
(103) and recommends her judgment, as such that “‘may be quite as safely trusted’” (103) as 
any of the rest of theirs. Part of Fanny’s abhorrence of acting has to do with her 
                                               
6 Wainwright reads Fanny’s failures of judgment as failures to meet a Lockean ideal of self-
examination espoused by Austen. 
7 Positive judgments of Fanny in comparison with Mary are further challenged during the 
private theatricals by the narrative’s presentation of Mary’s selfless kindness to Fanny when 
the latter is urged to act, including her suggestion that Mrs. Grant take the part for which 
Fanny is wanted. Mary’s befriending of Fanny will soon be exposed, however, as motivated 
by her desire to impress Edmund. I will discuss the narrative’s treatment of their friendship 
in Chapter Five.   
8 Marshall discusses Fanny’s preference for remaining a spectator, associating her perspective 
with the picturesque. This very perspective, claims Marshall, inscribes Fanny in theatrical 
relations and “may frame her own sentiments as theater” (75).  
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unwillingness to permit herself the same rights that the others take for granted and to rely as 
certainly on her judgment as Edmund does here. Fanny is overwhelmed by the requests that 
she participate because of her self-conception, especially the problematic aesthetic distance 
she places between herself and her cousins.  
The narrator’s description of Fanny’s reaction to the “attack from her cousin Tom, 
so public and so persevered in” (105), emphasizes the similar discomfort caused by her being 
the center of attention in the drawing room and her possibly acting on stage. When Tom 
calls to Fanny that “‘we want your services,’” she is “up in a moment, expecting some 
errand, for the habit of employing her in that way was not yet overcome, in spite of all that 
Edmund could do” (102). Fanny habitually hovers around the periphery of the household’s 
action, observing and assisting. She would much rather be called upon to run an errand than 
be called to the attention of the others in the drawing room, let alone be asked to participate 
in the play. Although Tom wants “her services” (102) in the play in the same way that he 
would want her to run him an errand, the request to act in the play coincides for Fanny with 
being asked to participate in the activities of the household in a way to which she is 
unaccustomed. She is used to serving as an observer rather than as a participant, and she 
abhors attention. Though her acquiescence to their request would not change Fanny’s status 
in her cousins’ eyes, it would challenge Fanny’s own conception of her position. Being 
forced onto a literal stage would require Fanny to acknowledge her participation on the 
figurative stage of her cousins’ lives rather than on its sidelines. They see her as having a bit 
part on both stages, while she insists that she remains altogether offstage.9   
                                               
9 See Litvak, Marshall, and Lott for discussions of the impossibility of not acting. Garson 
links this impossibility not with the performativity of identity, but instead, the practical 
problem of displaying modesty (134).  
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The narrator gives Fanny’s later reflections on what passed in the drawing room in 
an anaphora describing the successive reasons for Fanny’s suffering:  
To be called into notice in such a manner, to hear that it was but the prelude to 
something so infinitely worse, to be told that she must do what was so impossible as 
to act; and then to have the charge of obstinacy and ingratitude follow it, enforced 
with such a hint at the dependence of her situation…(105) 
Tom’s request makes Fanny uncomfortable because it simultaneously alters and reinforces 
her habitual position on the periphery. Although she is not used to being made the center of 
attention, she is used to obliging the wishes of her cousins. They ask her to participate in the 
play just as they would ask her to fetch something, but the request demands not only that 
she oblige their wishes, but also that she enter into a public and central sphere that she is 
uncomfortable sharing with them. To someone like Fanny who does not fully perceive 
herself as an actor in the world she inhabits, acting on stage is almost inconceivable.  
 Fanny’s immediate response to the request that she act gives way to doubt and self-
reflection, mental activities that Fanny performs in the seclusion of the East room.10 The 
East room, formerly the schoolroom of the house, is a place of safety for Fanny, where she 
can physically and emotionally get away from “anything unpleasant below” (106). There she 
can “find immediate consolation in some pursuit, or some train of thought at hand” (106). 
                                               
10 The East room figures prominently in many readings of the novel. For example, see I. 
Armstrong, whose interest in how the novel questions the dependence of servants and 
women leads her to interpret Fanny’s “silent appropriation of this space” as a “standing 
demonstration of both the thoughtlessness and neglect with which she is treated by the 
Bertrams and her own vindication of her identity and worth” (51). Garson identifies the East 
room as a conventional representation of a heroine’s sanctuary, but notes that it is never 
dramatized as the comforting place readers are told that it is. This discrepancy, argues 
Garson, is due to Austen’s awareness of the limits of inner resources (129-30). Emsley 
associates the East room with Fanny’s philosophical mind, as giving her a place to think 
(127).  
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The East room affords Fanny with both distance from her worries and ways to gain a 
different perspective on their causes. To Fanny, “everything [in the East room] was a friend, 
or bore her thoughts to a friend” (106). The memories and thoughts inspired by these 
objects combine suffering with consolation, “and the whole was now so blended together, so 
harmonized by distance, that every former affliction had its charm” (106).11 From the 
perspective of the East room, the ups and downs of Fanny’s daily life at Mansfield Park are 
resolved into a balanced picture. The temporal, spatial, and emotional distance from which 
Fanny composes this picture makes it possible, the narrator suggests, for Fanny’s negative 
experiences to be balanced by positive ones. 
 The harmonious picture that Fanny creates from the removed vantage point of the 
East room is an aesthetisization of her past. This aesthetic distance, like that which Fanny 
places between herself and her cousins, is not disinterested: both kinds of aesthetic distance 
are influenced by Fanny’s feelings for Edmund. Each, however, involves her high standards 
in a unique way. The harmonizing distance of the East room is a more productive 
perspective for Fanny than that bolstered by the aesthetic distance that she places between 
herself and her cousins. With the latter, her commitment to humility and selflessness 
amounts to a denial of Fanny’s real relationship with and responsibilities to her cousins. The 
                                               
11 Valihora quotes this passage in characterizing the picturesque heroine, Fanny, as associated 
with memory. The harmonizing action of her memory, argues Valihora, suggests aesthetic 
distance. This aesthetic distance affords a perspective that “orders a whole” (295). This kind 
of aesthetic distance is not, however, disinterested. Bevan identifies “associative memory” as 
one of Fanny’s most important qualities and argues that, in this scene, memory functions “to 
blend together events, people, possessions, and emotional experience into a totality of 
harmonious experience” (600). For Bevan, this harmonious blending is the basis of how 
Fanny defines herself in harmony with her world, and is contrasted to the Crawford’s 
attempts to define themselves through the imposition of fictions onto reality. Lynch, in 
contrast, interprets Fanny’s harmonizing perspective as a sad idealization, one Austen 
exposes in her intentionally challenging portrayal of interiority. Lynch also links Fanny’s 
harmonizing perspective with a nostalgic reading of Austen that her 2016 annotated edition 
of Mansfield Park attempts to dispel (4-5).   
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former, by contrast, idealizes her past as a whole so that the times which she had been 
defended or encouraged, in particular, the times which “Edmund had been her champion 
and her friend…or had given her some proof of affection which made her tears delightful” 
(106), balance out the instances of her being “misunderstood,” “disregarded,” “under-
valued,” and the “pains of tyranny, of ridicule, and neglect” (106).  
 In listening to her cousins’ stories about attending balls, Fanny attempts to occupy 
humbly her low position in the Bertram household by imposing an aesthetic distance 
between herself and her cousins that actually obscures her own dangerous feelings for 
Edmund and prevents any desire to join her cousins’ gaieties. This aesthetic distance 
idealizes her cousins by denying any shared reality; they become characters instead of being 
real people who affect and can be affected by her. The harmonizing distance of the East 
room from which Fanny views her past idealizes in a different way. This distance 
deemphasizes the faults of others and how they have affected Fanny not in order to deny 
their shared reality, but instead to see this reality in its best, its ideal, light. Fanny remembers 
her suffering in the abstract, but recalls concrete instances of the kindness of particular 
people.12 Her emphasis on the times when others have lived up to her ideals allows her to 
live up to them as well in constructing a harmonized picture of her past. In constructing this 
picture, she accepts her position with humility and forgiveness.  
 The contrast between the problematic aesthetic distance Fanny imposes between 
herself and her cousins and the more productive aesthetic distance she achieves in the East 
room is suggestive of the importance of distinguishing clearly between the real and the 
                                               
12 Duane reads this scene differently, interpreting Fanny as having learned that pleasure 
depends on pain (409). Canuel also emphasizes pain in his reading of Fanny’s behavior in the 
East room, specifically her desire to take on the guilt of the participants in the play (139-40).  
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represented. Aesthetisization and idealization need not, and cannot, be limited to interactions 
with representations; but aesthetisization and idealization become dangerous if one ignores 
the conditions of reality, i.e., the effects that one’s behavior has on others.13 The idealized 
picture that Fanny creates of her past helps her to feel and behave as she believes she ought 
to. This idealization may cause her disappointment if her future does not conform to her 
harmonized picture of the past, but it will also help her overcome this disappointment as she 
moves forward. The aesthetic distance she places between herself and her cousins, by 
contrast, denies her real feelings and situation and exacerbates the difficulties she tries to 
avoid.14 
 
III. Understanding One’s Motives and Compromising One’s Standards 
How is Fanny’s aesthetic idealization of her present and her past related to the 
idealization involved in her attitude towards social role-playing? When taken to Mansfield 
Park, Fanny is put in a new social setting with new rules. In learning these rules, Fanny has 
taken Sir Thomas and Edmund’s high standards as seriously as she has taken Mrs. Norris’s 
insistence on her lowly position. She strives to make her inner reality conform to an idealized 
self, a principled, selfless, and complaisant self. Fanny, like Edmund, does not always live up 
to the standards she espouses. The narrative exposes her failures, however, while at the same 
                                               
13 One might object that all aesthetisization and idealization involves representations rather 
than reality. Granting this objection, I am interested in the distinction between 
representations that have a fictional status and those that directly correspond to some reality.  
14 The stakes of ignoring the conditions of representation are not as high as those of ignoring 
the conditions of reality. Readers who disregard Fanny’s status as a fictional character, 
however, are likely to miss the richness of the aesthetic experience afforded by the novel, an 
aesthetic experience created by a tension between realism and idealism. I will return to this 
claim below. 
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time privileging her idealization over the Miss Bertrams’, Henry’s, and ultimately, Mary’s, 
pursuits of self-interest.  
In Sir Thomas’s absence, the difference between Fanny’s conception of his high 
standards and his children’s attitude (excepting Edmund’s) towards them becomes clear. 
When she is urged to take part in the private theatricals, the standards that Fanny has 
internalized come into conflict with those acted upon by her cousins. This conflict is 
particularly difficult for Fanny because it pits her conception of her social position against 
the demands of her standards. The necessity of obliging her cousins conflicts with the 
compulsion of doing what she believes is right.  
Fanny’s reaction to the request that she act forms an interesting comparison with 
Edmund’s justification of his capitulation. On the morning after having been urged to act, 
Fanny goes to the East room to calm her emotions and to examine her motives, as “she had 
begun to feel undecided as to what she ought to do” (107). Like Edmund, Fanny is torn among 
different sets of expectations. They both contend with the external pressure of the others, 
the high standards that they have internalized from Sir Thomas, and personal desires that 
they are more or less willing to acknowledge. Though both Fanny and Edmund consider 
themselves as thinking primarily of Sir Thomas and behaving according to his standards, the 
different ways that each weighs the available options deemphasizes the importance of his 
certain disapproval of any sort of private theatricals.  
Edmund claims to choose a lesser evil without acknowledging the influence of his 
feelings for Mary on his interpretation of his options. When Edmund considers joining the 
scheme a possibility, he ignores that this option means going against his father’s wishes. 
Even if he succeeds in limiting the scheme, he still does so by participating in something he 
considers wrong. Fanny also brackets Sir Thomas’s certain disapproval in weighing the 
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claims of her cousins against her own decision not to act. Her guilt at “refusing what was so 
warmly asked, so strongly wished for” by “those to whom she owed the greatest 
complaisance” (107) momentarily overshadows her certainty that she is doing what Sir 
Thomas would want her to do. In weighing the claims of her cousins, she already pits their 
desires against her own. Because of the complaisance she feels that she owes them and her 
strong fear of acting, she questions whether her refusal is actually “ill-nature – selfishness – 
and a fear of exposing herself” (107). Though Fanny believes that her cousins are behaving 
badly, their pressure to join them makes her question the reasons behind her refusal.15  
Fanny is suspicious of the coincidence between her terror of acting and her judgment that it 
would be wrong to do so. This coincidence and her cousins’ claims make it difficult for 
Fanny to clarify the reality behind the social performance she has given. “It would be so 
horrible to her to act,” the narrator specifies, “that she was inclined to suspect the truth and 
purity of her own scruples” (107). Her personal preference is so strong that she questions 
the motives behind the refusal of which she is sure Sir Thomas would approve.16  
Because Edmund does not acknowledge any personal benefit of his decision, he is 
not similarly suspicious of his motives. He makes a case for Mary’s claims without ever – so 
far as readers know – suspecting that he acts selfishly. Though he is uncertain enough of his 
capitulation to “‘want to consult’” (107) with Fanny about his decision to act, he tries to 
convince her of his position rather than listening to her objections. Edmund, on the one 
                                               
15 Lott reads this line in terms of Fanny’s dependent position and the struggle it causes 
between appearing as a subject and disappearing under social constraint (278).  
16 Duane reads this questioning as part of the “paradoxical logic of masochism” at work at 
Mansfield Park in which the pain caused by a demand justifies the demand (410). Miller 
notes the consequences of the coincidence between Fanny’s moral judgment and her 
personal preference, asking whether Fanny’s “suspicions merely prove that there is nothing 
to suspect in so scrupulous a mind? Or do they in fact invite us to suspect – to push our 
suspicions even beyond Fanny’s?” (56).  
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hand, lets his feelings for Mary influence his decision in a way that he perhaps never entirely 
acknowledges. Fanny, on the other hand, knowingly lets her feelings for Edmund, her 
disappointment and jealousy when he decides to act, overwhelm her previous attempts to 
decipher her motives or to think about how to behave as her ideal self in the current 
situation. The narrator ends chapter sixteen with Fanny’s inner response to Edmund’s 
decision:  
To be acting! After all his objections—objections so just and so public! After all that 
she had heard him say, and seen him look, and known him to be feeling. Could it be 
possible? Edmund so inconsistent. Was he not deceiving himself? Was he not wrong? 
Alas! it was all Miss Crawford’s doing. She had seen her influence in every speech, and 
was miserable. The doubts and alarms as to her own conduct, which had previously 
distressed her, and which had all slept while she listened to him, were become of little 
consequence now. This deeper anxiety swallowed them up. Things should take their 
course; she cared not how it ended. Her cousins might attack, but could hardly tease 
her. She was beyond their reach; and if at last obliged to yield—no matter—it was all 
misery now. (110)  
Fanny convicts Edmund of the inconsistency that he claims is only superficial. Does her 
certainty that Edmund is wrong come from her certainty of Mary’s influence or her certainty 
that refusal is the correct course of action? Even before she explicitly gives up all pursuit of 
right and wrong, Fanny conflates a personal and emotional response with a moral judgment 
in the same way that she was trying to avoid before Edmund interrupted her. How readers 
judge Fanny depends upon whether and how they identify and sympathize with her, a 
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process the narrative complicates by presenting her thoughts from various distances, moving 
in and out of free indirect speech.17  
 The rhythm and tone of the beginning of this passage suggest Fanny’s struggle, in 
her own thoughts, as she tries to fathom Edmund’s decision. The exclamations “to be 
acting!” and “Alas!”; the repetition of “his objections-objections so just and so public;” and 
the fragments and questions leading up to the sticking point for Fanny: “it was all Miss 
Crawford’s doing” indicate Fanny’s own thoughts given in free indirect speech.18 Then a 
calmer, more narratorial, voice steps in to describe the primary cause of Fanny’s distress 
(“She [Fanny] had seen her [Mary’s] influence in every speech, and was miserable”), and its 
effect: now that Edmund has capitulated, Fanny no longer cares about examining her own 
behavior. The narrator details how “the doubts and alarms as to her own conduct” are first 
overwhelmed by Edmund’s announcement, and then “become of little consequence. This 
deeper anxiety swallowed them up.” The narrator, not Fanny, clarifies the relationships 
among Fanny’s worries about her own behavior, her jealousy of Mary, and her 
                                               
17 Hough characterizes Austen’s “mixed style” (particularly in Emma) as comprised of 
“continual slight shifts in the point of view” (210), differentiating mainly between what he 
calls objective narration, coloured narrative, and free indirect style. Moving among these 
styles, argues Hough, delineates a fixed value-system against which the characters’ thoughts 
and actions may be evaluated. Though much of Hough’s analysis of this changing point of 
view is compelling, he overstates, I think, the unambiguous nature of objective narration in 
Austen and its reliance on real-world values.  
18 Pollack-Pelzner cites this passage in arguing that many of Austen’s techniques for 
“representing interior reflections” derive from the Lambs’ prose translations of Shakespeare, 
Tales of Shakespeare (770-1). He makes this claim not to detract from Austen’s reputation as an 
originator of free indirect speech, but to tell an interesting story about the novel’s 
development of interiority, a development Pollack-Pelzner connects to drama. Pollack-
Pelzner points to the same “questions and exclamations…fragments…intensifying adverbs 
and phrases that turn back on each other” that I specify above, claiming that they “situate us 
inside Fanny’s upset and obsessive mind” (771). While Pollack-Pelzner emphasizes the 
dramatic intensity of Austen’s use of free indirect speech here, I am interested in how 
readers might respond to this proximity to Fanny, a proximity that is complicated by the way 
the narrative moves in and out of free indirect speech as well as by the different expectations 
of Fanny encouraged by the novel’s two plots.   
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disappointment in Edmund. The description of these relationships moves out of Fanny’s 
head, giving readers a different perspective on her emotions, one with the potential to elicit 
more sympathy or harsher condemnation than Fanny’s own shocked thoughts. Are readers 
sympathetic to Fanny’s experience of this “deeper anxiety” or unsympathetic to how it 
“swallows up” her self-doubt, (self-doubt itself for which readers may be more or less 
sympathetic)?  
Next, the passage lapses subtly back into Fanny’s perspective: “Things should take 
their course” comes from her point of view rather than an external perspective which 
describes or comments. Indeed, it would be odd for the narrator to comment so vaguely on 
the course of events in this way. Only a semi-colon separates Fanny’s expression of 
resignation from the third-person, “she cared not how it ended,” which could be the 
narrator’s description or Fanny’s own “I care not” rendered in free indirect speech.19  
The passage (and chapter) ends with what, surely by the last clause if not before, 
must be Fanny’s own thoughts, resurrecting her just-abandoned concern about having to act 
only to dismiss it again as newly irrelevant: “Her cousins might attack, but could hardly tease 
her. She was beyond their reach; and if at last obliged to yield—no matter—it was all misery 
now.” The strength of “attack;” the wavering between resignation (“she was beyond their 
reach” and the interjected, “no matter”) and anxiety (“at last obliged to yield”); and the italics 
of “now” all suggest Fanny’s own expression of misery, misery caused by her disappointment 
in Edmund as both moral and personal ideal.  
                                               
19 While I lean towards the latter reading, I do not venture to make a strong case for one or 
the other. Instead, what matters for my analysis are the passage’s subtle changes of 
perspective, especially how they relate to the other ways in which the novel complicates 
readers’ interest in and judgment of Fanny. 
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This movement in and out of characters’ thoughts and perspectives is part of what 
characterizes Austen’s use of free indirect speech. Here, readers are invited into the 
turbulence of Fanny’s emotions, from disappointment in her ideal, Edmund, to blame and 
jealousy of her rival, Mary. But, the passage then shifts from the dramatic and internal 
description of Fanny’s “miserable” state to a more measured, presumably external, view of 
Fanny’s consequent shifting of priorities (from examining her own conduct to despairing 
over Edmund’s). The final three sentences of the passage move back from description to 
expression of Fanny’s state upon hearing of Edmund’s decision to act. The effects on 
readers of this movement in and out of Fanny’s thoughts as she responds to both moral and 
romantic disappointment depend on their willingness to feel along with her and the 
standards they invoke in judging her. Fanny is the only character who is shown to examine 
her motives in this way, who attempts to disentangle her emotional inner reality from the 
representation of an ideal self. Readers sympathetic to Fanny are likely to let her attempt 
outweigh her abandonment of it, while readers unsympathetic to her tend to find the very 
attempt annoying in its moralizing humility, or condemn her hypocritical abandonment of it 
as worse than not having tried at all.  
 Fanny’s feeling that the “deeper anxiety” caused by Edmund’s capitulation puts her 
“beyond [her cousins’] reach” (110) imposes a new kind of distance between herself and her 
world. Fanny went to the East room to “try its influence on an agitated, doubting spirit – to 
see if by looking at Edmund’s profile she could catch any of his counsel, or by giving air to 
her geraniums she might inhale a breeze of mental strength herself” (107). She goes there 
not only to achieve the kind of harmonizing perspective the room gives her on the past, but 
also to gain access to her ideal self, primarily through thinking of Edmund’s counsel. Instead, 
“as she looked around her, the claims of her cousins to being obliged, were strengthened by 
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the sight of present upon present that she had received from them” (107)20 and then 
Edmund himself enters not to give her counsel, but rather receive approval for his 
inconsistent reasoning, which he can perceive as little as he can admit Mary’s influence. 
Instead of providing her with a harmonizing perspective and helping her establish what is 
“right” (107), the East room highlights the immediate claims of her cousins rather than the 
more distant and general claims of Sir Thomas, and it now becomes the setting for an 
experience even worse than the one that she suffered in the drawing room the night before. 
Both the man she hopelessly loves and a moral standard have disappointed her. In response, 
Fanny thinks of herself as so emotionally compromised as to no longer care about either her 
moral standards or her fear of acting. The emotional distance that Fanny puts between 
herself and her cousins is no longer aesthetic; rather, it now distances her from her moral 
standards and her idealized self. It is not, however, so easy for Fanny to maintain such a 
distance from her fear of acting or from her emotional and social involvements with the 
actors.  
The narrator agrees with Fanny’s distrust of Edmund’s motives, describing his and 
Mary’s mutual satisfaction in his decision as “very sweet, if not very sound” (111). But 
Fanny’s correctness, having already been compromised by her emotional response to 
Edmund’s decision, is even more compromised by her reaction to being the only one not 
involved in the private theatricals. Upset by being obliged to Mary for saving her from 
having to act by suggesting that Mrs. Grant take the part for which she was wanted, and 
“wretched” at Edmund’s happiness under the decision that she cannot “acquit,” Fanny is 
                                               
20 Cleere interprets the East room in economic terms, noting that Fanny’s occupation of the 
room “confirms her social displacement” and that the objects in the room remind her of the 
debt she owes the Bertrams and is obligated to repay through domestic labor (117). 
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“full of jealousy and agitation” (111). Having previously described how Fanny gives up 
pursuing her doubts about her own behavior, the narrator here describes Fanny’s inability to 
“feel that she had done wrong herself” (111), her certainty of Edmund’s mistake,21 and the 
negative effects which her knowledge of the reasons for this mistake have on her attitude 
towards Mary and towards her own peripheral position. The narrator exposes not only 
Fanny’s jealousy, but also, and more importantly, an anger at being unimportant that 
contradicts both the moral high ground of Fanny’s refusal to participate and the low opinion 
of her worth about which she is usually so insistent:  
Miss Crawford came with looks of gaiety which seemed an insult, with friendly 
expressions towards herself which she could hardly answer calmly. Every body around 
her was gay and busy, prosperous and important, each had their object of interest, 
their part, their dress, their favourite scene, their friends and confederates, all were 
finding employment in consultations and comparisons, or diversion in the playful 
conceits they suggested. She alone was sad and insignificant; she had no share in any 
thing; she might go or stay, she might be in the midst of their noise, or retreat from it 
to the solitude of the East room, without being seen or missed. (111) 
The same Fanny that listened raptly to stories of her cousins’ pleasures at balls, as if these 
were tales of a world separated from her own by an unbridgeable aesthetic distance, now 
languishes at being left out of something in which she is constitutionally unequipped to 
participate and which she moreover judges as wrong. The passage, furthermore, presents the 
activities of those around her from Fanny’s perspective, but in balanced listing (“gay and 
busy,” “prosperous and important,” “their...their...their...their”) that suggests both a 
calmness it explicitly undermines and an unbearable piling up of things from which Fanny 
                                               
21 “…her heart and her judgment were equally against Edmund’s decision” (111) 
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feels excluded. Though the final sentence maintains the rhythm of repeated conjunctions, it 
shifts from the “and”s of the first sentence’s description of the gaiety of the others to the 
“or”s describing Fanny’s superfluousness. Readers unsympathetic to Fanny cannot forgive 
this lapse in her usual, and somewhat problematic, insistence on her unimportance. Her 
compromised certainty that she is right to refuse and the rest are wrong to participate does 
little to comfort her, and instead she longs to be involved in the activity of which she 
disapproves.  
 Readers who condemn Fanny as hypocritical are not likely to be appeased by the 
narrator’s assurance that “reflection brought better feelings, and shewed [Fanny] that Mrs. 
Grant was entitled to respect, which could never have belonged to her, and that had she 
received even the greatest, she could never have been easy in joining a scheme which, 
considering only her uncle, she must condemn altogether” (111). After the surprising request 
that she act, Fanny weighed the claims of her cousins against her own preference; and, after 
having experienced jealousy at not being included, Fanny weighs the claims of Sir Thomas 
against her own desire for respect, comforting herself by reasserting the absoluteness of two 
circumstances about which she has doubted: her lack of entitlement to respect and the force 
of Sir Thomas’s disapproval of the private theatricals. Fanny’s reassertion of the lowliness of 
her personal claims, together with the rightness of her refusal, cannot satisfy readers who 
want Fanny, as a heroine, either to possess more assertive and charming qualities or to be 
more assertive and steadfast in her good judgment. Readers sympathetic to Fanny’s attempts 
to be both good and lowly are more likely to forgive her jealousy and emotional response to 
Edmund’s decision. 
Fanny’s problematic refusal to act highlights the tension between Mansfield Park’s 
marriage plot and its focus on Fanny’s emotions, perspectives, and judgments. As the 
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heroine of a marriage comedy, Fanny would generally either occupy a central position in her 
fictional world or be peripheral in a way that reinforces the qualities that inspire hopes for 
her happy ending. Instead, the novel problematizes how Fanny occupies her peripheral 
position. The depiction of Fanny’s early aesthetisized perspective on social life at Mansfield 
Park emphasized her timidity as well as the influence of her feelings for Edmund on her 
conceptualization of her position on the periphery of the action. The episode of the private 
theatricals exposes her failure to control her inappropriate feelings for Edmund as well as the 
effect of her emotions on her moral standards. The novel’s focus on Fanny, its invitations to 
readers both to sympathize and to empathize with her, are complicated by its exposures of 
her failures, on the one hand, to be a more typical marriage comedy heroine, and, on the 
other hand, to be the kind of person that she strives to be. Fanny’s refusal to participate in 
the private theatricals exhibits both kinds of failures. I will return below to the questions 
these failures raise about the relationship between the distance from which readers regard 
Fanny and their judgments of her as well as of the novel.  
 
IV. Observing Theatrical vs. Social Acting 
 After Fanny refuses to act, abandons her self-examination, and struggles with 
jealousy of the participants in the play, she resumes her role on the periphery of the action at 
Mansfield Park. This action, however, now includes theatrical as well as social role-playing. 
How does Fanny’s role on the periphery of the private theatricals compare to her earlier role 
as observer of her cousins’ gaieties and her more recent role as jealous outsider? How does 
her peripheral participation in rehearsals compromise her refusal to act in the play? What is 
the nature of Fanny’s aesthetic enjoyment of the rehearsals and on what type of distance 
does this enjoyment rely? The narrator singles Fanny out as the only character capable of 
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appreciating the acting aesthetically. Though in one sense, aesthetic appreciation is the only 
appropriate response to a play, the way in which the play is put on at Mansfield Park makes 
it an inappropriate object of aesthetic appreciation. Fanny’s complicated distance from the 
actors, I argue, compromises both her aesthetic appreciation of their performances and the 
moral status of her refusal to join them.  
 Before Edmund’s decision to join the private theatricals, Fanny observed her 
cousins’ attempts to choose a play without concern. As they fought over which play to 
choose, “Fanny looked on and listened, not unamused to observe the selfishness which, 
more or less disguised, seemed to govern them all, and wondering how it would end. For her 
own gratification she could have wished that something might be acted, for she had never 
seen even half a play, but every thing of higher consequence was against it” (93).22 The 
narrator here juxtaposes Fanny’s peripheral position in the household, her desire to see a 
play, and her principled opposition to the private theatricals. Her amusement at the 
selfishness displayed by the others emphasizes the personal and emotional disinterestedness 
with which she observes them. Fanny’s lack of emotional or personal involvement makes her 
as distant from her cousins’ squabbles as she would be from any scenes they represent. 23 
Fanny does, however, distinguish between her personal gratification and considerations of 
“higher consequence” (93) in a way that the early participants in the private theatricals do 
not.   
                                               
22 Fanny’s amused observation of this selfish behavior can be compared to the disinterested 
observer’s amusement of Mary’s blunder at Sotherton. For a different reading of these lines, 
see Despotopoulou, who sees them as an example of the “more penetrating” “feminine 
angle of vision” (579) that Fanny represents.   
23 This stance forms an interesting comparison with Tom’s contention, discussed in Chapter 
Three, that conversing in the words of a playwright can be no worse than everyday social 
conversation. While Tom puts the play into the same realm as everyday social interaction, 
Fanny puts everyday social interaction into an aesthetisized realm such as that of a play.  
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 As I discussed above, Fanny cannot maintain the same personal and emotional 
distance from the others when she is asked, and even less after Edmund agrees, to 
participate in the private theatricals. Instead of observing from an aesthetisized distance, she 
first struggles with her reasons for refusing to oblige her cousins’ request and then feels 
excluded from their happy activity. She is able, however, to become less jealous by 
reasserting both her lowly position and her objections to the scheme. The changing situation 
that Fanny observes, furthermore, aids her internal efforts to quell her emotional response to 
what she sees. Fanny’s observation, first, of Julia’s suffering from Henry’s preference for 
Maria, and, second, of the troubles among the actors, helps her come to terms with her 
peripheral role. Instead of feeling excluded, she begins to feel useful. In returning to her 
habitual role of helper, she forgets that she aids an activity to which she has objected so 
vehemently and on such incontrovertible grounds as Sir Thomas’s certain disapproval.  
 The narrator reminds readers of Fanny’s initial jealousy in noting that “she had not 
to witness the continuance of such unanimity and delight as had been almost too much for 
her at first. Every body began to have their vexation” (114). This universal vexation helps 
change Fanny’s position on the periphery of the action from jealous outsider to sympathetic 
listener. She, “being always a very courteous listener, and often the only listener at hand, 
came in for the complaints and the distresses of most of them” (114). Because Fanny does 
not act herself, she can listen to the complaints of all the actors without the interest a fellow 
participant would feel. On the one hand, this lack of involvement makes her the perfect 
audience for the complaints of the actors. On the other hand, listening to their complaints 
involves her enough in their activities to banish her jealousy. In banishing her jealousy, this 
feeling of peripheral involvement also seemingly banishes her objections to the private 
theatricals. Her moral stand against the private theatricals has removed Fanny from life at 
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Mansfield Park more completely than she could bear. She fails to examine her moral as well 
as her social position as she reestablishes her role on the periphery of her cousins’ lives. 
Should Fanny’s disapproval of the scheme prevent her from comforting the participants?  
 Fanny becomes an audience not only to the social action surrounding the private 
theatricals, but also to the theatrical acting supposedly at their center. Once the rehearsals 
have begun, Fanny “believe[s] herself to derive as much innocent enjoyment from the play as 
any of them” (115).24 This pronouncement immediately follows the details of everyone’s 
vexations. Both the enjoyment and the innocence of the participants have been somewhat 
undermined, and certainly do not set a high standard for comparison. The narrator’s use of 
“believe” here imposes a potentially ironic distance between what Fanny believes and what 
the narrator, and reader (should she choose to follow the narrator), believe about what 
Fanny believes. This ironic use of “believe” raises questions about both Fanny’s innocent 
enjoyment and her perspective on her own feelings. 
 What kind of innocent enjoyment can any of them take in the play? I have already 
discussed the self-interested social enjoyment motivating the more innocent participants in 
the play, as well as the self-interested romantic enjoyment motivating the less innocent 
participants. Fanny’s position as an audience member rather than a participant raises the 
possibility of aesthetic enjoyment of the play for the first time.  
 Although being an actor in the play does not necessarily preclude, but instead merely 
changes, the type of aesthetic engagement possible with the play, the participants have not 
decided to stage a play out of any desire to create a successful aesthetic experience, but 
                                               
24 Miller finds this line “wonderfully ambiguous” (56). He emphasizes the contrast between 
the voice of Fanny’s modesty: “we are supposed to know that [Fanny’s] enjoyment alone is 
genuinely innocent,” and the more literal meaning raised by the questionable innocence of all 
the participants, including Fanny (56). Interestingly, he does not explore how the narrator 
positions readers in relation to these possible readings.   
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rather out of desires to create pleasurable personal and social experiences. Just as being part 
of the play does not necessarily preclude aesthetic engagement with it, neither does not being 
an actor compel one’s aesthetic appreciation of the play. Julia is too jealous, her mother too 
lazy, and her aunt too pecuniarily interested to regard rehearsals aesthetically. Fanny, by 
contrast, has been trained to enjoy aesthetic pursuits and thinks of herself as doing so when 
she starts to attend rehearsals. But the social nature of the private theatricals that prevents 
the participants from engaging aesthetically with their pursuit also qualifies both Fanny’s 
ability and her willingness to enjoy rehearsals aesthetically.  
 The narrator qualifies Fanny’s “innocent enjoyment” of the play by indicating the 
moral objections and social entanglements that interfere with it, especially as she watches 
Henry and Maria:  
Henry Crawford acted well, and it was a pleasure to her [Fanny] to creep into the 
theatre, and attend the rehearsal of the first act – in spite of the feelings it excited in 
some speeches for Maria. – Maria she also thought acted well – too well;  – and after 
the first rehearsal or two, Fanny began to be their only audience – and sometimes as 
prompter, sometimes as spectator – was often very useful. (115)25 
The emphasis on the pleasure that Fanny specifically can take in Henry and Maria’s 
rehearsals indicates that the other participants are not in positions to enjoy their rehearsals in 
the same way. Because she does not act in the play, she does not watch rehearsals with the 
personal (and possibly aesthetic interest) of a fellow actor. Fanny’s “innocent enjoyment” 
(115) of the rehearsals, however, comes at the expense of ignoring her concern for Maria’s 
behavior. Not only does her aesthetic enjoyment of their rehearsals occur “in spite of the 
                                               
25 Urda cites this passage as an example of a place where Austen might have, as her 
contemporaries often did, shown the scene acted. Austen’s choice not to do so, Urda argues, 
emphasizes true character over superficial performance (292).   
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feelings it excited in some speeches for Maria” (115), but also her judgment of Maria’s acting 
rests on her knowledge of the real feelings that it expresses rather than on an appreciation of 
any theatrical ability. Fanny’s personal and social relationship with Maria conflicts with her 
aesthetic pleasure in the rehearsals. This conflict does not, however, prevent her attendance 
of their rehearsals, let alone her enjoyment of them.  
Instead of trying to manipulate aesthetic distance, as do Maria and Henry, or trying 
to keep separate theatrical and social roles, as does Edmund, Fanny is challenged by the 
relationship between her social interaction with and responsibility to the actors, on the one 
hand, and her aesthetic appreciation of their acting or the play that they stage, on the other. 
The narrator’s description of her attendance at Maria and Henry’s rehearsals indicates the 
tensions among her aesthetic appreciation, her awareness of Henry and Maria’s problematic 
use of their theatrical roles, and her habitual social position as an observant helper. 
Although Fanny is the only one in any position to appreciate aesthetically Henry and 
Maria’s rehearsing, she is also the only one who both notices and cares about their flirtation 
(until she is joined in this knowledge and concern by Mr. Rushworth). Instead, however, of 
preventing her from attending Maria and Henry’s rehearsals, she is willing to attend as well 
as be “useful,” “sometimes as prompter, sometimes as spectator” (115).26 How should 
Fanny’s peripheral involvement in the private theatricals be judged? To what extent do her 
own social concerns obscure her moral judgments? How might she imagine Sir Thomas 
judging her involvement and how grievous is it that she fails to perform this imaginative act?  
                                               
26 The different ways in which the narrator specifies Fanny’s usefulness suggest two types of 
usefulness. Her usefulness as a prompter helps Henry and Maria get through the scene. Her 
usefulness as a spectator might be of the same sort, but it might also be useful in limiting the 
display of impropriety their rehearsals involve. The extent to which Henry and Maria 
consider Fanny a “non-person” (see Goffman 150) determines her usefulness in this second 
capacity.  
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The narrator’s depiction of Fanny’s behavior during the private theatricals challenges 
readers’ abilities to answer the questions it raises. Readers are told that though Fanny does 
have “many uncomfortable, anxious, apprehensive feelings” about the private theatricals,  
she was as far from finding herself without employment or utility amongst them, as 
without a companion in uneasiness; quite as far from having no demand on her leisure 
as on her compassion. The gloom of her first anticipations was proved to have been 
unfounded. She was occasionally useful to all; she was perhaps as much at peace as 
any. (116) 
Fanny’s concerns about her cousins’ misbehavior have been obscured by her feelings of 
jealousy and exclusion, which have in turn been overshadowed by her involvement in the 
rehearsals of the play. Though she does not discuss her anxieties with anyone, she is 
comforted by the knowledge that she is not the only sufferer. Her role as listener to and 
observer of both the social and theatrical acting of the others allows her to feel useful, and 
the unrest which she experienced after learning of Edmund’s decision has given way to a 
feeling of peace, a feeling which is formulated in a similar way as was her “innocent 
enjoyment of the play” (115): compared to the unrest and guilt of the others, Fanny’s 
involvement with and enjoyment of the play can be described as peaceful and innocent. But, 
while Fanny’s “innocent enjoyment of the play” was qualified by the narrator’s pointing out 
that this is what Fanny believes, her comparative peace during rehearsals is preceded by a 
“perhaps.” This “perhaps” also introduces a potentially ironic distance by raising the 
question of who might be able to settle this uncertainty about Fanny’s state of peace, and on 
what basis readers might decide for themselves.  
As I discussed in Chapter One, the aesthetic distance that Fanny self-protectively and 
problematically places between herself and her cousins helps prevent any jealousy of their 
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advantages before it begins, and denies her romantic feelings for Edmund. Though this 
aesthetic distance prevented Fanny from entering into her cousins’ excitement as they 
prepared for balls, it does not generally prevent her from making moral judgments about, or 
entering into the suffering of, those she observes. Both Fanny’s concern for the suffering 
that Henry and Maria’s flirtation might cause and her moral judgment of it are, however, 
suspended by her aesthetic appreciation of their acting and her pleasure in feeling useful. 
Fanny’s insistence on her lowly position in the household and the aesthetic distance that she 
uses to strengthen it inhibits her ability to take responsibility for her interactions with the 
Bertrams. This complex attitude contributes to the ease with which she enjoys aesthetically 
the rehearsals she considers morally problematic. Fanny’s desire to be useful to the others 
does not admit of any possibility of influencing them for the better. Her role as prompter 
and spectator at Maria and Henry’s rehearsals does not remind her of her objections to the 
whole endeavor; instead, it reinforces her problematic conception of her role in the 
household as an uninvolved helper, and offers an opportunity for aesthetic enjoyment that 
would be ruined by a more complete social engagement with the actors.27  
Readers who blame Fanny for her attitude towards her position in the Bertram 
household will judge negatively the emotion, moral high ground, and inconsistencies of her 
attitude towards the private theatricals. Readers who blame the Bertrams and Mrs. Norris for 
the position in which they put Fanny will be more sympathetic to her troubled attempts to 
occupy it, as well as to her attempts to distance herself from her own interests. Fanny objects 
to the private theatricals first, because of Sir Thomas’s certain disapproval, and, second, 
because of the somewhat scandalous situations the real people around her will represent in 
the play. Once rehearsals begin, however, she cannot help but regard them as the kind of 
                                               
27 An engagement, it should be noted, that none of the other characters achieve either. 
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aesthetic object that she has longed to see, and which “everything of higher consequence” 
(93) warned her that the private theatricals would not be. Fanny’s social involvement with 
the actors interferes with her enjoyment of the play as a play, while her enjoyment of the play 
as a play interferes with the standards of social behavior that motivated her objections to the 
scheme. Neither her aesthetic appreciation nor her moral objection to the private theatricals 
remains pure.  
This picture of Fanny’s social, moral, and aesthetic proclivities and mistakes is 
further complicated by her unwilling involvement in a rehearsal of Edmund and Mary’s as 
well as by her ultimate yielding to the requests that she fill in for Mrs. Grant in the rehearsal 
prevented by Sir Thomas’s unexpected return. Her ability to bracket the feelings aroused by 
Maria’s rehearsals with Henry does not extend to those aroused by the mere idea of Edmund 
and Mary rehearsing their love scene. The narrator emphasizes Fanny’s personal and 
emotional interest in this scene, characterizing it as one “which interest[s] her most 
particularly” (116) and the representation of which she looks forward to “as a circumstance 
almost too interesting” (117). Her personal and emotional interests make Fanny curious and 
combine “longing” with “dreading to see how they would perform” (117). Fanny both wants 
to see and fears watching Edmund and Mary perform theatrical roles in which their 
characters make explicit feelings their actors have not declared: “a marriage of love was to be 
described by the gentleman, and very little short of a declaration of love be made by the 
lady” (117).28 Though Mary, as I have already mentioned, has more subtle means of 
communicating her feelings than the forwardness favored by her character, Edmund’s hopes 
                                               
28 Ford notes that Fanny’s emotional response to the private theatricals extends to her 
reaction to the play itself, especially the scene between Edmund and Mary which Fanny 
cannot interpret at all due to her focus on the real people who will act it.  
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for her hand rely on her ability to choose a marriage of love over one of material and social 
advantage. 
Fanny’s personal and emotional interests in their romance overshadow any aesthetic 
interest she might take in their performance. She has already characterized Maria as acting 
“too well” (115) in her character’s expressions of affection for the character played by 
Henry; her curiosity about how Edmund and Mary will perform has to do with whether she 
will be able to discern their real feelings in their theatrical performances. Before she is given 
the opportunity to see them together, Fanny is surprised by Mary’s request that she herself 
take Edmund’s part in order to help Mary prepare for her performance with him. Mary 
emphasizes her discomfort at the explicitness of the scene. She wonders to Fanny, “‘How 
am I ever to look him in the face and say such things? Could you do it?’” (117). Without 
giving Fanny a chance to answer, Mary remembers the familial relationship between Fanny 
and Edmund and appeals to their similarities in asking Fanny to rehearse with her: “‘But 
then he is your cousin, which makes all the difference. You must rehearse it with me, that I 
may fancy you him, and get on by degrees. You have a look of his sometimes’” (117).  
Mary’s request that Fanny put herself in Mary’s position is immediately followed by a 
denial that their positions are equatable.29 Fanny’s familial relationship to Edmund, supposes 
Mary, should prevent her from the discomfort that Mary, as a possible match for Edmund, 
must feel in acting a love scene with him. Even if Mary had no romantic feelings for 
Edmund, the possibility that they be romantically involved, a possibility supposedly 
precluded by Fanny’s familial relationship, would make the scene uncomfortable. Mary’s 
comment suggests that because Fanny’s real relationship with Edmund precludes the 
                                               
29 Marshall notes the difficulties and complexities of Fanny’s “uncanny embodiment of 
identity and difference” in this scene, finding “a finely tuned sadism in Mary’s disingenuous 
casting” (77).  
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romantic relationship theatrically represented, Fanny could not feel the same kind of social 
discomfort Mary feels in her theatrical role.  
Accordingly, Mary shifts from asking Fanny to empathize with her to asking Fanny 
to represent Edmund.30 This request strikes Fanny differently than any of the urgings that 
she play the cottager’s wife in the play. The narrator exposes both Mary’s intentions and the 
response aroused in Fanny, saying that once Mary begins the scene, “Fanny join[s] in with all 
the modest feeling which the idea of representing Edmund was so strongly calculated to 
inspire; but with looks and voice so truly feminine, as to be no very good picture of a man” 
(118). Instead of considering the request as one to participate, however privately, in the ill-
judged scheme to put on a play, Fanny takes seriously Mary’s comparison between herself 
and Edmund, takes seriously the task of representing the cousin whom she so admires and 
loves. Instead of imagining how Edmund might feel acting opposite Mary, Fanny’s 
representation of Edmund seems more akin to her imagined ideal of him, an ideal that 
Fanny uses in her own attempts to be her ideal self.  
It is significant that, rather than asking Fanny to represent Anhalt, Mary asks Fanny 
to represent Edmund, a request to which she correctly calculates Fanny is more susceptible. 
Mary’s request is calculated not only to inspire acquiescence and “modest feeling” (118) in 
                                               
30 This request introduces another interesting instance of a character being asked to put 
oneself in another’s position. The idea of putting herself in Mary’s position vis-a-vis 
Edmund is both desirable and unbearable for Fanny. It is desirable insofar as she longs to be 
in Mary’s position of a potential match for Edmund. It is unbearable for two reasons, one 
having to do with her own position and the other having to do with Mary’s: Fanny does not 
want to put herself in Mary’s position because she denies desiring to be in it; she does not 
want to put herself in Mary’s position because she does not want to imagine what Mary must 
feel as a potential match for Edmund. The idea of representing Edmund could present 
Fanny with the same problem: she does not want to imagine what she believes he feels for 
Mary. She does not, however, understand the request in this way, instead thinking of 
Edmund generally rather than in his particular relationship with Mary.     
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Fanny, but also to give Mary the opportunity to prepare herself for acting opposite Edmund 
as Edmund rather than Edmund as Anhalt. Fanny’s femininity, however, provides Mary with 
the same kind of safety that she assumed Fanny’s familial relationship with Edmund would 
provide her.31 In both cases, the impossibility of a real romance is thought to make the 
theatrical representation of a romance easier by preventing any overlap between real and 
represented. While Mary practices quelling the social concerns that impede her theatrical 
performance with someone who does not arouse them, Fanny’s representation of her cousin 
distracts her from the social concerns that he might have in his theatrical role.   
Fanny looks to Edmund as an ideal. Mary’s request that she represent Edmund, 
therefore, focuses Fanny on his abstract qualities and distracts her from examining the 
theatrical representation of the real romantic feelings that she fears Mary and Edmund have 
for one another. Edmund’s sudden arrival, motivated by the same intentions that Mary has 
in seeking out Fanny, reawakens Fanny’s emotions, forces her to consider his particular 
feelings for Mary, and returns her to a position on the periphery of their social and theatrical 
performances. Fanny’s emotional involvement prevents her not only from performing the 
“office of judge and critic” with which she is “invested”(118) by Edmund and Mary, but also 
from wanting to remain in the peripheral role on which she usually, if problematically, 
insists.32  
                                               
31 M. Anderson also notes that Mary asks Fanny to portray Edmund rather than a character, 
but argues that this move places the two women into an erotic relation. Anderson also notes 
that Fanny’s participation in this impromptu rehearsal does not sit well with her refusal to 
act or with her attitude towards private theatricals in general (174-5).   
32 Marshall notes that we may sympathize with Fanny’s suffering as she considers Edmund 
and Mary’s performance, but also that readers and Fanny are confronted with her desire for 
Edmund when she is forced back into the peripheral role on which she problematically 
insists (81).  
  181 
The narrator’s formulation of the inverse relationship of Fanny’s comfort to 
Edmund and Mary’s happiness together, makes explicit Fanny’s reaction to how Edmund’s 
entrance changes the dynamic in the room: “She could not equal them in their warmth. Her 
spirits sank under the glow of theirs, and she felt herself becoming too nearly nothing to 
both, to have any comfort in having been sought by either. They must now rehearse 
together” (118). Edmund and Mary’s affection excludes Fanny from their interaction more 
dramatically than she is used to being excluded as a peripheral observer. Their affection turns 
her into a third wheel, but one whose presence they insist upon so that she may assist their 
rehearsal. This situation again causes Fanny to feel left out of something of which she insists 
she wants no part. Instead of observing as if there were no question of her real involvement 
with what she sees, Fanny observes as someone wanting to be included.33 The attention 
Mary and Edmund pay to one another, Fanny feels, makes it impossible for either of them 
to pay her the attention which each intended to pay to her in seeking her help. The 
usefulness that she had to each of them is obliterated by the discovery of its coincidence; 
having found each other seeking Fanny’s help, Edmund and Mary no longer need to 
rehearse with Fanny, and she “was wanted only to prompt and observe them” (118).34 
Fanny’s refusal to act in the play again results in the feeling that she is excluded from social 
life.  
                                               
33 Lott reads Fanny’s disappointment at Edmund’s arrival as that of being 
“relegate[ed…once again to the role of spectator,” arguing that Fanny does want to 
“participate in the play” (278). I cannot agree that Fanny actually wants to participate in the 
play, or that her discomfort when Edmund arrives has to do with not being able to continue 
reading his part.   
34 This formulation parallels that describing Fanny’s participation in Maria and Henry’s 
rehearsals, but while there she was a spectator, only slightly bothered by her personal 
involvement with the actors, of something she considered a primarily theatrical event, here 
she is an observer of a social drama, able to pay no attention to her tasks pertaining to the 
theatrical performance.  
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Fanny cannot move easily from representing Edmund with Mary to observing them 
rehearse together. Although she “earnestly desired to exercise [the office of judge and critic] 
and tell them all their faults,” Fanny “could not, would not, dared not attempt it” (118). 
Fanny’s desire to exercise this office, the narrator suggests, is not as a critic of theatre, but 
rather as a social critic evaluating the behavior of people with whom she shares a world. 
Emotional and social impulses prevent Fanny from being able to fill the office. “Had 
[Fanny] been otherwise qualified for criticism,” the narrator goes on, “her conscience must 
have restrained her from venturing at disapprobation. She believed herself to feel too much 
of it in the aggregate for honesty or safety in particulars” (118-9). This description not only 
compares but even conflates Fanny’s lack of theatrical qualifications to be a judge and critic 
of Edmund and Mary’s rehearsal with the lack of disinterestedness that prevents her from 
being a judge and critic of their behavior. Fanny does not consider herself qualified to judge 
and criticize Mary and Edmund’s rehearsal; her “could not” (118) corresponds to her low 
opinion of her worth to and claims on others, an opinion that I have argued is challenged by 
her jealous wishes to be included by them. Fanny’s “would not” (118) corresponds to the 
restraint of her conscience, which prevents her from engaging in an emotionally 
compromised judgment of their acting or of their behavior. The extent and type of Fanny’s 
disapprobation means that she “dare not” (118) express even the insignificant and particular 
criticisms of a theatre critic, albeit an unqualified one, lest she betray her personal emotional 
disapproval of Edmund and Mary’s relationship. This description of Fanny’s inability fulfill 
the “office of judge and critic” (118) is followed by another use of “believed herself” (119) to 
introduce Fanny’s feelings. The narrator’s common use of “believe” to introduce ironic 
distance may suggest, to readers less sympathetic to Fanny, that she is less honest about her 
feelings than she thinks. In this instance, however, the distance implied emphasizes not the 
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difference between what Fanny and the narrator believe about Fanny, but rather the distance 
provided by Fanny’s conscience, a distance from which she sees she must disqualify herself 
as judge.   
Fanny does not allow herself to act as judge and critic of Edmund and Mary’s 
rehearsal. She is, moreover, too emotionally affected by watching them to fulfill the role of 
prompter that she has decided “must be enough for her” (119). Even this role “was 
sometimes more than enough; for she could not always pay attention to the book. In 
watching them she forgot herself; and agitated by the increasing spirit of Edmund’s manner, 
had once closed the page and turned away exactly as he wanted help” (119). Fanny is not a 
good prompter because she is too interested in watching Edmund and Mary to follow them 
in the script. Fanny’s involvement in what she watches causes her to forget, not her feelings 
and criticisms, but rather her role as prompter. The more Edmund enters the spirit of the 
scene, the more Fanny reacts to the real emotions that she sees in his performance.  
Fanny’s immediate emotional reaction to the reality behind Edmund and Mary’s 
performance in the scene is reinforced by her recollection of it once they have left her. 
Fanny is “inclined to believe their performance would, indeed, have such nature and feeling 
in it, as must ensure their credit, and make it a very suffering exhibition to herself. Whatever 
might be its effect, however, she must stand the brunt of it again that very day” (119). In 
seeing them read together, Fanny is convinced that the real emotions inspiring Edmund and 
Mary’s performance will earn them praise as actors. She knows also that she will be affected 
not by their theatrical success, but instead by the emotional reality to which she attributes 
this success.  
Fanny could not have foreseen or prevented the rehearsal between Edmund and 
Mary that she suffers in the East room. She later admits, however, that she need not have 
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attended the larger rehearsal from which she anticipates suffering. Mrs. Grant’s absence at 
that rehearsal occasions requests that Fanny take her place. Even Edmund’s urging her to 
read the part does not immediately sway Fanny, who cannot “endure the idea of it” (120). 
The questions that Fanny asks herself reveal both the stubbornness of her resistance to 
acting and a shadowy awareness of how her participation in rehearsals compromises her 
refusal to act. She first appeals to the source that has already saved her twice, wondering to 
herself why Mary was not “to be applied to as well” (120). Fanny then turns from seeking 
external excuses to blaming herself for the position in which she has put herself. “Or why 
had not she rather gone to her own room,” Fanny asks, “instead of attending the rehearsal at 
all? She had known it would irritate and distress her – she had known it her duty to keep 
away. She was properly punished” (120).35 Above, Fanny assumed that she must suffer the 
rehearsal that she here insists she knew better than to attend. The renewed request that 
Fanny take the stage reawakens both her general and more personal objections to the private 
theatricals.  
Before seeing Edmund and Mary rehearse together, Fanny’s emotional interest in 
their performance prevented her from even considering the possibility of not attending the 
rehearsal. After being surprised by their impromptu rehearsal, she still considered the 
scheduled rehearsal unavoidable. When asked to act, however, Fanny remembers that the 
very emotional interest that made her curious should have been grounds for her refusal to 
satisfy this curiosity. The “duty to keep away” (120) from the rehearsal, a duty that she has 
not been seen to experience in relation to the other rehearsals which she has attended, could 
refer to a duty to avoid emotional unrest or a duty to respect Sir Thomas’s certain 
                                               
35 Marshall suggests that Fanny feels punished “perhaps for having been seduced into acting 
earlier that afternoon, perhaps for having recognized her own desire” (81).  
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disapproval of the private theatricals. The renewed request that Fanny take the stage puts her 
again into a situation in which her strong personal preference coincides with her sense of 
what is right. Fanny’s emotional, social, and aesthetic participation in the private theatricals 
means, however, that she must now suffer her punishment rather than examine her scruples. 
This reminder that her emotional interest in the rehearsal and her duty to Sir Thomas 
should have prevented her from attending the rehearsal does not prevent Fanny from 
yielding. Having put herself in danger, Fanny cannot refuse the requests of her cousins and 
extricate herself from having to do something which scares her and which she has judged to 
be disrespectful and wrong. Before Fanny has actually to act, however, the rehearsal is 
interrupted by the sudden return of Sir Thomas.  
 
V. The Stakes of Confusing the Real and the Represented 
 Mansfield Park’s depiction of the private theatricals emphasizes the consequences of 
confusing the real and the represented. The characters put themselves in dangerous positions 
when they ignore the conditions and constraints of reality. I discussed in Chapter Three how 
using the play to indulge their real flirtation positions Henry and Maria for social scandal and 
personal unhappiness. In this chapter, I have analyzed Fanny’s failure to live up to her 
standards in the face of pressure to join the play, disappointment in Edmund when he 
capitulates, and feelings of jealousy when she is excluded. The habitual way in which Fanny 
obscures the real conditions of her social relationship with her cousins by imposing an 
insurmountable aesthetic distance between herself and them makes it more difficult for her 
to navigate the conflict that arises during the private theatricals between the ideal she sets for 
herself of obliging her cousins and the ideal of Sir Thomas’s sense of propriety that she has 
internalized. Though Fanny falls short of both these ideals, her reference to them mitigates 
  186 
the consequences of her mistakes. Readers’ judgments of these mistakes are further 
complicated because the behavior that they know to have been compromised begins to earn 
her the recognition within the fictional world that the marriage plot promises for her.  
I will discuss in the next chapter the credit that Fanny gets from Sir Thomas and 
Edmund despite her compromised position in relation to the private theatricals. Here, my 
focus remains on the status of Fanny’s mistakes during the private theatricals and how they 
might be judged. Unlike Henry and Maria who manipulate aesthetic distance, Fanny ignores 
the conditions of the reality that governs her social interaction with her cousins. In an 
attempt to live up to the ideal she believes her role in the household demands, she does not 
act out of self-interest. Fanny’s failures to live up to her ideals, furthermore, do not affect 
others. She struggles with her standards and her emotions, but her behavior never 
encourages misunderstandings or puts anyone else in precarious situations.   
The narrator’s exposure of the inner turmoil that Fanny experiences in failing to live 
up to her ideals can overshadow how her behavior looks from the outside. She continues to 
be timidly helpful, taking pleasure in alleviating the stress of others and enjoying the 
rehearsals, which are the closest thing to a real play that she has had the opportunity to 
experience. Readers not only know that this externally unobjectionable behavior is 
compromised by Fanny’s emotions and the her failure to meet her standards, but also might 
find it problematic according to the standards of the marriage plot. As a heroine, Fanny is 
not supposed to be relegated to the sidelines unless she occupies this position with 
irreproachable and idealized qualities that will eventually be recognized. The tension between 
the marriage plot and the position plot intensifies during the episode of the private 
theatricals, raising the issue of how readers relate to Fanny as a representation.  
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The marriage plot and the position plot suggest two different sets of conditions of 
representation. While the former indicates idealized characters at an aesthetic remove from 
readers, the latter suggests realistic characters with whom readers are encouraged to 
empathize. This combination asks readers to maintain a complicated aesthetic distance from 
its characters, one that allows them to empathize with Fanny without forgetting that she is 
neither real nor ideal. She does not meet the standards of a typical, idealized heroine, nor 
does her status as a representation, one whose inner world is selectively revealed to readers, 
permit the same kind of judgment appropriate to a real person with whom readers share a 
world. Instead, she is a realistic heroine with flaws as well as strengths. In order to hope for 
her idealized happy ending, readers must both want her to live up to her ideal self and 
forgive her failures to do so. 
 
  188 
Chapter Five: The Two Plots Converge 
I. The Challenges of Fanny’s Increased Importance 
 Chapters Three and Four dealt with how Mansfield Park’s characters understand and 
navigate the relationships among the real, the represented, and the ideal during the private 
theatricals. In this chapter, I turn to how the novel as a representation challenges readers to 
consider its realism and idealism. It is in these terms that readers are forced to reevaluate 
their expectations for Fanny as well as for the novel when she becomes important within the 
fictional world. Henry’s pursuit of Fanny raises questions about the kind of heroine readers 
want Fanny to be, the kind of marriage comedy they want Mansfield Park to be, and the 
grounds of their judgments of the characters and of the novel. Fiction, Mansfield Park claims, 
ought not to be judged by the standards of either the ideal or the real, suggesting instead the 
ways in which judgments of the ideal and of the real might inform one another.  
 In this chapter I consider how this suggestion appears, first, in the novel’s 
developing plot-geometry and, second, in a sentence in which the narrator 
uncharacteristically intervenes to comment on Fanny as a heroine. While the novel’s 
marriage plot asks readers to form expectations for Fanny’s happy marriage, the position 
plot emphasizes the obstacle to this happy marriage created by Fanny’s own unwillingness to 
consider such a marriage possible. In the previous chapter, I discussed Fanny’s attempts to 
live up to an ideal self capable of disinterested judgment. Such a self could be the heroine of 
a marriage comedy in which the value of this faultless person is finally recognized by those 
around her. But, by exposing Fanny’s failures to achieve her ideals, the position plot casts 
Fanny as an idealistic, but less idealized, heroine. So, whereas the novel’s marriage plot casts 
Fanny as an idealized heroine whose true value will eventually be recognized by those 
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around her, the novel’s position plot casts Fanny as a more realistic heroine with whose 
fallibility readers are asked to sympathize.1  
 In the novel’s first volume, the interaction of these two plots, as I argued in Chapters 
One and Two, challenges readers’ judgments of Fanny and suggests the possibility of various 
obstacles to her happy marriage with Edmund. Fanny’s increasing importance in the second 
volume of the novel corresponds neither to expectations encouraged by the marriage plot 
that her happy marriage will be facilitated when the Bertrams learn her true value, nor to 
expectations encouraged by the position plot that her happy marriage will be facilitated when 
Fanny begins to value herself differently. Although Fanny’s increased importance does 
develop the idea that a general change in the way values are held at Mansfield Park will be 
necessary for her happy ending, the reasons for her new importance complicate the 
possibilities for what this change might be and how it might take place. Henry’s pursuit of 
Fanny introduces a new love triangle (among Henry, Fanny, and Edmund) that overlaps with 
the first (among Mary, Edmund, and Fanny) and offers the possibility of an alternative 
ending in which Fanny winds up with Henry and Edmund with Mary. This possibility forces 
readers to reevaluate their expectations of Fanny and of the novel. But the narrator’s 
uncharacteristic comment on how Fanny might react to this twist in the plot challenges 
readers to consider the grounds of their judgment of Fanny and of the novel. 
 
II. A Second Love Triangle and the Convergence of the Two Plots  
                                               
1 It is worth remembering that other approaches to the genre of the novel make use of the 
contrast between idealism and realism in ways distinct from my use here. Historical 
approaches often link the contrast to that between romance and novel; these generic 
distinctions are further analyzed, for example, in terms of changing socio-economic 
conditions (see Watt), changing notions of subjectivity (see Richetti), and dialectically (see 
McKeon). Critics of Mansfield Park often link idealism with didacticism and contrast it with 
Austen’s realism (see Mudrick, Duffy). Others see Austen as using an idealized plot structure 
to ironic effect (see Brown, Tauchert).  
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  As Chapters One and Two have shown, Mansfield Park’s position plot complicates 
the expectations associated with its marriage plot. The first volume of the novel develops 
instabilities among the Bertrams and the Crawfords. Its focus on Fanny, though establishing 
her as the heroine of the novel, emphasizes her lack of importance within the fictional 
world. The absence of instabilities concerning Fanny within the fictional world creates a 
tension with readers about how her happy marriage will be accomplished.2 While Fanny’s 
forbidden affection for Edmund and jealousy of Mary form the novel’s first love triangle, 
her denial of these feelings conceals this love triangle which consequently is unsuspected by 
anyone else in the fictional world, indeed perhaps even by Fanny herself.  
 Fanny’s refusal to acknowledge her romantic feelings for Edmund puts both her and 
readers in an awkward position. Fanny’s denial of her feelings prevents her from confronting 
the effect that they have on her judgment. As I explained in Chapter One, she attempts to 
nullify her feelings by placing a problematic aesthetic distance between herself and her 
cousins. This self-deception also interferes with readers’ proximity to Fanny, a proximity 
encouraged by the narrative’s invitations to share her perspective. Readers are distanced 
from her by their awareness of Fanny’s denial of her feelings and of the happy marriage 
promised by the novel. This distance is not, however, merely that of knowing more than 
Fanny knows, as it would be if she either did not have or did not deny her feelings for 
Edmund. Readers both know more than Fanny knows and know that she knows more than 
she admits to knowing. Each of these two kinds of superior knowledge distances readers 
from the perspective that they are invited to share with her, and each complicates the kinds 
of sympathy readers are able to feel for her. Instead of being positioned either to hope for a 
happy ending of which Fanny is entirely unaware or to share her confrontation with her 
                                               
2 See Phelan for the distinction between instabilities within a fictional world and tensions in 
the relationships among authors, narrators and audiences (Reading People).  
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inappropriate feelings, readers are positioned to see her denial of them and the effects of this 
denial on her judgment. Readers’ superior knowledge of Fanny’s feelings interferes with the 
proximity encouraged by using her as a focalizer.3 They are both invited to share her 
perspective and given information that shows this perspective in a critical light.  
 The novel thus asks readers not only to expect something that Fanny considers 
impossible, but also to evaluate her tactics for dealing with her forbidden feelings. Readers 
who expect Fanny’s happy marriage therefore must consider the kind of change necessary to 
make the marriage a happy ending. As I explained in Chapter One, the emphasis may be 
placed more or less on a change in how Fanny sees herself, on a change in how Fanny is 
seen within the fictional world, or on a change in how values are held within the fictional 
world. Readers unsympathetic to Fanny tend to place more emphasis on her need to change, 
while those who sympathize with her suppression of her feelings and forgive the effects that 
this has on her judgment are more likely to expect the others to change more than Fanny 
herself. The expectation of a change in how values are held within the fictional world might 
correspond to Fanny’s becoming more like the others or to the others becoming more like 
Fanny in relation to the values espoused by the Bertrams.  
 The love triangle comprised of Fanny, Edmund, and Mary thus suggests a happy 
ending for Fanny for which readers might or might not be able to hope. Sympathetic readers 
hope for the ending that Fanny does not consider possible, while unsympathetic readers 
either hope for Mary’s marriage to Edmund or want Fanny to change dramatically in order 
to deserve a happy ending with Edmund or with someone else. But, the novel also asks 
                                               
3 See Bujak for an insightful analysis of Austen’s narrative voice as a formal innovation 
obliged to Scott’s narrative poetry. While I agree with Bujak about the importance of 
Fanny’s peripherality, I cannot agree with his claim that it invites readers to relate to her as 
more like a narrator than a character. Her status as peripheral observer, I argue instead, 
continuously complicates the distance between her and readers in multiple ways.  
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readers to entertain another ending by introducing a second love triangle. When Fanny 
becomes more important within the fictional world and Henry begins to pursue her, a 
second overlapping love triangle is created that offers another possible ending, one that 
involves a dramatic change in Fanny (and a corresponding change in Edmund and/or Mary). 
Henry’s attentions first raise the possibility of Fanny’s marriage within the fictional world. 
For readers who already expect her marriage because of the novel’s genre, by contrast, 
Henry’s attentions add the question of “to whom?” to the question of “how?” already 
suggested by Fanny’s feelings for Edmund.  
 When only one love triangle exists, the imbalance between Fanny’s peripheral role 
within the fictional world and her importance to the novel’s plot is reflected by the 
imbalances among readers’ awareness of all three points of the triangle, characters’ awareness 
of only the instability between Edmund and Mary, and Fanny’s problematic denial of her 
feelings for Edmund and jealousy of Mary. The second love triangle reflects Fanny’s 
increased importance by making her the focus of instabilities within the fictional world. 
These instabilities relate to Henry’s pursuit of Fanny and her refusal of him. Though Fanny 
manages to keep her feelings for Edmund secret, her struggle to do so forces her to deal 
with them more explicitly, and the role they play in her continued refusal of Henry is made 
clear to her as well as to readers. The instability created by Henry’s attentions also 
complicates the tension with readers about what they want for Fanny as well as about the 
kind of marriage comedy they want the novel to be. Preferring that she end up with Edmund 
means wanting the fulfillment of Fanny’s unacknowledged hopes, while preferring that she 
accept Henry means wanting her to change her mind.  
 A number of additional positions fall under these two basic options for what readers 
might want for Fanny and from the novel. A desire for the realization of Fanny’s 
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unacknowledged hopes might accompany a more or less strong desire for her to change 
before her hopes are fulfilled. Readers might want Fanny merely to acknowledge her hopes; 
they might want her to acknowledge her worthiness of Edmund; or they might want her to 
change in a way that makes her more worthy than she has been, either by her own standards 
or by those of a typical marriage comedy. Readers who want Fanny to change her mind and 
accept Henry expect a big change in either Henry or Fanny, or a smaller change in both. 
Readers who sympathize with Fanny and agree with her negative judgment of Henry might 
want Henry to become worthy of Fanny so that she revises her judgment. Readers who do 
not sympathize with Fanny, by contrast, either want her earlier judgments of Henry to be 
somehow undermined, or want her to give up the principles that have grounded these 
judgments. Both sympathetic and unsympathetic readers might hope that Fanny and Henry 
are united after he becomes more, and she less, principled. These different options, in turn, 
correspond to different hopes about changes in the way values are held in the fictional 
world. Are the Bertrams and Fanny to become more like the Crawfords? Are the Crawfords 
and Fanny to become more like the Bertrams? Or are the Crawfords and the Bertrams to 
become more like Fanny?4   
                                               
4 Brenner argues that suspense is generated in the novel’s third volume by raising the 
question of whether the “characters will improve sufficiently to make for a happy ending,” 
but he considers only the alternative ending, an ending which he claims requires the 
improvement of both Henry and Mary, on the one hand, and Edmund and Fanny, on the 
other (25-6). I. Armstrong sees the alternative ending as a “teasing possibility” “in which a 
strong Fanny married a reformed Henry” (55). Brown sees the possibility of marriages 
between Edmund and Mary, on the one hand, and Fanny and Henry, on the other as a 
thwarted synthesis between classical and romantic values that fits with the novel’s pessimistic 
realism (91-2). Duffy, who recognizes the fairytale qualities of Mansfield Park’s plot (at one 
point suggesting that Mary’s biggest fault is not believing in fairytales (86)), does not see the 
Crawfords as viable options for Fanny and Edmund because his understanding of Austen’s 
worldview and didactic purpose includes a condemnation of the Crawfords’ faulty education 
and unprincipledness. Canuel sees Henry and Mary as wrong choices for Fanny and 
Edmund, mistakes they narrowly escape.  
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 The choice between Edmund and Henry as a match for Fanny suggests a contrast 
between a Cinderella-tale about the rewards of patience and virtue and a marriage comedy in 
which sibling sets resolve into romantic sets that blend the serious and upright with the 
charming and witty. This choice is only possible, however, if a reader considers Fanny’s 
marriage with Henry a potential ending.5 And this question about the nature of Mansfield 
Park’s marriage plot i.e., the question of whether Henry is a possible match for Fanny or 
merely an obstacle to her eventual marriage with Edmund, is complicated by its position 
plot. 
 In the novel’s first volume, the position plot’s emphasis on Fanny’s suppression of 
her feelings for Edmund complicates the marriage plot’s emphasis on the love triangle made 
up of Fanny, Edmund, and Mary. Readers are aware of a love triangle that has an effect on, 
but remains unacknowledged within, the fictional world. When the possibility that Fanny will 
marry is raised within the fictional world in the novel’s second volume, the position plot’s 
emphasis on Fanny’s reaction to being pursued by Henry complicates the question of 
whether he should be considered a possible match or not. This question develops the 
tensions introduced in the novel’s first volume about exactly what stands between Fanny and 
her happy ending, as well as about how these obstacles can be overcome.  
 The tensions developed throughout the novel have to do, consequently, not only 
with how Fanny’s happy ending will be accomplished, but also with what kind of happy 
                                               
5 Critics who do not see Henry as a viable option include N. Auerbach, who finds Henry’s 
insincerity such that “only the most sentimentally credulous reader could find this new 
performance [his passion for Fanny] credible” (111). Banfield sees the outcome of the novel 
as “always in suspense” yet “all the same prepared for” (“Moral Landscape” 16). In the 
context of discussing the ease with which the modesty of a lower-class heroine who marries 
up can be interpreted as merely tactical, Davidson understands Fanny as refusing “the 
reward of marriage to Henry Crawford, although circumstances might have bestowed it 
upon her” (263). M. Butler sees Henry’s attentions as a test of Fanny’s virtue which she, as 
an exemplary heroine, cannot fail (246). Donohue does not consider Henry a viable option, 
but instead reads his pursuit of Fanny as a form of oppression.  
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ending the novel promises. Henry’s attentions multiply and intensify the questions raised by 
the novel’s first volume about the kind of change necessary in order for Fanny’s happy 
ending to be accomplished. What kinds of changes are desirable or possible in Henry and 
Fanny? The unexpected ways in which Fanny becomes important within the fictional world 
complicate how readers answer these questions. Before turning to Henry’s attentions, 
therefore, I discuss how and why Fanny first becomes important within the fictional world.6 
Her new importance does not conform to the idealized pattern of a marriage comedy, nor 
does it conform to either her own idealistic or realistic expectations for herself or others. 
While Fanny struggles to cope with a new importance that she does not understand or 
welcome, readers must reassess their expectations for the idealized happy ending of the 
novel’s idealistic heroine, one who is portrayed realistically and as insistent on the limitations 
imposed by her own reality. 
 
III. The Value of Appearances 
 The first thing that increases Fanny’s importance at Mansfield Park is Sir Thomas’s 
appreciation of her improved appearance. On the one hand, this appreciation corresponds to 
readers’ expectations that Fanny’s value at Mansfield Park will increase and that she will 
come to be seen as marriage material. On the other hand, the fact that Sir Thomas values 
only Fanny’s appearance emphasizes that a change in how values are generally held at 
Mansfield Park is still necessary if Fanny is to be valued in a more substantial way, one that 
she might be more comfortable learning to accept. Her discomfort with her new importance, 
however, stems from her problematic conception of her position as much as from the 
                                               
6 Irvine reads Fanny as occupying the space of moral authority that Sir Thomas or Edmund 
would traditionally hold (68 and passim), and characterizes Fanny’s rejection of Henry as 
Austen’s rejection of Richardson’s solution to female agency in the reform plot of Pamela 
(71).  
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superficial cause of her elevation. Sir Thomas’s new appreciation of Fanny’s appearance, in 
other words, superficially fulfills expectations raised by her status as the heroine of a 
marriage comedy while at the same time emphasizing the problematic nature of this new 
position of importance. 
 The first cause of Fanny’s elevation thus challenges readers to evaluate different ways 
in which their expectations for Fanny might be met. Is being thought pretty enough to 
justify her increased importance and worthiness to marry? Might an appreciation of Fanny’s 
appearance lead to an appreciation of her other qualities, as Edmund hopes? To what extent 
does Fanny deserve her elevation and how should she react to it? Answering these questions 
is further complicated by Edmund’s claim to Sir Thomas that Fanny alone “‘judged rightly 
throughout’” (129) the episode of the private theatricals. The narrative gives no indication 
that Sir Thomas judges Fanny to be as blameless as Edmund claims she is and emphasizes 
the superficial cause of his increased regard rather than any appreciation of her judgment. 
Edmund’s claim, therefore, confronts readers with another reason that she could be but is 
not valued within the fictional world, albeit a reason that readers know is not entirely 
deserved. Not only was Fanny’s judgment of the private theatricals compromised by her 
emotions, she also finally agreed, after Edmund’s encouragement, to join the rehearsal that 
Sir Thomas’s return stopped short.7  
 That Edmund first gives Fanny credit for good judgment that she does not entirely 
deserve, and that Sir Thomas then gives her credit only for appearances over which she has 
no control, complicate readers’ evaluations of Fanny’s elevation. Those who want her to be 
elevated because of her good qualities will be disappointed not only because she is elevated 
for more superficial reasons, but also because she has faltered in the good qualities for which 
                                               
7 Lott argues that Fanny’s new ascendency begins with Edmund’s praise of her judgment, 
and is complicated by her capitulation to his request to act (276-7).  
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Edmund tries to give her credit. Those who care less about the reasons for her elevation will 
be disappointed by her inability to accept her new, more valued, position.  
 Fanny’s sudden elevation casts a new light on her peripheral position, a position that 
has generally been considered just and permanent within the fictional world and unjust and 
likely to change from the perspective of readers. Although it would have been considered 
presumptuous of Fanny to demand more consideration or attention, once it is given she is 
expected to appreciate it. Fanny’s elevation thus challenges her conception of herself and the 
grounds of readers’ judgments of her. The first volume of the novel challenged readers to 
differentiate between expectations justifiable from Fanny’s perspective and those justifiable 
from their own; the second volume builds on this challenge by changing the expectations 
justifiable from Fanny’s perspective and complicating those encouraged in readers by the 
novel’s two plots.  
 Fanny’s elevation begins with Sir Thomas’s return from Antigua. She dreads meeting 
him again and worries about intruding on the family’s reunion. Though she is “quite 
overlooked by her cousins” (122) as they rush to meet him, when she finally feels compelled 
to join them she hears him enquiring after the whereabouts of his “‘little Fanny’” (123) and 
is shocked by his kind and affectionate greeting. The change Fanny perceives in Sir 
Thomas’s treatment of her corresponds to the change he perceives in her appearance. Upon 
leaving for Antigua, Sir Thomas’s kindness in encouraging Fanny to invite her beloved 
brother for a visit had been tempered by his observation that William “‘must find his sister at 
sixteen in some respects too much like his sister at ten’” (25). Two years later,8 Sir Thomas is 
impressed with the improvement in health and beauty that he had doubted before his 
departure. He perceives that Fanny has grown into a young woman in his absence, a change 
                                               
8 See Ferguson, Downie and Southam for examples of conflicting arguments about the 
timeline of the novel in relation to the Abolition Act of 1807. 
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that no one at home has remarked upon or seen as significant. Fanny’s low position has been 
defined so that it would not matter whether she remained a sickly young girl or grew into a 
pretty young woman. Fanny accepts this definition of her position and never thinks of 
herself as the object of attention. But, once people want to look at her, she must learn to be 
looked at, a lesson that is much harder for timid and unassuming Fanny than was accepting 
others’ neglect of her. The attention that she now receives, however, does more than 
embarrass Fanny; it challenges the self-conception that she has developed in accepting her 
position in the Bertram household and denying any feelings that she deems inappropriate to 
that position, most importantly her romantic feelings for Edmund.  
 Fanny’s exclusion from the social activities of her cousins has indicated her exclusion 
from the marriage market.9 As I discussed in Chapter One, Fanny conceives of her exclusion 
from the social world of her cousins as more rigid and extreme than that demanded by her 
relatively fluid social position. By conceiving of the social distance separating her from her 
cousins as an aesthetic distance akin to that separating a reader from the characters in a 
book, Fanny attempts to protect herself from her own feelings. Although she imposes this 
distance in order to make impossible her feelings for Edmund as well as any desire she might 
feel to enter her cousins’ social world, the aesthetic distance she places between herself and 
her cousins misconstrues the effect that she might have on their world as much as it does 
the effect their world might have on her. In her denial of her feelings for Edmund, Fanny 
has also denied the possibility that he or anyone else might have feelings for her.  
 Sir Thomas’s sudden recognition that Fanny has grown into a pretty young woman 
thus makes her the object of a kind of attention that she not only has never sought, but also 
                                               
9 See Mary’s question about whether she is “out” (36). 
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has denied the possibility of receiving.10 Sir Thomas’s appreciation, moreover, is caused by 
and limited to Fanny’s appearance, something over which she has little control and for 
which she can take little credit. The first cause of Fanny’s increased importance within the 
fictional world is thus a change in how she is valued, but one that highlights the superficiality 
of the values held at Mansfield Park. 
 A conversation between Edmund and Fanny about the changes wrought by Sir 
Thomas’s return makes more explicit Sir Thomas’s new regard for Fanny and differentiates 
the way that Fanny and Edmund hold values from the way that the others do. In terms of 
the marriage plot, the conversation introduces Fanny’s new position as marriageable. 
Though the possibility of Fanny’s marriage is only made explicit when Henry begins to 
pursue her, this earlier conversation establishes her as worthy of attention and foreshadows 
the novel’s conclusion. The conversation suggests that Fanny could better fulfill the role of 
daughter to Sir Thomas than do his own children and underscores her compatibility with 
Edmund. In terms of the position plot, the conversation between Edmund and Fanny 
highlights the discrepancy between the values that Sir Thomas espouses and those upon 
which he acts together with the discrepancy between Fanny’s values and her position.  
 The conversation begins when Edmund comments on how serious the family has 
become since Sir Thomas’s return, mainly due to his father’s disinclination for visitors. 
Fanny corrects Edmund’s impression that they “‘had never lived so before’” (135) by 
reminding him of the seriousness of their evenings before Sir Thomas’s departure. While 
Edmund had grown accustomed to the liveliness characterizing Sir Thomas’s absence, Fanny 
                                               
10 See Duane for an argument that Fanny’s discomfort at Sir Thomas’s attention should be 
seen, as it would have been by Austen’s contemporaries, in terms the discourses of 
sensibility, nervousness, and hysteria, discourses linking physical and mental problems.  
Duane characterizes Sir Thomas’s return and attention to Fanny’s improved looks in terms 
of the gothic elements of unease and sexual violence (406).  
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is more suited to the graver evenings that have been reinstated by his return. She remarks on 
the pleasure that she takes in listening to Sir Thomas talk about the West Indies. “‘It 
entertains me more than many other things have done,’” she says, “‘but then I am unlike 
other people, I dare say’” (135-6). Edmund teases Fanny for daring to distinguish herself 
thusly from others, asking “‘Why should you dare say that?’ (smiling) – Do you want to be 
told that you are only unlike other people in being more wise and discreet?’” (136). 
 Edmund’s teasing implicitly contrasts two styles of conversation and the values that 
accompany them: a witty style that values flattery and a frank style that values sincerity. His 
playful question suggests that Fanny’s remark has been the kind of witty social role-playing 
wherein people do not say what they believe, but rather say whatever they think will forward 
their own interests.11 Following this interpretation, Fanny intends her comment that she is 
unlike other people as uncomplimentary to herself so that Edmund will contradict it with a 
complimentary interpretation of her difference from others. The compliment that Edmund 
refuses to give her, however, belies the style of conversation that would demand it, a witty 
style of conversation that does not value wisdom and discretion.  
 Fanny and Edmund value not only wisdom and discretion, but also frankness. 
Edmund is able to tease Fanny because her hesitation to point out her good qualities looks 
almost like the kind of wittiness in which a person puts oneself down for the express 
purpose of being complimented. Fanny, however, does not mean to put herself down. She 
knows that being able to appreciate Sir Thomas’s stories differentiates her positively from 
the Miss Bertrams. This knowledge is what makes her statement daring and invites 
                                               
11 The way in which compliments are demanded and given in this kind of conversation is 
indicated by the narrator in describing interactions between Henry and Maria when parts are 
being chosen for Lovers’ Vows: “…Maria and Henry Crawford conversed together in an 
under voice, and the declaration with which she began of, ‘I am sure I would give up the part 
to Julia most willingly, but that though I shall probably do it very ill, I feel persuaded she 
would do it worse,’ was doubtless receiving all the compliments it called for” (97).    
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Edmund’s teasing. His “‘why should you dare say that?’” (136) indicates that their frank style 
of conversation allows for the kind of self-recognition of which Fanny stops just short. 
Though she values frankness, she cannot be frank about her own good qualities. Even when 
she recognizes these qualities, the fact that others do not makes it daring for her to express 
them.  
 Fanny cannot convey her appreciation of Sir Thomas’s stories without indicating the 
positive quality that makes it possible. This quality differentiates her from others in a positive 
way, but Fanny is used to being distinguished as inferior. She retains her inferior position 
even as she demonstrates the qualities that should raise her in Sir Thomas’s estimation. Sir 
Thomas, Edmund next clarifies, is more inclined to admire Fanny’s appearance than the 
sensibility that enables her to appreciate his stories. “‘But when did you or any body ever get 
a compliment from me, Fanny,’” Edmund asks. “‘Go to my father if you want to be 
complimented. He will satisfy you. Ask your uncle what he thinks, and you will hear 
compliments enough; and though they may be chiefly on your person, you must put up with 
it, and trust to his seeing as much beauty of mind in time’” (136). Edmund’s refusal to 
compliment Fanny not only consists of more compliments than Fanny could expect or 
desire, but also indicates his difference from his father. Though both Edmund and Sir 
Thomas value seriousness and frankness, Sir Thomas does not appreciate these qualities in 
Fanny, noticing only her exterior.  
 Edmund does not explicitly criticize his father’s superficial appreciation of Fanny. 
He does, however, clarify how he and Fanny value appearances less than does Sir Thomas. 
In a remark that echoes Fanny’s earlier differentiation of herself from others, Edmund 
distinguishes the response that he and Fanny have to her uncle’s new appreciation from that 
which anybody else would have. “‘Your uncle thinks you very pretty, dear Fanny,’” he says,  
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“and that is the long and the short of the matter. Any body but myself would have 
made something more of it, and any body but you would resent that you had not been 
thought very pretty before; but the truth is, that your uncle never did admire you till 
now—and now he does.” (136) 
Edmund and Fanny are uniquely wise and discreet, he suggests, in valuing appearances less 
than others do. Edmund implies that while Sir Thomas might have the potential to be led 
from valuing outer to valuing inner beauty, Edmund and Fanny are not distracted from their 
commitments to inner beauty by preoccupations about whether outer beauty is appreciated.  
 Although Edmund is right that Fanny did not resent her not being thought pretty 
before, he does not understand the extent to which being thought pretty now disturbs her.12 
He implies that it is better to value appearances less than they are commonly valued without 
taking into account the significance for Fanny of the common value placed on appearances. 
In fact, after distinguishing how he and Fanny react to Sir Thomas’s new appreciation of her 
appearance from how anyone else would, Edmund insists that Fanny “‘must really begin to 
harden [herself] to the idea of being worth looking at’” and “‘must try not to mind growing 
up into a pretty woman’” (136). Unaccustomed to being looked at, Fanny does mind being 
thought a pretty young woman because an appreciation of her appearance not only 
highlights the depreciation of her other qualities, but also interferes with her insistence that 
she is not worthy of attention. Sir Thomas’s admiration suggests the possibility of Edmund’s 
admiration, a possibility for which Fanny cannot admit that she longs.13   
 Edmund’s teasing exposes the problematic nature both of Fanny’s self-conception 
and of values and evaluation in the Bertram household. Fanny does not explicitly assign a 
                                               
12 Duane reads Fanny’s discomfort here as resulting from the threat of Sir Thomas’s 
unwanted sexual attention, part of the novel’s invocation of a gothic incest plot (407).   
13 See Fanny’s response and the narrator’s comment: “‘Oh! don’t talk so, don’t talk so,” cried 
Fanny, distressed by more feelings than he was aware of” (136). 
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value to the difference that she notes between herself and others, but she is aware that being 
able to take an interest in Sir Thomas’s stories is a characteristic that he values. In fact, this 
knowledge together with a consciousness of her inferior position prevents her from 
displaying the characteristic so obviously missing in his daughters. The Miss Bertrams’ clear 
lack of interest in their father’s stories prevents Fanny from continuing to question Sir 
Thomas about what he says because, as she tells Edmund, “‘I thought it would appear as if I 
wanted to set myself off at their expense, by shewing a curiosity and pleasure in his 
information which he must wish his own daughters to feel’” (136).  
 At Mansfield Park, as I explained in Chapters One and Three, high social status is 
generally associated with good character and principles. The Miss Bertrams are valued as 
having both, while they possess only social status. Fanny, by contrast, has good character 
and principles without having social status. Her discomfort at displaying the qualities that the 
Miss Bertrams lack not only shows her awareness of this discrepancy between qualities and 
status but also exemplifies the kind of sensibility and modesty that Sir Thomas mistakenly 
believes his daughters possess. Fanny’s formulation of her fears indicates how impossible 
she thinks it is for someone in her low position to be credited with the qualities associated 
with people of higher status. Hence Fanny believes that, if she acted as the Miss Bertrams 
should, she would not be valued as they are, but instead suspected of an attempt to appear 
more valuable than she is. 
  
IV. The Idealized, Idealistic, and Realistic Heroine of Mansfield Park  
 In this section, I turn to the importance of Henry’s pursuit of Fanny by analyzing a 
single long sentence in which the narrator uncharacteristically comments on Fanny as a 
heroine and the novel’s status as a representation. Henry’s attentions change Fanny’s 
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position within the fictional world and radically challenge her self-conception and her 
judgment. They also cause the other characters to reevaluate Fanny’s worth. Some raise 
Fanny to the worth that they consider merits Henry’s attentions, while others consider her 
lucky to be receiving attentions that she does not really deserve.14 Her refusal of Henry’s 
attentions precipitates another reevaluation of Fanny and what others consider her 
inexplicable obstinacy proves to most that she does not deserve Henry’s offer of marriage.  
 Henry’s attentions also change the novel’s plot-geometry such that readers must 
reexamine their expectations of the novel as well as the grounds of their judgments of the 
characters. What kind of marriage comedy do they want the novel to be and how can its 
happy ending be achieved? Which characters will undergo what kinds of changes? How will 
the way that values are held in the fictional world change and who will be valued for what? 
The narrator’s uncharacteristic intrusion emphasizes Fanny’s status as a representation and 
contrasts her with a different kind of ideal heroine. The comment creates a set of contrasts 
among the ideal, real, and represented that draw attention to how readers might judge Fanny 
in each of these categories.  
 Before turning to the narrator’s uncharacteristic comment, I need, first, to provide 
more background about Fanny’s increased importance and, second, to discuss the negative 
light in which Henry’s attentions are introduced. Fanny has never been nor is she now 
wanted for herself, but instead to perform a role. Thus, when the newly married Maria leaves 
Mansfield Park, taking Julia with her, Fanny must get used to filling the “chasm” (140) 
created by their departure. The narrator clarifies how the change in Fanny’s position has 
nothing to do with her and everything to do with the absence of the Miss Bertrams:   
                                               
14 Edmund is alone in raising Henry, rather than Fanny, as a result of his choice. He tells 
Fanny “that [Henry’s heart] being for you, has raised him inconceivably in my opinion” 
(238).  
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Fanny’s consequence increased on the departure of her cousins. Becoming, as she then 
did, the only young woman in the drawing-room, the only occupier of that interesting 
division of a family in which she had hitherto held so humble a third, it was impossible 
for her not to be more looked at, more thought of and attended to, than she had ever 
been before; and ‘where is Fanny?’ became no uncommon question, even without her 
being wanted for any one’s convenience. (141) 
This description of Fanny’s increased importance emphasizes its similarity to her former lack 
of importance. Fanny’s position as the third young woman at Mansfield Park was so humble 
that she was hardly considered to occupy the same interesting division as her cousins, and 
was treated more as an assistant to, than a participant in, their activities. She may no longer 
be wanted only to fulfill someone’s immediate need, but being wanted as the only young 
woman around is being wanted to fulfill a general need.  
 The role of sole young woman at Mansfield Park is important not only in the 
drawing room there, but also at the Parsonage where Mary has little to occupy her. Fanny’s 
new value at the Parsonage, like that at Mansfield Park, is a matter of convenience for those 
who now value her and a source of discomfort for the newly valued Fanny. Only “in the 
gloom and dirt of a November day” does Fanny become a guest “most acceptable to Mary 
Crawford” (141). Mrs. Grant, the narrator makes clear, thinks only of Mary in inviting Fanny 
to the Parsonage. “By the easiest self-deceit,” however, she is able to “persuade herself that 
she [is] doing the kindest thing by Fanny, and giving her the most important opportunities of 
improvement in pressing her frequent calls” (141). Mrs. Grant obscures her use of Fanny to 
gratify Mary by labeling it a kindness to Fanny rather than to Mary. Fanny, in turn, is 
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expected to be grateful for being elevated, though, in fact, she is again being called upon as 
helpmate, now in the role of companion rather than servant.15  
 The narrator shows both Henry and Mary in a critical light when he shares with her 
his intention to “‘make Fanny Price in love with [him]’” (157). Henry, first interested in 
Fanny because there is no one else with whom to flirt, becomes more interested when she is 
not immediately won over by his attentions and therefore presents an unusual challenge.16 
While Mary does hope that Henry “‘will not be making her really unhappy’” (158), she does 
not try to stop her brother from toying with Fanny. Mary does as little to protect Fanny 
from what she assumes will be the meaningless attentions of her brother as she has done to 
                                               
15 While Fanny could probably not refuse the invitations to visit Mary, the narrator makes 
explicit that the circumstances of the invitations free Fanny from seeing her visits as an 
obligation, emphasizing that these visits stem instead from “a kind of fascination” (143). 
Fanny’s fascination with visiting Mary, I submit, parallels Mary’s other motive in befriending 
Fanny. Mary knows that Edmund is impressed by kindnesses to Fanny, while Fanny cannot 
overcome her curiosity about the woman whom Edmund loves or about this woman’s 
intentions regarding him. See Anderson for an argument about the homoerotic nature of this 
fascination.  
16 His sister is quick to guess his motives. In response to Henry’s description of Fanny’s 
“‘claims to notice’” and the “‘wonderful improvement that has taken place in her looks,’” 
Mary says:  
“‘Phoo! phoo! This is only because there were no tall women to compare her with, and 
because she has got a new gown, and you never saw her so well dressed before. She is just 
what she was in October, believe me. The truth is, that she was the only girl in company for 
you to notice, and you must have a somebody. I have always thought her pretty—not 
strikingly pretty—but ‘pretty enough,’ as people say; a sort of beauty that grows on one. Her 
eyes should be darker, but she has a sweet smile; but as for this wonderful degree of 
improvement, I am sure it may all be resolved into a better style of dress and your having 
nobody else to look at; and therefore, if you do set about a flirtation with her, you never will 
persuade me that it is in compliment to her beauty, or that it proceeds from anything but 
your own idleness and folly”“ (157-8). 
Henry does not answer the accusation, but his next comments clarify the nature of Fanny’s 
charms: she poses a challenge. “‘I never was so long in company with a girl in my life – 
trying to entertain her – and succeed so ill,’” he admits, continuing, “‘never met with a girl 
who looked so grave on me! I must try to get the better of this. Her looks say, “I will not like 
you, I am determined not to like you,” and I say she shall’” (158).  
Readers are likely to be as quick as Mary to understand what motivates Henry’s new interest 
in Fanny. Mary immediately corrects her first impression: “‘And so this is her attraction after 
all! This it is – her not caring about you – which gives her such a soft skin and makes her so 
much taller, and produces all these charms and graces!’” (158). 
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protect the Miss Bertrams or any of the other friends whose hearts Henry has tried to steal. 
Henry and Mary consider his flirtations nothing more than amusements.17 Neither of them 
worries about the consequences of misrepresenting themselves and their intentions, the 
consequences of making other people believe that they are something, e.g., potential 
husband or genuine friend, that they have no intention of being.  
 In classing Fanny generally as a young woman to be tricked into loving Henry, Mary 
further obscures the social distance between herself and Fanny that her desire for company 
has already encouraged her to overlook. Fanny, however, is different from the Miss Bertrams 
and the Crawfords in significant ways. First, her low social position distinguishes her from 
Mary’s usual friends and Henry’s usual targets. While Fanny must take seriously her social 
inferiority, the others are free to determine the practical meaning of her social status 
according to whether they need her to run their errands, keep them company, or return their 
affection. Second, her position and her values distinguish her view, especially of Henry, from 
that of the others: she does not see him as they do, nor does she see him as they think she 
does.  
 Fanny’s position in relation to Henry’s pursuit is clarified in the long sentence that 
also includes a rare and interesting intrusion by the narrator. The normally unobtrusive 
narrator enters to contrast Fanny with a different kind of novelistic heroine in order to 
clarify that her heart rather than her judgment will protect her from being taken in by 
                                               
17 The exchange about Fanny quoted in the previous note begins with Henry:  
“‘And how do you think I mean to amuse myself, Mary, on the days that I do not hunt? I am 
grown too old to go out more than three times a week; but I have a plan for the intermediate 
days, and what do you think it is?’  
‘To walk and ride with me, to be sure.’ 
‘Not exactly, though I shall be happy to do both, but that would be exercise only to my body, 
and I must take care of my mind. Besides that would be all recreation and indulgence, 
without the wholesome alloy of labour, and I do not like to eat the bread of idleness. No, my 
plan is to make Fanny Price in love with me’” (157).  
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Henry.18 The description begins with Mary’s lack of concern for and knowledge of Fanny’s 
real feelings:  
And without attempting any further remonstrance, she left Fanny to her fate – a fate 
which, had not Fanny’s heart been guarded in a way unsuspected by Miss Crawford, 
might have been a little harder than she deserved; for although there doubtless are 
such unconquerable young ladies of eighteen (or one should not read about them) as 
are never to be persuaded into love against their judgment by all that talent, manner, 
attention, and flattery can do, I have no inclination to believe Fanny one of them, or to 
think that with so much tenderness of disposition, and so much taste as belonged to 
her, she could have escaped heart-whole from the courtship (though the courtship 
only of a fortnight) of such a man as Crawford, in spite of there being some previous 
ill-opinion of him to be overcome, had not her affection been engaged elsewhere. 
(158-9)19 
This grammatically and conceptually complex sentence that punctuates the question of 
Fanny’s status as a fictional heroine presents in a nutshell the novel’s general challenge to 
readers’ expectations.20 The narrator does not often voice explicit opinions about Fanny or 
                                               
18 Hardy finds this priority inconsistent, and charges Austen with handling the love triangles 
with an “authorial double-standard:” here Fanny’s love for Edmund protects her from 
Henry, but the moral basis on which Fanny’s character is constructed requires that her right 
judgment reject Henry (74).  
19 Mary herself echoes this sentiment about Fanny’s susceptibility to Henry when he tells her 
of his intention to marry Fanny: “‘Were you even less pleasing – supposing her not to love 
you already, (of which however I can have little doubt,) you would be safe. The gentleness 
and gratitude of her disposition would secure her all your own immediately. From my soul I 
do not think she would marry you without love; that is, if there is a girl in the world capable of 
being uninfluenced by ambition, I can suppose it her; but ask her to love you, and she will 
never have the heart to refuse’” (200). 
20 Marshall places similar importance, but different significance on this appearance of the 
narratorial “I.” For Marshall, this “I” “reminds us that Austen, like Fanny, has lost her place 
in the book. She may wish to speak her feelings, but she chooses to write and be silent” (90). 
The inescapability of signification, however, allows Marshall to read Fanny not only as a 
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her status as a fictional heroine.21 Here, however, readers are directly challenged to sort out 
the grounds of their sympathy for and judgment of Fanny.   
 The sentence first hints at the importance of Fanny’s feelings for Edmund in her 
refusal of Henry, and then delays making that hint explicit until its final clause. Two 
contrasts separate this hint and its revelation. Both deal with Fanny’s susceptibility to Henry, 
but in different ways that combine to complicate readers’ expectations and draw attention to 
their judgments of the characters and the novel. The sentence assumes that Henry will 
pursue Fanny without any serious intentions, and therefore could break her heart (something 
about which neither Henry nor Mary cares). The narrator then draws two contrasts, which 
suggest, but do not easily resolve into, multi-layered parallels. The first introduces an 
“unconquerable” heroine whose infallible judgment would protect her from falling in love 
with Henry and contrasts such a heroine with Fanny, who, the ironic and parenthetical 
formulation suggests, is both more realistic than the idealized heroine and more susceptible 
to Henry; 22 the second contrasts the tenderness and taste that make Fanny susceptible to 
Henry with the feelings for Edmund that protect her from falling in love with Henry.  
                                                                                                                                            
figure of the reader, but also of “the absent author: the supervising author who would not 
speak in propria persona” (89).   
21 That the narrator means fictional heroines (and not, for example, the real women who 
might be discussed in a newspaper) is suggested by the diction and detail of the description. 
“Unconquerable” ladies besieged by “talent, manner, attention, and flattery” (158) are the 
stuff of novels, not newspapers. The newspaper article that informs Fanny of their behavior 
makes no mention of how deficient Henry’s judgment was in trying to “make Mrs. 
Rushworth Maria Bertram again in her treatment of himself” (317), nor Maria’s in believing 
that his flirtation accompanied any serious intentions. Mansfield Park, however, discusses 
both lapses of judgment. See Davis for a discussion of the origins of the English novel in 
terms of fact and fiction as they interrelated in different forms of publications in the late 
sixteenth through the eighteenth centuries.  
22 Richetti’s chapter on women novelists writing prior to Austen characterizes their challenge 
as “to balance plausibly full and entertaining representations of life and manners with the 
impossible paradoxes of idealized female personality” (192-3).  
  210 
 This long sentence is unusual in ways that draw attention to the novel’s challenge to 
readers’ judgments as well as to its own particular sort of artifice, neither simply ideal nor 
simply real. Not only does a narrator with thoughts and feelings about Fanny make an 
unusual intrusion, the intrusion itself is unusually self-referential in mentioning an idealized 
but unrealistic heroine. The sentence, like the novel, invites readers to sort through different 
perspectives on the real, the represented, and the ideal, as well as on how they might be 
related, that is, to consider how judgments of the real, the represented, and the ideal might 
differ from and inform one another. What kind of heroine is Fanny Price? What determines 
her status as a fictional creation and how? How do different narrative techniques determine 
this status and generate expectations? How are the underlying assumptions generated by the 
novel’s two plots related to how readers sympathize with and judge the characters?  
 The long sentence emphasizes the relationship between fiction and reality as well as 
the relationship between judgment and the heart. The narrator’s ironic assertion that the 
fictional existence of a type guarantees its reality raises questions about Fanny’s status as 
fictional and as realistic. The narrator contrasts Fanny to these idealized and unconquerable 
heroines in terms of their different capacities for judgment, but the contrast has implications 
about their respective statuses as fictional entities. If the narrator’s assertion about 
unconquerable young women is taken to be serious, then it follows that Fanny’s existence in 
Mansfield Park guarantees the existence of real young women like her who are idealistic and 
yet conquerable. If the assertion is taken to be ironic, as I think it must be, the implication is 
that unconquerable heroines are unrealistic idealizations in contrast to Fanny, whose idealism 
does not correspond to idealized and unconquerable judgment, and who is therefore more 
realistic. Taken together, these possibilities suggest that while Fanny is more realistic than 
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idealized heroines with unconquerable judgment, she is also a fictional creation to be 
distinguished from real people.23  
 The very inclusion of the sentence further complicates its implications about the 
relationships among fiction, reality, and idealization. The narrator uncharacteristically 
intrudes to give an opinion about Fanny’s true nature, but does not straightforwardly own up 
to any role in determining her nature. While the unusual narrative voice of the novel’s final 
chapter (to which the final chapter of this dissertation returns) takes authorial responsibility 
for the characters, this narrating “I” professes to having “no inclination to believe” (158) 
that Fanny is among the unconquerable heroines about whom one reads. Far from passing 
judgment on the characters, the narrator hints at authorial power while simultaneously 
mimicking the position of a reader who must determine what to believe about Fanny.  
 Of course, an omniscient narrator’s24 inclination to believe something about Fanny 
differs fundamentally from the inclination of an inquisitive reader. An authorial narrator’s 
inclination about a character generally corresponds with a fact rather than a belief about that 
character.25 Readers’ inclinations to believe something about a character, by contrast, can be 
                                               
23 I will discuss in Chapter Seven how the realism of the novel’s depiction of Fanny works 
with the idealism of its happy ending.  
24 See Culler’s case for abandoning the term “omniscient,” a term he convincingly argues is 
used to cover a variety of narrative effects including “the performative authoritativeness of 
many narrative declarations…the reporting of innermost thoughts and feelings…authorial 
narration…and the synoptic impersonal narration of the realist tradition” (26). The term 
persists, he argues, not because of its utility, but rather our “habit of naturalizing the strange 
details and practices of narrative by making the consciousness of an individual their source, 
and then imagining a quasi divine omniscient consciousness when human consciousness 
cannot fill that role” (32).  
25 Nelles argues that Austen’s narrators do not possess the core attributes of omniscience 
and are better characterized as infallible. Nelles uses the final chapter of Mansfield Park as an 
example of an Austen narrator approaching “the rhetoric of omnipotence.” This narrator, 
according to Nelles, “does admit to being a writer,” but falls short of omnipotence in 
adopting “the familiar realistic pose that she can direct the presentation of the story, but not 
alter the fabula itself” (121). In Chapter Seven, I discuss the narrative voice of Mansfield 
Park’s final chapter in terms of realism and idealism, claiming that this narrative voice differs 
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affected by their individual preferences as much as by the direct claims or subtle hints of a 
narrator. The combination of these perspectives in the narrator’s claim emphasizes the 
narrator’s authoritative knowledge of Fanny by couching it in terms of a reader’s interpretive 
whims. Thus, instead of taking authorial responsibility for the fiction, the narrator poses as 
someone who, like a reader, must interpret Fanny. This posturing, together with the 
narrator’s ironic connection of fiction to life, draws attention to the role that readers play in 
judging fictional characters and worlds. The different ways that the narrative positions 
readers in relation to the fictional world and its characters force them to examine how both 
narrative strategies and idiosyncratic qualities affect these relationships.  
 The implication that “unconquerable” (158) heroines are less realistic than their 
authors claim that they are contains a further suggestion that readers should relate to Fanny 
differently than they would to a heroine with impeccable judgment. They should relate to her 
as fictional and yet realistically fallible. The explicit comment on how Fanny is susceptible to 
Henry’s charms is surprising in its sharp contrast with the narrator’s more frequent portrayal 
of ways in which Fanny’s judgment falls short of her ideals. In giving readers Fanny’s 
perspective, the latter instances show readers what Fanny thinks and feels, as well as what 
she fails to understand about herself and her situation. In being invited to feel along with 
Fanny at the same time as being invited to see her critically, readers are challenged to 
consider why they do or do not sympathize with Fanny’s shortcomings. The narrator’s 
explicit comment, by contrast, clarifies the diverse motivations at work in Fanny from a 
different sort of external perspective, one free of Fanny’s incessant worrying. The narrator 
who provides this perspective clearly does not hold Fanny to the standards of an 
“unconquerable” (158) heroine and suggests that these standards are unrealistic. Both 
                                                                                                                                            
significantly from that of the rest of the novel, a difference that emphasizes the narrator’s 
responsibility for the characters. 
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readers and Fanny, however, tend to hold Fanny to idealistic standards not unrelated to 
those governing “unconquerable” (158) heroines. On the one hand, the novel’s marriage 
plot casts Fanny as a morally superior heroine whose judgment must withstand tests that will 
eventually prove her value. On the other hand, the position plot exposes both Fanny’s 
aspiration to judge disinterestedly and her failures to reach this ideal. The narrator’s 
unusually explicit comment presents the fallibility of Fanny’s judgment in a different, but 
equally complicated way. While the novel’s two plots pit generic expectations that Fanny 
behave ideally against the feelings and judgments aroused by showing her internal struggles 
to do so, the narrator’s explicit comment pits generic expectations that fictional heroines 
behave ideally against an assertion that Fanny is no such ideal heroine.  
 How, then, should readers evaluate Fanny and her struggles to behave ideally? The 
narrator’s explicit comment suggests that Fanny should not be judged as an idealized 
fictional heroine with infallible judgment. At the same time, the comment emphasizes 
Fanny’s status as fictional together with her realistic fallibility. The narrator’s explicit 
comment, in other words, proposes a set of standards by which to judge Fanny that avoids 
the distance imposed by idealism, on the one hand, and the proximity encouraged by realism, 
on the other. Readers are encouraged to enter into Fanny’s mind without losing a critical 
distance as well as to impose a critical distance that takes into account the insight that they 
gain from having entered into her mind. Fanny should be judged, therefore, neither as an 
idealized heroine nor as a real person, but rather as a realistic representation.  
 While the novel’s marriage plot suggests idealized characters such as Cinderella and 
Prince Charming, its position plot undermines this suggestion by presenting more realistic 
characters that do not conform to these ideals or live up to the standards of judgment 
appropriate to them. Fanny, Mary, Edmund and Henry all have characteristics that liken 
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them to Cinderella or Prince Charming, but they fail to conform to these types in diverse 
ways. Fanny, though in a Cinderella-like position, is not capable of hoping for a Prince 
Charming; fails to live up to the ideals that would make her worthy of a Prince Charming; 
and is not able to suppress the affection for Edmund that, if requited, would constitute a 
Cinderella-like elevation. Mary is not in the lowly position of a Cinderella, but her ambitions 
for a good marriage coincide with a desire to find a Prince Charming, a man with the status 
and wealth to fulfill her dreams of social success. Henry’s proposal to Fanny casts him as a 
Prince Charming within the fictional world, but he offers Fanny neither a marriage that she 
can accept nor an elevation in status that she desires.26 She does not even dare hope for a 
union with Edmund, whose ability to fulfill her suppressed desires casts him as her Prince 
Charming.27 Edmund’s status as such an idealized character is undermined, however, by 
Fanny’s suppression of her desires, which amount in any case to nothing more than a 
modest life with Edmund. Like Fanny, Edmund does not desire status and wealth, and 
without a desire for these he could never fill the role of Prince Charming that Mary wishes 
him to play.28  
 How Fanny, Mary and Edmund all both conform to and deviate from the idealized 
types of Cinderella and Prince Charming is clarified in the women’s disagreement about the 
relative merits of Edmund’s name and title. Fanny both loves Edmund as a cousin and 
places him at an inaccessible and aesthetisized distance. Mary loves him as a potential 
husband, while desiring him to be something he is not. “‘I am so glad your eldest cousin is 
                                               
26 In her 1990 introduction to Mansfield Park, M. Butler notes that Henry is positioned as a 
Prince Charming, but is not what he seems (xi).  
27 Hinnant emphasizes Fanny as Cinderella and Edmund as Prince Charming in his reading 
of Austen’s use of the courtship plot, arguing that Austen uses the Cinderella-plot to 
compare aesthetic style with sordid reality (296).  
28 Edwards notes that Edmund is hardly a Prince Charming and that the Crawfords, rather 
than Austen, “impose fantasy on truth” (55, note 5). 
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gone that he may be Mr. Bertram again,’” Mary says to Fanny, continuing, “‘there is 
something in the sound of Mr. Edmund Bertram so formal, so pitiful, so younger-brother-
like, that I detest it’” (145). In the absence of Tom, Edmund need no longer be distinguished 
from him and so Mary can pretend that he is not the younger brother that he actually is. 
Mary’s ear, attuned to markers of status, detests the name that announces Edmund’s as 
younger brother. To Fanny, by contrast,  
“the sound of Mr. Bertram is so cold and nothing-meaning – so entirely without 
warmth or character! – It just stands for a gentleman, and that’s all. But there is 
nobleness in the name of Edmund. It is a name of heroism and renown – of kings, 
princes, and knights; and seems to breathe the spirit of chivalry and warm affections.” 
(145)29 
The “Mr.” that indicates status to Mary means nothing to Fanny. But, instead of elaborating 
on the particular warmth and character that she associates with “Edmund,” Fanny cites its 
connection with the qualities of fairytale heroes. The heroic qualities valued by Fanny and 
indicated by the name “Edmund” are paralleled by the prestigious qualities that Mary values 
and would like to see indicated by higher titles that might precede it. “‘The name is good in 
itself,’” she grants, “‘and Lord Edmund or Sir Edmund sound delightfully; but sink it under 
the chill, the annihilation of a Mr. –  and Mr. Edmund is no more than Mr. John or Mr. 
Thomas’” (145). The “Mr.” that means nothing to Fanny when preceding Edmund’s family 
name makes Edmund appear a nothing to Mary when preceding his Christian name. But, 
while Mary enjoys calling Edmund by a title that obscures his status as younger brother, 
Fanny endows his Christian name with qualities that obscure her personal relationship to 
                                               
29 Garson cites this passage as an example of how Fanny’s aesthetic endorses a patriarchal 
order. She links this endorsement with Austen’s skepticism about the efficacy of inner 
resources and ultimate dependence of women on the material resources only men could 
provide (147-8).   
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him. Edmund does not possess the wealth and status that could make him Mary’s Prince 
Charming; nor can he occupy the aesthetisized role of fairytale hero in which Fanny tries to 
cast him. The unrealistic roles into which Mary and Fanny try to place Edmund thus 
emphasize the realism with which all three are portrayed. 
 Many readers of Mansfield Park privilege either the idealism of its marriage plot or the 
realism of its position plot. But partiality of either sort causes dissatisfaction with the novel. 
On the one hand, the novel’s focus on Fanny must frustrate readers who privilege the 
idealism of Mansfield Park’s marriage plot. Mary’s dreams of a Prince Charming might make 
her seem a more suitable heroine, while Henry’s ability to elevate Fanny above her cousins 
might make him a better candidate than Edmund for Fanny’s Prince Charming. On the 
other hand, the fallibility of all of the characters must stand out to readers who privilege the 
realism of the novel’s position plot. The characters’ realistic flaws make it difficult for such 
readers to hope for or accept an idealized happy ending of the narrative. I argue that, instead 
of being either a flawed marriage comedy or an inconsistent example of realism, Mansfield 
Park combines a marriage plot suggesting idealized characters and a position plot portraying 
these characters realistically in order to encourage readers to maintain a difficult distance 
from the characters, one from which idealism and realism can inform one another in a way 
appropriate to fiction. 
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Chapter Six: Distance, Perspective, Judgment 
I. Standards of Disinterestedness   
 Mansfield Park, I argued in the last chapter, suggests a unique mode of judgment 
appropriate to fiction, a mode of judgment that should be distinguished from the modes of 
judgment appropriate to the real or to the ideal. This mode of judgment appropriate to 
fiction can nonetheless inform judgments of the real in part by elucidating the difficulties of 
attaining disinterested judgment. In the last chapter, I discussed how readers’ judgments of 
the characters and of the novel are complicated by the different standards of judgment 
suggested by the novel’s two plots. In this chapter, I examine the different standards and 
ideals that inform the characters’ judgments in order to develop the novel’s suggestion that, 
while disinterested judgment is an impossible ideal, this impossibility does not affect the 
importance of a sincere relationship to it as an ideal.1 This suggestion emerges from a 
comparison of faulty judgments by Fanny, Sir Thomas, and Henry about Henry’s courtship 
of Fanny, a comparison that highlights the adequacy or inadequacy of the grounds on which 
characters make judgments of each other and on which readers make judgments of them. 
 This chapter’s focus on the characters’ different failures to achieve disinterestedness 
clarifies the novel’s contribution to philosophical aesthetics. First, the characters’ failures 
distinguish between two types of partiality that can interfere with disinterestedness: partiality 
as bias (most commonly, self-interest) and partiality as incompleteness. The novel’s 
representation of these failures, furthermore, clarifies the relationships among the necessarily 
disinterested attitude created by fictional distance, the interest required for readers to engage 
in fiction, and a standard of disinterested judgment that might be applied to in real life.  
                                               
1 Cottom also suggests that ideals are impossible within Austen’s fictional worlds, but 
attributes this impossibility to the conflict between aristocratic and middle-class values. 
Whereas his reading historically contextualizes Mansfield Park’s depiction of judgment, mine 
seeks to clarify the stakes of this depiction for literary judgment. 
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The concept of disinterested judgment is not only central to modern aesthetics, but 
traceable to eighteenth-century British thinkers influential in Austen’s time. Jerome Stolnitz 
argues for both the importance of the concept of disinterestedness in aesthetics, and its 
origin in the writings of Anthony Ashley Cooper, third earl of Shaftesbury. Shaftesbury, as 
he is known, wrote various, very popular, essays, of particular interest in this context, 
“Sensus communis, an essay on the freedom of wit and humour in a letter to a friend,” and 
“Soliloquy, or advice to an author.” The former develops an idea of common sense which is 
linked to the subordination of self-interest to an idea of a common good (93). “Soliloquy” 
emphasizes the importance of private self-reflection.2 These ideas of common sense and 
self-reflection form a central tension in aesthetic judgment and experience: that between 
subjective and objective grounds of judgment.3 Aesthetic judgment, thus, involves both 
personal and impersonal elements. Disinterested judgment can be invoked as ruling out 
selfish interests or avoiding external influences confusing the right judgment available to 
individuals.4 
 Austen’s portrayal of characters who are interested in the importance of and barriers 
to disinterested judgment aligns her with (nearly) contemporary thinkers such as Shaftesbury. 
                                               
2 L. Clark links Austen to Shaftesbury’s idea of soliloquy. Neither Valihora nor Clark is 
interested in proving that Austen read Shaftesbury, (a possibility Clark says is first suggested 
by Ryle in “Jane Austen and the Moralists”), but both see a suggestive relationship between 
the two. Ryle argues that “Austen, was, whether she knew it or not, a Shaftesburian” (301), 
and supports his claim by considering Austen’s moral-aesthetic vocabulary and conception 
of character. Though he considers himself unfit to prove that Austen read Shaftesbury, he 
likes to think she did.  
3 Kant’s is perhaps the most influential argument for a judgment of taste’s subjectivity and 
claim to objectivity (universality).  
4 See “Truth and Politics” for Arendt’s (Kantian) view of representative political thought. 
According to Arendt, in order to approach representative political thought, one must 
imagine oneself in other positions, thereby gradually enlarging one’s perspective. Arendt is 
careful to distinguish this process from empathy, as well as from imagining another’s 
perspective (in contrast to one’s own, in a different position). In “Some Questions of Moral 
Philosophy,” Arendt elaborates on this kind of judgment as a response to situations in which 
judgment is contested, as in both post-Holocaust morality and eighteenth-century aesthetics. 
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This connection has been explored by Valihora and L. Clark. I focus, in contrast, on the 
specific, literary way Austen deals with these issues, and encourages her readers to do the 
same. The distinction between partiality as bias and partiality as incompleteness is 
particularly relevant to the judgment of fictional worlds. First, aesthetic distance frees readers 
from actual self-interest, but novels encourage partiality towards characters. Second, fictional 
worlds can create an illusion of completeness and a perspective suggesting wholeness that 
are unavailable in reality.5 Austen challenges readers to notice the unique kinds of bias and 
perspective offered in relation to her characters and her novel. 
 
II. Experience and Impartiality in Ideal Judgment 
 I addressed in Chapter Five the possible reactions of readers to the alternative ending 
suggested by Henry’s proposal to Fanny. Within the fictional world, this alternative ending 
appears in an unquestionably positive light to everyone except Fanny, who sees both 
possible unions with the Crawfords as doomed to unhappiness.6 Matches between Fanny 
and Henry, on the one hand, and Edmund and Mary, on the other, cast the inhabitants of 
Mansfield Park as lucky and the Crawfords as disinterested. According to the standards of 
the fictional world, neither Fanny nor Edmund can expect Henry or Mary to marry beneath 
them. A willingness to do so indicates that Henry and Mary are motivated by disinterested 
love rather than material concerns. The narrative’s exposure of the shortcomings of Henry 
                                               
5 I do not intend any claim here about actual completeness, an author’s knowledge of 
fictional worlds, or their ontological status. I merely refer to the possibility offered by fiction 
of providing views not normally accessible (e.g., of character’s minds) and a general 
perspective, often associated with impersonal narrative, not available in real life. See Balfour 
for an interesting discussion of how Austen’s free indirect speech plays with the tension 
between personal and impersonal which does and does not translate into the many film 
adaptations of her work. Also see Miller (Style)for a somewhat enraptured discussion of 
Austen’s voice and style.   
6 Maria and Mrs. Norris also see the union between Fanny and Henry negatively, the former 
because of her feelings for Henry and the latter because of her dislike of Fanny.  
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and Mary, however, complicates readers’ expectations for the alternative ending just as its 
depiction of Fanny complicates their expectations for her happy ending.   
 Although the narrator exposes the Crawfords’ lack of disinterestedness, Fanny’s 
pessimism about the possibility of happy marriages between her and Henry and Edmund 
and Mary is also exposed as biased. In Chapter Five, I discussed one instance in which the 
narrator suggests that Fanny would be likely to fall in love with Henry if it were not for her 
feelings for Edmund, and I will address another suggestion that Fanny and Henry could be 
happy together in the next chapter, the final one in this study of Mansfield Park. Here, I 
concentrate on the narrator’s depiction of the faultiness of Fanny’s pessimism about a happy 
marriage between Mary and Edmund.  
 The narrator invokes two standards of impartial judgment – experienced (complete) 
and impartial (disinterested) – to problematize Fanny’s pessimism about the possibility of a 
happy marriage between Mary and Edmund. Before explicitly invoking these standards, the 
narrator undermines Fanny’s disinterestedness by emphasizing her belief in it: the prospect 
of Edmund’s marriage to Mary, according to the narrator, is “most sorrowful to [Fanny], 
independently – she believed independently of self” (249). Fanny’s supposedly selfless 
sorrow over their match is based on her negative judgment of Mary. Mary’s shortcomings, 
rather than Fanny’s feelings for Edmund, Fanny insists, influence her reaction to their 
match. The narrator’s repetition of the independence that Fanny believes her sorrow to have 
from her own relationship to Edmund and Mary, however, suggests that Fanny’s judgment 
of Mary is affected by her emotional interest in Edmund. 
 Fanny believes her judgment of Mary to have been confirmed in their final 
conversation before Mary traveled to London, a conversation in which, Mary, “in spite of 
some amiable sensations, and much personal kindness, had still been Miss Crawford, still 
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shewn a mind led astray and bewildered, and without any suspicion of being so; darkened, 
yet fancying itself light” (249). Fanny thinks that Mary has none of Edmund’s moral fiber, 
that Mary so little perceives the darkness in which she lives that she believes herself 
enlightened. According to Fanny, Mary cannot improve because she does not understand 
that she needs improvement. The narrator, however, indicates that Fanny’s inexperience 
skews her judgment, suggesting that  
she may be forgiven by older sages, for looking on the chance of Miss Crawford’s 
future improvement as nearly desperate, for thinking that if Edmund’s influence in this 
season of love, had already done so little in clearing her judgment, and regulating her 
notions, his worth would be finally wasted on her even in years of matrimony. (249) 
After undermining Fanny’s belief in the selflessness of her sorrow over Edmund’s potential 
marriage to Mary, the narrator undermines her perspective by suggesting its lack of 
experience. Like older sages (and potential readers), the narrator does not think that 
Edmund’s future with Mary would be so hopeless as Fanny imagines. 
 The narrator’s suggestion that older sages might forgive Fanny for her lack of 
experience raises the question of whether they, or readers, are willing to forgive Fanny for 
the partiality that affects her judgment as much as they are willing to forgive her for her 
inexperience. This suggestion is quickly made explicit in the next paragraph, in which the 
narrator considers both experienced and impartial judgment:  
Experience might have hoped more for any young people, so circumstanced, and 
impartiality would not have denied to Miss Crawford’s nature, that participation of the 
general nature of women, which would lead her to adopt the opinions of the man she 
loved and respected, as her own. –But as such were Fanny’s persuasions, she suffered 
very much from them, and could never speak of Miss Crawford without pain. (249) 
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The narrator proposes that more experienced observers would not, like Fanny, consider 
Mary’s early failure to be influenced by Edmund as an indication that she could never be 
influenced by him.7 Mary and Edmund have enough love, means, and influences, the 
narrator suggests, to convince older sages of their chances of conjugal felicity. This view of 
marriage disputes not only Fanny’s specific pessimism about Mary, but also Mary’s general 
conviction that marriage is the result of deceit and bound to be plagued by it. These 
objections raise the question of whether the narrator’s standard of experienced judgment is 
optimistic in the way that any person might be by disposition or in the way that the narrator 
of a marriage comedy must be by vocation. This question is related to questions of the 
novel’s relationship to the idealism of marriage comedies, questions to which I will return in 
the next chapter.   
 If experience might lead to an optimistic view of marriage in general, impartiality 
definitely leads to optimism about Mary’s specific potential for improvement. Fanny’s 
interested judgment of Mary is so focused on the particulars of their situation that she fails 
to consider Mary more generally as a woman, apt to “adopt the opinions of the man she 
loved and respected as her own” (249). Fanny’s partiality in denying that Mary shares “the 
general nature of women” (249) is both incomplete and biased. Not only does she see Mary 
exclusively in the limited context of their particular situation, this limited context inclines 
Fanny to judge Mary more harshly than would an impartial judge. Mary’s shortcomings, the 
narrator proposes, would not prevent the happiness of her marriage with Edmund. The 
individual qualities and opinions that ill suit her to Edmund would be overcome by the 
                                               
7 Jones, in the context of her biographical and historical account of marriage in Austen’s 
time, contrasts Fanny’s pessimism with the “more impartial judgment” that she attributes to 
Austen. Jones’s optimism about the happiness of Edmund and Mary’s marriage does not, 
however, extend to a union between Fanny and Henry, which she sees as doomed by their 
dissimilarities (148).  
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influences of her general nature. Fanny, according to the narrator, falls short of the standards 
of experienced and impartial judgment in considering the potential happiness of Edmund 
and Mary’s marriage. The shortcomings of Fanny’s judgment affect Fanny herself more than 
anyone else, causing her to mourn for the unhappiness that she considers Edmund’s fate.  
 The narrator’s exposure of Fanny’s failure to judge both impartially and from a wide 
experience raises questions for readers. How might Fanny correct her judgment? How 
should readers respond to the narrator’s judgments about Mary and Edmund? Though 
Fanny cannot correct the inexperience of her judgment, she could potentially be more 
impartial than she is. If her feelings for Edmund did not affect her judgment of Mary, would 
her inexperience still lead her to pessimism and sorrow? Could partiality be corrected by 
experience instead of inexperience contributing to partiality? According to the narrator, 
experienced judgment would arrive at an optimistic view of marriage, while impartial 
judgment would lead to an optimistic view of Mary’s potential to become more like 
Edmund. Do these judgments indicate that readers should hope for Mary’s marriage to 
Edmund rather than for Fanny’s?  
 The narrator exposes Fanny’s failures to judge according to the standards of 
experience and impartiality not, I propose, to encourage readers to hope for Mary’s happy 
marriage with Edmund, but rather to encourage readers to consider the effects of their own 
relative experience and partiality on their judgments of Fanny, Mary, and the novel. To what 
extent are readers’ experiences of real marriage and of marriage comedies relevant to their 
judgments of Fanny, Mary, and their potential marriages? The novel’s structure, I have 
argued, encourages a partiality towards Fanny that is challenged by the critical light in which 
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it shows her and by the contrast that it develops between Fanny and Mary.8 How might 
readers be partial to Fanny or Mary, and how might these partialities affect their judgments 
of their potential marriages? Does hoping for Fanny’s or Mary’s marriage to Edmund 
necessarily prevent readers from judging the alternative impartially? Though readers are 
encouraged to develop emotional attachments to the characters, they are given a perspective 
on them that has more potential for completeness and impartiality than that of any 
individual character. The narrator’s comments about the alternative ending remind readers of 
the possibility of attaining this perspective, as well as about the different kinds of limitations 
posed by their individual experiences and partialities.   
 In invoking standards of experience and impartiality, the narrator also introduces a 
conception of the general nature of women, a nature that would cause Mary, just as any 
other woman, “to adopt the opinions of the man she loved and respected as her own” (249). 
This conception of the general nature of women touches on one of the central questions 
raised by the interaction of the novel’s two plots: to what extent can people be educated or 
improved?9 The idea that women will adopt their husbands’ opinions focuses on a specific 
                                               
8 The novel further complicates expectations by suggesting that Edmund and Mary’s 
marriage is more and more likely at the same time as showing Mary in a more and more 
critical light, especially through the letters she writes to Fanny in Portsmouth.  
9 Improvement and education are emphasized by many critics of the novel. Duckworth 
discusses Austen’s symbolic use of the contemporary vocabulary of improvement to convey 
her conservative attitude towards the cultural heritage embodied in British estates. Boulukos 
links improvement with the kind of limited reform an absentee landowner like Sir Thomas 
might achieve. Brenner’s interpretation of the novel as a “dark ironic vision” (30) means 
improvement is impossible generally in the fictional world, as well as specifically for Fanny 
and the Crawfords. I. Armstrong discusses how the novel uses the words “improve” and 
“improvement” ambiguously in both aesthetic and social contexts (89 and passim). Cleere, in 
her reading of the novel’s family structure in economic terms, understands the novel to 
mean by “improvement” the “passage from utility to exchange” (122) undergone by Fanny 
after Sir Thomas’s return from Antigua. Cohen sees “improvement” as “the drive to achieve 
the stability of a closed system” (677) in her reading of Mansfield Park in terms of family 
systems theory. Quaintance discusses ways in which Austenian improvement is more 
congenial to Reptonian improvement than is often supposed. Chan’s attention to 
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type of influence between genders rather than on the general influence of a specific type of 
values. The narrator’s assertion that Mary, insofar as she shares the general nature of women, 
would be influenced by Edmund suggests that Fanny would, if she were to fall in love with 
Henry, likewise be influenced by him. The alternate ending suggested by Henry’s proposal 
implies, however, that Mary and Henry will be improved by Edmund and Fanny and adopt 
their values, not that both women will adopt the values of their husbands, whatever those 
values might be. The betterment that results from Henry’s attempts to win Fanny thus 
suggests that good values are more likely to influence bad values than the other way around. 
The novel also suggests, however, that bad values cannot always be improved. The 
Crawfords prove educable in that they can learn to appreciate good values, but 
unimprovable because they cannot consistently act according to them, while the Bertrams10 
and Fanny are both educable and improvable in their ability to learn from their mistakes and 
to better act according to their values.11 This contrast between educable and improvable 
people, I argue, is one place where Mansfield Park’s position and marriage plots intersect.12  
                                                                                                                                            
improvement and education distinguishes between formal and informal education, assessing 
the novel’s depiction of the possibility of change as slim. L. Clark contrasts real 
improvement with merely utilitarian education, and links the former to Aristotelian mimesis. 
Canuel links error and punishment with the ability to correct, and so achieve selfhood and 
narrative distinction.      
10 Except Maria, to whose fate I will return in the next chapter.  
11 Susan’s educability, and the relative effects of her natural qualities vs. her unfortunate 
environment provide another interesting example.  
12 See François for a discussion of “improvement” as a tradition in Western literary 
modernity to which she proposes a counter-tradition including Mansfield Park. Francois reads 
the novel as sharing an “ethos of attending to unobserved, not-for-profit experience rather 
than results entered on the public record, of defining action as a matter of timing and form 
rather than consequence, and of measuring difference not by what an action materially 
produces but by the imaginative possibilities revelation may either open or eclipse” (21). In 
this context, the question is not that of the characters’ potential improvement (“in its early 
sense of ‘the turning of a thing to profit or good account’” (234)), but rather that of how 
characters like Fanny “decline” (234) improvement, thereby questioning its limits and even 
desirability (235).   
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 Although the narrator here insists that Fanny is wrong to consider Mary 
unimprovable, the novel asserts that she, like Henry, falls back too easily into the loose 
values of London because, though she can appreciate the ideals espoused at Mansfield Park, 
she cannot change her behavior to reflect these ideals.13 The cynical attitude that the 
Crawfords have learned in London may be correctible under different circumstances, but 
their failure to understand the sincere attitude espoused at Mansfield Park prevents them 
from replacing their cynicism with sincerity. Of course, the failure of the Crawfords’ 
improvement can be blamed in part on the superficiality of the sincerity espoused at 
Mansfield Park. But Mary and Henry, the novel also suggests, would need to be constantly 
with Edmund and Fanny, constantly reminded of the ideal embodied in them, in order to 
behave consistently according to this ideal. The judgments passed on the characters in the 
conclusion of the novel suggest that the kind of flawed relationship that Fanny and the 
Bertrams have to ideals provides better results than the kind of flawed relationship that the 
Crawfords have. Sir Thomas, Edmund, Tom, Julia, and Fanny all suffer and change (albeit 
somewhat abruptly) the way that they hold values. The Crawfords are influenced by their 
betters, but not fundamentally improved.14 
 
                                               
13 I will deal in the next chapter with the narrator’s final comments on the effects of 
Mansfield Park on Mary, and her inability to find an appropriate match.  
14 Several critics emphasize disposition in accounting for these successes and failures. Chan 
sees disposition as a product of both natural qualities and environment, something that once 
formed, becomes difficult to change. Donohue links his idea of social ordination to the 
novel’s presentation of disposition as a natural tendency that is, nonetheless, susceptible to 
external influences (174).) Duffy emphasizes the precarious balance between natural gifts 
and education (77). Garson links improvement and education with the problem of justifying 
limited upward social mobility. Lynch’s reading of Austen’s allusions to nineteenth-century 
horticultural concerns (“‘Young Ladies’”) emphasizes the tension between the natural and 
artificial in courtship plots. Contrary to Austen scholarship that links realism with social 
regulation, Lynch argues instead that Austen aligns education with greenhouse cultivation, 
rewriting “that plot of naturalization in an idiom of artifice” (719).  
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III. Standards of Impartiality  
 Fanny’s judgment of the potential marriage between Mary and Edmund is flawed, 
according to the narrator, both because of Fanny’s lack of experience and her emotional and 
personal interest in Edmund. The first kind of partiality, her lack of a more complete picture 
of marriage, allows her to be more pessimistic about the possibilities of marital happiness 
than a more experienced perspective would recommend, while the second kind of partiality, 
the influence of her own feelings and interests, fails to balance her particular perspective on 
Mary with the results of a more general view of her as a woman. Sir Thomas’s perception of 
Fanny’s new potential and of her refusal of Henry provides an interesting contrast. His belief 
in his good values and his supposed strictness in judging the adherence of others to his own 
high standards disguise from him the laxity of his own conformance to them.  
 Having already been impressed by Fanny’s improved appearance, Sir Thomas begins 
to take a greater interest in her when he notices Henry’s interest. The narrator exposes the 
hypocrisy with which Sir Thomas observes Henry’s attentions. Although Sir Thomas is  
infinitely above scheming or contriving for any the most advantageous matrimonial 
establishment that could be among the apparent possibilities of any one most dear to 
him, and disdaining even as a littleness the being quick-sighted on such points, he 
could not avoid perceiving in a grand and careless way that Mr. Crawford was 
somewhat distinguishing his niece – nor perhaps refrain (though unconsciously) from 
giving a more willing assent to invitations [from the Grants] on that account. (163) 
Sir Thomas disapproves of the pursuit of advantageous marriages, but he cannot help being 
influenced by the advantage of a match between Henry and Fanny.15 In other people, Sir 
                                               
15 Sir Thomas here repeats his mistake with Maria and Rushworth. After having observed 
them together, he offers Maria the chance to back out of the marriage but is too easily 
convinced by her refusal (138). 
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Thomas attributes “being quick-sighted” (163) about advantageous matches to the negative 
influence of material interests. Because he does not believe himself to be susceptible to such 
interests, Sir Thomas interprets his own perception of Henry’s attentions not only as 
unavoidable, but also as carried out “in a grand and careless” (163) manner that he assumes 
is incompatible with the littleness exhibited by others. Sir Thomas’s dismissal of the 
possibility that he could be motivated by material concerns blinds him to how his behavior is 
affected by his perception of Henry’s attentions. The unacknowledged material motivations 
of his newfound sociability contradict the standards of disinterestedness that he casually 
invokes.  
 When Sir Thomas goes to the East room to tell Fanny about Henry’s proposal, he 
invokes a standard of impartial (as complete) judgment in a way that exposes his own failure 
to adhere to, or even understand, this standard. Before mentioning his business, Sir Thomas 
notices that Fanny has no fire in the room that has been allocated for her use. After 
gathering that Mrs. Norris has not allowed it, Sir Thomas justifies her behavior to Fanny, 
acknowledges it as extreme, and insists that Fanny’s impartial judgment will recognize it as 
kindly meant: 
“Your aunt Norris has always been an advocate, and very judiciously, for young 
people’s being brought up without unnecessary indulgences; but there should be 
moderation in everything. –She is also very hardy herself, which of course will 
influence her in her opinion of the wants of others. And on another account too, I can 
perfectly comprehend. –I know what her sentiments have always been. The principle 
was good in itself, but it may have been, and I believe has been carried too far in your 
case. –I am aware that there has been sometimes, in some points, a misplaced 
distinction; but I think too well of you, Fanny, to suppose you will ever harbour 
  229 
resentment on that account. –You have an understanding, which will prevent you 
from receiving things only in part, and judging partially by the event. –You will take in 
the whole of the past, you will consider times, persons, and probabilities, and you will 
feel that they were not least your friends who were educating and preparing you for that 
mediocrity of condition which seemed to be your lot. –Though their caution may prove 
eventually unnecessary, it was kindly meant; and of this you may be assured, that every 
advantage of affluence will be doubled by the little privations and restrictions that may 
have been imposed. I am sure you will not disappoint my opinion of you, by failing at 
any time to treat your aunt Norris with the respect and attention that are due to her.” 
(212) 
Sir Thomas’s appeal to impartial judgment based on a true picture of the whole situation 
under consideration is bookended by two comments about partiality: the first excuses that of 
Mrs. Norris, while the second attempts to ameliorate Fanny’s privations by insisting that they 
will enhance her experience of advantages. Mrs. Norris, according to Sir Thomas, should be 
forgiven for failing to live up to the standard he expects of Fanny: to “‘take in the whole of 
the past…consider times, persons, and probabilities’” (212). Fanny, furthermore, should 
consider the advantages that Sir Thomas expects she will soon enjoy from the perspective of 
her privations rather than considering her privations from the perspective of these new 
advantages.  
 In fact, Sir Thomas appeals to the standard of impartial, complete judgment precisely 
to forestall the possibility that Fanny, elevated by Henry’s offer, will judge Mrs. Norris 
harshly from her new position. But Sir Thomas’s appeal to a standard of impartial judgment 
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is problematic in a number of ways.16 He insists both that Mrs. Norris went too far in her 
treatment of Fanny and that this treatment was consistent with Fanny’s low position. This 
inconsistency can be unsatisfactorily resolved by a second, namely, his failure to hold Mrs. 
Norris to the same standard to which he holds Fanny. Following this interpretation, Mrs. 
Norris treated Fanny in a way that she thought was appropriate, but which was in fact 
excessive due to her failure to consider the difference between Fanny’s constitution and her 
own. Sir Thomas excuses Mrs. Norris’s insistence that Fanny have no fire in the East room 
by explaining the partiality of the former’s perspective. This excuse is weakened 
considerably, however, when he follows it with the injunction that Fanny’s judgment must 
not be partial, and instead must consider everything. Furthermore, while this excuse pertains 
to Mrs. Norris’s insistence that Fanny have no fire in the East room, it does nothing to 
explain the “‘misplaced distinction’” (212) that Sir Thomas acknowledges has sometimes 
been made between Fanny and her cousins. Sir Thomas has been complicit in making this 
distinction,17 and his attitude towards it now betrays the slippery partiality of his own 
judgment. His acknowledgment that Fanny has been mistreated rests on his current 
expectation of her elevation, while his insistence that Mrs. Norris’s treatment of Fanny has 
been appropriate rests on the former’s belief in Fanny’s inescapable “‘mediocrity of 
                                               
16 Sir Thomas is not alone in invoking ideal standards to influence Fanny’s judgment of 
Henry. Edmund grants her that her refusal has shown her to be “‘upright and disinterested’” 
(236), but continues by urging: “‘prove yourself grateful and tender-hearted; and then you 
will be the perfect model of a woman, which I have always believed you born for’” (236). 
Not only does Edmund believe that accepting Henry would make Fanny an ideal woman, he 
also believes that Henry’s affection for Fanny makes him, if not an ideal man, at least his 
ideal self. His love for Fanny, insists Edmund, “‘proves him unspoilt by his uncle. It proves 
him, in short, every thing that I had been used to wish to believe him, and feared he was 
not’” (238). Edmund’s feelings for Mary influence his judgment of Henry, as well as his 
inclination for a match between Henry and Fanny.  
17 I discussed in Chapter One his conversation with Mrs. Norris about the “‘distinction 
proper’” (10) to be made between his daughters and Fanny. He thereafter entrusts Mrs. 
Norris to enforce this difficult distinction, becoming aware of the way she does so only 
when it looks problematic in the light of Fanny’s imminent elevation.  
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condition’” (212). Sir Thomas demands of Fanny an idealized impartial judgment that 
forgives the partiality of Mrs. Norris. His expectation of Fanny’s impartiality, moreover, rests 
on the partiality of his own judgment. This partiality judges the mistreatment that he only 
somewhat acknowledges from the perspective of the elevation that he expects for her. 
Without the expectation of this elevation, Sir Thomas would not find the distinction 
between Fanny and her cousins misplaced, nor worry about Mrs. Norris’s overzealous 
application of her principles.   
 If Sir Thomas’s judgment is interested, partial, and inconsistent when he considers 
Fanny’s elevation, it becomes even more so when he understands that she means to refuse 
Henry’s offer. Fanny’s inability to explain her refusal without exposing either Maria’s 
behavior with Henry or her own feelings for Edmund contributes to the partiality of Sir 
Thomas’s perspective. His own interests, however, also play a role in his reaction to Fanny’s 
refusal. Henry’s status and charm prevent Sir Thomas from suspecting that he could lack 
principles. He does suspect that Fanny might have feelings for Edmund that would prevent 
her from accepting Henry, but satisfies himself “on the score of the cousins” (215) by 
calculatedly testing her and observing her reaction to his comments about Edmund’s love 
for Mary. Like the rest of the people in the fictional world, Sir Thomas cannot understand 
how someone in Fanny’s position could refuse an offer as advantageous as Henry’s, even 
without having affection for him.18 
                                               
18 Adler characterizes their argument as one of the starkest examples of feminine versus 
masculine styles of argumentation in Austen, with Fanny’s recourse to personal testimony 
completely overpowered by Sir Thomas’s use of “purely objective, legitimate strategies” 
(174). Adler’s interest in distinguishing feminine from masculine styles of argumentation 
causes her to deemphasize the reasons behind Fanny’s inability to support her position with 
objective reasons as well as the interests motivating Sir Thomas’s dismissal of her personal 
testimony.    
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 Sir Thomas’s attitude towards Henry’s offer and his lack of information about 
Fanny’s motives cause him to judge her refusal harshly. Although he has just attributed to 
her a judgment that meets the highest of standards, when he understands her refusal he 
reverses this opinion, calling her willful, inconsiderate, and selfish. Instead of trying to 
understand her refusal in the light of his previous opinion of her character, he adjusts his 
opinion of her character to fit his opinion of her refusal.19 Sir Thomas’s judgments of Fanny 
are conditioned, in other words, by the context in which they are made, rather than by a 
serious contemplation of their object.  
 After upbraiding Fanny for a willfulness and selfishness that he does not associate 
with her generally,20 Sir Thomas compares Fanny unfavorably to his daughters and reinstates 
the distinction between her and them that he had been on the verge of erasing, saying:  
“And I should have been very much surprised had either of my daughters, on 
receiving a proposal of marriage at any time, which might carry with it only half the 
eligibility of this, immediately and peremptorily, and without paying my opinion or my 
regard the compliment of any consultation, put a decided negative on it. I should have 
been much surprised, and much hurt, by such a proceeding. I should have thought it a 
gross violation of duty and respect. You are not to be judged by the same rule. You do 
not owe me the duty of a child. But, Fanny, if your heart can acquit you of ingratitude-” 
(216)   
                                               
19 He expresses his discontent thusly: “I will, therefore, only add, as thinking it my duty to 
mark my opinion of your conduct – that you have disappointed every expectation I had 
formed, and proved yourself of a character the very reverse of what I had supposed” (216).  
20 After Mrs. Norris accuses Fanny of “‘a little spirit of secrecy, and independence, and 
nonsense’” (219), the narrator shows Sir Thomas’s inconsistency: “As a general reflection on 
Fanny, Sir Thomas thought nothing could be more unjust, though he had been so lately 
expressing the same sentiments himself…” (219). 
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Sir Thomas accuses Fanny both of falling short of the standard to which he holds his 
daughters, and of not having the status that would demand such a standard. His 
inconsistency is doubly hurtful as it stresses not only his disappointment in Fanny, but also 
her inferior position in his household.21  
 If Fanny is not to be judged by the same rule as the Miss Bertrams, what rule does 
Sir Thomas use in judging her? His accusation of ingratitude implies that Fanny owes him 
the gratitude of a beneficiary rather than the duty of a child. While he expects his children to 
consult his opinion before making important decisions, he seems to expect from Fanny an 
automatic obedience to his preferences. Sir Thomas’s judgment of Fanny is partial both 
before and after her refusal of Henry. Beforehand, his expectation of her elevation causes 
him to see her in an idealized light and to hold to her to standards of impartial, complete 
judgment. Afterwards, he sees her in an unusually harsh light, holding her to standards of 
obedience in which her judgment has no place.  
 The irony of Sir Thomas’s invocation of impartial judgment is not limited to its 
expression of his own partiality. Fanny’s perspective from the periphery of the social action 
at Mansfield Park has always afforded her a more complete perspective on the behavior that 
she observes than the perspective of any of the more active participants. The narrator has 
exposed the problematic way in which Fanny’s exclusion from her cousins’ social world 
affects her perspective on it, as well as the interested partiality with which Fanny judges 
Mary. At the same time, the narrator has made clear that Fanny’s exclusion allows her to see 
                                               
21 Duane characterizes this encounter between Sir Thomas and Fanny as gothic, and 
discusses how ideals of daughterly gratitude and feminine pliability blur the boundaries 
between Sir Thomas’s demands and Fanny’s desires (406-7). 
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and judge behavior, such as that among Henry and the Miss Bertrams, that the other 
characters either notice only insofar as it relates to their own interests or fail to notice at all.22  
 This relatively complete perspective on the social action and actors at Mansfield 
Park, moreover, informs Fanny’s attitude towards her elevation. She cannot take seriously 
either Henry’s attentions or the new importance that they afford her. Far from adopting the 
new position of superiority that Sir Thomas fears will affect her judgment of Mrs. Norris 
(and, perhaps, the rest of them), Fanny resists her elevation and continues to insist on her 
lack of importance. The whole picture of Mansfield Park that Fanny is used to considering 
barely includes her, let alone places her at its center.  
 Fanny’s image of Mansfield Park and her role there is shown, however, to rest on an 
idealized image of Portsmouth as a home in which she belongs. Fanny’s return to 
Portsmouth profoundly challenges her perspective on her place in the world, revealing the 
radical incompleteness of her relatively complete, though problematic, view of Mansfield 
Park.23  
 
IV. The Distortions of Distance: Incompleteness and Partiality 
 Sir Thomas and Fanny see Henry’s offer in very different lights. The incompleteness 
of the former’s perspective together with the influence of his material interests prevents him 
from seeing Henry’s offer as anything but advantageous, whereas Fanny’s more complete 
perspective on Henry together with her partiality towards Edmund prevents her from seeing 
                                               
22 M. Butler associates Fanny’s role as observer with the privileged eighteenth-century literary 
role of “thoughtful bystander” (228). Readers, she argues, are meant to identify not with 
Fanny herself, but rather this role.  
23 Halperin argues that the Portsmouth episodes are the biggest flaw of Mansfield Park 
because Austen unwittingly represents a life of feeling there in contrast to the vacuity and 
superficial morality of Mansfield Park. Collins sees Portsmouth instead as a representation of 
the “seaminess” (180) of poverty unique in Austen, one associating Mansfield Park with 
Victorian novels and distinguishing it from Austen’s other novels.  
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the offer as anything but disadvantageous. Sir Thomas decides to send Fanny to visit her 
family in Portsmouth as “a medicinal project upon his niece’s understanding” (250), a 
decision Fanny receives with delight. While Sir Thomas believes that experiencing the 
difference between Portsmouth and Mansfield Park will “teach her the value of a good 
income” (250), Fanny believes that she will be returning to a home where she is an equal 
rather than an inferior. Sir Thomas is right that the perspective afforded by Portsmouth will 
change Fanny’s attitude and judgment, but he is not right about the kind of change it will 
effect.  
 Instead of re-evaluating Henry’s offer in Portsmouth, Fanny re-evaluates her concept 
of home.24 Although she does judge Henry as improved and is aware of what he could 
provide for her and her family, she does not consider accepting his offer and making a new 
home with him. 25 She desires only to return to Mansfield Park and the position of inferiority 
to which she had become accustomed and which she appreciates in a new way after 
spending time in Portsmouth. All the discomforts of that position are erased by the graver 
discomforts of Portsmouth. Sir Thomas’s plan works insofar as it teaches Fanny to 
appreciate the comforts of Mansfield Park. Her return to Portsmouth cannot, however, 
teach Fanny to value a good income at the price of a loveless marriage. Although she has 
                                               
24 “When she had been coming to Portsmouth, she had loved to call it her home, had been 
fond of saying that she was going home; the word had been very dear to her; and so it still 
was, but it must be applied to Mansfield. That was now the home. Portsmouth was 
Portsmouth; Mansfield was home” (292). 
25 Fanny thinks primarily of Susan: “Poor Susan was very little better fitted for home than 
her elder sister; and as Fanny grew thoroughly to understand this, she began to feel that 
when her own release from Portsmouth came, her happiness would have a material 
drawback in leaving Susan behind. That a girl so capable of being made, every thing good, 
should be left in such hands, distressed her more and more. Were she likely to have a home 
to invite her to, what a blessing it would be!—And had it been possible for her to return Mr. 
Crawford’s regard, the probability of his being very far from objecting to such a measure, 
would have been the greatest increase of all her own comforts. She thought he was really 
good-tempered, and could fancy his entering into a plan of that sort, most pleasantly” (284). 
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become accustomed to a certain standard of living at Mansfield Park, she has also 
internalized ideals that limit the influence of material interests on her judgment.26 She does 
not want to live in the squalor of Portsmouth, but she will not marry Henry just to escape 
it.27 
 Fanny is not forced to decide, however, between staying in Portsmouth and marrying 
Henry. Her realization that Mansfield Park is her home coincides with a realization at 
Mansfield Park that she belongs there. Although her new place in the household is cemented 
only in the novel’s final chapter after she returns, both her experiences in Portsmouth and 
the experiences of adversity suffered by the inhabitants of Mansfield Park in her absence 
contribute to a new mutual appreciation. Fanny’s judgment of herself and of Mansfield Park 
benefit from the perspective she gains in Portsmouth at the same time as her judgments of 
the Crawfords are borne out by their behavior. This behavior gives Sir Thomas a new 
perspective on Fanny’s refusal of Henry, while life in Portsmouth gives her a new 
perspective on Mansfield Park.  
 Before turning to how Fanny’s perspective changes in Portsmouth, I must explain 
further Sir Thomas’s intentions in sending her there as well as the idealistic hopes with 
which Fanny greets his decision. Fanny’s refusal of Henry causes Sir Thomas to consider her 
judgment “as at present diseased. A residence of eight or nine years in the abode of wealth 
and plenty had a little disordered her powers of comparing and judging” (250). Sir Thomas’s 
                                               
26 Lynch’s view of Mansfield Park as pushing the genre by exploring the psychological costs of 
a virtue-rewarded plot emphasizes both “the shaping power of circumstance” and, especially 
in relation to Fanny’s changing judgment after arriving in Portsmouth, her “susceptibility to 
the Bertrams’ influence” and her internalization of their “class prejudices” (“Introduction” 
11).  
27 De Rose reads the contrast between Mansfield Park and Portsmouth in terms of 
Johnsonian morality, emphasizing the inescapable hardship of both places, and the 
“discipline and moral strength” that allow Fanny to find pleasure at Mansfield Park that 
would have been impossible at Portsmouth (273).  
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diagnosis suggests that constant comfort is a detriment to healthy judgment, and, conversely, 
that a dose of privation can prevent or cure the disorder caused by constant comfort. In 
order for judgment to be healthy, in other words, it must be aware of different possible 
states of being, it must have a relatively complete picture of the possibilities that it evaluates.  
 Sir Thomas’s diagnosis again invokes an ideal of impartial, complete judgment. It 
also, however, reduces the problem posed to Fanny’s judgment by Henry’s offer to a 
question of material well-being. Having quickly ruled out the possibility of shortcomings on 
Henry’s part or a pre-engaged heart on Fanny’s, the only consideration that remains for Sir 
Thomas is the material advantage of the marriage. Although Fanny recognizes the 
disadvantage of not being able to express her doubts about Henry’s character, she “had 
hoped that to a man like her uncle, so discerning, so honourable, so good, the simple 
acknowledgment of settled dislike on her side, would have been sufficient. To her infinite 
grief she found it was not” (215).28 Sir Thomas would agree with Fanny’s attribution to him 
of discernment, honor, and goodness; he would not agree, however, with her interpretation 
of how these qualities should affect his judgment of Henry’s offer and her refusal. Fanny’s 
dislike of Henry does not figure into Sir Thomas’s judgment of the situation. He considers 
her emotional well-being to be dependent on and subordinate to her material well-being.  
 Sir Thomas’s diagnosis of Fanny’s judgment not only subordinates emotional to 
material considerations, but also reveals his attitude towards Fanny’s situation in his 
household. Henry’s offer promises to relieve Sir Thomas of the burden of caring for Fanny, 
and he expects Fanny to see it in the same way. Because she does not appreciate the “value 
                                               
28 Burdan reads Fanny’s mistake about how Sir Thomas will react to her refusal of Henry as 
one among many mistakes caused by her moral self-deception (201). François reads Fanny’s 
inability to express her doubts about Henry as one example among many of “Fanny’s refusal 
to enlighten those around her” (243), as well as of the coincidence of her principles and her 
self-interest (244).    
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of that home of greater permanence, and equal comfort” (250) to Mansfield Park that Henry 
offers her, Sir Thomas considers Fanny’s judgment diseased. He accordingly sends her to 
Portsmouth so that she will appreciate not only the comforts to which she has become 
accustomed, but also the precariousness of her position at Mansfield Park.29  
 Fanny does not consider her position at Mansfield Park precarious, nor does she 
consider Mansfield Park her real home. Her anticipation of what it will be like to return to 
her family in Portsmouth highlights how she thinks of her place at Mansfield Park. Fanny is 
overwhelmed by the thought of returning to Portsmouth. The narrator contextualizes her 
expectations before expressing them in a series of phrases in free indirect speech:  
The remembrance of all her earliest pleasures, and of what she had suffered in being 
torn from them, came over her with renewed strength, and it seemed as if to be at 
home again, would heal every pain that had since grown out of the separation. To be 
in the centre of such a circle, loved by so many, and more loved by all than she had 
ever been before, to feel affection without fear or restraint, to feel herself the equal of 
those who surrounded her, to be at peace from all mention of the Crawfords, safe 
from every look which could be fancied a reproach on their account! – This was a 
prospect to be dwelt on with a fondness that could be but half acknowledged. (250-1) 
The narrator’s introduction of Fanny’s specific expectations points out the effect of her 
memories on these expectations: they make it seem as if being at home will return her to the 
world of these idealized memories, erasing the time and the reality that separates her from 
them.30 Fanny conflates idealized memories of her early years with idealized images of 
                                               
29 Garson notes that Sir Thomas is right about Fanny’s limited resources and sees his 
surprise at Fanny’s refusal of Henry as natural (150). His surprise may be justified, but his 
subsequent judgments of Fanny, I argue, are problematic.  
30 Here, Fanny’s memory idealizes in an imbalanced and partial way that contrasts with the 
kind of harmonizing memory she attains in the East room (discussed in Chapter Five). In 
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returning home. The time between her leaving and her return will have no effect, she 
imagines, on Portsmouth or on her role there. She fills this time, moreover, with pain that 
will be entirely nullified by reoccupying the place she remembers so fondly. How she thinks 
about the pain of her time at Mansfield Park is clarified by the pleasures that she imagines 
await her in Portsmouth. If Portsmouth is filled with love and acceptance, Mansfield Park 
has been characterized by coldness and disapproval. The impossibility of acknowledging 
how fondly she dwells on her idealized expectations of Portsmouth, however, suggests 
Fanny’s inability to face directly their implications about Mansfield Park. 
 Fanny nonetheless believes that Portsmouth will offer her all that Mansfield Park has 
not provided. In Portsmouth she will not be excluded or inferior; she will be at the center 
rather than on the periphery; she will be loved rather than tolerated; she will be accepted 
rather than pressured to change her opinion of the Crawfords. Fanny’s memory of home 
includes no awareness of the material conditions of which Sir Thomas is so eager to remind 
her. Her family’s ignorance of the Crawfords might guarantee that they will not reproach her 
on their account, but Fanny’s failure to consider material conditions makes her unaware of 
how much more advantageous Henry’s offer would look to them than it does even to Sir 
Thomas. The latter values material considerations over emotional, but Fanny’s emotional 
idealization of Portsmouth ignores material considerations altogether.  
 As the narrator explains, Fanny anticipates returning to a home where she will not 
only be loved, but “more loved by all than she had ever been before” (251). This hope rests 
simultaneously on Fanny’s idealization of her family and her memory of not being as loved 
by them as this idealization imagines. The “few simple lines” that she receives from her 
mother after writing to propose her visit 
                                                                                                                                            
the East room, Fanny gains perspective on people with whom she lives. No such proximity 
to Portsmouth tempers her idealization of her former home.   
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expressed so natural and motherly a joy in the prospect of seeing her child again, as to 
confirm all the daughter’s views of happiness in being with her—convincing her that 
she should now find a warm and affectionate friend in the “Mamma” who had 
certainly shewn no remarkable fondness for her formerly; but this she could easily 
suppose to have been her own fault, or her own fancy. She had probably alienated 
Love by the helplessness and fretfulness of a fearful temper, or been unreasonable in 
wanting a larger share than any one among so many could deserve. Now, when she 
knew better how to be useful and how to forbear, and when her mother could be no 
longer occupied by the incessant demands of a house full of little children, there would 
be leisure and inclination for every comfort, and they should soon be what mother and 
daughter ought to be to each other. (252) 
Again, the narrator’s portrayal of Fanny’s expectations undermines them. Even when Fanny 
acknowledges the less than ideal realities of the past, she excuses the lack of love she 
remembers by blaming herself. In so doing, Fanny applies different standards in her 
assessments of her mother from those she applies in her implicit criticisms of Mansfield 
Park. If her own mother could not be expected to love a helpless, fretful, and fearful Fanny, 
what could Fanny expect of her relatives at Mansfield Park? If the positive qualities she has 
gained (at Mansfield Park) are to win over her mother, why have they had so little success at 
Mansfield Park?  
 While it might be reasonable to expect more from one’s family than from distant 
relatives, Fanny’s explicit and implicit expectations of Portsmouth and Mansfield Park are 
inconsistent with the difference between a natural and an adoptive home. First, Fanny holds 
Mansfield Park to higher standards than she does Portsmouth in not forgiving the former 
for a lack of love for which she excuses her mother. Second, she holds Portsmouth to higher 
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standards than she does Mansfield Park in expecting her mother to be affected by qualities 
that she does not expect Mansfield Park to reward. The ideal mother-daughter relationship 
that Fanny expects to materialize at Portsmouth does not conform to anything that Fanny 
has experienced, nor does she consider, in this expectation, that different standards of life 
and of familial relationships might operate in Portsmouth and in Mansfield Park.  
 Fanny’s expectations of her family interact with her judgment of Mansfield Park in a 
way that does neither justice. Her idealization of Portsmouth degrades her judgment of 
Mansfield Park, obscuring the values and comforts to which she has become accustomed. 
This idealization also overlooks the reality of Portsmouth, a reality that her habituation to 
Mansfield Park has made unbearable to Fanny. Fanny is confronted with this reality 
immediately upon her arrival in her parents’ home, where no one has either the “leisure” or 
the “inclination” (252) to conform to her ideals.  
 Fanny’s arrival at Portsmouth provides a mirror image of her arrival at Mansfield 
Park eight years earlier.31 The grandeur of the latter had made her uncomfortable, with its 
“rooms…too large for her to move in with ease” (13). Upon arriving in Portsmouth, 
however, she has become so accustomed to the large rooms of Mansfield Park that when 
she is taken into the parlour of her former home, a room “so small that her first conviction 
was of its being only a passage-room to something better,…she stood for a moment 
expecting to be invited on” (256). Fanny’s judgment of each place is conditioned by the 
expectations habituated in the context of the other.  
 The material conditions of Portsmouth are not alone in appearing differently to the 
eighteen-year old Fanny than they did to the ten-year old that left them. She is surprised by 
                                               
31 Wright reads sending Fanny to Portsmouth as a temporal displacement plot showing 
readers what has been prevented by sending Fanny to Mansfield Park. Fanny’s arrival in 
Portsmouth, she argues, is characterized more as a first time visit than a return home (386-
7).   
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her parents’ lack of interest in her and shocked by the disorder and noise that reigns in the 
household that she has remembered as so comfortable.32 Fanny’s idealized picture of home 
clashes with its reality, a clash that first forces a revision of her ideal. “She was at home,” 
Fanny insists, “But, alas! it was not such a home, she had not such a welcome, as—she 
checked herself; she was unreasonable” (260). Just as at Mansfield Park Fanny excused her 
mother’s previous lack of love, in Portsmouth Fanny excuses her family’s lack of interest in 
her, asking: “What right had she to be of importance to her family? She could have none, so 
long lost sight of!” (260). When still in Mansfield, Fanny could imagine the fulfillment of her 
ideal in Portsmouth; but, once in Portsmouth, she must confront the distance of its reality 
from her ideal. 
 The standards by which Fanny judges Portsmouth are those that she has learned at 
Mansfield Park.33 While Portsmouth falls far below these standards, the now distant 
Mansfield Park embodies them in a way that obscures from Fanny the less-than-ideal 
everyday realities that she had suffered there and that she had hoped to escape in 
Portsmouth. Even before she begins calling Mansfield Park her true home, she idealizes 
Mansfield Park in a way similar to how she had idealized Portsmouth when at Mansfield 
Park. While blaming herself and her unreasonable expectations for her disappointment in 
Portsmouth, she nevertheless “thought it would not have been so at Mansfield. No, in her 
uncle’s house there would have been a consideration of times and seasons, a regulation of 
                                               
32 Banfield’s argument that Mansfield Park represents the “just mean” (5) between the 
extremes of Portsmouth and Sotherton emphasizes Portsmouth’s disorder and chaos. 
Brown characterizes London, Portsmouth, and Mansfield Park as hell, purgatory, and 
heaven, respectively (81).   
33 Lodge also notes that Fanny judges the inhabitants of Portsmouth according to the 
standards of Mansfield Park. He considers these judgments particularly harsh because he 
(like Halperin) sees Portsmouth as full of life, especially in contrast to Mansfield Park, and 
because he, rightly I think, emphasizes the difficulty posed by Fanny’s relative blindness to 
the faults of the Bertrams, who fail to live up to the values they espouse (95-6). 
  243 
subject, a propriety, an attention towards every body which there was not here” (260).34 
What she once experienced as the coldness and formality of Mansfield Park has become a 
comfortable and necessary conformance to propriety.35  
 Fanny’s idealizations of Portsmouth and of Mansfield Park share the effects of 
distance. From a physical (and in the case of Portsmouth, temporal) distance, Fanny focuses 
on the general qualities of each place without considering the immediate experience of each 
or its more particular qualities. There are, however, also important differences between 
Fanny’s idealizations of Portsmouth and of Mansfield Park. Fanny was taken from the home 
in Portsmouth in which she was happy to Mansfield Park, a place she first experienced as 
terrifying and uncomfortable. Her idealization of Portsmouth grew out of her longing for 
her former home. As she grew more accustomed to Mansfield Park, Fanny adjusted her 
memories of Portsmouth to supply the comforts that were not forthcoming at Mansfield 
Park, but did not adjust them in accordance with the comforts to which she had become 
accustomed.  
 While Fanny idealizes Portsmouth over time as the perfect home, her idealization of 
Mansfield Park occurs almost immediately in reaction to the reality of Portsmouth. Though 
she cannot help but shed tears upon departing from Mansfield, Fanny leaves “willingly and 
eagerly” (254), 36 anticipating a happy homecoming in Portsmouth. The reality of the 
                                               
34 Cohen reads Fanny’s judgment as reflecting the different familial structures of the Betrams 
and the Prices rather than her own shifting loyalties (674-5). 
35 Zimmerman reads Fanny’s trip to Portsmouth as teaching her to value manners, even 
though polite society does not always live up to her moral standards (352-3).  
36 The narrator teases Fanny a little in describing her sensitivity and emotion upon leaving 
Mansfield Park: “Poor Fanny! though going, as she did, willingly and eagerly, the last evening 
at Mansfield Park must still be wretchedness. Her heart was completely sad at parting. She 
had tears for every room in the house, much more for every beloved inhabitant. She clung to 
her aunt, because she would miss her; she kissed the hand of her uncle with struggling sobs, 
because she had displeased him; and as for Edmund, she could neither speak, nor look, nor 
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homecoming she experiences shows her Mansfield Park in a new light. She not only 
appreciates the propriety and formality that once made her uncomfortable, but also ceases to 
consider significant the discomfort of her inferior position or to regret not being the kind of 
object of affection that she had anticipated being in Portsmouth.  
 Fanny’s quick shift from idealizing Portsmouth to idealizing Mansfield Park strikes 
many readers as a fatal weakness. Her shifting idealizations show her judgments of both 
Portsmouth and Mansfield Park to be inconsistent and dependent on her position.37 This 
inconsistency and dependence, I submit, is the narrative’s point. Fanny’s judgment has never 
been consistent, infallible, or free from various types of interest. At the same time, her 
commitment to judging disinterestedly, however short she may fall of her ideal, prevents her 
from hurting others and assures a self-reflection conducive to improvement. The drastic 
change in perspective that occurs when Fanny returns to Portsmouth therefore indicates not 
only the inescapable effects of one’s particular position on one’s judgment, but also the 
resources that might balance these effects. 
 Fanny first judges Portsmouth in the light of Mansfield Park, and then Mansfield 
Park in the light of Portsmouth. She is unable to distance herself from both places 
simultaneously and judge them side by side from an impartial perspective. However, despite 
the partiality of Fanny’s current position, her change in perspective also involves a 
reorganization of values that the narrator corroborates. Her parents’ house not only has 
none of the emotional comforts that she has anticipated, but also abounds with emotional 
and material discomforts that she has not anticipated. How could the inferiority of her 
                                                                                                                                            
think, when the last moment came with him, and it was not till it was over that she knew he 
was giving her the affectionate farewell of a brother” (254).  
37 Fleishman considers Fanny weak and finds her judgment inconsistent, characterizing her 
judgments of Portsmouth and her parents as snobbish and jealous (45).  
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position at Mansfield Park not appear more desirable than her lack of importance in 
Portsmouth?38  
 
V. Partiality, Ideals, and Judgment 
 Fanny’s disappointment in Portsmouth and negative judgment of her parents does 
not change her behavior. She attempts to be of use however she can, just as she always has 
at Mansfield Park. These attempts are generally not valued in either place, but Fanny’s 
limited success in Portsmouth contributes to a sense of self that has never accompanied her 
role as helpmate at Mansfield Park. In Portsmouth, Fanny learns that she is capable of 
influencing others.  
 The danger of Fanny’s idealization of Mansfield Park is thus countered by the use to 
which she puts all that she has acquired or developed there in advising and guiding Susan. 
She uses the economic resources supplied by Mansfield Park to resolve an ongoing dispute 
between her sisters as well as to subscribe, “in propria persona” (271), to a library.39 Her 
subscription not only satisfies Fanny’s longing to read, but also makes her a teacher to Susan. 
She is amazed “to be having any one’s improvement in view in her choice! But so it was. 
Susan had read nothing, and Fanny longed to give her a share in her own first pleasures, and 
inspire a taste for the biography and poetry which she delighted in herself” (271). The 
education she acquired at Mansfield Park allows Fanny to guide Susan in a way reminiscent 
                                               
38 Canuel makes a similar point by contrasting the upper-class system of pains and 
mortifications of Mansfield Park with the more formidable pain of exclusion that Fanny 
suffers in Portsmouth. 
39 Despotopoulou reads this as an example of Fanny’s agency and freedom from male 
influence (583). Mandal associates Fanny’s economic ability to settle a familial dispute with 
Evangelical representations of charity (112), and her subscription to the library as a 
recognition of her moral independence (122).  
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of Edmund’s guidance of Fanny.40 This activity makes Fanny aware in a new way of her 
involvement with and possible influence on other people. While Henry’s courtship first 
made Fanny the object of attention, her relationship with Susan makes Fanny an actor in her 
own world. She and Susan withdraw from the others to read together, but Fanny no longer 
observes her surroundings from an aesthetisized distance. She overcomes her reluctance to 
act and is rewarded with a relationship with Susan that is a “material advantage to each” 
(270). The education that Fanny receives at Mansfield Park is utilized in a new way in 
Portsmouth.  
 Henry’s arrival there constitutes another test of her judgment, as well as an 
interesting comparison between different types of partiality and idealization. In Portsmouth, 
Fanny judges Henry to be improved without “considering in how different a circle she had 
been just seeing him, [or] how much might be owing to contrast” (281). Her judgment, in 
other words, is partial. When they were in Mansfield Park, Henry and Mary appeared to 
Fanny to represent the problematic values of London and fall very short of the standards of 
Mansfield Park. In Portsmouth, conversely, Henry is so different from her family that he 
appears similar to the inhabitants of Mansfield Park (whom Fanny idealizes from a distance), 
and is aligned, rather than contrasted, with them.41 
                                               
40 Duffy also notes this similarity in his somewhat inconsistent discussion of the relationship 
between environment and natural character (78). Marshall interprets Fanny’s amazement at 
playing the role of Edmund in educating Susan as stemming from her amazement about “the 
act of subscribing herself as herself, the act of signing her name” (87). His reading 
emphasizes the ambiguity and even impossibility of appearing in propia persona.  
41 Wainwright, who considers Fanny’s character flaws in terms of Lockean ideals, sees Fanny 
as unreservedly judging Henry improved, but unable to communicate this judgment due to 
her “extreme reserve” (66-7). I find Fanny’s judgment of Henry’s improvement to be both 
tempered and presented as partial. Additionally, I do not think Fanny ever wants to 
encourage Henry in any way or that encouragement of Henry is presented as positive in any 
way.  
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 Despite Fanny’s judgment that Henry is improved, she is steadfast in her refusal to 
consider marrying him.42 The incompleteness of her judgment of Henry’s improvement is 
complemented by whatever prevents her from accepting him. Her continued refusal and its 
basis in her emotions can be seen in a negative or positive light. On the one hand, her 
inability to master her feelings for Edmund can be seen as an obstacle to a marriage not only 
materially advantageous, but also recommended by her judgment that Henry is improved. 
On the other hand, her refusal to consider marrying someone whom she does not love can 
be seen as adherence to a principle that protects her from her flawed judgment of Henry’s 
improvement. 
 Readers’ evaluations of Fanny’s judgments of Henry are of course determined in part 
by how they judge Henry, and how they judge Henry is determined by the narrator’s 
depiction of his partiality and idealizations, which come across as more problematic than 
those of Fanny. Readers’ judgments of Fanny’s and Henry’s relative flaws are complicated, 
however, by the kind of partiality and idealization that the interaction of the novel’s two 
plots encourages in readers. I will return to novel’s invitations to judge partially and 
impartially as well as to idealize both it and its characters after examining its depiction of 
Henry’s partiality and idealization.  
 The narrator introduces Henry’s intentions towards Fanny as irresponsible and 
somewhat cruel, but depicts the change in his intentions more ambiguously. His initial plan 
to amuse himself by engaging Fanny’s heart is fueled, firstly, by the challenge of her cold 
response and, secondly, by the feeling he perceives in her spirited interaction with William.  
                                               
42 In Grenberg’s analysis of Fanny as exemplifying Kantian courageous humility, Fanny’s 
refusal of Henry shows her moral agency. Henry, on the other hand, shows how Kant’s 
radical evil exists in genteel society.   
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 Henry observes Fanny listening to William’s stories of danger at sea, and the siblings 
form 
a picture which Henry Crawford had moral taste enough to value. Fanny’s attractions 
increased – increased twofold – for the sensibility which beautified her complexion 
and illumined her countenance, was an attraction in itself. He was no longer in doubt 
of the capabilities of her heart. She had feeling, genuine feeling. It would be something 
to be loved by such a girl, to excite the first ardours of her young, unsophisticated 
mind! She interested him more than he had foreseen. (161-2) 
The passage begins by characterizing Henry’s position of observation as both aesthetic and 
moral. He contemplates “a picture” (161) of Fanny absorbed in William’s stories, a picture 
his moral taste qualifies him to value. Fraternal love,43 the narrator suggests, cannot be 
appreciated without moral taste. Henry has the taste to appreciate the moral scene of 
Fanny’s love for her brother, but this moral taste does not, as becomes clear in the 
continuation, prevent him from wishing to toy with Fanny’s feelings.  
 In an aesthetic context, Henry’s moral taste corresponds to that of Edmund and 
Fanny; he is able to appreciate the beauty of fraternal love as well as of a good sermon. The 
                                               
43 The narrator places a high value on fraternal love and attaches importance to the ability to 
appreciate this bond in others: “An advantage this, a strengthener of love, in which even the 
conjugal tie is beneath the fraternal. Children of the same family, the same blood, with the 
same first associations and habits, have some means of enjoyment in their power, which no 
subsequent connections can supply; and it must be by a long and unnatural estrangement, by 
a divorce which no subsequent connection can justify, if such precious remains of the 
earliest attachments are ever entirely outlived. Too often, alas! it is so. – Fraternal love, 
sometimes almost every thing, is at others worse than nothing. But with William and Fanny 
Price, it was still a sentiment in all its prime and freshness, wounded by no opposition of 
interest, cooled by no separate attachment, and feeling the influence of time and absence 
only in its increase. 
An affection so amiable was advancing each in the opinion of all who had hearts to value 
any thing good. Henry Crawford was as much struck with it as any.” (161) 
Ryle identifies the relationship between fraternal and conjugal ties as Mansfield Park’s “theme-
notion” (292), and discusses how the novel compares the characters in terms of their abilities 
to fill their family roles.  
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moral taste with which he contemplates Fanny has no effect, however, on his real intentions 
towards her. His aesthetic appreciation of her sensibility is, in fact, so separated from his real 
behavior that he recognizes the pleasure it might afford him “to be loved by such a girl” 
without thinking of how her “genuine feeling” and “unsophisticated mind” (162) might be 
affected by heartbreak and disappointment. The proof of her strong feelings that so attracts 
Henry also increases the irresponsibility of exciting ardours that he has no intention of 
reciprocating. Henry may be able to appreciate Fanny’s virtues, but he has not learned to 
apply his moral taste to his interactions with real people.   
 As I mentioned in Chapter Five, the narrator singles out Fanny’s tenderness and 
taste as the qualities that make her most susceptible to Henry. Henry’s moral taste and the 
good sense that allows him to appreciate her virtues make him unexpectedly susceptible to 
Fanny. He proclaims himself “‘fairly caught’” (199), announces his plans to marry her, and 
refuses to take “no” for an answer. What began as, in Mary’s words, a “‘wicked project upon 
[Fanny’s] peace’” (201), becomes real feeling and serious intention. But what motivates 
Henry?44  
 The narrator makes clear Henry’s capacity to appreciate Fanny’s virtues, his 
possession of talents irresistible to Fanny’s taste, and his intentions to treat her with love and 
consideration.45 At the same time, his flaws are revealed to expose the similarity between his 
                                               
44 Garson calls the question of Henry’s sincerity “undecidable” (138), noting that readers are 
never given Henry’s own perspective. She attributes to Henry aristocratic natural taste that 
makes him Fanny’s complement as well as her opposite (138).  
45 The narrator describes Henry’s sense: “Nor was this all. Henry Crawford had too much 
sense not to feel the worth of good principles in a wife, though he was too little accustomed 
to serious reflection to know them by their proper name; but when he talked of her having 
such a steadiness and regularity of conduct, such a high notion of honour, and such an 
observance of decorum as might warrant any man in the fullest dependence on her faith and 
integrity, he expressed what was inspired by the knowledge of her being well principled and 
religious” (201). The talents that are irresistible to Fanny’s taste include his acting and his 
reading of Shakespeare. She tries to ignore him, “but taste was too strong in her. She could 
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initial plan to toy with Fanny and his serious courtship. Not only does Henry’s moral taste 
and good sense make him susceptible to Fanny’s (unsuspected) charms, his “disposition to 
persevere” (221) is fueled by Fanny’s refusal. The good qualities that enable him to 
appreciate Fanny are countered by morally ambiguous qualities that prevent him from being 
dissuaded from his purpose.46 The narrator mentions the role that his vanity plays in 
maintaining his optimism and describes his feelings for Fanny in terms that call into question 
the role that she plays in them. Henry thinks more about his own attractions than the 
possible reasons for Fanny’s relative immunity to them. The strength of his love corresponds 
to a lack of consideration: “it was a love which, operating on an active, sanguine spirit, of 
more warmth than delicacy, made her affection appear of greater consequence, because it 
was withheld, and determined him to have the glory, as well as the felicity, of forcing her to 
love him” (221). Henry’s pursuit of Fanny is motivated by a pleasure in the chase that 
overlooks Fanny’s feelings. He may have the ability to appreciate her good qualities, but his 
vanity and love of novelty and role-playing motivate and qualify his perseverance.47 
                                                                                                                                            
not abstract her mind five minutes: she was forced to listen; his reading was capital, and her 
pleasure in good reading extreme” (228). Henry expresses his consideration in vowing not to 
take her from Northampton and in thinking of the pleasure he will get from being “‘the 
person to give the consequence so justly her due’” (203).  
46 Henry’s perseverance in the face of her refusal angers Fanny, and reminds her and readers 
of why she has judged him harshly: “Now she was angry. Some resentment did arise at a 
perseverance so selfish and ungenerous. Here was again a want of delicacy and regard for 
others which had formerly so struck and disgusted her. Here was again a something of the 
same Mr. Crawford whom she had so reprobated before. How evidently was there a gross 
want of feeling and humanity where his own pleasure was concerned – And, alas! how 
always known no principle to supply as a duty what the heart was deficient in. Had her own 
affections been as free – as perhaps they ought to have been – he never could have engaged 
them” (222-3).   
47 Also: “Love such as his, in a man like himself, must with perseverance secure a return, and 
at no great distance; and he had so much delight in the idea of obliging her to love him in a 
very short time, that her not loving him now was scarcely regretted. A little difficulty to be 
overcome, was no evil to Henry Crawford. He rather derived spirits from it. He had been 
apt to gain hearts too easily. His situation was new and animating” (221).  
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 Henry’s idealization of Fanny and his attempts to impress her superficially improve 
his behavior. When he is near her or focused entirely on impressing her, he acts according to 
her standards. While in Mansfield Park, this behavior succeeds only in making Fanny treat 
him with greater politeness than his previous behavior had warranted. He is more successful 
in Portsmouth, but his appeal to her judgment betrays his superficial adherence to the values 
that he appreciates in Fanny. After impressing her with his tales of being a responsible 
landowner, he asks Fanny to advise him about how to proceed. In addition to her customary 
refusal to take the position of advisor, Fanny adds a maxim about judgment in the following 
dialogue: 
“I advise! – You know very well what is right.”  
“Yes. When you give me your opinion, I always know what is right. Your judgment is 
my rule of right.”  
“Oh, no! – do not say so. We have all a better guide in ourselves, if we would attend to 
it, than any other person can be.” (280)48 
Henry idealizes Fanny in a way that betrays his flawed understanding of the values he tries to 
adopt. In appealing to Fanny as a “rule of right” (280), Henry thinks he is improving himself, 
but he takes no responsibility for the process. He does not want to judge for himself, a 
responsibility that Fanny insists everyone has.49  
                                               
48 Despotopoulou cites these lines in her reading of Fanny as embodying Adam Smith’s 
impartial spectator. Although the comparison to Smith is useful, I remain unconvinced of 
Despotopoulou’s argument that Fanny’s feminine gaze creates a space of female agency in 
Mansfield Park. 
49 Fanny takes this responsibility seriously. She does, however, make use of external 
standards. When she feels herself “incapable of judging impartially” (295) whether to accept 
Mary’s offer that she and Henry return Fanny to Mansfield Park Fanny considers her 
obligation to Sir Thomas “a rule…which settled everything” (296). Instead of being “left to 
weigh and decide between opposite inclinations and doubtful notions of right” (296) – her 
desire to return to Mansfield and her wish to prevent Mary and Edmund from being 
together – Fanny’s “awe of her uncle, and her dread of taking a liberty with him, made it 
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 Henry, Fanny, and Sir Thomas all display partial and interested judgments. None of 
them can attain a complete view or prevent their interests from influencing them. The novel, 
I propose, distinguishes among their different kinds of partiality and interestedness in terms 
of their different relationships to ideals. Fanny and Sir Thomas take ideals seriously, but fall 
short of them in different ways. Neither attains the complete view that both value, nor are 
they able to prevent personal and emotional interests from affecting their judgments. 
Although Fanny doubts and questions herself, she is unable to see these interests clearly and 
thus to neutralize their influence. Sir Thomas does not doubt himself or his adherence to his 
ideals; his certainty that he embodies them precludes any possibility that he acknowledge the 
influence of material interests that he considers beneath him. Neither Fanny’s profound, nor 
Sir Thomas’s superficial, relationship to ideals is ideal. Fanny’s mistakes, however, require a 
less dramatic corrective than do Sir Thomas’s.  
 But Sir Thomas’s shortcomings compare favorably to Henry’s late and lazy 
relationship to ideals. Henry’s failure to internalize the ideal that he sees in Fanny has more 
severe consequences and less potential for correction than Sir Thomas’s superficial 
relationship to his ideals, let alone Fanny’s failure to live up to hers. Though Fanny does not 
always see her failures clearly, her acknowledgment that she does not live up to her ideals 
motivates self-correction and improvement. Because Sir Thomas takes ideals seriously, he 
can be shown his failures to adhere to them and therewith improve his efforts to do so. 
Henry’s potential for improvement, by contrast, is limited to his relationship to Fanny and 
                                                                                                                                            
instantly plain to her, what she had to do. She must absolutely decline the proposal” (296). 
While Henry wants Fanny to supply the judgment he is too lazy to develop in himself, Fanny 
avoids deciding between questionable personal desires by appealing to a duty to Sir Thomas 
of which she has no doubts.  
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the ideal he sees in her. He can play the role of her ideal suitor only insofar as he 
understands the part, which he relies on Fanny to define for him.  
 The novel’s characters thus display different relationships to ideals and different 
types of partial and interested judgment. The novel’s conclusion, as I will discuss in the next 
chapter, passes definitive judgment on these differences. The interaction of the novel’s two 
plots leading up to this conclusion, however, complicates readers’ judgments of these 
differences. This interaction makes it difficult for readers to access the more complete 
picture offered by their position outside the fictional world and accordingly to judge the 
characters from this perspective of completeness, a perspective unavailable within the 
fictional world. The position plot invites readers to enter into Fanny’s mind and share her 
perspective. This partiality and interestedness encouraged by the position plot are countered 
by the critical distance from Fanny often taken by the narrator as well as by the idealization 
of her encouraged by the marriage plot. Neither the proximate partiality encouraged by the 
position plot nor the distanced idealization encouraged by the marriage plot offers readers a 
comfortable position in relation to its characters. Instead, the plots work together to suggest 
an alternative position in which the distance and proximity offered by each inform one 
another. 
 The novel’s portrayal of its characters’ partiality, interestedness, and idealizations 
thus raises questions about how readers might judge it and its characters. Should readers 
aspire to a complete, impartial perspective on this – or for that matter, any – novel’s 
characters? How might this perspective distinguish readers’ judgment of the characters from 
that of characters’ judgments of one another? What makes a novel’s characters into ideals 
and how does this status affect the way readers judge them? What causes readers to be 
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emotionally interested in characters and how does emotional interest affect readers’ 
judgments of characters and novels?  
 Mansfield Park’s depiction of the partiality, interestedness, and idealization of its 
characters suggests that judgment is determined by the quality and interaction of these 
factors. According to the novel, because individuals cannot see their own interests or remove 
themselves from the particular situations in which they make judgments, disinterested 
judgment is an impossible ideal. The relative successes of the characters in approaching this 
ideal are, however, determined by the sincerity of their relationships to it. Readers, in turn, 
are challenged to determine the ideal way in which to judge the characters and the novel. 
This ideal, I suggest, requires a constant balancing of partiality and distance that strives for 
completeness that is not an idealization.  
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Chapter Seven: Concluding Judgments 
I. Mansfield Park’s Idealized Ending: Fictionality and Realism 
 The final chapter of this study of Mansfield Park turns to the final chapter of the 
novel. In novel’s last chapter, the narrator takes on a new voice that involves new distances 
from both characters and readers. Instead of unobtrusively relating the actions and thoughts 
of the characters, the narrator passes judgment on them and places them in final positions.  
 The narrator’s somewhat abrupt resolution of the novel’s instabilities in its final chapter, I 
argue, emphasizes its fictionality in a way that also resolves the tension it has created with 
readers about what they should hope for the characters as well as about the kind of novel 
that they are reading.  
 The events that transpire before the final chapter while Fanny is in Portsmouth 
begin to resolve the position plot: Fanny gains a sense of self-worth and realizes that 
Mansfield Park is her home while the inhabitants of Mansfield Park realize not only that 
Fanny belongs with them, but also that the Crawfords do not. Henry and Maria’s behavior 
rules out the possibility of the alternate ending to the marriage plot suggested by Henry’s 
proposal to Fanny. Fanny’s return to Mansfield Park, in the antepenultimate chapter of the 
novel, thus promises that the position plot and the marriage plot will both ultimately be 
resolved by her eventual marriage to Edmund. The penultimate chapter increases the 
expectation of this ending by putting it off and exemplifying Rabinowitz’s rule of chutzpah 
with its insistence on the agreement of Fanny and Edmund that he will never get over Mary. 
The ultimate chapter’s terse treatment of the expected resolution, however, asks readers to 
imagine for themselves both Edmund’s transfer of affection to Fanny and the change in 
Fanny that enables her to think of herself as his wife rather than his cousin. Though this 
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conclusion remains unsatisfactory for many readers, it emphasizes the difference between 
fiction and life in a way that resolves the questions raised by the novel’s two plots. 
 Austen is in good company when her conclusions are considered weak.1 Conclusions 
are notoriously difficult, partly due to the inevitable transition from fiction to life when a 
novel ends. My reading of Mansfield Park has emphasized how the novel raises different 
kinds of questions about the relationship between fiction and life throughout, especially at 
the levels of plot, character, voice, and syntax. That these issues come to the forefront at the 
novel’s conclusion should come as no surprise. It should also come as no surprise that, after 
Fanny, the conclusion is the novel’s most hotly contested element.2  
 The battle-lines pitting didacticism and romance against irony and realism are by now 
familiar. On the one hand, critics condemn the conclusion of the novel as an inartistic lapse 
into moralizing that undermines Austen’s realist project,3 while on the other hand, 
champions of a radical Austen insist on the irony of the happy ending, an irony that resists 
both literary and social conventions.4 The seemingly endless configurations of these 
commitments and judgments of the novel overlap with theories and assumptions about how 
novels can and should end. 
                                               
1 Cottom considers Austen’s endings generally weak, and unable to resolve what comes 
before. He reads this weakness as a sign of the impossibility of fixing meaning in Austen’s 
world. Halperin suggests that Austen’s endings fall short because she is unable to 
satisfactorily imagine a marital state she has not experienced. Somewhat surprisingly, 
Tauchert makes a similar connection in giving biographical context to her reading of 
Austen’s use of romance plots to convey female knowledge. Haggerty also finds Austen’s 
endings generally unsatisfying, though he commends her ability to stretch the romance plot. 
2 Rabinowitz (“Reading Beginnings and Endings”) helpfully cites I.A. Richards on the 
inevitability of imposing interested interpretations and the intentionality of this kind of 
misreading (310).  
3 Duffy’s limited view of realism and Mudrick’s of irony lead each to this type of negative 
judgment. Gard’s sensitive reading finds the end problematic, but “not so much bad art, as 
art limited by its ambitious success” (141).  
4 M. Anderson, for example, argues that the conclusion of Mansfield Park is a “revolt against 
the politics of closure that hermetically seals the heroine’s fate at the moment of marriage” 
(181).   
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 In Secular Scripture, Frye offers a useful jumping off point. Austen’s “characters are 
believable,” he comments, “yet every so often we become aware of the tension between 
them and the outlines of the story into which they are obliged to fit. This is particularly true 
of endings, where the right men get married to the right women, although the inherent 
unlikelihood of these unions has been the main theme of the story” (39). Frye here brings 
together two central issues in the critical literature on Mansfield Park’s conclusion: one, the 
realism of the characters versus the romanticism or idealism of the plot, and two, the conflict 
between what drives a story and its conclusion.  
 This tension between a novel’s “principles of production” and its “claims of closure 
to a resolved meaning” (xi) is what interests D.A. Miller in Narrative and its Discontents, where 
he defines the former as the narratable and the latter as the unnarratable. For Miller, this 
relationship is interesting in Austen because the ideological closure imposed at the end of the 
novels should not allow the kind of moral lapses that move the narrative forward. Austen’s 
narratives can only proceed, therefore, “in a mode of negation. A moral negation exculpates 
the novelist from the sin of narrating, and hence permits the act of narration to go forward” 
(63). Miller’s theoretical interest aligns him with interpretations of Mansfield Park that 
emphasize the conflict between the novel’s content and its form, a conflict that becomes 
most violent at the novel’s conclusion. Galperin, for example, reads the narrative voice of 
the ending of Mansfield Park as a “transgression,” and the “miserable trajectory” of its story 
as a “foreclosure on ‘real life’” (“Missed Opportunities” 129). Miller’s own interpretation of 
Mansfield Park’s conclusion as a “moral-ideological fiat” (25) emphasizes the necessary 
reduction of fixing meaning.5 Though Galperin argues for an oppositional Austen and Miller 
                                               
5 Miller’s emphasis on the reductiveness of closure does not, however, prevent him from 
finding, particularly in Austen’s dramatization of the act of closure, a questioning of its 
completeness.   
  
 
 
 
258 
is seduced by her style,6 both critics read the end of Mansfield Park as a closing off of 
possibilities.7  
 Hinnant, in contrast, reads the tension between the realism of the characters and the 
idealism of the courtship plot as productive. The idealism of the happy ending is meant not 
to reinforce courtship conventions, but rather to expose and question them. Tandon’s study 
of Austen also highlights a tension between form and content that overlaps with the 
interests of Miller and Galperin. He argues, however, that the formal didacticism of Mansfield 
Park’s conclusion is countered by the suggestion of happy accident, a suggestion that 
“emphasizes humans’ limited power to locate and dictate meaning” (224). While Tandon 
links this picture of human limitation to Mansfield Park’s expression of Austen’s religious 
sensibility,8 Doody’s reading of the last chapter as “diffusing ‘an appearance of amiable 
sensibility’ over an unpalatable ending” (179) connects the artificiality of this ending to 
Austen’s portrayal of the fallibility of language.9  
 Mansfield Park’s idealized happy ending can thus be seen as a failure in itself or as 
more or less successfully expressing a different failure, be it literary, societal, or human. The 
happy ending can be seen as artificial in a negative way, or falling short in a way that is 
successful. These varying interpretations depend on what readers and critics take to be at 
stake at the end of the novel.   
 Will the marriage plot fulfill its promise of an idealized happy ending? What 
constitutes a happy ending within the world of the novel? What kind of happy ending can 
readers of the novel accept for its characters, characters who fail to live up to their own 
                                               
6 See Galperin’s The Historical Austen and Miller’s Jane Austen, or, the Secret of Style. 
7 Hardy also sees the end as a closing off of possibilities.  
8 Tauchert also makes this connection in her reading of Fanny’s ending as providential.  
9 Edwards and Fleishman also read the conclusion as painting a picture of limitation. For 
Edwards, it is Fanny and Edmund who are limited; for Fleishman, it is society as a whole.  
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ideals as well as to the ideal types expected in marriage comedies? The idealism of the 
marriage plot together with the realism of the position plot complicate readers’ expectations 
for the characters and for the novel. The novel complicates expectations in this way, I 
submit, in order to both portray the difficulty of attaining disinterested judgment and engage 
readers in this difficulty. In the novel’s final chapter, the characters that have failed to have a 
sincere relationship with this ideal are condemned, while those that have failed to live up to 
this ideal but have taken it seriously are rewarded with an idealized happy ending. This 
idealized happy ending confronts readers simultaneously with the fictionality and the realism 
of the characters.10 These characters whose minds readers have entered and with whom they 
may or may not have sympathized are, in the end, subject not to the laws governing readers, 
but rather to those governing fiction. Readers who have been unable to sympathize with the 
characters’ struggles or who cannot accept the imposition of an idealized happy ending on 
the novel’s realistic characters find the novel unsatisfactory, whereas those who engage with 
the novel’s challenge to examine the grounds of their own judgment are rewarded with an 
experience of reading fiction that has relevance to their real lives. In this chapter, I analyze 
the narrative voice of the novel’s conclusion as well as the judgments passed on the 
characters in order to clarify the novel’s claims about the relationships among the real, the 
ideal, and the represented.     
 
II. Authoritative Distance: The Narrative Voice of Mansfield Park’s Final Chapter 
 The final chapter of Mansfield Park opens with an explicit description of the 
narrator’s activity. After having detailed in the previous chapter a conversation between 
                                               
10 Graham reads the final chapter as a “foregrounding of fictionality” that “encourages 
readerly interrogation” (889). He gives an ethical, pragmatic, and “contextually literary” 
answer to the question of why Austen chose to end with a union between a mentor and 
mentee rather than that between a rake and the good woman who reforms him (889).    
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Edmund and Fanny in which he describes his disappointment in Mary,11 the narrator, in the 
final chapter, changes tone and declares: “Let other pens dwell on guilt and misery. I quit 
such odious subjects as soon as I can, impatient to restore every body, not greatly in fault 
themselves, to tolerable comfort, and to have done with all the rest” (312).12 This declaration 
not only refers explicitly to the narrator as writer, but also to the writer’s power over the 
characters. This impatient and authoritative narrative voice forms a stark contrast with the 
narrative voice typical of the rest of the novel. The latter has generally remained unobtrusive, 
rarely indicating an authorial presence even when exposing the characters in ways that 
contradicted their own beliefs and assertions. This unobtrusive voice, sometimes 
encouraging proximity to and sometimes distance from the characters, has influenced 
readers’ judgments subtly. The narrative voice of the final chapter, in contrast, speaks to 
readers directly, asserting its authority and its intention of wrapping up loose ends to supply 
a happy ending. 
 The narrator’s new authority and explicit intention creates new distances among the 
narrator, the other characters, and readers. The use of a narrative “I” distances the narrator 
from readers by indicating an explicit speaker in a particular position.13 This speaker 
                                               
11 I will return to the narrative’s treatment of this disappointment below.  
12 J. Donohue reads this opening as an “arresting” invocation of the novel’s governing comic 
principle, a principle that he argues is applied to material that is not traditionally comic (171). 
In her analysis of theatre in Mansfield Park, Lott calls the sentence a “narrative deus ex 
machina” and likens Austen’s use of such a mechanism to “Sir Thomas’s similar but 
inadequate attempts to enforce his will” (283). Graham calls the author of these sentences a 
“cool ironist” compared to the “earnest moralist” more common in the rest of the novel 
(889), a characterization that critics who read the end of the novel as didactic would reverse. 
Lynch (“‘Young Ladies’”) reads the line as a reminder “of the force of novelistic form itself” 
and of Austen’s own role as artist (719).  
13 For a contrasting interpretation, see Doody’s impression of the final chapter’s opening 
sentence as a troubling instance of  “‘novel slang’” that “seeks to identify the author’s feeling 
and the reader’s, even in advance of complete narration” (178). Of course, this attempt to 
identify the reader and author may fail and create distance instead. I refer to a different 
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unambiguously stands between readers and characters, negotiating their relationship. The 
distance between this narrator and the characters is thus also distinct from that between the 
characters and the narrator of the body of the novel, a narrator who often conveys the 
characters’ thoughts in their own words and who, as I discussed in Chapter Five, does not 
take authorial responsibility for them even when expressing explicit opinions about their 
futures.  
 The narrator of the novel’s final chapter not only admits to having some control 
over the characters’ fates, but also refers to Fanny affectionately in the possessive: “my 
Fanny” (312). This explicit and affectionate ownership begins a paragraph that resolves a 
major part of the position plot by establishing Fanny’s happiness; that qualifies the narrator’s 
newly asserted omniscience and omnipotence;14 and that touches on, only to put off until the 
end of the chapter, the expected resolution of the marriage comedy. After having established 
a new, authoritative narrative role, the narrator describes Fanny’s state upon returning to 
Mansfield Park and learning of Edmund’s disappointment in Mary:  
My Fanny indeed at this very time, I have the satisfaction of knowing, must have been 
happy in spite of everything. She must have been a happy creature in spite of all that 
she felt or thought she felt, for the distress of those around her. She had sources of 
delight that must force their way. She was returned to Mansfield Park, she was useful, 
she was beloved; she was safe from Mr. Crawford, and when Sir Thomas came back 
she had every proof that could be given in his then melancholy state of spirits, of his 
                                                                                                                                            
distance between readers and a specific “I,” a distance I contrast with that between readers 
and the unspecified and unobtrusive narrator more common in Mansfield Park.   
14 See Nelles’s argument that Austen’s narrators should be considered infallible rather than 
omniscient. Nelles uses the opening of Mansfield Park’s final chapter and the quote below to 
argue that even when Austen’s narrators “approach the rhetoric of omnipotence, most often 
when they step forward on the final pages to wrap things up at an accelerated pace,” they 
nonetheless suggest a limited and human, rather than omnipotent, perspective (121).  
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perfect approbation and increased regard; and happy as all this must make her, she 
would still have been happy without any of it, for Edmund was no longer the dupe of 
Miss Crawford. (312-3)15 
The first sentence of this passage attests to Fanny’s happiness in a way that complicates the 
newly asserted authority of the narrative voice and its relationship to the novel’s heroine. 
Does the narrator refer to “my Fanny” (312) as an author to her creation or merely as a 
writer to her, possibly real, subject? Is the narrator’s satisfaction in Fanny’s happiness based 
on direct knowledge of her feelings or on a familiarity with her that merely suggests that she 
“must have been happy” (312)? The next sentence does not answer, but instead complicates 
these questions by undermining Fanny’s knowledge of her own feelings: the narrator doubts 
that Fanny is as affected by the distress of others as Fanny thinks that she is. Throughout the 
novel, the narrator has both taken a special interest in Fanny and revealed more to readers 
about Fanny than Fanny is able to see in herself. This interest and exposure, however, has 
rarely been as explicit as it is in the passage under discussion. Readers must consider this 
intervention more directly than the more subtle influence of the less obtrusive narrator of 
the bulk of the novel. In spite of intervening explicitly as a writer, the relationship of the 
narrator of the novel’s final chapter to the characters remains ambiguous. This ambiguity is 
caused, I suggest, by the narrator’s task of securing an idealized happy ending for the novel’s 
realistic characters.  
 The coincidence between the happiness of some characters and the unhappiness of 
others is an important part of the combination of idealism and realism central to the novel’s 
conclusion. This coincidence takes various forms and is mentioned several times by the 
                                               
15 N. Auerbach reads this passage as exhibiting the “cannibalistic undercurrents” (110) of 
Fanny’s final acceptance at Mansfield Park. Though she notes the dependence of Fanny’s 
happiness “on the wounds and disappointments of others” (111), she reads this dependence 
as related to Fanny’s Romantic monstrosity rather than to the novel’s realism. 
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narrator in the final chapters of the novel. An idealized happy ending normally depends on 
both the happiness, or reward, of the characters “not greatly in fault themselves” (312) and 
the unhappiness, or punishment, of the guiltier parties (I will return to the narrator’s 
establishment of this coincidence below). Less typical is the coincidence of Fanny’s 
happiness with the unhappiness of the Bertrams, especially that of Edmund.16 The most 
salient factor of Fanny’s happiness is her knowledge that “Edmund was no longer the dupe 
of Miss Crawford” (312). The narrator immediately contrasts Fanny’s happiness in this 
knowledge with the suffering it causes Edmund: “It is true, that Edmund was very far from 
happy himself. He was suffering from disappointment and regret, grieving over what was, 
and wishing for what could never be” (313). But Edmund’s disappointment and regret, the 
clarity with which he now sees Mary’s faults is precisely what makes Fanny so happy. The 
narrator continues: “She knew it was so, and was sorry; but it was with a sorrow so founded 
on satisfaction, so tending to ease, and so much in harmony with every dearest sensation, 
that there are few who might not have been glad to exchange their greatest gaiety for it” 
(313). Though Fanny is sorry that Edmund is unhappy, she is happy about the reasons for 
his unhappiness. The satisfaction, ease, and dearest sensations founding the sorrow that 
                                               
16 This coincidence is also mentioned when Fanny learns of her imminent return to 
Mansfield Park: “She was, she felt she was, in the greatest danger of being exquisitely happy, 
while so many were miserable. The evil which brought such good to her! She dreaded lest 
she should learn to be insensible of it. To be going so soon, sent for so kindly, sent for as a 
comfort, and with leave to take Susan, was altogether such a combination of blessings as set 
her heart in a glow, and for a time, seemed to distance every pain, and make her incapable of 
suitably sharing the distress even of those whose distress she thought of most” (301). Here, 
the narrator’s comment about what Fanny feels about her own state is complemented by 
Fanny’s own words and emphasizes her ability, rather than inability, to acknowledge how her 
happiness outweighs the suffering of others with which it coincides. Duane characterizes 
Fanny as Austen’s “most deeply compromised heroine” because her success depends on 
being able to “reap benefits from her own discomfort” (410).  
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Fanny does feel can be interpreted more or less generously.17 Is it Fanny’s regard for 
Edmund or her romantic feelings for him that make her so happy in his disappointment? 
The narrator’s description of Fanny’s sorrow, a sorrow that most would readily exchange for 
their greatest gaiety, simultaneously tempers her happiness and presents it as complete. At 
this point, Fanny has obtained everything that she has admitted to desiring: a secure home at 
Mansfield Park and safety for both herself and Edmund from the dangers posed by Henry 
and Mary Crawford. Readers, however, know that she also desires the marriage to Edmund 
promised her by the marriage plot. Instead of addressing this desire, the narrator turns to the 
punishments and rewards of the other characters.  
 The opening paragraphs of the novel’s final chapter thus establish an authoritative 
narrative voice that asserts its responsibility for the characters while at the same time 
refusing to address directly readers’ expectations for the heroine and hero of the marriage 
plot. The narrator’s promise to tie up loose ends, reward the good, and punish the bad 
anticipates an idealized happy ending only to postpone its essential element: the marriage of 
the heroine to the hero. Before reaching this conclusion, the narrator passes judgment on 
the other characters in a way that provides idealized endings to their stories without 
overlooking the realism with which they have been portrayed. These judgments are therefore 
essential prefaces to the conclusion of the marriage plot.  
 
III. The Narrator’s Judgment and the Responsibility of the Characters 
 What kind of conclusion is promised by the narrator’s stated intention to “quit such 
odious subjects” as “guilt and misery,” and “to restore everybody, not greatly in fault 
                                               
17 Edwards, who approves of Fanny as well as the novel, cites this passage as an example of 
the kind of criticism of Fanny that makes her Austen’s most “vulnerable” and “human” 
heroine (64). I have mentioned N. Auerbach’s conflicting interpretation of Fanny as 
monstrous.  
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themselves, to tolerable comfort, and to have done with all the rest” (312)? Does having 
done with the guiltier parties mean merely no longer writing about them or establishing them 
in some relatively undesirable state that complements the “tolerable comfort” (312) 
promised for the others?18 The idea of restoring the less guilty characters to only “tolerable 
comfort” (312) suggests that the anticipated happy ending will not be the idealized ending of 
a marriage comedy, but rather a more realistic ending in which not all hopes are satisfied or 
dreams fulfilled. While initially the suggestion that guilt and misery will be left behind as 
soon as possible might seem to look backwards at the previous chapter’s detailing of Julia 
and Yates’s elopement, Maria and Henry’s adultery, and Edmund’s disappointment in Mary, 
readers soon learn that it also looks forward to the meting out of punishments in the final 
chapter. By what standards does the narrator decide who is more and who less guilty? By 
what standards does the narrator determine the appropriate rewards for the less guilty and 
punishments for the guiltier?  
 I have already suggested that the narrator complicatedly combines the standards of 
idealism and realism in rewarding and punishing the novel’s characters. These standards have 
been developed through the interaction of the novel’s two plots. The marriage plot, on the 
one hand, has suggested ideal types to which the novel’s realistic characters have failed to 
conform. The position plot, on the other hand, has introduced ideals of judgment that the 
characters have realistically failed to actualize. The novel, I have argued, distinguishes among 
the characters in terms of both their different kinds of ideals and of their relationships to 
these ideals. These distinctions have privileged the characters who take high ideals seriously 
                                               
18 Miller’s reading connects the meting out of just deserts with the imposition of closure. 
Instabilities, like Henry and Mary, are finally fixed, even in their narratability: Henry, argues 
Miller, “may still be a narratable character at the end of Mansfield Park, but the ending of the 
novel irrevocably changes the status of his narratability. Whether explicitly or not, closure in 
Jane Austen provides a complete set of nominations for all that needs to be named” (26).  
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over those who do not, though also emphasizing both the failures of these characters to live 
up to their ideals and their lack of self-awareness. In passing judgment on the characters, the 
novel’s conclusion both maintains and complicates these distinctions. The narrator’s final 
judgments maintain the realism of the position plot by punishing most of both the more and 
the less guilty characters primarily with an awareness of their faults. At the same time, Fanny 
receives the idealized reward promised by the marriage comedy, a reward complemented by 
the idealized banishment of all the characters who might remind the inhabitants of Mansfield 
park of their past mistakes. 
  The narrator first addresses Sir Thomas as “the longest to suffer” (313). Readers will 
soon learn, however, of the equally long suffering of other, guiltier characters. Either Sir 
Thomas’s suffering is of a different sort than that of these guiltier characters, or it is 
considered the longest only in comparison with that of the other characters “not greatly in 
fault themselves” (312). Sir Thomas is the guiltiest of these characters due to “errors in his 
own conduct as a parent” (313). He takes responsibility for allowing Maria’s unfortunate 
marriage, and though “comfort was to be found greater than he had supposed, in his other 
children” (313), “the anguish arising from the conviction of his own errors in the education 
of his daughters, was never to be entirely done away” (314). Sir Thomas suffers primarily 
from a consciousness of his mistakes. He has learned that he has not lived up to the ideals 
he has espoused and has therefore failed to instill these ideals in his daughters.  
 Sir Thomas suffers acutely from his awareness that “he had brought up his 
daughters, without their understanding their first duties, or his being acquainted with their 
character and temper” (314).19 The narrator, however, shifts the blame for the only 
irreparable damage, Maria’s adultery, to Mrs. Norris, who lacks the good intentions Sir 
                                               
19 See Mandal for a discussion of this passage, and others, as using phrases from Evangelical 
discourse (114).  
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Thomas brought to the faulty education of his daughters as well as his capacity for self-
knowledge and regret. While Sir Thomas’s mistakes affect his two daughters equally, Mrs. 
Norris’s negative influence is as lopsided as her affection: “That Julia escaped better than 
Maria was owing,” the narrator indicates, “in some measure, to a favourable difference of 
disposition and circumstance, but in a greater to her having been less the darling of that very 
aunt, less flattered and less spoilt…education had not given her so very hurtful a degree of 
self-consequence” (316). Both Julia’s innate characteristics and her position as inferior to her 
sister mitigate the influence of Mrs. Norris. She is able to avoid Maria’s mistakes and return 
to Mansfield Park in spite of her elopement. 
 Sir Thomas’s sons fare better than his daughters, but they repeat the basic pattern of 
their sisters: Tom’s inclinations towards self-gratification are encouraged by his position as 
eldest son, whereas Edmund’s need to provide for himself complements his more serious 
nature. The illness that Tom contracts in his careless pleasure-seeking provides the remedy 
for his “thoughtlessness and selfishness” (313). After having “suffered” and “learnt to think” 
he reproaches himself as an “accessory” to Maria’s adultery “by all the dangerous intimacy of 
his unjustifiable theatre,” and becomes “what he ought to be, useful to his father, steady and 
quiet, and not living merely for himself” (313). Both Tom and Julia have learned to take 
seriously the high ideals of which they previously thought little. Edmund, as I mentioned 
above, suffers from his disappointment in Mary, a suffering to which I will return below 
before addressing his reward. 
 Maria, who commits the most blatant sin, receives the harshest punishment. She 
refuses to leave Henry; he refuses to marry her, and they become “for a while each other’s 
punishment” (314). The narrator stresses Maria’s failure to get what she wants from Henry 
together with her inability to learn from her mistakes: “She had lived with him to be 
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reproached as the ruin of all his happiness in Fanny, and carried away no better consolation 
in leaving him than that she had divided them. What can exceed the misery of such a mind in 
such a situation” (314-5). In the narrator’s question, “misery” (315) both describes Maria’s 
internal experience and constitutes an external judgment on her lack of redeeming qualities.20 
The misery that Maria feels in being rejected is mirrored by the miserable state of someone 
able to take consolation in the unhappiness that she has caused the man who rejects her. 
 Maria, Mr. Rushworth, and Mrs. Norris share the inability to suffer from the 
consciousness of wrongdoing. Their punishments, accordingly, involve the unhappiness of 
not getting what they want21 and, in the case of Maria and Mrs. Norris, being banished to 
                                               
20 The narrator makes several comments about Maria’s shortcomings earlier in the novel that 
prefigure this judgment. The narrator comments on Maria’s response to the news that Sir 
Thomas will be home by November: “Maria was more to be pitied than Julia, for to her the 
father brought a husband, and the return of the friend most solicitous for her happiness, 
would unite her to the lover, on whom she had chosen that happiness should depend. It was 
a gloomy prospect, and all she could do was to throw a mist over it, and hope when the mist 
cleared away, she should see something else. It would hardly be early in November, there 
were generally delays, a bad passage or something; that favouring something which every body 
who shuts their eyes while they look, or their understandings while they reason, feels the 
comfort of” (76). After detailing the ease with which Sir Thomas accepts Maria’s assurance 
that she wants to marry Rushworth, the narrator clarifies Maria’s feelings and motives: “To 
her the conference closed as satisfactorily as to him. She was in a state of mind to be glad 
that she had secured her fate beyond recall—that she had pledged herself anew to 
Sotherton—that she was safe from the possibility of giving Crawford the triumph of 
governing her actions, and destroying her prospects; and retired in proud resolve, 
determined only to behave more cautiously to Mr. Rushworth in future, that her father 
might not be again suspecting her. 
Had Sir Thomas applied to his daughter within the first three or four days after Henry 
Crawford’s leaving Mansfield, before her feelings were at all tranquillized, before she had 
given up every hope of him, or absolutely resolved on enduring his rival, her answer might 
have been different; but after another three or four days, when there was no return, no letter, 
no message—no symptom of a softened heart—no hope of advantage from separation—her 
mind became cool enough to seek all the comfort that pride and self-revenge could give” 
(138-9). 
21 The narrator compares the potential, the mistakes, and the concomitant punishments of 
Maria and Mr. Rushworth: “Mr. Rushworth had no difficulty in procuring a divorce and so 
ended a marriage contracted under such circumstances as to make any better end, the effect 
of good luck, not to be reckoned on. She had despised him, and loved another – and he had 
been very much aware that it was so. The indignities of stupidity, and the disappointments of 
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“another country – remote and private, where, shut up together with little society, on one 
side no affection, on the other, no judgment, it may be reasonably supposed that their 
tempers became their mutual punishment” (315).22 The banishment of Maria and Mrs. 
Norris not only punishes the two characters in the novel who are given no redeeming 
qualities, but also changes the landscape of Mansfield Park.23 The superficial virtue of Maria 
and Mrs. Norris, which held precedence until Sir Thomas’s return from Antigua, is replaced 
by Sir Thomas’s improved understanding of his values and Fanny’s complete embodiment 
of them. The banishment of Maria and Mrs. Norris thus complements Fanny’s final 
idealized elevation by contributing to a final idealization of Mansfield Park.24   
 The banishment of Maria and Mrs. Norris idealizes the novel’s closing picture of 
Mansfield Park because it removes the guilt together with the guilty parties from its 
remaining inhabitants. The narrator tempers this idealization, however, with hints that all 
reminders of guilt cannot be eradicated. Moreover, the narrator insists that the idealized 
happiness achieved by the less guilty characters depends on their own suffering and 
privation as well as on the guilt and unhappiness of others. The narrator’s description of Sir 
                                                                                                                                            
selfish passion, can excite little pity. His punishment followed his conduct, as did a deeper 
punishment, the deeper guilt of his wife. He was released from the engagement to be 
mortified and unhappy, till some other pretty girl could attract him into matrimony again, 
and he might set forward on a second, and it is to be hoped, more prosperous trial of the 
state – if duped, to be duped at least with good humour and good luck; while she must 
withdraw with infinitely stronger feelings to a retirement and reproach, which could allow no 
second spring of hope or character” (315). Mr. Rushworth’s comparatively light punishment 
can be compared to that of Henry, to which I will return below. Societal rules do not punish 
either man for his irresponsible, and in Henry’s case, sinful, behavior with Maria, but Mr. 
Rushworth, unlike Henry, has too little sense to understand his mistake.   
22 Sir Thomas refuses to let Maria return to Mansfield Park as Mrs. Norris wishes, and the 
latter “resolv[es] to quit Mansfield, and devote herself to her unfortunate Maria” (315).  
23 See K. Anderson for an argument that Mrs. Norris is a more complicated character than is 
usually acknowledged. Anderson interestingly contrasts the influence of Mrs. Norris’s vigor 
and Lady Bertram’s languor on Fanny’s physical development. She also characterizes Mrs. 
Norris’s willingness to be banished with Maria as an act of selflessness (350).  
24 Hall’s reading of the novel’s gothic elements considers Fanny as winning out in a passive-
aggressive way typical of gothic heroines (215).  
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Thomas’s relief at being rid of Mrs. Norris exhibits this combination and echoes the 
description, quoted in note fifteen above, of Fanny’s happiness upon learning that she will 
be returned to Mansfield Park. Both Fanny and Sir Thomas find themselves in “danger” of 
deemphasizing the evils that bring them such happiness:  
Mrs. Norris’s removal from Mansfield was the great supplementary comfort of Sir 
Thomas’s life. His opinion of her had been sinking from the day of his return from 
Antigua…He had felt her as an hourly evil, which was so much the worse, as there 
seemed no chance of its ceasing but with life; she seemed a part of himself, that must 
be borne for ever. To be relieved from her, therefore, was so great a felicity, that had 
she not left bitter remembrances behind her, there might have been danger of his 
learning almost to approve the evil which produced such a good. (315-6) 
Although Mrs. Norris’s removal affords Sir Thomas merely “supplementary” (315) comfort, 
in contrast to the more central and positive comfort that he finds in the improvement of his 
children and in his relationship with Fanny, this comfort threatens to overshadow the guilt 
of his faulty education of his daughters. The narrator’s description of how Sir Thomas 
considers Mrs. Norris an evil that “seemed a part of himself” (316) suggests that she not 
only reminds him of his own shortcomings, but even begins to embody his guilt. This 
suggestion is strengthened by the description of his relief at being rid of her: because he had 
thought he could never escape her, his relief in doing so is so great that it almost makes its 
cause – Maria’s guilt and his own complicity in it – worthwhile. Just as Sir Thomas could not 
get rid of Mrs. Norris without the extreme circumstances produced by Maria’s adultery, he 
could not experience the “felicity” (316) of being relieved from his guilt without having 
incurred it in the first place. The narrator emphasizes this connection between evil and good 
by parenthetically insisting that, though Sir Thomas is rid of Mrs. Norris, he cannot be rid of 
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the “bitter remembrances” (316) that she leaves behind. By not specifying these “bitter 
remembrances,” the narrator inserts a bit of vague and realistic discomfort into the ideal 
happiness finally achieved at Mansfield Park.   
 The punishment of the Crawfords also contributes to the idealized conclusion of 
Mansfield Park, but is restrained by the realism of the novel’s position plot. Both Henry and 
Mary are punished primarily through a consciousness of having lost out on a type of life that 
they learned to appreciate without being able to exemplify and so merit. In contrast to Sir 
Thomas, Tom, and probably Julia, however, Henry and Mary are not improved by, but 
instead only suffer from, a consciousness of their mistakes. In describing this consciousness, 
the conclusion of the novel returns to the question of whether Fanny could have ended up 
with Henry and Edmund with Mary. The narrator makes it clear that Henry and Mary both 
learn that this outcome would have been preferable for them; but it is also clear, I submit, 
that neither of them could have deserved it.   
 Although the narrator’s concluding treatment of Henry dwells on the happiness he 
could have had with Fanny, it emphasizes the impossibility of his achieving this happiness by 
presenting it in a series of conditionals and explicitly qualifying his potential:  
Henry Crawford, ruined by early independence and bad domestic example, indulged in 
the freaks of a cold-blooded vanity a little too long. Once it had, by an opening 
undesigned and unmerited, led him into the way of happiness. Could he have been 
satisfied with the conquest of one amiable woman’s affections, could he have found 
sufficient exultation in overcoming the reluctance, in working himself into the esteem 
and tenderness of Fanny Price, there would have been every probability of success and 
felicity for him. His affection had already done something. Her influence over him had 
already given him some influence over her. Would he have deserved more, there can 
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be no doubt that more would have been obtained; especially when that marriage had 
taken place, which would have given him the assistance of her conscience in subduing 
her first inclination, and brought them very often together. Would he have persevered, 
and uprightly, Fanny must have been his reward – and a reward very voluntarily 
bestowed – within a reasonable period from Edmund’s marrying Mary. (316-7)  
The narrator begins by characterizing Henry as already ruined by his early life. Any potential 
Henry might have had, this characterization suggests, has already been lost. The effects of 
his early independence and the bad domestic example of his uncle and aunt prevent him 
from meeting the conditions that could have “led him into the way of happiness” (316-7). 
The fact that this path is open to him at all is due not to any positive characteristic he 
possesses, but rather to the vanity that motivates his pursuit of Fanny. It is thus more 
surprising that he is able to be influenced by and influence Fanny at all than that he should 
be unable to be satisfied with his progress, to deserve more, or to persevere uprightly in his 
pursuit. The narrator’s comment that he would have won Fanny emphasizes, therefore, not 
his potential to achieve such happiness, but rather his lack of such potential and the 
corresponding impossibility of his achieving such happiness.25  
 If Henry and Mary had been different kinds of people, or had benefited from better 
upbringings, then the alternative ending of their marriages to Fanny and Edmund 
respectively would have been a real possibility. These conditions were not met. The novel, 
then, tells a story not of how Henry and Mary are, or even might have been, improved, but 
rather how Edmund and the Bertrams learn that they are unimproveable, and, in so doing, 
                                               
25 Edwards reads this passage differently, as suggesting that Henry could have been 
redeemed, a suggestion he finds out of sync with the rest of the novel (65). Both Edwards 
and Graham take issue with characterizing Henry’s vanity as “cold-blooded.” Koppel, in his 
argument about the contingency of Mansfield Park’s conclusion, also reads this passage as 
suggesting that Henry could have won Fanny (306).  
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learn about themselves and their values. The narrator’s insistence that Fanny would have 
happily married Henry if he had deserved her, had persevered, and Edmund had married 
Mary, furthermore, vindicates her refusal of Henry. She was right to refuse him not only 
because he did not deserve her, but also because she could not marry him with a clear 
conscience without her “first inclination” (317) for Edmund having been subdued by his 
marriage to Mary. Fanny’s judgment of Henry may have faltered, but her awareness of her 
inability to love him prevented the negative consequences that this failure could have caused: 
two unhappy marriages.  
 After detailing the effects of Henry’s weakness in having to “make Mrs. Rushworth 
Maria Bertram again in her treatment of himself” (317), the narrator turns to his punishment:  
That punishment, the public punishment of disgrace, should in a just measure attend 
his share of the offence is, we know, not one of the barriers, which society gives to 
virtue. In this world, the penalty is less equal than could be wished; but without 
presuming to look forward to a juster appointment hereafter, we may fairly consider a 
man of sense like Henry Crawford, to be providing for himself no small portion of 
vexation and regret – vexation that must rise sometimes to self-reproach, and regret to 
wretchedness – in having so requited hospitality, so injured family peace, so forfeited 
his best, most estimable and endeared acquaintance, and so lost the woman whom he 
had rationally, as well as passionately loved. (318)  
Henry’s punishment conforms to the demands of realism.26 The narrator neither makes 
society impose an unrealistic penalty nor relies on the future possibility of divine 
punishment. Instead, the narrator assumes that readers share this realistic perspective by 
                                               
26 Canuel also cites this passage in claiming that the novel does not, finally, present marriage 
ideally. He contrasts the idealism of the traditional marriage plot not with realism, but 
instead with an emphasis on error.  
  
 
 
 
274 
twice using the first-person plural in the passage. “We” (318) are asked, first, to acknowledge 
that public punishment does not discourage behavior such as Henry’s, and, second, to 
contemplate the internal punishment that a man like Henry must suffer from the knowledge 
of his mistakes. This realistic punishment requires that Henry’s lack of potential for 
improvement be balanced by the sense to understand what he has lost. The narrator 
describes two levels of discomfort that Henry must suffer: on the one hand, relatively mild 
though material vexation and regret; on the other hand, more severe and less frequent self-
reproach and wretchedness. These two registers of suffering reflect Henry’s unfortunate 
combination of positive and negative qualities and the uncomfortable degree of self-
awareness that he is able to attain. Having bumbled his way into potential happiness with 
Fanny, Henry began to appreciate what he had found and was able to play the role of 
deserving suitor for a time. Having fallen back into his old ways and lost this opportunity for 
happiness, Henry can appreciate the harm he has done to himself as well as others. He 
knows enough to suffer in this knowledge, but the narrator gives no indication that he 
knows himself well enough to understand why he has made the mistakes he has or to 
prevent him from making similar mistakes in the future.  
 Although Mary commits no offence such as the ones her brother or Maria have 
wrought, she, like Henry, is punished with a consciousness of her mistakes and, like Maria, 
ends up living with an older female relative instead of marrying.27 Maria’s lack of self-
knowledge and restraint leads her into a prestigious marriage to a man she does not love; an 
                                               
27 The fact that Mary’s punishment for her lack of self-knowledge is more like Maria’s 
punishment for adultery than Henry’s for either reflects the different social standards applied 
to men and women within the fictional world as well as within Austen’s own world. Brooke 
comments on the difference between Maria’s and Henry’s punishments in his historical 
contextualization of Austen’s portrayal of the place of women (161-4). He argues, in his 
epilogue on Austen’s feminism, that “the novels as a whole suggest an obsession with the 
inferior rights and opportunities of women – softened for her readers by the happy and 
successful marriages with which she endows her heroines” (203). 
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unsuccessful and sinful attempt to escape it with a man who does not love her; and finally to 
a miserable residence with Mrs. Norris. In contrast, Mary’s lack of self-knowledge, together 
with the behavior of Maria and Henry, prevent her from marrying the man she loves; the 
experience of loving and losing him prevents her from entering into a prestigious but 
loveless marriage; and she ends up in a relatively comfortable situation with Mrs. Grant, but 
one colored, nonetheless, by regret. “For Mary,” the narrator specifies,   
though perfectly resolved against ever attaching herself to a younger brother again, 
was long in finding among the dashing representatives, or idle heir-apparents, who 
were at the command of her beauty, and her 20,000l. any one who could satisfy the 
better taste she had acquired at Mansfield, whose character and manners could 
authorise a hope of the domestic happiness she had there learned to estimate, or put 
Edmund Bertram sufficiently out of her head. (318) 
This description of Mary’s failure to achieve her goal of an advantageous marriage reveals 
the incompleteness of the lessons she has learned at Mansfield Park. Although she has 
acquired “better taste” and “learned to estimate” “domestic happiness” (318), she has not 
learned how to find suitors who will meet these standards. Instead, she expects to find a man 
who can offer her both the wealth and prestige that she has always wanted and the 
uprightness and dedication that she, despite herself, finds attractive in Edmund. Her failure 
to understand the unlikeliness of this combination reflects her lack of self-knowledge. She 
has learned to appreciate the values of Mansfield Park without seeing their incompatibility 
with those of London, to which she still subscribes. 
 
IV. The Disappointed Hero: Edmund’s Loss of Mary 
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 Before turning to how the last chapter of Mansfield Park finally unites Edmund and 
Fanny, I must discuss Edmund’s loss of Mary. The dissolution of this half of the alternative 
ending to the marriage comedy is much less straightforward than that of the potential 
marriage between Fanny and Henry. While the possibility of a marriage between Fanny and 
Henry is nullified by his behavior in a way that vindicates Fanny’s refusal of him, the 
possibility of a marriage between Edmund and Mary is nullified by the behavior of their 
siblings and friends in a way that leaves their own feelings up in the air. Before Henry and 
Maria ruin the possibility of a union between Edmund and Mary, the narrative builds tension 
by establishing, on the one hand, the strength of Edmund’s feelings for her and, on the 
other hand, her unsuitability for him. After Henry and Maria make it impossible for Edmund 
to propose to Mary, the narrative builds tension by making readers wait, along with Fanny, 
to find out his reaction to his loss.  
 In Portsmouth, Fanny receives letters from both Edmund and Mary that convince 
her that the marriage she dreads will take place. Edmund’s letter to Fanny after having been 
in London to see Mary makes clear both his pessimism about her answer and his intention 
to persevere. He despairs over the “‘influence of the fashionable world’” (286), but insists 
that he “‘cannot give her up’” (286). Mary’s letters to Fanny around this time do nothing to 
clarify her intentions towards Edmund, but they do make clear her unsuitability for him. She 
appeals to Fanny for news of Tom’s illness, an illness she considers in light of the “‘wealth 
and consequence’” (294) its ending fatally could bestow upon Edmund. She is frank28 about 
                                               
28 She writes, in part: “‘To have such a fine young man cut off in the flower of his days, is 
most melancholy. Poor Sir Thomas will feel it dreadfully. I really am quite agitated on the 
subject. Fanny, Fanny, I see you smile, and look cunning, but, upon my honour, I never 
bribed a physician in my life. Poor young man! – If he is to die, there will be two poor young 
men less in the world; and with a fearless face and bold voice would I say to any one, that 
wealth and consequence could fall into no hands more deserving of them. It was a foolish 
precipitation last Christmas, but the evil of a few days may be blotted out in part. Varnish 
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the positive effect this change in status would have on her willingness to marry Edmund, but 
does not clarify what her decision would be if Tom survives and Edmund remains both a 
clergyman and a younger son, a decision with which she would most likely have been faced 
had Maria and Henry not run away together.  
Henry and Maria’s behavior have consequences for Edmund and Mary that are clear 
to Sir Thomas, Fanny, and readers:29 “Edmund must be for ever divided from Miss 
Crawford” (307). Edmund’s reaction to this certainty, however, is obscure. Fanny worries 
that Edmund might not be as convinced of his loss of Mary as she is, but thinks that Sir 
Thomas, distressed over all his other children, must at least be able to take comfort in 
Edmund. Sir Thomas, however, worries about Edmund’s well-being following the loss of 
“the woman, whom he had been pursuing with undoubted attachment, and strong 
probability of success” (307). The narrator piques readers’ curiosity about Edmund’s state of 
mind by highlighting the complementary nature of the information Fanny and Sir Thomas 
lack, at the same time as indicating that Mary’s true character has been revealed to Edmund:  
Fanny was not in the secret of her uncle’s feelings, Sir Thomas not in the secret of 
Miss Crawford’s character. Had he been privy to her conversation with his son, he 
would not have wished her to belong to him, though her twenty thousand pounds had 
been forty. (307) 
                                                                                                                                            
and gilding hide many stains. It will be but the loss of the Esquire after his name. With real 
affection, Fanny, like mine, more might be overlooked. Write to me by return of post, judge 
of my anxiety, and do not trifle with it. Tell me the real truth, as you have it from the 
fountain head. And now, do not trouble yourself to be ashamed of either my feelings or your 
own. Believe me, they are not only natural, they are philanthropic and virtuous. I put it to 
your conscience, whether “Sir Edmund” would not do more good with all the Bertram 
property, than any other possible “Sir”’” (294-5). 
29 It is not clear that Mary, who, readers will soon find out, regards Henry and Maria’s action 
as mere “‘folly’” (308), understands that their behavior cuts her off definitively from 
Edmund. Her insistence that, if Henry can be convinced to marry Maria “‘she may recover 
her footing in society to a certain degree’” (310) suggests that she does not.  
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By placing Fanny and Mary at opposite ends of what would be a chiasmus if not for their 
non-identity (Fanny – Sir Thomas – Sir Thomas – Mary), the narrator opposes Fanny’s and 
Sir Thomas’s ignorance at the same time as implying a contrast between the relationship of 
father-in-law that Sir Thomas mistakenly regrets not being able to have with Mary, and the 
one that he has not yet seen the possibility of having with Fanny. Edmund’s disillusionment 
with Mary is necessary for his future union with Fanny. In disappointing the expectation set 
up by the rhetorical figure to relate Sir Thomas to Fanny, therefore, the narrator encourages 
the expectation that Fanny will be related as daughter-in-law to Sir Thomas, taking the place 
next to Edmund that Sir Thomas still regrets Mary cannot occupy. 
 Readers, however, must wait along with Fanny to learn more about Edmund’s 
attitude towards his break with Mary.30 Edmund loses Mary, first, through the behavior of 
his sister and friend. This loss creates an interesting relationship between the novel’s 
overlapping love triangles. One of the obstacles preventing Fanny’s marriage to Henry is her 
impossible love for Edmund, of which only she and readers are aware. One of the obstacles 
preventing Fanny’s marriage to Edmund is his love, and potential marriage to, Mary. When 
Edmund loses Mary because of Henry and Maria, the potential marriage to Fanny that 
readers expect is put into question by his now-impossible love for Mary. Before becoming 
disillusioned with Mary, Edmund is cast as a heart-broken hero, destined to mourn forever 
for his lost love. Once disillusioned, he may still be heart-broken, but instead of suffering 
endless regret for what could have been, he is positioned to learn from his mistake with 
Mary and potentially love again. Although readers have already been given a hint that 
                                               
30 The narrator emphasizes readers’ anticipation by poking fun at Fanny’s conviction that 
“long, long would it be ere Miss Crawford’s name passed his lips again, or she could hope 
for a renewal of such confidential intercourse as had been” (307) by insisting that the time 
between Thursday, when Edmund and Fanny arrive at Mansfield, and Sunday evening, when 
Edmund confides in Fanny, “was long” (307).  
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Edmund has seen Mary’s true character and Fanny still refuses to contemplate the possibility 
of marrying Edmund, this difference between Edmund as forever broken-hearted and 
Edmund as able to love again is at stake for both readers and Fanny as they await more 
information about Edmund’s reaction to his final meeting with Mary.  
 When the narrator treats, in the novel’s penultimate chapter, the conversation 
Edmund and Fanny have about this last meeting, there is an uncomfortable overlap between 
the marriage that Fanny still refuses to contemplate and that readers are now certain will take 
place. While Edmund is unequivocal about his disillusionment with Mary, the chapter ends 
by insisting on the perfect agreement between Fanny and Edmund, first, about Mary, and, 
second, about “the lasting effect, the indelible impression, which such a disappointment 
must make on his mind” (312). The preceding conversation Edmund and Fanny have about 
Mary, however, presents a more complicated picture of their respective attitudes towards 
her. Furthermore, the narrator’s use of free indirect speech to express Fanny’s belief in the 
impossibility of him ever falling in love again activates, as I mentioned above, Rabinowitz’s 
rule of chutzpah. “Time would undoubtedly abate somewhat of his sufferings,” the narrator 
begins, “but still it was a sort of thing which he never could get entirely the better of; and as 
to his ever meeting with any other woman who could—it was too impossible to be named 
but with indignation. Fanny’s friendship was all that he had to cling to” (312). The 
aposiopesis signals Fanny’s inability to confront the possibility that Edmund’s loss of Mary 
affords. The narrator further highlights Fanny’s continued refusal to acknowledge her 
romantic desires by emphasizing the importance of the friendly relationship that she has 
always insisted is enough for her, a relationship that has now become Edmund’s only 
consolation.  
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 Before maintaining that Fanny and Edmund think “exactly the same” (312) about 
Mary, the narrator provides a conversation that reveals their differences. Edmund and Fanny 
may come to an agreement about Mary, but their different positions in relation to her make 
it impossible for them to think about her in exactly the same way. Edmund’s judgment of 
Mary is influenced by the experience of having loved her, even a mistaken idea of her, while 
Fanny’s judgment of Mary cannot take this experience into account. Edmund’s 
disillusionment is complete. “‘The charm is broken,’” he proclaims, “‘my eyes are opened’” 
(309). His new discovery that she has been “‘spoilt’” (308) by the world, however, rests on 
his continued belief that she is “‘a woman whom nature had so richly endowed’” (308). 
Although he must give up his mistaken idea of who Mary is, he cannot believe that this idea 
was entirely unfounded. He continues to insist on the very potential he always invoked when 
excusing faults that he imagined could in her case be corrected.31 Edmund professes that he 
                                               
31 When Edmund and Fanny discuss Mary soon after her arrival at Mansfield Park he 
defends her against Fanny’s charge of ungratefulness: “‘Ungrateful is a strong word. I do not 
know that her uncle has any claim to her gratitude; his wife certainly had; and it is the warmth 
of her respect for her aunt’s memory which misleads her here. She is awkwardly 
circumstanced. With such warm feelings and lively spirits it must be difficult to do justice to 
her affection for Mrs. Crawford, without throwing a shade on the admiral. I do not pretend 
to know which was most to blame in their disagreements, though the admiral’s present 
conduct might incline one to the side of his wife: but it is natural and amiable that Miss 
Crawford should acquit her aunt entirely. I do not censure her opinions; but there certainly is 
impropriety in making them public’” (46). When Fanny blames Mary’s impropriety on the 
aunt who has educated her, Edmund agrees: “‘That is a fair remark. Yes, we must suppose 
the faults of the niece to have been those of the aunt; and it makes one more sensible of the 
disadvantages she has been under. But I think her present home must do her good. Mrs. 
Grant’s manners are just what they ought to be. She speaks of her brother with a very 
pleasing affection’” (46). When Fanny asks what right Mary has to assume that Edmund 
would be as remiss as Henry is in writing letters, Edmund responds: “‘The right of a lively 
mind, Fanny, seizing whatever may contribute to its own amusement or that of others; 
perfectly allowable, when untinctured by ill humour or roughness; and there is not a shadow 
of either in the countenance or manner of Miss Crawford, nothing sharp, or loud, or coarse. 
She is perfectly feminine, except in the instances we have been speaking of. There she cannot 
be justified. I am glad you saw it all as I did’” (47). Here, Edmund assumes an agreement 
that his conversation with Fanny has not entirely justified, and which the narrator goes on to 
doubt.  
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would have preferred the pain of being separated by circumstances from the Mary he loved 
to being forced to give up this mistaken idea of Mary along with the real person. He 
reconstructs for Fanny what he told Mary:  
“That, perhaps it was best for me; I had less to regret in sacrificing a friendship –  
feelings – hopes which must, at any rate, have been torn from me now. And yet, that I 
must and would confess, that, could I have restored her to what she had appeared to 
me before, I would infinitely prefer any increase of the pain of parting, for the sake of 
carrying with me the right of tenderness and esteem.” (311) 
His disappointment fresh, Edmund wishes he could have been the heart-broken hero who 
was torn from a real love rather than the heart-broken hero who loved not a real woman but 
instead a “‘creature of [his] own imagination’” (311).  
 Fanny has less interest than Edmund in Mary’s spoiled potential. She has never 
considered Mary improveable and she has always seen Mary’s good qualities as 
overshadowed by her bad ones. Though she continues to talk with Edmund about Mary and 
“how delightful nature had made her, and how excellent she would have been, had she fallen 
into good hands earlier,” Fanny feels “more than justified in adding to his knowledge of her 
real character, by some hint of what share his brother’s state of health might be supposed to 
have in her wish for a complete reconciliation” (312).32 Whereas Edmund’s concern is with 
the idea of Mary that he has lost, an idea that he tries to recapture by dwelling on how she 
might have fulfilled it, Fanny’s concern is how undeserving Mary actually is of Edmund. She 
does not want Edmund to be deceived by his emphasis on Mary’s potential any more than 
                                               
32 Critics condemn this confidence as a cruel expression of Fanny’s jealousy. For example, 
see Edwards, who finds Fanny admirable though imperfect, and faults Fanny here, seeing 
the episode as evidence of the narrator’s distance from her (64). Mandal, who approves of 
Fanny as a “human being with her own desires and failings” (121) cites this as an example of 
the latter which displays “a certain moral superiority that verges on the sadistic” (120).  
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she wanted him to be deceived by Mary herself. Edmund struggles against Fanny’s hint, but 
ends up “submit[ing] to believe, that Tom’s illness had influenced [Mary]” (312).33 
Nonetheless, he “reserv[es] for himself this consoling thought, that considering the many 
counteractions of opposing habits, she had certainly been more attached to him than could 
have been expected, and for his sake been more near doing right. Fanny thought exactly the 
same” (312). Edmund and Fanny can agree that Mary’s affection for him showed her in the 
best possible light, but their very different relationships to Mary, I submit, preclude a perfect 
accord. For Edmund, Mary’s unlikely development of feelings for someone in his position 
consoles him for the loss of the woman he thought she was. This consolation allows him to 
see himself and Mary in the best light. For Fanny, in contrast, Mary’s ability to feel for 
Edmund demonstrates the strength of his good qualities rather than any redeeming qualities 
in Mary. Mary’s feelings for Edmund may have been her best quality, but for Fanny, always 
convinced that she was incapable of being improved by him, this quality only emphasizes her 
shortcomings. 
 The narrator’s contentions that Fanny and Edmund “thought exactly the same” 
(312) about Mary and “were quite agreed” (312) about the effects of his loss of her anticipate 
the novel’s idealized happy ending in different ways: the first asserts that Fanny and Edmund 
are compatible in a particular way and the second suggests that they can agree without being 
right. The idealized compatibility of Edmund and Fanny, the proposal that they think alike, 
is first introduced through his early participation in her education. They begin to think 
differently, as I discussed in Chapter Two, when Mary enters the picture. The conversation 
Edmund and Fanny have about his final meeting with Mary qualifies the narrator’s explicit 
                                               
33 Wright reads Fanny’s correction and Edmund’s submission to it as a recognition of Mary 
as a “cautionary wretch” (389) and part of Fanny’s success in preventing Edmund from 
being deceived by her.  
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assertion at the end of the chapter that they return to perfect accord in their final estimations 
of her. They no longer disagree, but because their positions in relation to Mary are different, 
their judgments of her cannot be identical. This discrepancy anticipates the distinct narrative 
voice of the novel’s final chapter and its summary resolution of the marriage comedy. The 
final union of Fanny and Edmund is idealized as the perfect culmination of a marriage plot. 
The inevitable and realistic imperfection of their agreement together with the narrator’s lack 
of interest in detailing their perfect happiness or the changes of heart which make it possible, 
however, contrast the idealization of this ending with the realism of the novel’s imperfect, 
yet deserving, characters.  
 
V. Real Idealism: The Accomplishment of the Novel’s Happy Ending  
 After detailing the characters’ punishments, the narrator of Mansfield Park’s final 
chapter turns to the rewards of the more deserving characters: primarily the happy marriage 
between Fanny and Edmund that the novel’s marriage plot promises. The narrator’s 
summary treatment of this anticipated union emphasizes both its realistic and idealized 
qualities. The new distance that the narrator takes from the characters means giving only 
general information about their thoughts and feelings, thereby leaving readers to imagine for 
themselves Edmund’s transfer of affection to Fanny, her acknowledgement of his feelings 
for her, and the happiness of them both on being finally united. By passing the responsibility 
of filling in these details to readers, the narrator avoids the danger of providing details that 
readers would find unrealistic while at the same time emphasizing that the union is the 
idealized ending of a marriage comedy. Readers, in other words, are challenged to make the 
idealized ending realistic for themselves. This final challenge concludes the challenge 
presented by the novel’s two plots by emphasizing the difference between reality and 
  
 
 
 
284 
representation, and, at the same time, asking readers to forge their own connections between 
these spheres. Readers’ judgments of the characters and of the novel might, in this way, 
inform how they make judgments in real life.  
 The most explicit example of the narrator’s transfer of responsibility to readers for 
the details of the novel’s happy ending is the comment about how long it takes Edmund to 
get over his disappointment in Mary and begin to love Fanny.34 “I purposely abstain from 
dates on this occasion,” announces the narrator,  
that every one may be at liberty to fix their own, aware that the cure of unconquerable 
passions, and the transfer of unchanging attachments, must vary much as to time in 
different people. – I only intreat every body to believe that exactly at the time when it 
was quite natural that it should be so, and not a week earlier, Edmund did cease to 
care about Miss Crawford, and became as anxious to marry Fanny as Fanny herself 
could desire. (319) 
Although the chapter began with a narrating “I” whose intentions towards the characters are 
explicit, judgments are passed on them without explicit reference to the narrator or this new 
role. Here, the role of responsible narrator is again made explicit, but only in order to 
transfer responsibility to readers.35 In giving readers the “liberty to fix their own” (319) dates 
for Edmund’s transfer of affection from Mary to Fanny, the narrator asks readers to 
                                               
34 E. Auerbach comments on this passage as well as other examples of what she calls 
“narrative vagueness,” arguing that Austen avoids “the sound of full omnipotence” (192), 
“perhaps…to remind readers that none of us can really enter into the private recesses of 
another human mind” (193). I suggest that the occasional and emphatic vagueness of 
Austen’s narrator is used differently at different moments to contrast realism with idealism, 
and the narrator’s responsibility with that of the reader.  
35 Tanner also discusses this passage as an explicit transfer “from the obligation of the author 
to the discretion (or fantasy of the reader). We may fill in the blank or gap…as we please” 
(172). Tanner, however, identifies the gap as the “whole realm of sexual feeling,” an area 
Austen is generally unwilling to represent, but especially so in the case of Edmund and 
Fanny, whom he characterizes as “as far from the realm of the sexual as is compatible with 
their getting married” (172-3). 
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establish the details of a transfer that she then ironically characterizes as impossible by 
describing Edmund’s passion for Mary as “unconquerable” and his attachment to her as 
“unchanging” (319). These descriptions emphasize the narrator’s omission of more 
important information than exactly how long it took Edmund to get over his 
disappointment in Mary and to start loving Fanny. How exactly the “unchanging” changed 
and the “unconquerable” (319) was conquered are more crucial than exactly how long this 
process took.36 If the narrator gave the same kind of detailed depiction of these changes as 
has been given to other important events in the novel (e.g., Henry’s developing feelings for 
Fanny and her changing judgments of him), readers would not care about exactly how long 
they took. The liberty to choose one’s own dates for Edmund’s transfer of affection does 
not help readers who cannot imagine how that transfer took place, information for which 
the narrator implicitly makes them responsible.37  
 Moreover, the narrator’s stated reason for not specifying how long it takes Edmund 
to get over Mary and start loving Fanny – that these changes “must vary much as to time in 
different people” (319) – contains an interesting ambiguity. Although the sentence itself talks 
about the difference in the people undergoing the changes, the paragraph addresses itself to 
differences in readers who judge the people undergoing the changes. Surely Edmund is 
                                               
36 The narrator also abstains from providing exact dates when discussing how long Fanny 
thinks that it will take Henry to get over her. In this case, it is not how long the change will 
take that is in question, but rather how long Fanny thinks the change will take. And, at stake 
is not the reader’s sense of realism, but Fanny’s modesty: “She could not, though only 
eighteen, suppose Mr. Crawford’s attachment would hold out for ever; she could not but 
imagine that steady, unceasing discouragement from herself would put an end to it in time. 
How much time she might, in her own fancy, allot for its dominion, is another concern. It 
would not be fair to enquire into a young lady’s exact estimate of her own perfections.” 
(224) 
37 The narrator’s brief discussion of how Edmund learns to love Fanny stresses the 
naturalness of the change given his role as her mentor and protector, the same role that first 
inspired Fanny’s love for him. His infatuation with Mary becomes a misstep on the “road to 
happiness” (319) directing him towards Fanny. Graham categorizes Mansfield Park as using 
the conventional marriage comedy plot of mentor/mentee.   
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known well enough to both the narrator and readers for either to determine how long it 
might take him to undergo such changes. Readers’ different beliefs about how long such 
changes might take, however, cannot be similarly fixed. Is the narrator giving readers the 
interpretive freedom to decide what kind of person they think Edmund is in determining 
how long it will take him to get over Mary and to start loving Fanny? Or, is the narrator 
giving each reader the freedom to decide how long it will take Edmund to undergo such 
changes by looking inward and consulting her own beliefs about how long such changes 
would take her? Which decision gives readers more freedom or responsibility? The narrator 
thus asks readers not only to determine for themselves the details of the novel’s happy 
ending, but also to negotiate the relationship between the narrator’s responsibility and their 
own. 
 What is the difference between being free to determine details about a narrative and 
having to do so? What is the difference between determining how long emotional changes 
take and determining how emotional changes take place? What factors contribute to the 
narrator’s willingness to call such emotional changes “natural” (319) and readers’ ability to 
perceive them as such?38 What is the relationship between readers’ freedom or obligation to 
fill in textual gaps and their sense of the realism or idealism of a narrative? As the narrator of 
Mansfield Park hints in the quotation above, readers fill in narrative gaps by combining their 
own beliefs with the narrative’s standards of realism.39 But, as I have discussed, the novel’s 
two plots work together to complicate how readers ascertain its standards of realism. The 
narrator’s announcement that readers are free to determine for themselves how long it takes 
                                               
38 Lynch (“‘Young Ladies’”) notes the narrator’s refusal to describe Edmund’s “so-called 
‘natural change of heart,’” linking this absence to the novel’s problematization of natural 
development (718).  
39 Rabinowitz cites the quotation above as an example of playing “to comic effect” with the 
realism rule readers use to fill in textual gaps (152). 
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Edmund to get over Mary and to fall in love with Fanny makes readers responsible for 
synthesizing the novel’s realistic portrayal of its characters with the idealized outcome it 
provides for them. 
 The feelings of Edmund and Fanny upon achieving their idealized union are also left 
to readers to imagine for themselves. The narrator presents this task, however, in different 
terms than those used for the task of setting the dates for Edmund’s transfer of affection. 
Edmund’s “happiness,” (319) the narrator speculates, “must have been great enough to 
warrant any strength of language in which he could clothe it to [Fanny] or to himself; it must 
have been a delightful happiness” (320).40 The narrator claims perfect knowledge neither of 
Edmund’s happiness nor of how he expresses it. Though readers are assured that Edmund’s 
happiness can be described as “delightful” (320), readers are left, along with Edmund, to 
determine the actual language in which his happiness can be expressed. While Edmund’s 
happiness warrants the strongest imaginable language, Fanny’s happiness is of a sort “which 
no description can reach” (320). The narrator clarifies that to attempt such a description 
would be inappropriate: “Let no one presume to give the feelings of a young woman on 
receiving the assurance of that affection of which she has scarcely allowed herself to 
entertain a hope” (320). Edmund’s happiness is described in idealized terms, but Fanny’s is 
idealized to the extent that it can be neither described nor expressed. The marriage comedy 
must make the impossible somehow possible, but the description of how its realistic 
characters feel when this impossible possibility happens does not, the narrator insists, fall 
                                               
40 Burdan enlists the numerous “must’s” of the novel’s final chapter in her argument that it 
should be taken ironically. The conclusion of the novel fails, argues Burdan, not because 
Austen sacrifices realism to didacticism, but instead because Fanny fails to be the Christian 
heroine she appears to be. Though Burdan’s claim that Fanny’s failures can encourage 
readers to question their expectations superficially aligns with my own, we take different 
approaches to the kinds of expectations that might be questioned and how.   
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within the novel’s scope. The narrator has established the anticipated ending; readers must 
decide for themselves how to fill in its details in a way that makes it viable.  
 The narrator’s description of Sir Thomas’s attitude towards a marriage between 
Edmund and Fanny provides a hint about how readers might respond to the novel’s 
idealized ending. Sir Thomas, “sick of ambitious and mercenary connections, prizing more 
and more the sterling good of principle and temper, and chiefly anxious to bind by the 
strongest securities all that remained to him of domestic felicity” (320), rejoices at the 
prospect of a marriage between Fanny and Edmund. His “joyful consent,” the narrator goes 
on, “formed just such a contrast with his early opinion on the subject when the poor little 
girl’s coming had been first agitated, as time is for ever producing between the plans and 
decisions of mortals, for their own instruction, and their neighbours’ entertainment” (320).41 
The contrast between Sir Thomas’s initial and final opinions exemplifies the marriage 
comedy’s trajectory of making the impossible somehow possible. Instead of taking 
responsibility for this trajectory, however, the narrator attributes Sir Thomas’s change of 
heart to “time” (320). From the narrator’s distant and generalizing perspective, the changes 
wrought by time are both inevitable and inscrutable to mere “mortals” (320). By referring to 
the characters as “mortals” subject to the vicissitudes of “time,” the narrator obscures their 
particularity and emphasizes their general characteristics. The characters are no longer the 
realistic representations with whom readers have been encouraged to sympathize and 
empathize. Instead of struggling along with the characters as they learn from their mistakes, 
                                               
41 E. Auerbach comments on this passage in the context of her claim that in Mansfield Park, 
“Austen reserves the language of character transformation and moral journey for three male 
characters: Sir Thomas Bertram and his two sons, Tom and Edmund” (183). Although 
Auerbach also acknowledges the importance of Fanny’s changing sense of self-worth, she 
focuses on the potential for human growth evidenced by Sir Thomas’s change of heart and 
Austen’s reminder “of her own dual mission as a moral but comic novelist” (186). I suggest 
that Austen not only reminds readers of her role as a novelist, but also encourages them to 
consider both the role of novels in their own lives and their own responsibilities as readers.    
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readers are now associated with the neighbors who are entertained by the contrast between 
the character’s initial plans and their final decisions.  
 The fact that the narrator mentions neighbors rather than readers as those who are 
entertained by the edifying workings of time on mortals is somewhat surprising. The change 
in register effected by the narrator’s use of the terms “time” and “mortals” (320) positions 
the characters as generalized examples within the realm of representation, while the idea that 
the instruction of these mortals is entertaining to their neighbors suggests that they serve as 
examples not for readers removed from them by aesthetic distance, but rather for neighbors 
who share with them a realistic world. The narrator, I propose, mentions neighbors instead 
of readers to emphasize the connection, as well as the difference, between representation 
and reality. Real neighbors and represented characters can both be entertaining. Both can be 
judged according to realistic or idealistic standards. Judgments of representations, however, 
do not have the same consequences as do judgments of reality. But they can, nevertheless, 
inform judgments of reality in meaningful ways. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
The conclusion of Mansfield Park, I have argued, both resolves its double plot and 
transfers a particular kind of responsibility to readers to consider their judgments of the 
novel as well as its potential relevance to their everyday lives. This move from the realm of 
fiction to that of life changes the stakes of making judgments. A plot must come to an end, 
an end which in the case of a marriage comedy is known from the outset. The novel is the 
delay of this inevitable conclusion. In The Sense of an Ending, Frank Kermode connects this 
literary tension between an unknown path and a known destination with the basic human 
problem of making sense of a reality marked by a beginning and an end. 
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For Kermode, fiction humanizes the passage of time. He uses “fiction,” it is 
important to note, to cover not only literature, which can help us make sense of our world, 
but also everyday fictions, which we need to help us make sense of our world. This 
expansive view of fiction starts with a contrast between human fictions and inhuman reality. 
Only against this larger contrast and its insistence on the fictionality of all human narratives 
about reality does Kermode distinguish among different ways of relating to fictions. The 
necessity of fictions makes the question of how we relate to and use them crucial. According 
to Kermode, fictions can be used for “finding things out” about oneself and the world (39), 
or for personal escape and real violence. Kermode calls the latter kind of fictions “myths.” 
The contrast between myth and fiction is not fixed; rather, “fictions can degenerate into 
myths whenever they are not consciously held to be fictive” (39). Kermode, like Arendt, 
connects this degeneration, this lack of awareness and responsibility towards a sense-making 
fiction as such, to the possibility of radical evil. 
The real-life stakes of turning fiction to myth, of imposing an absolute truth rather 
than telling an evolving story, are obviously much higher than those of confusing reality and 
representation in either the fictional world of Mansfield Park or in readers’ potential 
engagement with it. Both characters’ experiences within the fictional world and readers’ 
experiences of the novel, however, have the potential to inform how readers relate to 
everyday sense-making fictions and help them prevent these fictions from degenerating into 
myth.  
Kermode’s distinction between fiction and myth highlights Mansfield Park’s 
contributions to questions of philosophical aesthetics. These contributions, as I have 
demonstrated throughout this work, have chiefly to do with disinterested judgment, aesthetic 
distance, and relationships to standards and ideals. For Kermode, the fictionality of ideals 
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means that they could potentially be treated as myths, that “people will live by that which 
was designed only to know by” (112). Mansfield Park presents interesting questions and 
problems about the difference between ideals as useful fictions or stultifying myths: how the 
characters relate to ideals within the fictional world; how the plot structure and use of irony 
and free indirect speech encourage different standards of judging the characters; and, how 
the novel itself might be judged differently according to different generic standards and 
ideals.  
In the world of Mansfield Park, I have argued, disinterested judgment is an 
impossible, but nonetheless desirable, ideal. The characters’ failures to achieve disinterested 
judgment show how their particular perspectives, positions, and interests influence their 
judgments. The Crawfords’ indulgence of their own interests ends up harming both 
themselves and others. At the same time, the difficulties of countering both particularity and 
interest are shown by the different admirable and self-serving ways Fanny, Edmund, and Sir 
Thomas appeal to standards and ideals. Moreover, the various ways in which Fanny and 
Mary are and are not able to sympathize and empathize with others reveal the ease with 
which individuals universalize their own perspectives, as well as how impartiality can be 
compromised by two kinds of partiality: partiality as both incompleteness and as bias. I hope 
to have given a picture of how the characters’ different ways of relating to an ideal of 
disinterested judgment is related to the different, and sometimes competing, ways in which 
the novel interests readers in these characters. 
Mansfield Park’s contributions to questions of philosophical aesthetics complement 
the opportunity it offers any individual reader to both have an enjoyable reading experience 
and to encounter the Bakhtinian challenge to make art and life answerable. My reading of 
Mansfield Park emphasizes the importance of clearly distinguishing the realms of art and life, 
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of representation and reality. The challenge of making art and life answerable can only be 
met when the two realms are clearly differentiated. Aesthetic distance affords readers 
imaginative freedom, play, and experiment. Freed from the constraints involved in real-
world interactions, readers can try out many different ways of thinking and feeling about the 
characters, knowing all the while the impossibility of affecting the characters or any part of 
the fictional world. The narrator’s transfer of responsibility to readers at the end of Mansfield 
Park, I hope my readers now appreciate, is a challenge to bring the fruits of that imaginative 
freedom into the real world. 
  293 
Works Cited  
Adler, Barbara Laughlin. “‘A Disagreement between Us:’ Gendered Argument in Austen’s Novels.” 
Persuasions: Journal of the Jane Austen Society of North America 24 (2002): 164-76.  
Altieri, Charles. Reckoning with the Imagination: Wittgenstein and the Aesthetics of Literary Experience. 
London: Cornell University Press, 2015.   
Amis, Kingsley. “What Became of Jane Austen?” Jane Austen: A Collection of Critical Essays. Watt 141-
4.  
Anderson, Misty. “‘The Different Sorts of Friendship:’ Desire in Mansfield Park.” Looser 167-183.  
Anderson, Amanda. “The Temptations of Aggrandized Agency: Feminist Histories and the Horizon 
of Modernity.” Victorian Studies 43.1 (2000): 43-65.  
Anderson, Kathleen. “Lounging Ladies and Galloping Girls: Physical Strength and Femininity in 
Mansfield Park.” Women’s Studies 38.3 (2009): 342-58.  
Arendt, Hannah. “Some Questions of Moral Philosophy.” Responsibility and Judgment. Ed. Jerome 
Kohn. New York: Schocken Books, 2003. 49-146.  
---. “Truth and Politics.” Between Past and Future. New York: Viking Press, 1961. 227-264.  
Armstrong, Isobel. Jane Austen: Mansfield Park. London: Penguin, 1988.  
Armstrong, Nancy. Desire and Domestic Fiction: A Political History of the Novel. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1987.   
Attridge, Derek. The Singularity of Literature. London: Routledge, 2004. 
Auerbach, Nina. “Feeling as One Ought about Fanny Price.” Bloom 103-116.  
Auerbach, Emily. Searching for Jane Austen. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2004.  
Austen, Jane. Mansfield Park. 1813. Ed. Claudia Johnson. New York: Norton, 1998.  
Babb, Howard S. Jane Austen’s Novels: The Fabric of Dialogue. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 
1962.  
Bakhtin, M. M. “Art and Answerability.” Art and Answerability: Early Philosophical Essays. Ed. Michael 
Holquist and Vadim Liapunov. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990. 1-3. 
Balfour, Ian. “Free Indirect Filmmaking.” Constellations of Contemporary Romanticism. Ed. Jacques 
Khalip and Forest Pyle. New York: Fordham University Press, 2016.  
Banfield, Ann. “The Moral Landscape of Mansfield Park.” Nineteenth Century Fiction 26.1 (1971): 1-24.  
  294 
---. Unspeakable Sentences: Narration and Representation in the Language of Fiction. Boston: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1982. 
Bevan, Knatchbull C. “Personal Identity in Mansfield Park: Forms, Fictions, Role-Play, and Reality.” 
Studies in English Literature, 1500-1900 27.4 (1987): 595-608. 
Bloom, Harold, ed. Jane Austen’s Mansfield Park. New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1987.    
Bonaparte, Felicia. “‘Let Other Pens Dwell on Guilt and Misery:’ The Ordination of the Text and 
the Subversion of ‘Religion’ in Jane Austen’s Mansfield Park.” Religion & Literature 43.2 (2011): 
45-67.  
Booth, Wayne C. The Rhetoric of Fiction. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983.  
Boulukos, George E. “The Politics of Silence: Mansfield Park and the Amelioration of Slavery.” 
Novel: A Forum on Fiction 39.3 (2006): 361-83.  
Brenner, Gerry. “Mansfield Park: Reading for ‘Improvement.’” Studies in the Novel 7.1 (1975): 24-32.  
Brissenden, R. F. “Mansfield Park: Freedom and the Family.” Jane Austen: Bicentenary Essays. Ed. John 
Halperin, 1975. 156-71.  
Brock, Stuart. “The Creationist Fiction: The Case Against Creationism about Fictional Characters.” 
The Philosophical Review 119.3 (2010): 337-64.  
Brooke, Christopher. Jane Austen: Illusion and Reality. Rochester: D.S. Brewer, 1999.  
Brown, Julia Prewitt. Jane Austen’s Novels: Social Change and Literary Form. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1979.  
Bujak, Nick. “Form and Generic Interrelation in the Romantic Period: Walter Scott’s Poetic 
Influence on Jane Austen.” Narrative 22.1 (2014): 45-67.  
Burdan, Judith. “Mansfield Park and the Question of Irony.” Persuasions: Journal of the Jane Austen Society 
of North America 23 (2001): 197-204.  
Butler, Marilyn. “Introduction.” Mansfield Park. By Jane Austen. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1990. vii-xxxvi. 
---. Jane Austen and the War of Ideas. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990. 
Butler, E. M. “Mansfield Park and Kotzebue’s Lovers’ Vows.” The Modern Language Review 28.3 (1933): 
326-37.   
Byrne, Paula. Jane Austen and the Theatre. London: Hambledon and London, 2002.  
---. “‘We Must Descend a Little:’ Mansfield Park and the Comic Theatre.” Women’s Writing 5.1 (1998): 
91-102.  
  295 
Canuel, Mark. “Jane Austen and the Importance of being Wrong.” Studies in Romanticism 44.2 (2005): 
123-50.  
Carroll, Noël. The Philosophy of Horror, Or, Paradoxes of the Heart. New York: Routledge, 1990.  
Cavell, Stanley. Disowning Knowledge: In Six Plays of Shakespeare. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1988.  
Chan, Mary M. “Mansfield Park as Greenhouse: ‘the Effect of Education’ in Mansfield Park.” 
Persuasions: The Jane Austen Journal On-Line 27.1 (2006). 
Chapman, Robert William, ed. Letters to Her Sister Cassandra and Others. By Jane Austen. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1932. 
 Clark, Lorraine. “Remembering Nature: Soliloquy as Aesthetic Form in Mansfield Park.” Eighteenth-
Century Fiction 24.2 (2011): 353-79.   
Clark, Matthew. A Matter of Style: On Writing and Technique. Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2002. 
---. Narrative Structures and the Language of the Self. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2010.   
Cleere, Eileen. “Reinvesting Nieces: Mansfield Park and the Economics of Endogamy.” Novel: A 
Forum on Fiction 28.2 (1995): 113-30.   
Clune, Michael. American Literature and the Free Market: 1945-2000. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010.  
Cohen, Paula Marantz. “Stabilizing the Family System at Mansfield Park.” ELH 54.3 (1987): 669-93.  
Cohn, Dorrit. Transparent Minds: Narrative Modes for Presenting Consciousness in Fiction. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1978. 
Culler, Jonathan. “Omniscience.” Narrative 12.1 (2004): 22-34. 
Collins, Barbara Bail. “Jane Austen’s Victorian Novel.” Nineteenth-Century Fiction 4.3 (1949): 175-85.  
Conger, Syndy McMillen. “Reading Lovers’ Vows: Jane Austen’s Reflections on English Sense and 
German Sensibility.” Studies in Philology 85.1 (1988): 92-113.  
Cottom, Daniel. “The Novels of Jane Austen: Attachments and Supplantments.” Novel: A Forum on 
Fiction 14.2 (1981): 152-67.   
Davidson, Jenny. “A Modest Question about Mansfield Park.” Eighteenth-Century Fiction 16.2 (2004): 
243-64.   
Davis, Lennard J. Factual Fictions: The Origins of the English Novel. New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1983.  
  296 
Dawson, Paul. “Ten Theses Against Fictionality.” Narrative 23.1 (2015): 74-100.  
De Rose, Peter L. “Hardship, Recollection, and Discipline: Three Lessons in Mansfield Park.” Studies 
in the Novel 9 (1977): 261-78.   
Despotopoulou, A. “Fanny’s Gaze and the Construction of Feminine Space in Mansfield Park.” The 
Modern Language Review 99.3 (2004): 569-83.  
Donohue, Joseph W. “Ordination and the Divided House at Mansfield Park.” ELH 32.2 (1965): 
169-78.   
Doody, Margaret Anne. “Turns of Speech and Figures of Mind.” Johnson and Tuite 165-184. 
Downie, J. A. “Who Says She’s A Bourgeois Writer? Reconsidering the Social and Political Contexts 
of Jane Austen’s Novels.” Eighteenth-Century Studies 40.1 (2006): 69-84. 
Duane, Anna Mae. “Confusions of Guilt and Complications of Evil: Hysteria and the High Price of 
Love at Mansfield Park.” Studies in the Novel 33.4 (2001): 402-15.   
Duckworth, Alistair M. The Improvement of the Estate: A Study of Jane Austen’s Novels. Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1971.  
Duffy, Joseph M. “Moral Integrity and Moral Anarchy in Mansfield Park.” ELH 23.1 (1956): 71-91.  
Dunn, Allen. “The Ethics of Mansfield Park: MacIntyre, Said, and Social Context.” Soundings: An 
Interdisciplinary Journal 78.3 (1995): 483-500.  
Eagleton, Terry. The Ideology of the Aesthetic. Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1990.  
Edge, Charles. “Mansfield Park and Ordination.” Nineteenth-Century Fiction 16.3 (1961): 269-274.  
Edwards, Thomas. “The Difficult Beauty of Mansfield Park.” Nineteenth-Century Fiction 20.1 (1965): 51-
67. 
Emsley, Sarah. Jane Austen’s Philosophy of the Virtues. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.  
Ferguson, Moira. “Mansfield Park: Slavery, Colonialism, and Gender.” The Oxford Literary Review 13.1-
2 (1991): 118-39.  
Fish, Stanley. Is there a Text in this Class?: The Authority of Interpretive Communities. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1980.  
Fleishman, Avrom. A Reading of Mansfield Park: An Essay in Critical Synthesis. Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1967.  
Fletcher, Angus, and John Monterosso. “The Science of Free-Indirect Discourse: An Alternate 
Cognitive Effect.” Narrative 24.1 (2016): 82-103.  
  297 
Ford, Susan Allen. “‘It is about Lovers’ Vows:’ Kotzebue, Inchbald, and the Players of Mansfield Park.” 
Persuasions: The Jane Austen Journal On-Line 27.1 (2006). 
Fraiman, Susan. “Jane Austen and Edward Said: Gender, Culture, and Imperialism.” Critical Inquiry 
21.4 (1995): 805-21. 
François, Anne-Lise. Open Secrets: The Literature of Uncounted Experience. Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2008.   
Franke, William. “Acknowledging Unknowing: Stanley Cavell and the Philosophical Criticism of 
Literature.” Philosophy and Literature 39.1 (2015): 248-58.  
Frye, Northrop. Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971.  
---. The Secular Scripture: A Study of the Structure of Romance. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976. 
Galperin, William H. “The Missed Opportunities of Mansfield Park.” Johnson and Tuite 123-32.  
---. The Historical Austen. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003.  
Gard, Roger. Jane Austen’s Novels: The Art of Clarity. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992. 
Gardiner, Ellen. “Privacy, Privilege, and ‘Poaching’ in Mansfield Park.” Looser 151-165.  
Garson, Marjorie. Moral Taste: Aesthetics, Subjectivity and Social Power in the Nineteenth-Century Novel. 
Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007.  
Gay, Penny. Jane Austen and the Theatre. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002.  
Genette, Gérard. Essays in Aesthetics. Ed. Dorrit Cohn. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2005.  
---. Narrative Discourse: An Essay in Method. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983. 
Gisborne, Thomas. An Enquiry into the Duties of the Female Sex. London, 1797.  
Goffman, Erving. The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. Garden City: Doubleday, 1959.  
Goldman, Alan H. Philosophy and the Novel. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.   
Graham, Peter W. “Falling for the Crawfords: Character, Contingency, and Narrative.” ELH: Journal 
of English Literary History 77.4 (2010): 867-91.  
Greenfield, Susan C. “Fanny’s Misreading and the Misreading of Fanny: Women, Literature, and 
Interiority in Mansfield Park.” Texas Studies in Literature and Language 36.3 (1994): 306-27.  
Grenberg, Jeanine M. “Courageous Humility in Jane Austen’s Mansfield Park.” Social Theory and 
Practice 33.4 (2007): 645-66.  
  298 
Haggerty, George E. “Fanny Price: ‘Is She Solemn?—Is She Queer?—Is She Prudish?’.” The 
Eighteenth Century 53.2 (2012): 175-88.  
Hale, Dorothy J. “Aesthetics and the New Ethics: Theorizing the Novel in the Twenty-First 
Century.” PMLA 124.3 (2009): 896-905.  
---. “Fiction as Restriction: Self-Binding in New Ethical Theories of the Novel.” Narrative 15.2 
(2007): 187-206.  
---. “On Beauty as Beautiful?: The Problem of Novelistic Aesthetics by Way of Zadie Smith.” 
Contemporary Literature 53.4 (2012): 814-44.  
Hall, Lynda A. “Addressing Readerly Unease: Discovering the Gothic in Mansfield Park.” Persuasions 
28 (2006): 208-16.  
Halperin, John. “The Trouble with Mansfield Park.” Studies in the Novel 7 (1975): 6-23.  
Harding, D. W. “Regulated Hatred: An Aspect of the Work of Jane Austen.” Watt 166-79. 
Hardy, J. P. Jane Austen’s Heroines: Intimacy in Human Relationships. Boston: Routledge & K. Paul, 1984. 
Harpham, Geoffrey. “The Hunger of Martha Nussbaum.” Representations 77.1 (2002): 52-81.   
Hart, Francis R. “The Spaces of Privacy: Jane Austen.” Nineteenth-Century Fiction 30.3 (1975): 305-33.  
Herman, David, ed. The Emergence of Mind: Representations of Consciousness in Narrative Discourse in 
English. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2011.  
Hinnant, Charles H. “Jane Austen’s ‘Wild Imagination:’ Romance and the Courtship Plot in the Six 
Canonical Novels.” Narrative 14.3 (2006): 294-310.  
Holland, Norman Norwood. The Dynamics of Literary Response. New York: Norton, 1975.  
Holquist, Michael. “Narrative Reflections — After After Virtue.” Narrative Inquiry 21.2 (2011): 358-
66. 
Huang, Mei. Transforming the Cinderella Dream: From Frances Burney to Charlotte Bronte. New Brunswick: 
Rutgers University Press, 1990. 
Hudson, Glenda A. Sibling Love and Incest in Jane Austen’s Fiction. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999.  
Implied Author: Back from the Grave or Simply Dead Again. Spec. issue of Style. 45.1 (2011): 1-160. 
Irvine, Robert. Jane Austen. New York: Routledge, 2005. 
Irwin, William R., and David Kyle Johnson. “What would Dutton Say about the Paradox of 
Fiction?” Philosophy and Literature 38.1 (2014): 144-7.  
  299 
Jauss, Hans Robert. “Levels of Identification of Hero and Audience.” New Literary History: A Journal 
of Theory and Interpretation 5.2 (1974): 283-317.  
Jenkins, Joyce. “The Puzzle of Fanny Price.” Philosophy and Literature 30.2 (2006): 346-60.  
Johnson, Claudia, ed. Mansfield Park. By Jane Austen. New York: Norton, 1998.  
Johnson, Claudia and Clara Tuite, eds. A Companion to Jane Austen. Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009.  
---. “Introduction.” Johnson and Tuite 1-10. 
Jones, Hazel. Jane Austen and Marriage. New York: Continuum, 2009.  
Jordan, Elaine. “Pulpit, Stage, and Novel: Mansfield Park and Mrs. Inchbald’s Lovers’ Vows.” Novel: A 
Forum on Fiction 20.2 (1987): 138-48.  
Kant, Immanuel. The Critique of Judgment. 1781. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.   
Kaufmann, David. “Closure in Mansfield Park and the Sanctity of the Family.” Philological Quarterly 
65.2 (1986): 211-29.  
Keen, Suzanne. Empathy and the Novel. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. 
Kermode, Frank. The Sense of an Ending; Studies in the Theory of Fiction. London: Oxford University 
Press, 1966.   
Kirkham, Margaret. “Feminist Irony and the Priceless Heroine of Mansfield Park.” Bloom 117-34. 
Knox-Shaw, Peter. Jane Austen and the Enlightenment. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004.  
Lamarque, Peter. “How can we Fear and Pity Fictions?” British Journal of Aesthetics 21.4 (1981): 291-
304.   
---. Truth, Fiction, and Literature: A Philosophical Perspective. Ed. Stein Haugom Olsen. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1994.  
Landy, Joshua. How to do Things with Fictions. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012. 
---. Philosophy as Fiction: Self, Deception, and Knowledge in Proust. New York: Oxford University Press, 
2004. 
Levine, George Lewis. The Realistic Imagination: English Fiction from Frankenstein to Lady Chatterley. 
London: University of Chicago Press, 1981. 
Lew, Joseph. “‘That Abominable Traffic:’ Mansfield Park and the Dynamics of Slavery.” Johnson 
498-510.  
  300 
Lewis, C. S. “A Note on Jane Austen.” Watt 25-34. 
Lewis, David K. On the Plurality of Worlds. New York: B. Blackwell, 1986. 
Litvak, Joseph. “The Infection of Acting: Theatricals and Theatricality in Mansfield Park.” ELH 53.2 
(1986): 331-55.  
Lodge, David. “The Vocabulary of Mansfield Park.” Language of Fiction. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1966. 94-113. 
Looser, Devoney, ed. Jane Austen and the Discourse of Feminism. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995.   
Lott, Anna. “Staging a Lesson: The Theatricals and Proper Conduct in Mansfield Park.” Studies in the 
Novel 38.3 (2006): 275-87.   
Lowe, N. J. The Classical Plot and the Invention of Western Narrative. New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000. 
Lynch, Deidre. “At Home with Jane Austen.” Cultural Institutions of the Novel. Ed. Deidre Lynch and 
William B. Warner. Durham: Duke University Press, 1996. 159-92.   
---. “Introduction.” Mansfield Park. By Jane Austen. Cambridge: Belknap of Harvard University 
Press, 2016. 
---. “‘Young Ladies are Delicate Plants:’ Jane Austen and Greenhouse Romanticism.” ELH 77.3 
(2010): 689-729.   
MacIntyre, Alasdair C. After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 2007.  
Magee, William H. “Instrument of Growth: The Courtship and Marriage Plot in Jane Austen’s 
Novels.” Journal of Narrative Technique 17.2 (1987): 198-208.  
Mailloux, Steven. Reception Histories: Rhetoric, Pragmatism, and American Cultural Politics. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1998.  
Mandal, Anthony. Jane Austen and the Popular Novel: The Determined Author. Houndmills: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2007.  
Marinucci, Mimi, ed. Jane Austen and Philosophy. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017.   
Marshall, David. The Frame of Art: Fictions of Aesthetic Experience, 1750-1815. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2005.  
May, Leila Silvana. “The Strong-Arming of Desire: A Reconsideration of Nancy Armstrong’s Desire 
and Domestic Fiction.” ELH 68.1 (2001): 267-85.  
  301 
McKeon, Michael. The Origins of the English Novel, 1600-1740. London: Radius, 1988.  
Meinong, Alexius. “The Theory of Objects.” Realism and the Background of Phenomenology. Ed. Robert 
Chisholm. Glencoe: The Free Press, 1960. 76-117.   
Miller, D. A. Jane Austen, Or, the Secret of Style. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003.  
---. Narrative and its Discontents: Problems of Closure in the Traditional Novel. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1981. 
More, Hannah. Strictures on the Modern System of Female Education. Philadelphia, 1800.   
Mudrick, Marvin. Jane Austen: Irony as Defense and Discovery. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1952.  
Nachumi, Nora. “Seeing Double: Theatrical Spectatorship in Mansfield Park.” Philological Quarterly 
80.3 (2001): 233-52.  
Nehamas, Alexander. “The Postulated Author: Critical Monism as a Regulative Ideal.” Critical Inquiry 
8.1 (1981): 133-49.  
---. “What an Author Is.” Journal of Philosophy 83.11 (1986): 685-91. 
Nelles, William. “Omniscience for Atheists: Or, Jane Austen’s Infallible Narrator.” Narrative 14.2 
(2006): 118-31.  
Novitz, David. “Fiction, Imagination and Emotion.” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 38.3 
(1980): 279-88. 
---. Knowledge, Fiction, and Imagination. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987.   
Nussbaum, Martha. Love’s Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1992.  
O’Quinn, Daniel. “Jane Austen and Performance: Theatre, Memory, and Enculturation.” Johnson 
and Tuite 377-88.  
Ortega y Gasset, José. “The Dehumanization of Art.” The Dehumanization of Art and Other Essays on 
Art, Culture, and Literature. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1948. 3-54.  
O’Toole, Tess. “Becoming Fanny Bertram: Adoption in Mansfield Park.” Persuasions 36.36 (2014): 54-
65.  
Park, You-me and Rajeswari Sunder Rajan, eds. The Postcolonial Jane Austen. London: Routledge, 2000.  
Phelan, James. Experiencing Fiction: Judgments, Progressions, and the Rhetorical Theory of Narrative. 
Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2007.  
  302 
---. Reading People, Reading Plots: Character, Progression, and the Interpretation of Narrative. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1989. 
Pinch, Adela. “Introduction.” Emma. By Jane Austen. Ed. James Kinsley and Adela Pinch. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2003. 
Pollack-Pelzner, Daniel. “Jane Austen, the Prose Shakespeare.” Studies in English Literature 1500-1900 
53.4 (2013): 763-92.   
  Poovey, Mary. The Proper Lady and the Woman Writer: Ideology as Style in the Works of Mary Wollstonecraft, 
Mary Shelley, and Jane Austen. London: University of Chicago Press, 1984.  
Quaintance, Richard. “Humphry Repton, ‘any Mr. Repton,’ and the ‘Improvement’ Metonym in 
Mansfield Park.” Studies in Eighteenth Century Culture 27.1 (1998): 365-84.  
Rabinowitz, Peter J. Before Reading: Narrative Conventions and the Politics of Interpretation. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1987.  
---. “Reading Beginnings and Endings.” Narrative Dynamics; Essays on Time, Plot, Closure, and Frames. 
Ed. Brian Richardson. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2002. 300-313.  
Ramal, Randy. “Love, Self-Deception, and the Moral ‘must.’” Philosophy and Literature 29.2 (2005): 
379-93.  
Richetti, John J. The English Novel in History, 1700-1780. New York: Routledge, 1999. 
Rorty, Richard, J.B. Schneewind, and Quentin Skinner. Philosophy in History. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1984.   
Ryle, Gilbert. “Jane Austen and the Moralists.” Collected Papers. London: Hutchinson, 1971. 286-301.  
Said, Edward W. Culture and Imperialism. New York: Vintage Books, 1994.  
Scott, Paul Gordon. “Disinterested Selves: Clarissa and the Tactics of Sentiment.” ELH 64.2 (1997): 
473-502.  
Shaftesbury, Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of 1671-1713. “Sensus communis, an essay on the 
freedom of wit and humour in a letter to a friend.” Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times. 
Ed. Lawrence E. Klein. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. 29-69. 
---. “Soliloquy, or advice to an author.” Shaftesbury 70-162.  
Shaw, Harry. “Austen’s Realist Play.” Johnson and Tuite 206-15.  
---. Narrating Reality: Austen, Scott, Eliot. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999.  
  303 
Simpson, Janice C. “Fanny Price as Cinderella: Folk and Fairy-Tale in Mansfield Park.” Persuasions 9 
(1987): 25-30.  
Skov Nielsen, Henrik, James Phelan, and Richard Walsh. “Ten Theses about Fictionality.” Narrative 
23.1 (2015): 61-73.  
Soloway, Anita. “‘For Her Price is Far Above Rubies:’ Choosing a Wife in Mansfield Park.” Persuasions 
36 (2014): 80-88.  
Southam, Brian. “The Silence of the Bertrams.” Johnson 493-98.  
Spencer, Jane. “Narrative Technique: Austen and Her Contemporaries.” Johnson and Tuite 185-94.  
Stecker, Robert. “Should we Still Care about the Paradox of Fiction?” The British Journal of Aesthetics 
51.3 (2011): 295-308.  
Stewart, Garrett. Dear Reader: The Conscripted Audience in Nineteenth-Century British Fiction. Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996.  
Stokes, Myra. The Language of Jane Austen: A Study of some Aspects of Her Vocabulary. Houndmills, 
Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991.  
Stolnitz, Jerome. “On the Origins of ‘Aesthetic Disinterestedness.” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art 
Criticism 20.2 (1961): 131-43.  
---. “On the Significance of Lord Shaftesbury in Modern Aesthetic Theory.” The Philosophical 
Quarterly 11.43 (1961): 97-113.  
Sturrock, June. “Money, Morals, and Mansfield Park: The West Indies Revisited.” Persuasions 28 
(2006): 176-84.  
Tandon, Bharat. Jane Austen and the Morality of Conversation. London: Anthem, 2003.  
Tanner, Tony. “The Quiet Thing: Mansfield Park.” Jane Austen. London: MacMillan, 1986. 142-175.  
Tarpley, Joyce Kerr. Constancy & the Ethics of Jane Austen’s Mansfield Park. Washington: Catholic 
University of America Press, 2010.  
Tauchert, Ashley. Romancing Jane Austen: Narrative, Realism, and the Possibility of a Happy Ending. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. 
Tave, Stewart. “Propriety and Lovers’ Vows.” Bloom 37-46.    
Todorov, Tzvetan. Introduction to Poetics. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981.  
Toymentsev, Sergey. “‘It Could Have All Turned Out Differently:’ Ideological Censorship of the 
Marriage Plot in Jane Austen’s Mansfield Park.” The AnaChronisT (2011): 18-33.  
  304 
Trilling, Lionel. “Mansfield Park.” The Opposing Self: Nine Essays in Criticism. New York: First Harvest, 
1979. 181-202.  
Troost, Linda, and Sayre Greenfield. “A History of the Fanny Wars.” Persuasions: The Jane Austen 
Journal 36 (2014): 15-33.  
Tullmann, Katherine, and Wesley Buckwalter. “Does the Paradox of Fiction Exist?” Erkenntnis 79.4 
(2014): 779-96.  
Urda, Kathleen E. “Why the Show Must Not Go on: ‘Real Character’ and the Absence of Theatrical 
Performances in Mansfield Park.” Eighteenth-Century Fiction 26.2 (2013): 281-302.  
Valihora, Karen. Austen’s Oughts: Judgment After Locke and Shaftesbury. Newark: University of Delaware 
Press, 2010.  
Voskuil, Lynn. “Sotherton and the Geography of Empire: The Landscapes of Mansfield Park.” Studies 
in Romanticism 53.4 (2014): 591-615.  
Wainwright, Valerie. “Jane Austen’s Challenges, Or the Powers of Character and the 
Understanding.” Philosophy and Literature 38.1 (2014): 58-73.  
Wallace, Tara Ghoshal. Jane Austen and Narrative Authority. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995.  
Walton, Kendall L. “How Remote are Fictional Worlds from the Real World?” The Journal of 
Aesthetics and Art Criticism 37.1 (1978): 11-23.  
---. In Other Shoes: Music, Metaphor, Empathy, Existence. New York: Oxford University Press, 2015.  
---. Mimesis as make-Believe: On the Foundations of the Representational Arts. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1990.  
Watt, Ian, ed. Jane Austen: A Collection of Critical Essays. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1963.  
---. The Rise of the Novel: Studies in Defoe, Richardson, and Fielding. Los Angeles: University of California 
Press, 2001.  
Wiesenfarth, Joseph. The Errand of Form: An Assay of Jane Austen’s Art. New York: Fordham 
University Press, 1967.  
Wiltshire, John. “Decolonising Mansfield Park.” Essays in Criticism 53.4 (2003): 303-22.  
Wright, Erika. “Prevention as Narrative in Jane Austen’s Mansfield Park.” Studies in the Novel 42.4 
(2010): 377-94.  
Yeazell, Ruth Bernard. “The Boundaries of Mansfield Park.” Representations 7.1 (1984): 133-52.  
Zelicovici, Dvora. “The Inefficacy of Lovers’ Vows.” ELH 50.3 (1983): 531-40.  
  305 
Zimmerman, Everett. “Jane Austen and Mansfield Park: A Discrimination of Ironies.” Studies in the 
Novel 1.3 (1969): 347-56.  
